METAPHYSICA

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METAPHYSICA

Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae

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English Translation

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APPARATUS FOR METAPHYSICS.

The notion of Metaphysics. Metaphysics is the science which, by the light of natural reason, reasons about things placed beyond sense and all matter. This definition will hardly be difficult to understand, if we recall that sciences are distinguished by a different degree of abstraction from matter. The science which considers being abstracted from singular matter alone is called Physics; that which abstracts from singular and sensible matter together is Mathematics; that which is entirely freed from all matter, even from intelligible matter, is called Metaphysics (1). It is therefore a speculative science, whose object is real being as such, insofar as it comprises created and uncreated being (2). That it is speculative is clear, since it contemplates its object in order to know, not truly in order to order it to practice. Moreover, that object is not being as it is divided into real being and being of reason, for being of reason, as participating only in likeness of the properties of being, is subjected to the consideration of Metaphysics only secondarily, nor can it be its proper specificative. It remains, therefore, that the object is real being; not mobile real being, which is the object of Physics, nor quantitative real being, which is the object of Mathematics; but entirely immaterial real being. Moreover, being can be immaterial negatively, insofar as it lacks all determination: of which kind is being in general, which is common to God and creatures. Indeed, the properties of being

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with which Metaphysics deals, namely one, true, good, etc., belong per se primarily to indeterminate being which is predicated of God and creatures, not truly to being reduplicatively as created, and so Ontological Metaphysics is constituted. Secondly, being can be immaterial positively, insofar as it is some reality which by its nature transcends every sensible order, of which kind is our soul considered according to intellect and will, Psychological Metaphysics; and, above the soul, spirit, and God naturally knowable, Theological Metaphysics. II. — The scope of Metaphysics.

The per se object therefore of Metaphysics is real immaterial being which comprises uncreated and created being. Under created being, Metaphysics considers substance in common, and, in particular, substances which abstract from all matter, namely spiritual substances, insofar as they are knowable by our intellect, accident in common, and, in particular, accidents which are absolved from matter according to themselves, such as quality, relation, spiritual accidents, intellect, will; but concerning accidents which imbibe matter in their concept, such as quantity, position, place, Metaphysics does not treat except

per accidens, insofar as all these participate in the common notion of real being. Concerning uncreated being, it considers those things which are not per se impervious to the light of natural reason. You will object: Being is the adequate object of the intellect. Therefore it is not the object of Metaphysics. — I respond: The object of the intellect is being taken most universally, most commonly, according to all degrees; but the object of Metaphysics is being, not according to all degrees, but only according to degrees abstracting from all matter. III. — The di fferent names of this science. This science considers many things: common being, common causes, and separate substances. Insofar as it contemplates common being, absolved from matter, namely transphysical being, it is called strictly Metaphysics; insofar as it deals with common causes, common principles, it is called First Philosophy; and rightly first, because immaterial beings are the first of all, and immaterial causes are the first causes of beings: As it attains immaterial substance which is our soul according to intellect and will, it is called Psychology; insofar as it finally considers the most immaterial substance, at the summit of spirituality namely God, it is called Theology, and indeed Natural Theology, because it reasons from principles knowable by natural reason. Some, however, do not wish God to be comprehended within the proper object of Metaphysics (1). If, however, it is established that the object of Metaphysics is real immaterial being knowable by the light of natural reason, some Theological Metaphysics must

be admitted. IV. — The division of Metaphysics in Modern Philosophy. More recent philosophers divide Metaphysics into General Metaphysics, which, following Wolf, they call Ontology, and Special Metaphysics, which comprises Cosmology, Psychology, and Natural Theology. Against this division we have noted some things in the Prolegomena to Philosophy, vol. I, p. 11. Ontology therefore is itself the First Philosophy of the Ancients, and can be defined: The science which considers being and those things which follow upon being itself. Whence it contemplates firstly being insofar as it is something common to all, and the notions which are convertible with this most common being and are called transcendentals. Secondly, the general modes in which being exists, namely in itself or in another, and consequently it deals again with the predicaments, not now as they are predicables, which consideration pertains to Logic, but as they are beings of first intention; and, among the predicaments, it especially considers substance. Moreover, every being acts in some way; whence Ontology finally treats of causes. Special Metaphysics, however, according to our division, cannot be anything other than Psychological and Theological, because Cosmology, Biology, Anthropology, are not absolved from all matter. V. — The excellence and properties of Metaphysics. This science excels among others: 1° by reason of its object, because it contemplates

that which is most real and most noble, namely immaterial being. 2° By reason of principality and command, because other sciences are directed by it; for they require the principles of Metaphysics, but it does not presuppose others, nor is it ordered to them, and therefore it is called by the Philosopher most free and mistress. 3° By reason of utility, because it constitutes the true foundations of the sciences and serves most greatly to extirpate the errors of materialism; with respect to Theology, however, it provides notions of nature, person, relation, etc., without which the mysteries of Faith either cannot be explained at all or only with great difficulty. Hence it appears what are

the properties of Metaphysics: First, it is the most free and dominant science, both because it is independent of others and the director of others, and because it seeks knowledge for its own sake, not truly for further utility. Secondly, it is the most honorable of all, because it is most divine; for it deals with divine things, namely first principles, first causes, substances which participate in God, and concerning God Himself. It is also called divine, because God alone possesses it according to perfect comprehension; it is possessed by men indeed, not however as a possession, but as something borrowed from God. Hence that saying is applied to Metaphysics: It is not a human possession, but a divine borrowing.

Thirdly, it is most real, because nothing is more real than the fundamental notion of being, and immaterial substances. Those who deny the reality of Metaphysics are called Agnostics. It would, however, be beside the point to refute this error here, for the reality of Metaphysics is established by all those things by which we have already proved the existence and spirituality of the soul, and by those by which, in Ontology, we will vindicate the objective value of being, truth, good, substance, cause, etc. To this also contribute what we have discussed in Logic about Criteria. We demonstrate therefore the reality of Metaphysics in actual exercise throughout the whole work (1). Fourthly, it is most certain in itself, as was said in Major Logic (2). Fifthly, it is natural wisdom. For wisdom is called that science by which one knows all things and the most difficult things, with certainty, through causes; which is more apt for teaching, which is more eligible for its own sake, and which relates to others as principal and architectonic. But Metaphysics 1° knows all things, for it contemplates the most universal principles to which all things are subjected; 2° knows the most difficult things, for it learns those things which are most remote from the senses, namely God, intelligences, and being in common; 3° is most certain, as has been said; 4° teaches the first causes of all causes, and hence of all things; 5° is more apt for teaching, because to know is through causes, and to teach is

to cause knowledge in another; 6° is more eligible for its own sake, because it is most concerned with knowable things, namely with the first principles and causes of all things; 7° finally, it relates to other sciences as principal and architectonic, because it considers the final cause of all things, namely the good of the whole universe, which is the best in nature (1). VI. — In what place and in what order Metaphysics is to be treated. We have shown, in the prolegomena to Philosophy, that Metaphysics is to be learned last, after Natural Philosophy; because the natural and logical order demands that we follow the different degrees of abstraction and that through concrete and sensible things, which are more known to us, we gradually rise to abstract and insensible things. Nor let it be said that the knowledge of Metaphysics is prerequired for the other parts of Philosophy. For although certain notions are altogether necessary, it suffices that they be explained briefly and cursorily, on occasion; by no means, however, is a completed treatise on the whole of Metaphysics presupposed. Natural Philosophy, on the contrary, ought to be prior to Metaphysics, so that it may prove the existence of the very object of Metaphysics, namely first principles, the first efficient cause, which established all things; the material and formal cause; that finality and activity are found in things; that there exists a spiritual substance, namely the rational soul, etc., etc. Metaphysics, therefore, since it directly attends to immaterial things, does not properly deal with the sensible world, nor with organic (1). On the reality of Metaphysics one may consult Card. MERCER. Onta- logy; C. LABEYRIE, Dogma and Metaphysics; DELLMAS, Ontology. (2). Tract. III, q. III. a. IV, vol. I, pp. 454-455

life, nor truly concerning the human soul as this is an intrinsic part of the natural composite. But the soul considered according to intellect and will, which are not acts of any bodily organ, pertains to Metaphysics.

PSYCHOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS

Under this respect the soul can be said to be entirely abstract; being in common, however, is still more abstract; and finally God is the object most abstract and most immaterial of all, at the ultimate summit of spirituality. Since therefore the order of treatment ought to correspond to the order of abstraction, we must first speak of the Soul according to its immaterial respect, afterwards of Being in common, and finally of God.

There will therefore be a tripartite division of Metaphysics: 1° Psychological Metaphysics; 2° Ontological Metaphysics; 3° Theological Metaphysics, or Theodicy (which it is not our intention to treat). VII. — The history and fortune of Metaphysics. They say the name was introduced by Andronicus of Rhodes, who distributed the books of Aristotle into a double series: some concerning physics, namely the observable world, others concerning metaphysics, after the physics, μετὰ τὰ φυσικά. Aristotle, therefore, is the principal parent of Metaphysics. This science the Peripatetics and Scholastics cultivated as primary and fundamental; it was attacked, however, by the ancient Materialists, and the modern Sensists, Humes, Hobbes, etc.; by the Transcendental Critics, who say only phenomena, not however the noumena themselves, can be attained by us; by the Positivists, who acknowledge nothing beyond experience. — The Cartesians, however, and Idealists cultivate Psychological Metaphysics almost exclusively, and, while they are too much occupied with the thinking subject, they neglect the other parts of Metaphysics. However, by the impulse and work of Leo XIII and Pius X, Metaphysics, not only Psychological but also Ontological, is reviving in Catholic schools. Moreover, the writers on Metaphysics are innumerable, the principal of whom, on occasion, will be cited. The human soul, insofar as it is the form of the body and a part of this observable composite which is called rational animal, is the object of Natural Philosophy; insofar as it entirely transcends matter and the sensible order, it pertains to Metaphysics, by reason of intellect and will, which are not acts of any bodily organ. Psychological Metaphysics is therefore divided into two

treatises: I. On the Intellect and Intellection: II. On the Will and its acts.

FIRST TREATISE — ON THE INTELLECT AND INTELLECTION.

There is a twofold form by which intellectual cognition takes place: namely the intellect and the intelligible species, or idea. First, therefore, we investigate the nature of the intellect and ideas; then we inquire into the origin of ideas. Having completed the problem of the impressed species, questions arise concerning the expressed species, or mental word; finally, concerning the proper object of the human intellect.

QUESTION ONE — ON THE NOTION AND NATURE OF THE INTELLECT.

We must therefore speak both concerning the notion and nature of the intellect, and concerning the notion and nature of intelligible species.

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cognitive: it agrees with sense in that in both powers cognition is accomplished through a vital union and assimilation of the object with the faculty; 3° of quiddity, in which it is essentially distinguished from sense. For sensitive cognition is exercised concerning external qualities or merely sensible internal affections; but to understand, since it is to read within or between, penetrates to the inmost parts of a thing and attains the essence itself. It is not merely a faculty which perceives relations, as Rabier defines (1), for certain relations can be merely sensible; but it knows what a thing is. 4° of the quiddity of a material thing: for the object of the intellect is twofold: namely adequate and proper. The adequate is being as being; for every thing, by the

very fact that it is, is true and speaks of order to intellect, and the intellect itself can attain whatever has the notion of truth, provided it is duly presented to it. Hence with respect to its adequate object it apprehends not only the intrinsic essence, not only that from which a thing is, namely the material cause, from which a thing is drawn out, and the formal cause, by which it is constituted in its own nature; but also that by which a thing is made, namely the efficient cause, by which it is produced in being, and the final cause, for the sake of which it is produced. But the proper object is quiddity, not of any thing whatever, but of a material thing. The human intellect, although entirely spiritual, is nevertheless a faculty of a substance which is form in matter without material conditions; it claims for itself an object of the same order, neither material nor purely immaterial, but the form of a material thing without material conditions, and this is the quiddity of a sensible thing abstracted from individuating principles. But more on these things below. III. — Whether the Intellect is a passive power. Properly speaking, one is said to su ffer when something is received with the rejection of another thing. This happens in two ways: for either a suitable form is received, an unsuitable form being rejected, as when we acquire health after sickness has been rejected; or an unsuitable form is received, a suitable form being rejected, as when sickness is introduced after health is rejected, and this is most properly to suffer. « For one is said to suffer from the fact that he is drawn to the agent; but that which recedes from what is suitable to itself seems most to be drawn to another. » — In a (1). « Intelligence, in the strict sense of the word, can be de fined: the faculty of perceiving relations ». PARISEN, PsychéL, p. 90.

ARTICLE ONE — On The Notion And Nature Of The Intellect

I. — The multiple acceptation of Intellect. Intellect is sometimes taken for the intellective substance itself: thus the human soul is sometimes called by the name of intellect; in which sense also an angel is called mind or intellect. Commonly, however, it is taken for the faculty itself or complex of faculties. More recent authors sometimes designate by the word intellect the complex of cognitive faculties: hence they grant intellect to brutes, not without some danger of error, namely of confusing intellect with sense. Properly it is taken for the cognitive faculty of truth, and is also called mind, reason. Most strictly, however, among the Scholastics it designates the cognitive faculty of truth as it concerns immediate judgments, in which no discourse intervenes, and hence is logically distinguished from reason, which signifies the intellective faculty as it concerns discourse or reasoning and argumentation. II. — The proper acceptation. In the present context we take intellect for the cognitive faculty of truth and define it as: The cognitive faculty which perceives the quiddity of a material thing. It is called 1° a faculty, namely a predicamental accident really distinct from the essence of the soul: for the intellect is an immediately operative principle, and moreover we know from elsewhere that no created substance is the immediate elicitive of an operation (2); — 2° cog- (1). One may consult: ARISTOTLE, III. On the Soul, c. IV; B. ALBERTUS, S. THOMAS, SCOTUS, On the Soul; S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 79; CAJETANUS, BANKER, in h. I.; ALAMANNUS, Tertia, Secunde, q. 93; JOANNES A S. THOMA, Phil. Nat., q. 9; PESCH, LORKNEKELL, REMER, MEACHER, Psychol.; ALBERT, La Psychologie thomiste et les théories modernes, sect. IV, c. I; RABIER, liv. II; P . JANET, c. VII. (2). Cf. II. P . Phil. Nat. Tract. III, q. I, a. I, vol. II, pp. 518 and sqq.

very broad sense, however, one is said to suffer when something receives in act that to which it was in potency, without anything being rejected. In which acceptation, every transition from potency to act is a certain passion (1).

But what is meant by active power and passive power the Angelic Doctor clearly explains (2). « Active power is not distinguished from passive from the fact that it has operation, because,

since every power of the soul, both active and passive, has some operation, every power of the soul would be active. Their distinction, however, is known by comparing the power to its object. For if the object relates to the power as patient and transmuted, then it will be an active power; but if conversely it relates as agent and mover, then it will be a passive power. And hence it is that all the powers of the vegetative soul are active, because food is transmuted by the power of the soul both in nourishing and in generating. But all the sensitive powers are passive, because they are moved and brought into act by sensible objects. But concerning the intellect, some power is active, some passive. » IV. — First conclusion: The human intellect is an essentially passive power, although it enjoys true and immanent activity. The first part is against the Transcendentalists, whose [pantheism we have refuted in Natural Philosophy (3); against the Cartesians, who contend that the intellect is always and from the beginning actually thinking; against the Ontologists, who hold that the intellect has a natural immediate vision of God; and generally against the Innatists, who think that the intellect is essentially completed by ideas naturally implanted in it. The conclusion is proved. That is considered a passive power which in relation to its proper object behaves not as an agent and mover, but as a patient and transmuted thing, so that it does not make its object, but supposes it and depends upon it. But the human intellect behaves in relation to its object not as an agent, but as a patient and dependent. Therefore it is a passive power. (1). Cf. 8. Thomas, I° II°, q. 22, a. 1. (2). QQ. Dipp. De Veritate, q. 16, a. 1, ad. 13. (3) Tract. I, q. 1, a. III., vol. II. pp. 26, sqq. P-ob. min. The object of the intellect is infinite, since it is being as being, and whatever can have the notion of being; but those things which can have the notion of being are infinite (1). But our intellect cannot behave as agent and efficient with respect to the infinite.

Therefore the human intellect relates to its object, not as an agent, but as a patient and dependent. Proof of the subordinate minor. If the intellect behaved as an agent with respect to the infinite, it would cause infinites and simultaneously understand infinites. But manifestly it is impossible for our intellect to be an infinite cause and to understand infinites simultaneously. Therefore. The major is clear. For in this hypothesis infinites would depend adequately on the intellect, and the intellect would be the cause by which infinites exist and by which they become intelligible; or, in other words, the intellect would be at once the efficient principle and the intelligible form of infinites. But the intellect knows those things of which it is the principle and intelligible form. Therefore it would understand infinites. — Indeed, it would understand all things simultaneously in act, not successively. The intellect itself would be the intelligible form of all infinites: hence infinite intelligibles would make one thing simultaneously with itself. Therefore, by intuiting itself, it would perceive all infinites simultaneously in act. But, as experience testifies, we find that in the beginning we are only potentially understanding, but afterwards we are made actually understanding with respect to certain intelligibles, while remaining still in potency with respect to others. Therefore it is most manifest that the intellect is a passive power in the explained sense. This argument therefore is not only a priori, but also rests on the testimony of experience and conscience. For we are conscious that our intellection depends on objects and that those things which are placed far from us escape us. The second argument is drawn from the refutation of other opinions. All systems which advocate absolute (1). « No sum of intelligibles, however considerable, exhausts our intellectual virtuality... Its knowable object is not this or that particular being, but being without addition, being purely and simply. It is not surprising, therefore, that particular objects and their sum do not exhaust the intelligence. The adequate object of our understanding surpasses them. It is in its own way their limit. As ascending fractions never attain unity, so never will

the multiplication of our particular conceptions attain being. » P . GANDEL, O. P . Revue Thomiste, 1898, p. 284.

activity of the human intellect are laboring under falsity, such as innatism, ontologism, transcendentalism, concerning which in the following question. The II° part is declared, namely that the human intellect, although essentially passive insofar as it depends on objects, is, on the other hand, endowed with the greatest immanent activity. The Scholastics assert passivity especially, in order to better dispel errors and equivocations, but they by no means deny the excellence and fruitfulness of the intellect; indeed, they assert that the seeds of sciences are developed by the activity of the intellect and that the scientific edifice is built by the intellect itself. The intellect does not make its object, but receives it from without, not however as a photographic plate or an inert mirror, which merely receive, but as a vital power, which modifies the external object to some extent by appropriating it to itself and assimilating it vitally. That activity is demonstrated in a threefold operation. In simple apprehension the intellect itself produces the expressed species, or mental word, together with its intellection, and hence has a concept, in which it indeed places abstract relations, independent of place and time, which have never affected the sense. The very beings of reason which it creates, although they have a foundation in reality, testify to the activity of the human mind. In judgment it exerts its activity by composing or dividing and by perceiving the necessary relation by which the predicate is connected with the subject, which the senses do not suggest. In reasoning the fruitfulness is still greater, for from two connected concepts it forms a third, from few known things it attains knowledge of many unknown things, from few principles it elicits innumerable conclusions. Whether by syllogism, or induction, or invention, or discipline, that wonderful edifice of science is built, whose foundations and elements are indeed drawn from the nature of things, but whose construction is the true and proper work of the human intellect. It is not worthwhile to explain the matter further, for the activity of our intellect is

abundantly demonstrated by all those things which we discuss in Logic concerning the three operations of the mind, science, etc., and below concerning ideas and intellection, etc.

V. — SECOND CONCLUSION: BESIDES THIS INTELLECT WHICH WE HAVE SHOWN TO BE A PASSIVE POWER,

there is in the intellective part of man another active power, which is called the agent intellect. Proof: Since all cognition takes place insofar as the object is in the knower, intellectual cognition requires that the intelligible object be present in the intellect through some representation of itself, or likeness. But the representation of an intelligible object in the intellect is called an intelligible species, or idea. Therefore intellectual cognition requires that intelligible species be present in the intellect. There must therefore be some cause which impresses or generates intelligible species in the intellect. But no other cause can be assigned except the agent intellect. Therefore an agent intellect must be admitted. Proof of the subordinate minor. The cause producing ideas is either some extrinsic agent, which would infuse them into us either at the origin of the soul or in the course of life; or the objects themselves; or some power of the soul. But 1° not an extrinsic cause; for, as will be proved shortly, ideas are neither implanted in us nor flow from God or from some separate intellect. 2° Nor the objects alone. For universals, which are the objects of the intellect, exist only in singulars and sensibles, which indeed are not actually intelligible, but only potentially, and remain involved in material conditions. But matter cannot in any way impress something on the intellect, otherwise the nobler would suffer from the inferior. Therefore objects according to themselves cannot generate ideas in the intellect. It remains, therefore, that the cause which fashions species is some power of the soul. Moreover, it is clear that it is not the senses, either external or internal, which are in no way able

to extend themselves beyond their own genus and influence the intellect. It is therefore some intellective power. But again it cannot be the passive intellect, which in relation to objects behaves as something transmuted, patient and dependent. Therefore there is an active intellect, which relates to objects as agent and transmuting. It cannot, however, be called agent insofar as it makes the intelligible itself, for thus it would fall into idealistic pantheism; but it is called agent because it makes intelligibles in potency to be actually intelligible. For external objects cannot be actually intelligible because they are

singular and material and clothed in concrete conditions. In order to become actually intelligible, they must become universal, or be stripped of individuating conditions. The agent intellect is therefore called such because it makes objects actually intelligible by abstracting from singulars. VI. — The passive intellect and the agent intellect are compared. It is clear, therefore, that there is a twofold faculty in the intellective part: the passive or possible intellect, which is like a tablet on which nothing is written; and the agent intellect, which renders things actually intelligible. The possible intellect elicits the act of intellection, but the agent intellect does not itself understand, but makes understand, and its entire function is to abstract. We defined the possible intellect as: The cognitive faculty of the quiddity of a material thing. The agent intellect, however, can be defined as: The active intellectual faculty which abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Thus, therefore, the whole process of cognition takes place: An external object is received in the external sense through an intentional species; from the external sense it comes to the phantasy and is preserved there by an imaginative species, which is called a phantasm. Moreover, in the phantasm the universal is contained, but still involved in singular conditions. The agent intellect, however, strips it of individuating conditions; and in this way it fashions an intelligible species from the phantasm. This intelligible species, in turn, determines and fecundates the possible

intellect, and together with it actively concurs in eliciting intellection; the possible intellect itself, by the very fact that it understands, forms the expressed species or mental word. In the mental word, cognition is completed and perfected. Thus, the agent intellect produces the intelligible species, but does not understand; the possible intellect, however, does not make the species, but supposes it, yet it elicits intellection and generates the word. Let it suffice to state these things for now, for each point will be explained again, just as there will be further discussion concerning the distinction between the agent and possible intellects. VII — Whether in the intellective part there are other faculties besides the agent and possible intellect. Commonly counted in the intellective part are memory, reason, higher reason, lower reason, speculative intellect, practical intellect, synderesis, conscience, concerning each of which something must be discussed. VIII — Whether memory properly so called is found in the intellective part and whether it is distinct from the intellect (1). Memory has a twofold function: 1° to preserve species, which indeed does not imply an act of cognition, but a passive information and mere retention; 2° to recall past things, which certainly denominates actual cognition. Avicenna taught that intelligible species do not remain in the intellect except when they are actually understood; therefore he denied to the intellective part memory as a preserver of species. Others, maintaining that the intellect directly knows singulars, admit intellectual memory with respect to both functions, both as preserver of species and as recaller of the past. St. Thomas holds a middle way: he admits in the intellect memory as retentive of species, but denies memory with respect to direct knowledge of a past thing; he admits again memory with respect to indirect cognition of past things; but direct recollection of singulars he attributes to sensitive memory. IX — First conclusion: There is intellectual memory as a preserver of species; indeed also as cognizant of past things, not directly, however, but indirectly. I° part is proved. Whatever is received is received according to the mode of the recipient. But the

intellect is a power more preservative of the forms it receives than corporeal matter; for

a spiritual nature is more immutable and firm. Therefore, if corporeal matter retains forms even after it has ceased to act through them, if the imagination preserves species of things in their absence, much more does the intellect receive forms, or intelligible species, immutably and inamissibly. It is confirmed. The intellect preserves habits, as all concede, otherwise we would not be said to know habitually. But habits of sciences are formed from intelligible species. Therefore the intellect

retains species; therefore intellectual memory exists as a retainer of species. The II° part is proved, namely that there must be some intellectual memory cognizant of past things. The recollection of the past requires the identity of the subject and the notion of time; for it is necessary that the same knower apprehend that he is the one who formerly did or suffered this. But to perceive the identity of the subject, or substance as permanent, belongs only to that faculty which perceives substance, namely the intellect; similarly, since time is something abstract which has complete being only in the intellect, the perception of time can only be attributed to the intellect. Therefore the recollection of the past requires some intellectual memory, even as cognizant. The III° part is proved. The direct and proper object of the intellective faculty, as will be proved later, is the universal and immaterial. But a past thing, insofar as it affects us in this mutable state, is something singular clothed in material conditions: for, except for the act of our intellect, every singular thing, past or present, presents itself to us under a sensible and concrete aspect. Therefore the past is not the direct object of intellectual memory. The IV° part is proved. In the past there are two things: the object of cognition and the act of cognition. But the act of the intellect, although in itself something singular, is nevertheless immaterial; and therefore, just as the intellect knows itself, although it is singular, so it knows its own understanding, which is a singular act, whether existing in the past, present, or future. But it cannot perceive its act in the past unless it

simultaneously attains indirectly the object of that act in the past: for it knows its act not in general, but distinctly, and therefore with its proper object. Therefore the intellect, or intellectual memory, is indirectly cognizant of past things. « Thus, therefore, the notion of memory is preserved with respect to past things in the intellect, insofar as it understands itself to have previously understood, not however insofar as it understands the past as it is here and now (1). » (1). S. Tnomas. I. P . q. 79, a. 6, ad 2.

X — Second conclusion: Intellectual memory is not distinct from the intellect. Several more recent authors affirm this distinction, such as Th. Reid, who thinks memory is a primitive faculty implanted in us by God (1); and Cousin, who calls memory a faculty of its own right and independent of others (2). The conclusion is proved. Arg. Iu. Intellectual memory perceives the identity of the subject and the notion of time. But both functions pertain to the intellect. Therefore intellectual memory is not distinguished from the intellect. The minor is already clear. To apprehend time is proper to the abstracting intellect; to apprehend the subject as the same is to perceive substance as permanent, and this is also the proper function of the intellect. Arg. IIum Memory is a preserver of species and is cognizant of past things in the explained sense. But from neither aspect can a reason be drawn for distinguishing it from the intellect. Therefore. Not from the first aspect, for the intellect, as immutable and incorruptible, preserves species immovably and inamissibly. Not from the other aspect. For the distinction of faculties is considered on the part of the formal objects. But the past is not a distinct object; for it is contained under the general notion of the intelligible, which is the object of the intellect; moreover, the difference of the past or present in the intelligible object is something accidental and accessory. Therefore, for recollection, the intellect concurs insofar as it is intimate consciousness

apprehending the identity of the subject, and insofar as it is a reflexive and comparative faculty referring the subject to the past, under such an object, such a circumstance, such a time. These three things, therefore, intellectual memory

implies: the notion of intellect, the notion of intimate consciousness, the notion of reflexive and comparative faculty.

XI. — REASON IS NOT ANOTHER POWER DISTINCT FROM THE INTELLECT. AGAINST THE KANTIANS,

Guntherians, Ontologists. Proof. To reason, which is the act of reason, is compared (1) « Memory is a primitive faculty, with which the author of our being has endowed us and for which we can give no other reason, except that it pleased him to make it an element of our constitution. » Œuvres complètes, t. IV, p. 54. (2) « Memory is a faculty which has its natural authority like all others, and which can only be accounted for by the constitution of our mind. » Huicène leçon de philosophie écossaise.

to understanding, which is the act of the intellect, as being moved is to rest, as acquiring is to having, as imperfect to perfect. But to rest and to be moved, imperfect and perfect, are not reduced to different powers, but to one and the same power, even in natural things, because by the same nature something is moved to a place and rests in a place. Therefore intellect and reason are one and the same power. The major is explained. To understand is to apprehend truth simply, without any discourse; but to reason is to proceed from one known thing to another, to be known, by means of a middle term. Reasoning, therefore, is a movement from an already known truth to an unknown truth to be discovered, while understanding is, as it were, rest, or a simple intuition of a thing. Let the notions handed down in Logic be recalled.

XII. — HIGHER AND LOWER REASON ARE NOT DIVERSE POWERS.

Higher reason is that which regards the eternal reasons and higher motives, while lower reason attends to lower motives and temporal reasons. — Now, temporals and eternals relate to each other in this way, that in the way of discovery temporals are the means of knowing eternals, for through sensibles we are led to invisible and eternal things; but in the way of judgment, through eternals already

known, we decide about temporals and arrange temporals according to the reasons of eternals. Thus, eternal reasons relate as the most universal principles and the supreme rule which looks to the ultimate end; temporal reasons, however, as less universal principles, which are reduced to the former; as lower rules to be ruled by the higher rules. Just as in the sciences Metaphysics uses the highest principles, Physics uses less universal principles which are ruled by the higher; just as also in the arts, the higher arts, or architectonic, regard higher principles, but the lower arts, or ministerial, have lower principles, which are governed by the higher. But the most universal and less universal principles, higher and lower sciences, architectonic and ministerial arts, although they pertain to different habits, are nevertheless reduced to one and the same power. For all these things must be comprehended under one mode of understanding, under the common notion of being and truth. Therefore eternal reasons and

temporal reasons are ascribed to one intellective power. — Otherwise: Temporal and eternal reasons relate to our knowledge in such a way that one is a means to knowing and judging the other. But « to the same power of reason pertains both the means and the ultimate: for the act of reason is, as it were, a certain motion from one thing to another; but it is the same mobile thing which, passing through the middle, reaches the end. Hence one and the same power of reason is higher and lower reason; but they are distinguished according to Augustine, lib. 12 de Trinitate, cap. 4, by the offices of acts and according to diverse habits; for wisdom is attributed

to the higher reason, but science to the lower (1). » XIII. — Objections: Contingent and necessary pertain to diverse genera, as corruptible and incorruptible. But the necessary is the same as the eternal, and the temporal the same as the contingent. Therefore temporal reasons and eternal reasons are to be ascribed to diverse powers. Resp. : Dist. maj. : Contingent and necessary pertain to diverse genera, insofar however as they agree in the common notion of being and truth, I grant; to diverse genera which cannot be reduced to

one common notion of intelligibility, I deny. I grant the min. and deny the consequence. The intellect attains necessary and contingent things according to the same notion of object, namely according to the notion of being and truth. Hence it perfectly knows necessary things, which have perfect being in truth, as attaining their quiddity, through which it demonstrates their proper accidents. But it knows contingent things imperfectly, just as they have imperfect being and truth. But perfect and imperfect in act do not diversify the power, but they diversify acts according to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of acts and the habits themselves. Thus the Angelic Doctor, loc. cit. XIV. Diverse acceptations of reason in modern philosophy. Many moderns (excepting the Kantians, Guntherians, Ontologists) agree substantially with St. Thomas in this matter: (1). S. Tiiomas. I. P ., q. 79, a. 9.

although they call reason by different names, they profess it to be one faculty. Reason attains what is more general, principles, and investigates and examines causes; intellect, or mind, applies principles to particular cases; reason is the faculty of order, the faculty of comprehending; intellect is the faculty of knowing. « In a word, from a practical and usual point of view, reason can be defined as the faculty of order. From a theoretical point of view, we have said that it seeks causes, effects, connections, and progressions of things: what is this other than the faculty of order?... We can also say with M. Cournot that reason in man consists in grasping 'the reason' in things, that is to say the why and how; finally, with Descartes and the Logic of Port-Royal, that reason consists in distinguishing true from false. If we reunite and compare all the preceding acceptations: to know causes and effects, to grasp the reason of things, to foresee the future in the present and the past, to perceive order, to distinguish true from false, etc., we will see that they can all be reduced to one: the faculty of understanding. I can know the events of history without understanding them, know the phenomena of nature without understanding them, know myself without understanding myself. Intelligence in general is the faculty

of knowing. Reason is the faculty of understanding (1). » From the time of Leibniz, and especially of Kant, reason, or pure reason, is called the faculty of the absolute, and consequently the faculty of principles and causes, since principles have their origin and root in the absolute. « Since Leibniz and Kant it has become customary to give this term a more particular meaning. By it is understood the faculty of the absolute: in this case, the expression 'pure' is usually added: pure reason (die reine Vernunft); it is almost the same faculty which Malebranche designated by the name pure understanding. Pure reason is not only the faculty of the absolute, it is also the faculty of principles: and it is the faculty of principles because it is the faculty of the absolute; for it is in the absolute that principles have their source. As the faculty of the absolute, pure reason provides us with certain notions such as: absolute, infinite, necessary and perfect. As the faculty of principles, pure reason provides us with certain universal and necessary principles: such as the principle of causality, the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of substance, the principle of identity and contradiction, etc. — But is there a pure reason?... Let us only say that if there is a pure reason, that is to say, as we have defined it, a faculty of the absolute or faculty of principles, this faculty will not essentially be distinguished from reason understood in the usual and general sense which we have defined as the faculty of understanding. Indeed, we only understand with the help of principles, and we only understand the principles themselves with the help of the absolute (1). » XV. — Speculative and practical intellect are not diverse powers. The speculative intellect is that which apprehends truth in itself simply to know, and which

rests in contemplation alone; the practical intellect, however, orders what it apprehends to action. But it pertains to the same intellect to know truth in itself and to order truth to action. Therefore the same intellect is simultaneously speculative and practical. Proof of the min. That which relates accidentally to the notion of the object which a power regards does not diversify it: thus, because it

is accidental to the colored thing to be a man, to be white, to be great or small, all these things are apprehended by the same visual power. But it is accidental to something apprehended by the intellect to be ordered or not ordered to action: for these things are reduced to the same genus of understanding and to the same notion of intelligibility. Therefore it pertains to the same power to know truth as speculable and truth as orderable to action. You will say: The object of the speculative intellect is the true, but of the practical intellect is the good. But the good and the true are formally distinct objects, which induce diverse powers. Therefore the speculative and practical also diversify powers. Resp. : Dist. maj. : The object of the practical intellect is the good as knowable, and as directable and orderable to action under the aspect of truth, I grant; it is the good as appetible formally and under the aspect of good, I deny. Contra-dist. min. : The true under the aspect of truth and

the good as appetible formally, or under the aspect of good, are formally distinct, I grant; the true, and the good considered not as appetible or under the aspect of good, but as knowable or under the aspect of truth, are formally distinct, I deny, and I deny the consequence. Truth and good mutually demand and include each other: for truth is a certain good, otherwise it would not be appetible; and good is a certain truth, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore truth as appetible can be the object of the will, and good as intelligible can be the object of the intellect. Moreover, the object of the practical intellect is good as knowable and directable, whereby good is not withdrawn from the notion of truth, but is a truth orderable to action. Wherefore the practical intellect regards the same object as the speculative intellect. XVI. — Synderesis is not a power, but a habit of first principles in the practical or moral order. Every reasoning proceeds from the understanding of certain principles not demonstrable, but naturally known; otherwise there would be an infinite process. But, just as speculative reason reasons about speculative things, so practical reason reasons about things to be done. Therefore, just as in the

speculative order there are some naturally known principles (1), so in the practical, or moral, order some naturally known principles must be admitted. But the first principles of speculable things do not pertain to any special power, but to a certain special habit, which is called the understanding of principles (2). Therefore also the first principles of operable things should not be ascribed to any special power, but only to a special habit; and this is called synderesis. XVII. — Moral conscience is not a power, nor a habit, but an act of the practical intellect. Moral conscience implies an order or application of knowledge to something, for conscience is said to be knowledge with another. But the application of knowledge to something takes place through an act. Therefore conscience implies an act: indeed of the intellect, for it is a directing and manifesting application; of the practical, however, because it regards operation. It presupposes, however, an influence of the will, which moves the intellect in order to action. Conscience therefore applies the principles of synderesis. This happens in three ways: « In one way, according as we know that we have done or not done something, and in this sense conscience is said to bear witness; in another way, according as we judge that something is to be done or not done, and in this sense conscience is said to bind or incite. In a third way, according as we judge that something already done has been done well or badly, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, or accuse, or remorse (1). » But all these things imply an act. Conscience can be described as: The practical dictate by which we judge that something can be done, because it is good; that it ought to be done because it is commanded; that it should be omitted because it is evil (antecedent conscience); or by which we judge that something in the past could have been done, because it was good; ought to have been done, because it

was commanded; ought to have been omitted, because it was evil (consequent conscience). However, because a habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name of conscience is attributed to the first natural habit, namely synderesis. XVIII. — Concerning psychological intellectual conscience.

It can be de fined as: The faculty which testifies and reports the internal affections of the subject, or internal facts. Since it regards truth as its object, it is not really distinguished from intellect and reason. Because its function is to relate what is in us or takes place, its testimony cannot be the first act of the knower; but, just as every act presupposes its proper object, so conscience presupposes the other acts which it testifies to. Moreover, conscience properly speaking is reflexive (2). But reflection is posterior to the acts upon which it turns. Therefore the act of being conscious is not primitive, as some moderns imagine. But since conscience is an intimate sense, it has for its object those things which it feels within. But it does not feel external things, which are in another order, nor past things, which no longer are, nor future things, which are not yet; but only internal facts actually present, which (1) De istis principiis cf. Logica, pp. 329, sqq. (2) Cf. Logica, p. 317.

affect it. These, therefore, are its proper and direct object. But those facts are apprehended in the concrete, and therefore in the subject by which they are sustained, and accordingly the subject itself becomes the indirect object of conscience; and, because the actually sustaining subject cannot exist without existence, hence conscience invincibly reports the existence of our soul. It is not, however, a perfect and distinct cognition, for which diligent and subtle inquiry is required (1). They ask whether intellectual conscience attains the identity of the thinking subject. It seems to us that the answer should be: Conscience indeed concurs in that perception, but it is not sufficient; because the cognition of the identity of the Ego requires simultaneously conscience, memory, and reason. For it is necessary 1° that a man feel that he is and acts now; 2° that he remember that he was and acted in the past; 3° that he refer the present with the past and combine both terms in one subject. Moreover, the first condition implies an act of conscience; the second, an act of memory; the third, however, comparison and judgment, which are to be ascribed not to conscience nor properly to memory, but to reason (2). XIX. — The diverse states of the passive intellect.

From all that has been explained thus far, it is concluded that there is one passive intellect. It can, however, be considered in a triple state: sometimes it is in potency only, and thus it is called possible; sometimes, however, it is in first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; finally, sometimes in second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or acquired intellect. (1). Cf. infra q. IV, a. III, How the soul knows itself. (2) One may consult ALIBERT, op. cit. pp. 175-201; P . JAXET, na. 105-116; RABER, Psychol., cc. VI-VII. — On sensitive conscience and conscious or unconscious sensations, c. II. P . Phil. Nat. vol. II, pp. 56i.sqq. Tract. III, q. III. q. III. 576-577, 588 sqq. — On the truthfulness of conscience cf. Logica, pp. 317-318.

ARTICLE TWO — On The Nature And Existence Of Ideas

I. — A twofold acceptation of the term. Idea is a Greek word which in Latin is called species or form. An idea, therefore, is understood as a form of another thing, distinct from the thing itself, existing beyond and outside it. But a form of something existing beyond itself can be referred to two things: either as an exemplar of that of which it is said to be a form, or as a principle of cognition of it, according as the forms of knowable things are in the knower. Wherefore an idea can be taken either as an exemplar of a thing to be made, or as a principle of cognition. In the first acceptation it is defined as: A form existing in the mind of the artificer, according to whose imitation the artificer works. 1° It is a likeness of the thing to be made, or its

representative in the mind. It is not, however, merely representative; but it is required 2° that it really influence the making and production of the thing, insofar as it properly determines the artifact to a certain species, e.g., of a temple, through its passive imitation: for from the fact that the artificer imitates the idea of a temple, it properly follows that the artifact made by him is a temple, not a house or a tower. An idea taken thus is in the practical intellect, and regards practical cognition actually or virtually; actually indeed, if it tends to the work in fact;

virtually, however, if it is orderable to the work, even if it is not actually ordered. Under the other respect, the idea is defined as: A vital likeness of the thing known, determining the intellect to know that thing. This it has in common with the idea in the first acceptation, that both are a certain representation of a thing, by which the soul (1). Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 15; QQ.Dipp. De Verit. q. 3; I Sent., dist. 86. q. 2, aa. 2 et 3; ALAMANXVS, q. 95, et auctores infra citandi de idea- sum origine.

vitally assimilates the object to itself and both are produced by the mind (1); but it differs because the first idea implies causality with respect to an external work and always regards practical cognition: but the idea taken in the second way is merely representative and generates merely speculative cognition. II. — Which sense is the stricter? — The idea, taken more strictly, designates an exemplar. For an idea is a form. But « a form always implies the relation of a cause. For a form is in a certain way a cause of that which is formed according to it: whether the formation is by way of inherence, as in extrinsic forms, or by way of imitation, as in exemplar forms (2). » An idea, therefore, implies causality; but causality in an exemplar with respect to a thing to be made is properly found, not however in speculative cognition. Thus, an idea as representative denominates both speculative and practical cognition; but an idea as causative, as an exemplar, regards only practical cognition. In God there are ideas in this double sense: with respect to existing things they are ideas as exemplars; with respect to possible things they are ideas as representative. In the present treatise, idea is taken for the representation of a thing in the mind, and is thus more commonly and more properly called intelligible species, or impressed species. But concerning the idea as exemplar, there will be discussion in Ontological Metaphysics. III. — On the necessity of ideas, or intelligible species. The existence of ideas in our mind is denied by Malebranche and generally by the Ontologists, who hold that we see all things in God, and also by those who advocate the total activity of our intellect. However, other philosophers commonly profess

the necessity of ideas, although many reject representative species for external perception. « The theory of representative ideas has been denied only with respect to external perception... But when it concerns ideas, that is to say (1) « The representations which are born of the understanding are called ideas or concepts. » P . JAXER, n. 149. — « The idea is what represents the truth of the object understood. » BOSSURN, Logique, c. III. (2). S. THOMAS, QQ Dispp., de Ferit. q. 3, a. 3. conceptions or recollections of the object, there is no doubt that these ideas are very legitimately called representative of the object, either immediately, if it concerns individual images, or mediately, if it concerns general concepts (1). » We have vindicated the existence of sensible species elsewhere (2); here, therefore, we treat only of intelligible species. IV. — The necessity and existence of intelligible species is demonstrated. The first argument is drawn from the nature of intellection, as a certain action. The species by which the intellect understands is its form, because a form is that by which an agent operates. But a form does not perfectly complete a power unless it comprehends all things to which the power extends. Therefore the species by which the intellect understands does not perfectly complete its power unless it comprehends all things to which the intellective power extends. But the intellective power extends to all things, since it regards as its object universally all being. Therefore something cannot be a species completing the power of the intellect, unless it universally comprehends all being. But the essence of the rational soul in no way contains in itself universal and infinite being, since it is limited to a genus and species. Therefore the essence of the soul is not a species completing the power of the intellect: consequently the soul cannot

understand all things through its essence. On the other hand, it does not intuit things in the divine essence, as conscience testifies and as will be shown below. Therefore its intellect must be perfected by certain superadded species in order to know things (3). The second argument is drawn from the nature of intellection as cognition. Axiom:

Like is known by like, requires that the principle of cognition be a form similar to the thing known. It can, however, be similar to it either in the mode of being, so that the form of the known is in the knower in the same way as it is in the thing known, as the ancient materialists held; or in the notion of form, but not in the mode of being of the form. But it is impossible that it be similar to it in the same mode of being. It remains, therefore, that the form, which is the principle of intellection, be similar to the thing known in the notion of form, but not in its mode of being. But a form thus similar, namely a form of a thing existing beyond the thing itself, (1) P . JAXET, Traité de Philosophie, pp. 869-370. (2) II P . Pali. Nat. Tract. III, q. III, a. II, vol. II. pp. 579, sqq. (3) C. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 75 a.

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is called an idea, or intelligible species. Therefore intelligible species are necessary for intellection, just as it is necessary that cognition take place through the assimilation of the thing known and the knower. That assimilation according to material being is impossible is too clear. For the act of cognition extends to those things which are outside the knower; matter, on the contrary, restricts and determines to one thing, so much so that the notion of cognition and the notion of materiality are opposed. Hence those things which receive forms only materially are in no way cognitive, such as plants. Every cognition implies a certain immateriality, and becomes more perfect the more immaterial it is: thus among the senses, sight is more cognitive because it is purer and less material; the intellect is more cognitive because it abstracts more from matter, and in intellectual cognition itself there are as many degrees of cognition as there are degrees of abstraction from matter. It is clear, therefore, that the assimilation of the known and the knower must take place in an intentional and ideal way, that is, through an intelligible species (1). The third argument is drawn from the indetermination of the intellect. The intellect, as a passive power, is of itself indifferent to understanding this or that object. Therefore it

must be determined by the object itself. Moreover, the object cannot move and determine the intellect unless it is intelligibly in the intellect. But to be intelligibly in the intellect is to exist in it through an intelligible species, as the words themselves indicate. Therefore intelligible species are necessary for perfecting cognition. V. — The twofold function and twofold respect of the intelligible species. From these arguments it is manifest that the intelligible species has a twofold function: 1° to be representative and vicarious of the object; 2° to actuate and determine the intellect. It is therefore to be considered subjectively and objectively. Subjectively, it is a form of the intellect. For the species, as we have said, is that by which the intellect understands. But that by which a thing acts is its form. Therefore the species is a form of the intellect, indeed an accidental form, just as the intellect itself is an accident. Moreover, an accident follows the nature of the subject in which it is sustained and from which it proceeds; (1). Cf. ALAMANXES, Tertia-Secunse, q. 95. a. 1. the intelligible species by the same right follows the nature of the intellect. But the intellect is a positive, singular, spiritual thing; wherefore under that respect there are no universal ideas. But the idea is to be considered especially objectively; for it is placed in the intellect for this purpose, that it may be the representative of the object. Wherefore the idea is not fully conceived unless it is considered as essentially vicarious and objective. Under this representative respect, however, the idea is measured by the objects themselves and is called positive or negative, singular or universal, spiritual or material, according as the object is a positive thing, or only a negation and privation, or something singular or universal, material or spiritual, etc. Commonly and properly, the idea is taken objectively. But how the intelligible species relates to intellection.

VI. — Conclusion: The idea actively concurs in intellection, namely in such a way that intellection is produced both by the intellect and by the intelligible species as by two partial principles constituting one integral principle. Arg. Iu^Just as in the vision of white or black

there is an effective principle of vision as it is vision, and an effective principle as it is vision of white or black; so a principle of intellection must be assigned not only as it is intellection, but also as it is intellection of this or that object. But, just as the principle of vision, as it is vision, is the visual power, and its principle, as it is vision of white or black, is the object itself through the intentional species; so the principle of intellection, as it is intellection, will be the intellective power, and its principle, as it is intellection of this or that object, will be the object itself through the intelligible species. Therefore, as there are two principles of vision, namely sight and the intentional species, so two principles concur in intellection, the intellect and the intelligible species. The major is clear from the analogy which prevails between the two operations. The minor is declared. The determination of sight to such a visible thing, the determination of the intellect to such an intelligible thing, does not arise from the faculty itself, since this is passive and indeterminate. Therefore it arises from the object itself as it is present in the faculty through a species. Therefore the principle of vision or intellection, insofar as

it is of such an object, is the object itself through a species. Arg. II™. Wherever the principle of action is only an agent in potency, necessarily besides it another principle in act must concur. For nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. But the possible intellect is only potentially understanding. Therefore, besides it, another principle of intellection must be assigned by which the intellect is constituted in act. But the intellect is made in act through the species impressed upon it. Therefore the impressed species is a principle and cause of intellection. Therefore neither the intellect alone nor the idea alone produces intellection, but both together; although intellection is produced by the intellect as by a principal cause, from which it depends in substance, and by the intelligible species as to mode (1). VII. — The distinction of the Idea from cognition and from the term of cognition. Two corollaries follow from the preceding. The first corollary. The idea is not the vital action of the intellect itself, as the

Cartesians wrongly contend: it is distinguished from intellection as cause from effect, since intellection is produced by it as by a co-principle. Yet the idea can be called vital for three reasons: 1° because it is produced by a vital faculty; 2° because it is the cause of a vital act; 3° because it is received in a vital subject. The second corollary: The intelligible species is not that which is known, nor is it the object of direct cognition. For the direct object of cognition is its proper term. But the idea, as we have proved, is a principle of cognition. But it is impossible that the cause and principle of an action be simultaneously and properly the principle of the action and its direct term, since principle and term are opposites. Therefore it is impossible for the intelligible species to be the direct object of cognition. We say direct, because we attain the idea indirectly and reflexively, just as we reflexively perceive the act of the intellect and those things which are in it or take place in it. VIII. — Di fficulties against the existence of intelligible species are solved. 1° As good relates to appetite, so truth relates to (1). Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 79, a. 3, QQ. Dipp. De Anima, a. 4, De Verit. q. 8 a. 6. q. 9, a. 5. ART. II. — ON THE NATURE AND EXISTENCE OF IDEAS. 37 the intellect. But the good is not in the appetite through any likeness of itself. Therefore neither is truth in the intellect through any representation of itself: therefore the intellect needs no species. Resp. : There is not a parity between the mode in which the intellect perceives its object and the mode in which the appetite attains its. For intellection is perfected in the mind, and has its term in the knower himself; hence the knowable object must be received in the knower, either through its essence, which is not possible, or through its likeness. On the contrary, the operation of the affective part begins from the soul and is terminated in things: for appetite takes place insofar as the appetent is in the appetible. Wherefore a likeness by which it would be informed is not required in the appetite, as it is in the intellect.

2° If there were an impressed species in the intellect, it would be known before the expressed species, which we

nevertheless deny. Therefore there is no impressed species. Proof of antecedent: That which is prior in the intellect is known first. But the impressed species is prior in the intellect than the expressed. Therefore it would be known first. Resp. : I deny the antecedent, and to its proof, I distinguish the major: That which is prior in the intellect is known first, as an object of cognition, I grant; as a principle and means of cognition, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: The impressed species is prior in the intellect, as a principle and means of cognition, I grant: as an object of it, I deny, and I deny the conclusion. If two things are objects of the intellect, that which is prior in the intellect will certainly be perceived first; but if one is not an object of the intellect, but the other is, this latter will be known first, even if it is later in the intellect. Moreover, the impressed idea, as we have said, is a means to knowing, and a principle of cognition; but it is not the direct object of cognition. Therefore, although it is prior in the intellect, it is not therefore perceived first. 3° The intellect experimentally apprehends those things which are in itself. But it does not experimentally know ideas. Therefore ideas are not in the intellect. Resp. : Distinguish the major: The intellect knows experimentally those things which are in itself, as objects of conscience, I grant; it knows experimentally those things which are otherwise in itself, I deny. I distinguish the conclusion: Therefore ideas are not in the intellect, as a proper object of conscience, I grant; otherwise, I deny. The intellect experimentally apprehends only those things which

are objects of conscience, such as internal affections and facts of the mind; but it knows other things in another way. Because, therefore, the idea is not the proper and direct object of conscience, the intellect does not experimentally know its own idea; however, by experimentally feeling itself to understand, it implicitly perceives and demonstrates to itself that it has ideas, the principles of its intellection. The existence of ideas is indeed proved by the testimony of conscience, but through reasoning. The intellect is conscious that it understands; reason infers: therefore there are in the intellect principles of intellection; which

reasoning again proves that there are intelligible species.

QUESTION TWO

On the origin of ideas (1). The question of the origin of ideas is intimately connected with the most celebrated controversy concerning the nature of man and the union of the soul with the body, and is in some sense a consequence of it. For those who deny the existence or spirituality of the soul trace the entire origin and cause of ideas to objects and the senses. Those who hold that man is an intelligence using a body, consequently teach that ideas arise in us independently of material objects and the senses. But those who hold the Peripatetic-Scholastic doctrine, namely that man is neither soul alone nor body alone, but a composite of both, assert that the adequate cause of ideas is neither objects and senses alone, nor intellect alone, but both senses and intellect together. All opinions on the origin of ideas can therefore be conveniently reduced to three systems: 1° either ideas are in us independently of objects and senses; 2° or they are caused entirely by the senses; 3° or they are from the senses and from the intellect, but in different ways: from the senses ministerially, from the intellect principally. The defenders of the first system are the Innatists, Rationalists, Transcendentalists, Ontologists; of the second system, the Materialists and Sensists, or Empiricists; of the third system, finally, the Peripatetics and Scholastics. (1). One may consult: ARISTOTELES, III De Anima, cc. 4 et 5 ; S. THO- MAS, Comment. in III De Anima; QQ. Dipp. De Verit. q. 10, q. De Ani- ma ; Sum. Theol. I. P . q. 84 ; Opusc. II. cc. 81, ss ; CAZETANUS, BANNER, Comm. in I. P . ; ALAMANNUS, q. 95, ss.; JOANNES a S. THOMA, q. 10 ; LINERATOR, Theorie de la connaissance intellectuelle ; ZIGLIARA, De la lumière intellectuelle, tom. III, liv. I, c. VI, ss. ; PRILLACUBE, De Concepti- bus; MERCHER, PESCH, DE MARIA, RIMER, LORENZELLI, Psychol.; FABOBS, Le Cerveau, l'Âme et les Facultés ;

ALIBERT, La Psychol. them. et les thèor. mod. I. P . sect. IV, aa. IV-VI ; VACANT, Etudes comparées sur la philoso-

phie de saint Thomas et sur celle de Duns Scot, VIII et IX ; P . JANET, nb. 185, ss.; RABNER, cc. XXIX-XXX ; HARALD HORDRISO, Esquisse d'une Psychologie fondée sur l'expérience, V, Psychologie de la connaissance. 1. — Platonic Innatism (1). Plato, observing that all things which are in the senses are singular, contingent, mutable; on the other hand, wishing to preserve the certainty of science, which is concerned with universals, necessities, and eternals, « held that the forms of sensible things subsist of themselves without matter: such as the form of man, which he called man himself, and the form or idea of a horse, which he called horse itself, and so on for others. » But this idea is participated in both by corporeal matter and by the intellect: by matter indeed for existence, by the intellect for knowledge. Matter, indeed, becomes stone because it participates in the idea of stone, and our intellect, by participating in the idea of stone, becomes understanding of stone. But since participation in an idea is through a certain likeness of it, he held that sensible forms which are in corporeal matter flow from ideas, as certain likenesses of them, and that the intelligible species of our intellect are certain likenesses of ideas flowing from them (2). The intellect of man is naturally full of all these species, but is prevented by the union with the body from being able to come into act. Wherefore ideas are, as it were, dormant in the soul, and must be awakened by things perceived by the senses; so that the soul does not learn, but only recollects forgotten knowledge, or reminisces. II. — Avicenna. He held that ideas arise in us from a certain separate form, which he called the Agent Intellect. The ideas of all sensibles do not subsist of themselves without matter, but pre-exist immaterially in separate intellects: they are derived from the first intellect to the next, and so on to the last, which is the Agent Intellect; but from the Agent Intellect intelligible forms flow into the soul, and sensible forms into corporeal matter (1). III. — Cartesian Innatism. The principle of the Cartesians is that the essence of the soul is placed in thought itself. But thought is altogether incompatible without ideas: hence they assert that the soul, from the

beginning of its creation, has certain at least innate ideas, among which is the idea of God. They do not deny, however, that many ideas can be acquired by us; indeed, Descartes admitted that certain ideas arise in the mind from the senses through corporeal things, namely adventitious ideas; and that certain others are generated by the mind itself through the association of phantasms of material things, namely fictitious ideas. Hence, according to him, there is a threefold class of ideas: innate ideas, adventitious ideas, fictitious ideas. Moreover, innate ideas remain as if dormant in our mind; however, through the excitation of external objects they become actual, or reflected (2). IV. — Leibniz. Firmly convinced that the intellect is not distinct from the essence of the soul, and that it cannot exist without any act of cognition, he taught that the soul has innate in it a certain confused cognition of all things. Monads, which are called atoms and constitute bodies, represent the world only obscurely; monads which are souls of brutes represent the universe more clearly but still imperfectly; but monads which are human souls have a representation of the whole universe. There is therefore in our soul a schema, or a certain indistinct image of the universe, which is afterwards gradually evolved through the activity of the intellect, while external objects act upon the body and through the body upon the soul. And thus a previously confused cognition is at length resolved into many particular clear and distinct ideas. Wolf, the disciple and interpreter of Leibniz, defends this opinion (3). (1). Cf. Phidon, traduction Sasser, pp. 45, ss; Platon, par. Cl. Piat. (2) Cf. S. Thomas, I. P . q. 84, a. 4. Cf. etiam Akristov. VII Metaphys., text. 44-58 ; Cicero, Tuscul. c. XXIV (1). S. Thomas, ibid. (2). Cf. Cartes. Meditat. III, c. VII. (3) Cf. Leibnitz, Monadolog., et Nouveaux Essais sur « entenagement human, Avant-propos ; Wour, Psycho. Rat. sect. I.

V. — Rosmini. He admits that all ideas are acquired except the idea of ideal being. This indeed

is innate to us, for it is the form and light of reason; indeed, our soul, which was only sensitive in the beginning, is raised to a better state through the intuition of being,

changes its nature, and becomes intelligent, subsistent, and immortal. But the idea of being applied to sensibles gives rise to generic and specific ideas. In cognition, therefore, two elements concur: the formal element, which is the intelligible in an ideal state, abstracted from real existence, and the material element, which is the real existence of the intelligible element itself. In this way, however, intellectual perception takes place: an external object excites a sensation in our sense; to this sensation our conscience joins the idea of being and through judgment knows that the ideal intelligible itself is realized in the object of sensation; and thus we are persuaded of the real existence of the said object. If these two are considered together, namely the idea of possible being and the persuasion of the real existence of the said object, the idea is only singular. But if we remove the idea of being from the persuasion of real existence, the idea is universal. Hence, according to Rosmini, universal ideas are the sensations themselves clothed with the idea of ideal possible being, with the persuasion of their real existence removed; the universal, however, is the singular itself in an ideal state. If finally from the singular considered in an ideal state we remove the individuating notes, we have abstraction and an abstract idea (1). VI. — Recent forms of innatism. Th. Reid thinks first principles are properly innate, and that experience only concurs in applying principles and in enabling the soul to acquire an explicit consciousness of them. H. Spencer traces principles to a certain heredity, or hereditary law, by virtue of which the experience of past humanity is infused into successive individuals with their very nature. Traditionalism somewhat favors innatism, insofar as it denies that ideas even of the natural order can be acquired by us and contends that they are transmitted to individuals by means of traditional teaching. (1). Cf. Rosmux. Saglio suli. Origine delle idee, sez. 3. VII. — Conclusion: The system of innate ideas, whether in general, or under the various forms it assumes, considering the present state of the union of the soul with the body, can by no means be admitted; hence the Aristotelian axiom is true: The intellect

in the beginning is like a blank tablet. Proof. Arg. I'm. Something relates to the principle of action in the same way as it relates to the action itself. But a man sometimes relates only potentially to the action of understanding. Therefore he is also only potentially related to the principles of understanding. But the principles of understanding are ideas. Therefore man is in potency to ideas. But if ideas were innate or infused, he would not be in potency to them, since he would have them in act. Therefore ideas are not innate to us. The reason for the major is that the principle of operation and the operation itself divide the operative genus, since one is the beginning, the other the completion. But the beginning and completion form one thing: hence what is in potency to one is in potency to the other, and what is in act of one is also in act of the other. Therefore, if man is in potency to the action of understanding, he is by the same right in potency to ideas; and if he had species in act, he would also understand in act (1). This can be stated in another way: Given the form, its natural effect is given. But the idea is a form of the intellect. Therefore, given the idea, its natural effect, which is intellection, is given. Therefore, if ideas were innate, the intellect would understand them actually, which is plainly contrary to the testimony of conscience. VII. — The evasion of the adversaries is precluded. Plato replied that the intellect is prevented from coming into act by the union with the body. But this is no answer. For the operation of the intellect is natural, the union of the soul with the body is according to nature. But it cannot happen that the natural operation of a thing is totally impeded by that which is according to nature to it, according to the axiom: One natural thing does not totally impede the natural thing of the same thing. Therefore it cannot happen that the operation of the intellect is totally impeded by the union with the body. Nor is the reply of the moderns any better, namely that innate

ideas generate in us only habitual knowledge, which needs excitation by sensibles. For it is of the nature of habitual knowledge that the mind can use it when it wishes. For the intellect, when it already enjoys the habit of

knowledge, which is first act, can, when it pleases, proceed to second act, which is operation. Therefore, if we had ideas in habit, we could use them at will. Let the cause be assigned which prevents the said habit from passing into act. Is it the union of the soul with the body? It is replied: The union, which is natural, cannot impede a natural effect. If the said species serve no purpose except to be excited by the senses, they are uselessly held to be implanted in the mind independently of the senses. Moreover, God and nature do nothing in vain. Therefore ideas are not infused by God or nature. Wherefore innatism is entirely gratuitous and explains nothing (1). IX. — Another demonstration. a In the absence of a sense, there is a lack of knowledge of those things which are apprehended according to that sense; just as one born blind can have no knowledge of colors (2). » But no reason for this fact can be assigned if ideas are innate to us. Therefore. The major is known by experience itself. The minor is declared. If the idea of color is habitually in the mind of one born blind, why cannot he use it? A man who once had sight and afterwards became blind can certainly use the idea of color which he retains habitually, although he does not use sight. Therefore, if one born blind had the idea of color habitually, he could use it, although he could not use sight. Nor can it be replied that a sensation is necessary to determine the intellect to know color. For it must be explained why it is necessary, why the principle determining the spiritual intellect must be of the sensitive order. It is entirely gratuitous to posit a dormant idea. For what reason is it dormant? For an idea is something essentially vital. By the very fact that it is in the intellect, it is intelligible. Therefore it is absurd to assert that ideas exist in the intellect and yet are not intelligible to the intellect. Innatism can therefore be defended in no sense (1). » X. — The third demonstration (2). The union of the soul with the body cannot be admitted to be futile and accidental. But, if our ideas are innate or flow from separate forms, this union will be entirely futile. Therefore they are neither innate nor infused from without. Proof of the minor. The soul is united to the body not for the sake of the body,

but for the sake of the soul itself, just as a form is not for the sake of matter, but rather conversely. Hence, that the union not be futile, it is required that the body serve for the perfection of the soul. But it does not serve for the perfection of the soul in being, since the soul does not originate nor depend on the body according to its being. Therefore it serves for perfection in operating, which is to understand. But the body does not serve intellection at all, if the soul understands either through innate species or through species flowing from separate forms. Hence, if the soul acquires knowledge, or ideas, independently of the body, the union of the soul with the body will be futile. They reply again that the union is not therefore futile because the soul is excited through the senses. — But that excitation is not necessary for the soul except insofar as the soul is dormant through its union with the body; « and thus the senses would not bene fit the intellective soul, except to remove the impediment which comes to the soul from the union with the body. It remains, therefore, to ask what is the cause of the union of the soul with the body. » Therefore, unless it is admitted that the body serves the soul for acquiring intelligible species from sensibles, the union with the body is futile. It can be objected: This argument shows that not all ideas are innate, and that at least some are abstracted from sensibles by the intellect, but it does not prove that no idea at all is innate. We reply: The argument has universal force. It shows that it is natural for the soul to understand through species acquired from sensibles. But the intellect, since it is a simple essence, does not (1). « The supposition of something innate, says MARIE DE BIRAN, is the death of analysis; it is the philosopher's act of despair. » (2). S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 84, a. 3. (1). « Thus the theory of innateness, besides being the 'most expensive' hypothesis, is not even

capable of being conceived precisely. » RAIKER, Psychol., p. 384. (2) S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 84, a. 4.

have a twofold natural mode of understanding so diverse: namely a mode of understanding through innate species and a mode of understanding through acquired species. —

Therefore the argument shows that the soul, considering the natural order, understands solely through acquired ideas. Moreover, if the soul had certain ideas naturally implanted in it, since these would suffice to constitute the intellect in act, the intellect would no longer be in potency, but simply in act independently of the body. But what is simply in act, even if it does not yet possess ultimate and complete perfection, is considered essentially perfect. Therefore the soul would essentially be perfect independently of the body: wherefore the union with the body would only contribute to perfecting the soul in a certain respect, not simply. Therefore this union would still be accidental.

XI. — INNATISM FAVORS SUBJECTIVISM AND SCEPTICISM.

If ideas do not originate from sensible objects at all, it is impossible to know their conformity with sensible objects. But, not knowing the conformity of the idea with the object, it is impossible to elicit a certain judgment. Therefore, unless our ideas are drawn from objects, no means remains for certainly discovering truth; and a broad way lies open to scepticism. Indeed, unless it is true, the intellect cannot perceive conformity with an object unless it attains the object itself, which is material and singular. Moreover, an idea as it is in the mind does not represent material and singular principles properly and distinctly. Therefore the intellect will not be able to apply that idea to a singular thing distinctly, but as if blindly. Hence it is that Innatists are forced to take refuge either in blind instinct or in subjectivism and idealism. A fitting and lucid explanation, on the contrary, is provided if it is granted that ideas are drawn from singulars by the abstraction of the intellect, which singulars are known immediately and intuitively by the senses. XII. — Refutation in Particular. The preceding arguments attack all Innatists. Nor is anything else to be added against Plato and Avicenna. But the reasons of the Cartesians, which place the essence of the soul in thought, will be refuted below in n. XIII. Leibniz's doctrine fails in many ways. It rests falsely on the foundation of

pre-established harmony. It erroneously supposes that the soul is a schema of all things. For only that essence can be representative of the universe which is the cause of the universe; for an essence does not represent except those things which are contained in it or in its cause. But the essence of the soul is not the cause of things, nor does it contain all things. Therefore it cannot be a schema, or representative image, of all things. Leibniz also erroneously held that the essence of the soul is not distinct from the intellect, and that the intellect cannot exist without action, since, on the contrary, every action in created things is an accident separable from the essence itself. In the doctrine of Rosmini, many false things are implied, which have been condemned by the Church. Among the 80 propositions proscribed by the Holy Office, we will write out these, which pertain to the present matter: « I. In the order of created things, something divine is immediately manifested to the human intellect in itself, namely that which pertains to the divine nature. « IV. Indeterminate being, which without doubt is known to all intelligences, is that divine thing which is manifested to man in nature. « V. Being which man intuits must necessarily be something of necessary and eternal being, of the creating, determining, and finishing cause of all contingent beings, and this is God. « IX. Being, the object of intuition, is the initial act of all beings (1).» In his process, Rosmini confuses many things, and especially the universal with the ideal. For a singular thing in a possible state remains singular; it is indeed ideal, but by no means

universal. Finally, omitting other arguments, we observe that the Rosminian synthesis, which is proposed as the origin of ideas, is impossible and absurd. For the intellect would have to compose the ideal with the real, the intelligible with the object of sensation. But the intellect according to itself does not know the object of sensation, which is material. Therefore it cannot apply the ideal to it except blindly; and hence the way to subjectivism and scepticism, as has been said. (1). Cf. DEXISIOH, n. 1736, 1739, 1740, 1744.

The theory of Reid bears all the disadvantages of innatism: experience is altogether necessary not only for applying principles, but also for acquiring the very ideas which constitute principles. Cf. n. XIV. The opinion of H. Spencer labors under the defect of sensism, indeed of evolutionism, as will be shown below, a. iv. Moreover, it is impossible that from experience alone, which is particular, a universal principle be drawn out unless we are willing that the conclusion be broader than the premises. Traditionalism is refuted below, q. IV, a. IV.

XIII. DIFFICULTIES ARE SOLVED.

1o Man is a thinking being. But thought without ideas is altogether incompatible. Therefore man naturally has certain innate ideas. So the Cartesians. Resp. : Dist. maj. : Man is a thinking being, insofar as actual thought pertains to the essence of the soul, I deny; insofar as the faculty of thinking pertains to the essence, I subdistinguish: as something consequent to the essence, I grant: as something constitutive, I deny. I grant the min., and deny the consequence. The act of thinking in created things is an accident both predicamental and predicable, which most certainly cannot constitute the essence of the soul. But the faculty of thinking is not a predicable accident, but a property, for it necessarily follows the nature of man. It is, however, a predicamental accident, needing substance as a subject, and therefore is not constitutive of the essence, although it is consequent to it. 2o The love of happiness is innate in us. But love presupposes cognition and ideas. Therefore innate ideas are in us. Resp. : Distinguish the major: The love of happiness is innate to us subjectively taken, as a natural inclination to happiness, I grant; it is innate to us formally and objectively taken, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence. We admit that there is in us a natural appetite for happiness, which follows nature and can tend to the unknown; but the adversaries feign that the love is innate formally taken, which arises from cognition. They therefore suppose precisely what would have to be proved.

XIV. — ON THE INNATISM OF FIRST PRINCIPLES.

It is objected 3° : Every necessary judgment is an a priori judgment. But what is an a priori judgment if not something innate? Therefore at least necessary judgments are innate to us, and consequently innate ideas are in us. Proof of the min. : An a priori judgment is said to be that which does not originate from nor depend on experience. But what is independent of experience is certainly innate. Therefore. Resp. : I deny the min., and to its proof I distinguish the major: An a priori judgment is said to be that which does not depend on experience, in this sense that the conformity of the predicate with the subject is perceived independently of experience, from the mere notion of the subject, I grant; in this sense that the ideas which constitute the judgment are in us independently of the cognition of the senses, I deny. I contradistinguish the min. : A judgment which does not depend on experience is innate, if the

ideas of which it consists are in us independently of the cognition of the senses, I grant; if only the conformity of the predicate with the subject is known without the testimony of experience, I deny. And I deny the conclusion. Explanation. A judgment is a cognitive act by which the mind joins two ideas by affirmation or separates them by negation. But in order that the intellect be able to compose the predicate with the subject, it must perceive the conformity of the predicate with the subject. Sometimes this conformity is only known by experience, as when I say: The circle is made of iron; and then the judgment is called a posteriori. Sometimes, however, this conformity is perceived in the mere notion of the subject: The circle is round. I know, independently of experience, that roundness belongs to a circle; in this way the judgment is called a priori. Here, therefore, two cognitions must be carefully distinguished: 1° the cognition of the conformity of the predicate with the subject, and this is naturally, or logically, imbibed in, or included in, the notion of the subject; 2° the cognition of the idea which is the subject, and the idea which is the

predicate: e.g., the idea of circle and the idea of roundness. Where do I get the concept of circle and the concept of roundness? A priori? Let the adversaries prove this. We hold that the idea of circle and the idea of roundness, like other ideas, are generated from sensibles, through the power of the agent intellect. 4o Inst. : First principles are said to be naturally known. But what

is naturally known is innate. Therefore first principles are innate. Resp. : Distinguish the major: They are naturally known absolutely and properly speaking, I deny; as if naturally known, in this sense that they are most easily and without inquiry known, I grant. I contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence. Man is said to have naturally the seeds of sciences and first principles are said to be naturally known, because « from the very nature of the intellectual soul, says St. Thomas, it is fitting for man that immediately upon knowing what a whole is and what a part is, he knows that every whole is greater than its part, and similarly in other cases. But what a whole is and what a part is, he cannot know except through intelligible species received from phantasms, and therefore the Philosopher shows that the knowledge of principles comes to us from sense (1). » Thus, in first principles there are multiple respects to be considered. For first, the cognition of the terms and the connection of the terms with each other by way of a certain synthesis must be considered. Both, however, require experience: « The habit of principles, says Cajetan, pre-requires experiment, not only for the cognition of the terms, but also for the connection of them... The terms received... are not sufficient to move and determine the intellect to this composition rather than that... Necessarily the complex cognition of principles pre-requires sensitive experimental (2). » Secondly, the ease with which they are acquired can be considered, and thus they are said to be naturally known in a broad sense: for those things which are known immediately from the beginning, without study and inquiry, are considered as if naturally known (3). Thirdly, the cognition of the conformity of the predicate with the subject can be considered, and in this respect first

principles are said to be pure, a priori and independent of experience (4). Fourthly, the formal reason for assenting to a universal principle can be considered, and this does not rest on experience, but is generated from the relation of the terms to each other (1). With these distinctions, the diverse places in which St. Thomas sometimes asserts that first principles are acquired by experience, and sometimes that they are naturally known, are reconciled (2). (1) Cf. Logic, pp. 421-422. (2) One may consult: S. THOMAS, I° II°, q. 51, a. 1, De Verit., q. 10, a. 6, ad. 12, q. De Anima, 7, q. De Magistro, a. 3, De virtut. in communi, q. 1, a. 8, I. Cont Gent, c. 12; CAJETANUS, loc. cit.; FERNARIZNISSE, Comm. in III. Cont. Gent. c. 46 ; JOANNES a S. THOMA, Curius Theologicus, Do virtut. theol. Disp. XVI, a. 2; SUARIS, Disp. Metaphys. disp. II, sect. 6, LAHRENT SAIVE, Revue Augustinienne, 15 decemb. 1905. 1. — What is transcendentalism in general. It is the system of those who assert that intelligible

objects are transcendent, namely placed above the powers of reason and all experience; and consequently that the origin of our ideas must be traced back from the mere analysis of thought, or from subjective a priori forms, independently of experience. It is advocated in various ways by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. II. — Kant's doctrine (1). All cognition, according to the Scholastics, is produced from two sources: from the object and the power, or faculty. But according to Kant there is a threefold cognitive faculty: sensibility, intellect, and reason. Sensibility is the passive receptivity of impressions. The impressions which it receives from within is internal sensibility; but the sensibility which gathers impressions from without is external sensibility. Moreover, all external sensibility takes place in space: for whatever we perceive outside us depends on space; but internal sensibility, since it necessarily takes place in succession, implies time. Hence there are two forms of sensibility: the form of space and the form of time. These are indeed present in us a priori, since they remain in us independently of experience, and even if we remove thought from the objects of experience. Hence they can be

called pure intuitions, distinct from empirical intuitions. Above sensibility stands the intellect (2). But just as sen- (1). Cf. KANT, Logique Transcend. Critique de la raison pure, traduct. BARNI; KANT, par Th. RÜRSSEN, collect. ALGAS; L'Idée ou critique da Kantisme, par C. PIAT, lib. ALGAS; PISCH, Le Kantisme et ses erreurs, Paris, LETRINILLERUX. (2) In his Metaphysics, Kant posits three faculties in the intellective part: intellect, judgment, and reason. « Understanding is the faculty of knowing the particular by the general; judgment, the faculty of knowing the general by the particular; and reason, the faculty of knowing the general a priori and of forming rules for diverse phenomena. »

sibility has a priori sensible forms, so the intellect is furnished with intelligible forms, which, since they represent necessary elements, are also necessary and a priori. They are ordained to understanding phenomena, and are called categories. Now, there are as many categories as there are ways in which a predicate is referred to a subject. This is done either according to quantity, and hence we have unity, plurality, totality; or according to quality, and hence affirmation, negation, limitation; or according to relation, and hence subsistence and inherence, cause and effect, action and passion; or according to modality, and hence existence and non- existence, possibility and impossibility, necessity and contingency. Reason, finally, is the supreme faculty to which it pertains to attain intelligibles, or noumena, which are unconditioned. Reason likewise must be furnished with a priori and unconditioned forms, which refer to noumena, and these are called ideas. There are three in number: namely the idea of the soul, the idea of finality, and the idea of God. For in us is the soul, the thinking subject, hence the psychological idea; outside us the world, finality, hence the cosmological idea; above us and the world, God, the theological idea. In summary: Kant posits two a priori forms in sensibility: the form of space and the form of time; twelve in the intellect, which are the twelve categories; three in reason, which are the ideas of the soul, of finality, and of God. All are innate, and are

presented as constitutive forms of cognition itself. We apply these subjective forms to the objects of experience; hence it happens that we know things not as they are in themselves, but as the mind forms them for itself; or, in other words, we attain the phenomenal world, but by no means the noumenal world. The soul is indeed inclined to know objects, but on the other hand objects transcend reason itself. Hence antinomies in our mind, or contradictions between the law which impels the soul to know and the law by virtue of which objects surpass reason. III. — Kantian transcendentalism labors under manifold defects. It has all the disadvantages of innatism (1); but it abounds in many others. (1). « No one has abused innateness as much as Kant, both by the number

First. The form of space and the form of time are presented as pure, necessary, universal

intuitions. But it is incompatible to attribute necessary and universal forms to sensibility, since sensibility alone attains contingent and singular things. Therefore the form of space and the form of time in the Kantian sense are incompatible, unless we wish to confuse the sensitive order with the intellectual. Secondly. No cause can be assigned from which the origin of those a priori forms is drawn. Not the object, otherwise they would not be subjective and solely a priori, as transcendentalism wishes. Not the knowing subject. The reason why the object is not the cause of those forms, according to Kant's tenets, is its singularity and contingency. But the knowing subject is no less singular than the object itself, nor is it more exempt from contingency. Therefore the origin of those forms cannot be traced back to the knowing subject. Thirdly. Given, but not granted, that those forms are from the knowing subject, the disadvantage is not thereby avoided. For either they are mere affections and modifications of the subject, or they enjoy some objective being. If the first, the principle of contradiction is overthrown. For each form simultaneously consists in the intellect with opposite and contradictory notions. Therefore, if all are modifications of the intellect, it follows that opposite and contradictory affections

simultaneously belong to the intellect. If the second, pantheism is introduced. For, if those a priori forms have objective being, they are the source of all objectivity and the cause of all ideas. But ideas are infinite. Therefore the subjective form would be an infinite source, and would be identified with divine and infinite being. Fourthly. Kant, by virtue of his system, asserts that things are known by us through synthetic a priori judgments, and that reason really differs from intellect. But that these two things are most false is already established: of innate things he admits in the intelligence, and by the manner in which he understands innateness. It is not only the two sensible forms of space and time that are innate; it is also the twelve categories of the understanding: unity, plurality, substance, causality, possibility, existence, etc. All these categories are for Kant so many pre-existing forms, in which the concrete matter provided by experience will be molded. » RANIER, Psychol., p. 384.

in Minor Logic (1) we have placed before our eyes the impossibility of synthetic a priori judgments, and at the beginning of Psychological Metaphysics we have shown that intellect and reason are really one faculty (2), just as we also know that judgment is not a faculty, but the second operation of the intellect, which is preceded by simple apprehension. IV. — Hegel's doctrines. Against Fichte and Schelling, what we have discussed in I. P . Phil. Nat. on Pantheism is sufficient (3). Some things are to be added concerning the Hegelian system (4). Hegel teaches that the absolute and universal principle of all human cognition is the Idea, or most abstract being, or pure thought. In its first moment, the Idea, or pure being, is pure indetermination. For determination implies opposition; at the beginning, however, there is no opposite. Moreover, pure indetermination is pure non-being. Hence pure being and pure non- being are the same, and consequently in the Idea all things are involved and identified (5). In the second moment, however, the Idea goes forth from itself, evolves itself, and produces the World. In the third moment, finally, the Idea returns to itself, becomes conscious of itself, and

posits Mind. Hence a threefold part of Philosophy: Logic, for the first moment, Natural Philosophy, for the second moment, Philosophy of Mind, for the third moment. We indeed ascend to the Idea gradually by abstracting properties from sensible things. Experience, however, contributes nothing to the construction of knowledge itself, but is rather rejected as useless, compared with the Idea. V. — Hegelian transcendentalism abounds in many absurdities. First indeed, it absurdly posits that all things are identified in the Idea, (1). Logie., pp. 125-126. (2) Supra q. 1, a. 1, n. XI, ss. « Thus, there are no innate categories; there is nothing innate, as Leibniz said, except intelligence, that is to say the faculty of perceiving relations which are given between objects and our experience. » RANIER, p. 282. (3) Vol. II, pp. 26, ss.

(4) Cf. HESON, Logique, 2 vol. ALCAN. (5). « Being and nothing are the same thing. Nothing, as nothing, as similar to itself, is precisely the same thing as being... Contraries coexist in everything. In fact, there is never any absolute yes or no, as vulgar reason maintains. »

for which to be shown he uses sophistical argumentation: Pure being is pure indetermination. A double sense lies hidden here: Either: Being in general is something most vague which abstracts from every generic, specific, individual determination. This sense is true; for being in common is transcendent, which is absolved from categorical determination. Or: Being in common is something indeterminate which implies the negation of all entity, even ideal. This sense is most false, for being in common is some true ideal entity having a foundation in reality. That which is subjoined must also be distinguished: Pure indetermination is pure non-being. Indetermination which is the negation of all entity, I grant; indetermination which is only the negation of generic, specific, individual determination, I deny. Hegel therefore uses equivocation by using indetermination sometimes for the negation of all entity, sometimes for the negation only of generic, specific, and individual determination. He does not therefore conclude scientifically, but sophistically: « Being is non-being, and

this is the first and absolute truth (1). » Secondly. It is impossible to explain how the Idea can posit itself. For the knowing subject is prior to cognition, and existence is prior to operation. Therefore the idea does not bestow existence on itself by positing itself; but from the fact that the subject exists, the Idea can be posited. Thirdly. If the Idea has consciousness of itself only in the third moment, the two prior moments are entirely unconscious and unknown. By what right, therefore, does Hegel dare to recount the history of the Idea in the two prior moments? Finally, to omit other things, it is absurd to posit the Idea as the first and only principle, and the first and only reality. For the Idea is an image and representation. But it is absurdly conceived that an image is prior to the reality represented. (1). According to Hegel there are three degrees of thought: 1° being is and non-being is not; 2° being is not and non-being is; 3° being is and is not, non-being is not and is. In this third degree alone is truth. « Being is and nothing is not; — primitive naivety; being is not, nothing is; scepticism, the first step of science; being is and is not, nothing is not and is; — absolute truth. » Cf. P .GRATZKY , Logique, Principe d'Identité, Principe de Transcendance. VI. — On certain other forms of transcendentalism. Cousin holds that primitive ideas arise in us from a certain revelation of an impersonal reason which manifests itself to us through innate spontaneity. For the first manifestation of intellectual activity is entirely spontaneous, by which we apprehend the threefold element of human cognition, namely the thinking subject, the world, and God, in a somewhat indistinct and confused manner. Then comes free reflection, by which we perceive each of those elements clearly and distinctly. With respect to the first manifestation of impersonal reason, therefore, our ideas are a priori and spontaneous. It is replied that the theory of impersonal reason is a form of psychological pantheism, which has already been refuted many times. Moreover, if primitive cognition is spontaneous and blind, the criterion of human certainty is not evidence, but blind instinct or blind faith, which we have rejected in Logic (1). Finally, the knowledge of God is not innate and

intuitive, but abstractive and discursive, derived from creatures through reasoning (2). Kantian transcendentalism is restored with new apparatus by Boutroux, whose doctrines are excellently expounded and refuted by P . Gardeil, O. P . (3). The same author should be consulted on the most recent forms of Kantism, advocated by Thouverez, Gory, Brunschwigch (4). (1) Logic. pp. 361, 362. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . Q. 2, aa. 1 et 2 (3) Revue Thomiste, 1897, pp. 1-30, 180-191. (4) P . GARDINI, Revue Thomiste, 1897, pp. 490-516 1. — Notion and division of Ontologism. Ontologism is the system asserting that the cognition of our intellect begins from an immediate and intuitive vision of God, that is, God is the first

object which our mind intuits. For God, who is first in the order of being, is also first in the order of cognition, or, as they say, the first Ontological is also the first Logical. The name was introduced by Gioberti, but the thing is not new. The Neoplatonists already taught a similar opinion; in the Middle Ages, Almaricus Carnutensis contended that God is the formal principle of all things, from which it followed that God is also the proper object which we know in things. Four species of Ontologism are commonly distinguished: pantheistic, rationalistic, Malebranchian, and moderate. — The pantheistic asserts the immediate intuition of God because it holds that our intellect is identified with the divine essence. This monstrous error we have refuted elsewhere (2). — The rationalistic, however, at least verbally, distinguishes our reason from God, but again holds that it is natural to our mind to be able to penetrate the divine nature, and therefore that God is the direct object of our intellect. This opinion indirectly falls into pantheism. For only that intellect which is itself infinite can penetrate the infinite essence. It would therefore be pointless to refute this philosophical invention, which is heretical in theology, specifically. (1) Cf. M a l e b r a n c h i e , R e c h e r c h e d e l a c e r i t é ; G e n d i t , D é f e n s e d u s e n t i - m e n t d u P . M a l e b r a n c h e ; J e a n S a n s - F i e l , D i s c u s s i o n a m i c a l e s u r l ' O n - t o l o g i s m e , D e F o r t h o d o x i e d e l ' O n t o l o g i s m e ; U b a g h s , P e y c h o l .

; Z i o l l a n a , D e l a L u m i è r e i n t e l l e c t u e l l e , l i v . I I e t I I I , u b i p r a c i p u i a u c t o r e s c o n s u l e n d i r e f e r u n t u r . (2) I. P . Phil. Nat. Tract. I. q. I. a. 3, tom. II, pp. 24, sqq. II. — Malebranchius. He teaches that God is the first object that we apprehend in the order of time; whatever we know, even singulars, we intuit in God. But the divine essence can be considered in two ways: 1° as it is in itself, or in the absolute sense; 2° as it implies an order to creatures, as it is the archetypal idea, and according to relative attributes, which belong to it as Creator, such as omnipotence, providence, justice. These attributes are distinguished from the divine essence virtually: hence it happens that they can be seen without the absolute essence itself being seen. Hence, although God is most perfect, our cognition is nevertheless imperfect, because we apprehend as distinct those things which are really identified in God. III. — Gioberti. The opinion of Malebranche was embraced by Card. Gerdil and Gioberti. The latter, although he proposes the doctrine in a new form, does not depart much from the opinion of Malebranche. He begins with the distinction between being and existences. God alone is being, but creatures are only existences. Moreover, the spontaneous and necessary intuition of Being is implanted in man from the beginning, which is exercised by way of a judgment asserting: Being, as being, is. Moreover, Being creates existences. Hence the first of all judgments and the first foundation of all existence is presented by this formula: Being creates existences. The mind of man is therefore created with the substantial and inalienable intuition of God creating the world, and hence he contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself. Hence it happens that the real order and the order of cognition perfectly correspond, insofar as God, the first being, is also the first known. Hence the celebrated principle is established: The first Ontological is also the first Logical, and from both one simple thing is formed which can be called the first Philosophical. This is direct and spontaneous perception. Besides this, there is another, which is called reflection, and which is voluntary. This is a certain return of the mind upon direct perception,

by which we inspect the object more distinctly and apprehend God under diverse forms, e.g., of substance, goodness, beauty, etc. Reflection, however, needs oral speech, by which the transition is made from direct to reflected cognition, just as in the opinion of de Bonald, man cannot speak his thought unless he first thinks the speech.

IV. — Moderate Ontologism. It concedes that singulars and contingents are known by the senses immediately in themselves, as Malebranche held; but on the other hand it asserts that universals are seen in the divine essence considered in a relative sense. Let there be a perception of a tree: in that cognition there are two elements: the specific type of the tree, and

the individuality of this tree. Indeed, the specific type resides in the divine mind and is known in the divine ideas; but the individuality is apprehended directly by the sense. This Ontologism, which some attribute to Fenelon and Bossuet, is commonly defended by more recent Ontologists: Ubaghs, Hugonin, Julio Fabre, Vercellone, Milone. V. — The twofold mode of seeing things in God. Let it first be noted that the formula: To know all things in God, in the divine ideas, in the eternal reasons, can be understood in two ways, objectively and causally: Objectively « as in an object of cognition, as someone sees in a mirror those things whose images are in the mirror »; causally, « as in a principle of cognition, as if we said that in the sun are seen those things which are seen by the sun (1). » VI. First conclusion: Our soul knows all things causally in God, or in the eternal reasons. Proof. There is a twofold form, or cause, by which we understand: the light of the intellect and the intelligible species. But both are caused by the eternal reasons. Therefore our cognition is caused by the eternal reasons, and hence we know all things in the eternal reasons causally. Proof of the min. The intellectual light itself which is in us is nothing other than a certain participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which the eternal reasons are contained. But the intelligible species are caused by things. But things themselves are caused by the divine ideas. Therefore our idea is caused by the divine

ideas. In other words, our cognition, to be true, must be conformed to things, but things are conformed to the divine ideas. Therefore our cognition, to be true, must be conformed to the divine ideas and therefore mediately and causally we know truth in the divine ideas (2). Objectively, however, we do not see things in the eternal reasons, « but thus the Blessed, who see God and all things in Him, know all things in the eternal reasons. » Let it therefore be VII. Second conclusion: In the present state we see nothing in God as an object known first: wherefore Ontologism, which holds that our cognition begins from the immediate vision of God, is false and absurd, under whatever form it is proposed. The simplest and most effective argument is drawn from the testimony of conscience. If we saw God intuitively and immediately, we could not lack intimate consciousness of this vision. But no man living in this mortal life is conscious of intuiting God: on the contrary, all, except the Ontologists, are persuaded that they are entirely deprived of the intuitive vision of God. Therefore. The major is clear in itself, because no one can see the source of light and not be conscious of this vision: for the source of light, by the very fact that it is seen, renders itself necessarily evident and manifest by its clarity. Just as it is impossible to see the sun immediately and not have consciousness of this vision, so it is impossible for us to intuit God, the source of all light, and remain unconscious of this vision. Otherwise even the Blessed in heaven could be unconscious of their beatitude. They reply that we lack consciousness of this vision because this cognition is imperfect and confused; for we perceive the divine essence not in itself, but only in a relative sense. But on the contrary. The principle of knowing other things must be known more clearly than all other things which receive their clarity from it. But, according to the Ontologists, the vision of God is the principle of knowing other things. Therefore it must be clearer than the knowledge of other things, and therefore if we are conscious that we have knowledge of other things, a fortiori we should enjoy consciousness of the divine vision. But what they add, that one can see the divine essence in a relative

sense without seeing it in the absolute sense, is most false, as will be clear from the following argument. Arg. IIum. The Ontologists assert that in the present life divine being, or divine ideas, or divine attributes, are seen as they have respect to creatures. But it is impossible to see those things unless the divine essence in itself is intuitively perceived. Therefore from the tenets of the Ontologists it follows that man in the present life intuits the divine essence in itself. But the intuition of the divine essence in itself is eternal beatitude. Therefore in the present life we would attain eternal beatitude, and the damned themselves, since they always retain cognition, would always enjoy beatitude. Proof of the first minor. Just as being in itself is prior to being in relation to another, so to know something in itself is prior to knowing it by comparison with another. Therefore to intuit God in Himself is prior to intuiting Him according to respect to creatures. Therefore, if we attain the divine essence according to respect to creatures, a fortiori we see it in itself. Moreover, either we really perceive divine ideas and divine attributes, or we do not. If we do not

really see, the matter of Ontologism is already done with. If, however, we really intuit, we attain them as they are really. But they are really the divine essence itself. Therefore we cannot intuit them unless we simultaneously attain the divine essence. Nor does a distinction of reason suffice so that attributes can be seen without the essence being seen. In the present life, indeed, we apprehend attributes as distinct from essence, because we do not intuit them as they really are; but if we apprehended them really, we would perceive them as one and the same with the essence: hence, with them seen, the essence would be seen. For then only in the same object is one thing known without the knowledge of another, when the species is so representative of one that it does not represent the other. But in God, that which representatively intuits being and attributes necessarily simultaneously expresses the essence. Therefore it is impossible to see divine ideas, divine attributes, without the essence itself being seen. Arg. IIIum. If we naturally understood all things in God, God

Himself would be the species, or natural form, of our intellect: for God, who is infinite, cannot be represented through a finite species. But it is incompatible that God be the natural form of our intellect. Therefore it is incompatible that we naturally intuit things in God Himself. Proof of the min. Act and potency are in the same genus. But the intelligible form is the act of the intellect. Therefore the form and the intellect are in the same genus. But the divine essence and the human intellect are not in the same genus, as is clear. Therefore it is incompatible

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that the divine essence be the form of our intellect (1). If, however, the adversaries reply that the form of our intellect is the divine attributes, divine being, the same disadvantage is incurred. For although we might pass over the distinction which the Ontologists introduce, it would still be most evident that divine being, or divine attributes, since they are infinite, are not in the same genus as the created intellect. Hence it is concluded that Ontologism undermines the supernatural order. For if the vision of God is natural, grace, the light of glory, etc., are superfluous. It is therefore found to be opposed not only to sound philosophy, but also to the principles of faith. Arg. IVam. In the present life intellectual cognition takes place through conversion to phantasms: for when we wish to understand something we form phantasms by way of examples, and when we wish to make someone understand something, we propose to him examples from which he can form phantasms for understanding. But, if we intuit all things in God, that conversion is useless; indeed, it rather impedes cognition: for intuitive vision of God and conversion to phantasms are opposed. Therefore. VIII. — A special observation on Malebranchius. — These arguments attack Ontologism under whatever form it is proposed. Against Malebranchius, however, this reason is specially to be added: If singulars and contingents are not seen in themselves, but only in God, the senses are useless, the organs of the senses are useless. But it is incompatible that such wonderful organs should be given to us by God in vain. IX. — A twofold argument from

authority. We will conclude the matter with a twofold argument from authority. The first is from St. Thomas: « Some have said that the first thing known by the human mind, even in this life, is God, who is the first truth, and that through Him all other things are known. But this is manifestly false; because to know God by essence is man's beatitude: hence it would follow that every man is happy. And moreover, since

in the divine essence all things which are said of it are one, no one would err concerning those things which are said of God; which is proved by experience to be false. And again, those things which are first in the cognition of the intellect ought to be most certain; hence the intellect is certain that it understands them. Which is manifestly not the case in the matter proposed (1). » The second is the declaration of the S. Cong. of the Holy O ffice, 18 Sept 1861. It replied that

the following propositions cannot safely be taught: Prop. 1. « Immediate knowledge of God, at least habitual, is essential to the human intellect, so that without it it can know nothing; since it is itself the intellectual light. » Prop. 2. « That being which is in all things and without which we understand nothing is divine being. » Prop. 3. « Universals, considered on the part of reality, are not really distinguished from God. » Prop. 4. « The innate knowledge of God, as being simply, eminently involves all other knowledge, and through it we implicitly know every being, under whatever respect it is knowable. » Prop. 5. « All other ideas are only modi fications of the idea by which God as being simply is understood (2). » Among the propositions which D. Branchereau proposed to the S. Congregation for examination, we will write out the following two, which also cannot be safely taught: « From the first instant of existence, the mind enjoys an ideal perception, not indeed reflexively, but directly. » « Among the intelligible truths which we apprehend ideally, God is placed first, whose intellection, although essentially distinct from the intuition of the blessed, is terminated not to a representative image, but to God Himself. » X. — On that in which we know all

things. It is objected: 1« That in which we know all other things and through which we judge of others is the first thing known by us. But we know all things in the light of the first truth, and through it we judge of all things, as Augustine says. Therefore God is the first thing known by us (3). (1) Opusc. In Boet, De Trinitate, q. 1, a. 5. (2) Cf. DEXIUSES, Enchiridion, nn. 1516 1520. (3) S. THOMAS, I. P . o. 84, a. 5, arg. 1.

Resp. : Distinguish the major: That in which we know all things, etc., as in an object, is known first, I grant; as in a principle, or cause, of cognition, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: We know all things in the light of the first truth, as in a cause, I grant; objectively, or as in an object, I deny. And I deny the conclusion. The solution is clear from our first conclusion. XI. — On that which is first present in the intellect. It is objected 2«: For something to be known first, it suffices that it be first present in the intellect and first intelligible. But God is first present in the intellect and first intelligible. Therefore God is first known. Resp. : Distinguish the major: It suffices that it be present in the intellect as an object, I grant; only as to essence or potency, I deny; it suffices that it be first intelligible, with respect to the understander, I grant; in itself and absolutely, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: God is first in the intellect as to essence, potency, I grant; as an object, I deny; God is first intelligible, in itself and absolutely, I grant; with respect to our intellect, I deny; and I deny the conclusion. Our soul is most present to itself, just as it is also most intelligible in itself, since it is immaterial; nevertheless it does not perceive itself by intuitive cognition, but only by abstractive and reflexive cognition. Similarly, although God is intimately present in the soul as to essence, He is not therefore present as an object; and, although He is first intelligible in Himself, He is not however first intelligible with respect to us. Indeed, those things which are most intelligible in themselves are less intelligible to us; for their clarity blinds the mind, which relates to them as the eye of the owl to the sun. XII. — On that which is first loved. — It is objected 3° : That which is first loved is first known. But

God is first loved, since He is the ultimate end of all. Therefore God is first known. Resp. : Distinguish the major: That which is first loved with elicited love is first known, I grant; that which is first loved with natural love, is first known, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: God is first loved with natural love, I grant; with perfect and distinct elicited love, I deny, and I deny the conclusion.

A twofold love, as has often been explained, is distinguished: innate and elicited. Innate love follows nature itself: it presupposes cognition indeed in the Author of nature, but not in the appetent itself. Elicited love, however, follows the cognition of the appetent itself; and, if the cognition is distinct, the love will be distinct; but if confused cognition, confused and indistinct love. Indeed, all things desire God by innate love: for they desire their own perfection, but nothing is desirable except insofar as in it is found a likeness of the supreme good. But by confused elicited love we first desire God, insofar as in the beginning we desire happiness in common, not yet knowing in what it consists. But God is not the first loved by distinct elicited appetite, presupposing cognition by which we apprehend in particular in what happiness formally consists. XIII. — On being in common and most perfect being. It is objected 4° : That which is first known by us is the notion of being. But the notion of being cannot be anything other than God. Therefore God is what is first known by us. Resp. : Distinguish the major: That which is first known is the notion of being in common, which is predicated analogically of God and creatures, I grant; it is the notion of most perfect being, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: The notion of most perfect being is nothing other than God, I grant; the notion of being in common is God, I deny, and I deny the conclusion. The first object known, according to the Scholastics, is being in common, which abstracts from the uncreated and created, and which is predicated analogically of God and creatures. But such being is indeterminate and imperfect, and cannot without impiety be called God. 5° Inst. : The notion of being is so participated in by each creature that it exceeds them all and is never exhausted by

them. But being which exceeds creatures and is never exhausted by them is God Himself. Therefore the notion of being is nothing other than God. Resp. : Distinguish the major: The notion of being exceeds all creatures and is never exhausted by them, as to extension, I grant; as to comprehension, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: That which exceeds all creatures and is not exhausted by them, according to

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comprehension, is God, I grant; only as to extension, I deny, and I deny the conclusion. As is explained in Logic, those things which are greater in extension are less in comprehension. Thus man extends to more things than Peter, but Peter claims more predicates for himself than man. Moreover, being extends to all things and is never exhausted by them; in extension, therefore, it exceeds all creatures, but in comprehension it is the least predicate which is attributed to any thing. XIV. — On the first Ontological and the first Logical. It is objected 6° : The first Ontological must be the first Logical. But God is the first Ontological. Therefore He is also the first Logical. Proof of the major. The order of cognition must correspond to the order of things. Therefore what is first in the order of being, or first Ontological, must be first in the order of cognition, or first Logical. Resp. : I deny the major, and to its proof I distinguish the antecedent: The order of cognition must correspond to the order of things, in this sense that cognition must be conformed to the thing, apprehending it as it is and not otherwise, I grant; in this sense that there must be in cognition the same mode and the same order as in the things themselves, I deny; and I deny the consequence. The truth of cognition is the adequation of the intellect with the thing, namely in this way that the order of cognition be conformed to the things themselves, otherwise the intellect would err by apprehending things otherwise than they are. But the truth of cognition by no means requires that what is prior in the nature of things be known first. Thus cause is prior to effect, and nevertheless we infer cause from effect. Many things are prior and more known in

themselves which nevertheless remain posterior and less known with respect to us. XV. — On the first Absolute. — It is objected 7° : A creature, since it is dependent on God, is relative. But the relative cannot be known unless the first absolute on which it depends is known. Therefore a creature cannot be known unless the first absolute, namely God, is known.

Resp. : Distinguish the major: A creature is relative only, I deny; it is relative and includes something absolute, I grant. Distinguish the minor: The relative cannot be known without that on which it depends, in this sense

that one is not perceived without the other, I grant; in this sense that that on which it depends must be known first, I deny. I distinguish the conclusion: A creature, according as it is absolute, cannot be known unless God is known, I deny; a creature, as relative, cannot be known unless God is apprehended simultaneously, I grant; unless He is thought of first, I deny. — In a creature the absolute can be considered, namely the notion of being, the notion of substance, etc., and under this respect it can be perceived without God being thought of. It can also be considered reduplicatively as a creature, and in this way it is essentially relative. Moreover, correlatives are simultaneous in cognition. Therefore it follows only that the creature and God are known together, not that God is known first. But, simply speaking, in a creature the absolute is apprehended before the relative, just as being in itself, substance in itself, is perceived before being as dependent, substance as dependent. XVI. — On the cognition of the in finite. It is objected 8° : We know the in finite. But we cannot form the notion of the infinite from finite things. Therefore we directly intuit the infinite. Resp. : Distinguish the major: We know the infinite by analogous and positive-negative cognition, I grant; by proper and adequate cognition, I deny. — I contradistinguish the minor, and I deny the conclusion. From this fact of experience, that the idea of the infinite is positive- negative, it can be understood that the idea of the infinite is acquired from a finite thing, of which the mind retains the entity and removes the negation, as is fully

explained in Ontology, Tract. II.

ARTICLE FOUR.

EMPIRICISM IS CONSIDERED (1).

the impression of external things a sensation is excited in it: the mind immediately becomes, as it were, wholly occupied with this sensation, which remains entirely vivid, and hence sensation becomes attention. But when there is duplicated attention, comparison takes place; but comparison cannot occur unless relations between several things are known: which cognition is judgment. Often, however, attention is carried from one object to another, so that it may consider their qualities separately, as light which is reflected from one object to another; hence reflection occurs. But a duplicated judgment becomes reasoning; finally, composition, or synthesis of images, is imagination. There are therefore six faculties of the soul: attention, comparison, judgment, reflection, imagination, reasoning. All, however, are certain transformations of sensation. Laromiguière moderated the said system in some respects, positing three faculties: attention, comparison, judgment. IV. — Conclusion: It is impossible that the senses be the adequate cause of intellection; and therefore empiricism is impossible. Here could be gathered all the arguments by which we demonstrated the spirituality of the soul. We will select a few: Arg. Ium. If all our cognition is of the sensitive order, the intellect is not distinguished from sense; and, since sense essentially depends on the body, the intellect will also be essentially bound to matter. But what essentially depends on matter is generable and corruptible. Therefore our soul will be material and corruptible: hence all the worst consequences flow from denying the spirituality of the soul, especially in the ethical order: subversion of morals, denial of liberty, etc. — Since animals themselves enjoy sensation, man would differ from brutes either not at all, or, at most, by an accidental distinction. Arg. Ilum. Sense, since it is bound to a concrete organ, can only apprehend concrete, singular, and contingent things. But our ideas represent spiritual things, or present material

things in an absolute, universal, necessary mode. Therefore it is incompatible that the sense be the total cause of our ideas. Hence, once sensism is admitted, all the foundations of our knowledge, which is concerned with universals and necessities, collapse. Arg. IIIum. Sense apprehends phenomena and qualities of things, but does not penetrate the intimate essence. But we really attain the essences of things; indeed, the proper object of our intellection is the quiddity itself. Therefore it is impossible that sense be the total cause of our ideas or of our intellection. Let all those things by which we refuted organicism and those by which the spirituality of the soul was vindicated be compared (1).

V. — A SPECIAL OBSERVATION ON LOCKE AND CONDILLAC.

Resp. : Distinguish the major: Nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the sense as in the matter of the cause, I grant; as from a total cause, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the conclusion. The intellect knows nothing unless the sense has supplied the matter from which it draws its object; but we deny that the thing is in the intellect in the same way as it is in the sense. For before the thing which is in the sense is impressed on the intellect, it is essentially changed by the active power of the agent intellect, as will be explained below. 2° The operation which is followed by fatigue of a bodily organ is of the sensitive order. But the operation of the intellect is followed by fatigue of the brain. Therefore intellection is of the sensitive order; and consequently all ideas are acquired by sense. Resp. : Distinguish the major: The operation which is followed by fatigue of an organ per se is of the sensitive order, I grant; the operation which is followed by fatigue per accidens, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: The operation of the intellect is followed by fatigue, per se and by reason of the intellection itself, I deny; per accidens and by reason of the phantasms which serve intellection, I grant. And I deny the conclusion. The intellect, in the present state of union, needs the operation of sensitive powers, by which phantasms are prepared for it. But since the sensitive powers use a bodily organ, from the act of intellection there

follows per accidens fatigue of that organ. Hence, however, the spirituality of intellection is not assailed (1). ideas, a law which amplifies experience and from which principles are deduced. Associated ideas, by virtue of experience repeated many times, generate a habit, and if experience is repeated often and very often, it becomes an invincible habit, which imposes necessity on the intellect and determines it to understand in such a way. Because, e.g., by frequent experience we see effect follow cause, hence it happens that we never conceive effect without cause. Thus experience, together with the association of ideas, fittingly explains the origin of principles, whether physical, mathematical, or philosophical, such as the principle of causality. But these assertions contradict facts. For in the aforesaid hypothesis that tendency would be broader and stronger the greater the experience, and hence would scarcely be found in children who had not yet been taught by repeated experiences. But, on the contrary, it is manifest in all and at every age (1). Moreover, by what law does the association of ideas take place, and by what law is it perceived? There is no effect broader and more excellent than its cause: from singulars and concretes a general and abstract principle will never be produced unless there is in us a superior faculty, cognizant of universals, which is spiritual, namely the intellect. VIII. — Experience with the theory of heredity. H. Spencer, Lewwes, Murphy, restore empiricism with new apparatus. Singular experience is not sufficient for acquiring principles, but all experiences of all generations and ages, gathered together and accumulated and transmitted to individuals through heredity, explain the origin of principles. There is therefore in cognition something innate and something empirical. The human species gathers experiences, and transmits to individuals dispositions which are held as laws. Each VII. Another form of empiricism: experience with the association of ideas. This is a new way by which Hume and Stuart Mill defend empiricism. They concede that pure empiricism cannot explain the adequate origin of ideas, especially first and necessary principles; they therefore have recourse to a

certain association of (1). Cf. vol.II, pp. 405-407. (1) « The facts by no means con firm this rigorous consequence of the theory. The tendency to generalize, under the name of cause and effect, certain relations of succession shows itself in all minds and at all ages. It cannot be said that it is acquired and developed gradually. It appears with all its force at the first awakening and in the first manifestations of the child's intelligence. This judgment of causality, with the prevision and belief it implies, is henceforth universal. » P n t o s , T r a d . d u T r a i s i d e l a n a t u r e h u m a i n e d e H e x e , I n t r o d . p . X X X V I I I .

man concurs in this cognition, but necessarily undergoes the influence of all his predecessors.

This theory bears the disadvantages of both innatism and empiricism. For heredity is a certain pre-existence, although impersonal, and hence the arguments against the Platonists adduced above recur. On the other hand, experiences even of all centuries gathered together can never establish a universal principle. For just as finite added to finite never produces infinite, so all singular and concrete experiences will never produce a universal, abstract principle, absolute in place and time. Because a principle of this kind is placed in a superior order, namely the immaterial and spiritual, and requires a faculty of the same order, and this is the intellect (1). IX. — The system of sensible presentation. Some philosophers, among the spiritualists, such as Balmés, although they concede that the senses are not the adequate cause of intellection, think that « for the intelligible union of the object with the intellect, the presence of the object in the sense and through the sense is sufficient, whether this happens insofar as the sensation itself renders the object present to the intellect, as some hold; or insofar as the intellect contemplates and perceives the object in the image contained in the imagination without a sensible species, as others teach (2). » Which opinion to some extent gives occasion to sensism. For the object, as contained in sensation, or image, or phantasm, is concrete, singular, material. Therefore, if the presence of the object in the phantasm suffices for intellection, the object of intellection

will be sensible and concrete; and then the spirituality of cognition is lost. Let those writers therefore remember that only spiritual, universal, and abstract things are actually intelligible; but sensible representations, images, and phantasms are only potentially intelligible. (1) Those who seek a longer exposition and refutation may consult R. REN, Peychel., c. XXVIII; P . JANET, Peychel., c. IX. (2). CARD. GONZALEZ, Philos. Ideol. c. II, a. IV.

ARTICLE FIVE.

THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM IS VINDICATED.

I. — Two assertions in the scholastic system. The Peripatetic-Scholastic doctrine is expressed in these words: Cognition begins in sense and is perfected in the intellect. We have found that our ideas are not in us a priori; nor are they infused by God or by any separate form; we do not intuit God or divine ideas at all in this present life; on the other hand, it is clear that the senses are not the proper cause of intellection. It remains, therefore, that both sense and intellect concur, but in different ways, to form intelligible species: sense indeed ministerially, intellect principally, so that cognition begins in sense and is perfected in the intellect. In this system, therefore, two things are asserted: 1° that sensibles are the matter from which ideas are drawn; 2° that the proper cause which forms ideas is not the senses, but the abstractive power of the agent intellect. These two assertions are entirely inseparable in the teaching of the Scholastics. II. — The first assertion is proved, namely that ideas are acquired from sensibles. Arg. 1°m. The fundamental reason has already been assigned against Innatists. The soul is united to the body for its own good, namely to obtain its perfection in operation from the body and from the senses. But the perfection of the soul in operation is cognition. Therefore, unless the soul receives its cognition from the body and the senses, the union will be futile (1). Arg. II°m. The intellect can understand nothing except dependently on the phantasy. But the cognition of the phantasy is caused by sensible (1). Above, a. I, n. IX.

objects. Therefore intellection originates from sensibles. But it is impossible to explain such dependence unless ideas are drawn from sensibles. Therefore our ideas are acquired from sensibles. The major is proved. « When someone tries to understand something, he forms for himself some phantasms by way of examples in which he may, as it were, inspect what he is trying to

understand. And hence it is also that when we want to make someone understand something, we propose to him some examples from which he can form phantasms for understanding (1). » Secondly « We see that when the act of the imaginative power is impeded by injury to the organ, as in the insane, and similarly when the act of the memorative power is impeded, as in the lethargic, intellection itself is impeded (2). » Nor let it be said that the intellect depends on the phantasy in some intellections, not however in all. For if the intellect could understand something without conversion to phantasms, it would certainly do so in the cognition of spiritual things. But we cannot know incorporeal things except after the manner of corporeal things, by remotion or some comparison to corporeal things. Hence it is that more spiritual things are more difficult to grasp, and it is necessary to employ sensible examples so that spiritual things may be understood. Hence those who have a more vivid imagination attain truth more quickly. Therefore in every action of the intellect, the concurrence of the phantasy is required. The minor is clear. For although the imagination can compose, divide, and partition phantasms, etc., it nevertheless necessarily presupposes the action of the external senses, from which it receives species; hence it happens that if someone lacks the exercise of a sense, the phantasy cannot imagine those things which are apprehended according to that sense, just as one born blind cannot imagine color. It is clear, therefore, that the intellect depends on the external senses, and therefore on sensibles (3). (1). S. Thoox, I P . q. 84, a. 7. (2). Ibid. (3). « Hence the necessity for the mind to call upon images to represent the most puri fied ideas. The image must always be placed in support behind the object aimed at by the intelligence.

Concept and image form a linked couple. » P . GARDEL, O. P ., Revue Thomistes, t. XI, p. 646.

We assert, however, that this dependence cannot be explained unless ideas are drawn from sensibles. For a twofold dependence of a faculty is distinguished: subjective and objective; subjective, when the faculty depends on something as a co-principle of its action, such as sight, imagination, on their organs; objective, when the faculty depends on something as supplying the object or the matter of the object. But it is absolutely incompatible that the intellect depend on the body subjectively, since it is entirely spiritual. Therefore it depends on sense objectively as on a supplier of the object, or rather, the matter from which it itself, by its own power, draws out its object. Therefore, unless the object and ideas of the intellect come from the senses, the intellect would in no way depend on sense. — Nor let it be replied that this dependence consists in the sense exciting ideas. We have already answered this objection, art. I. It certainly cannot be explained how an entirely spiritual idea, which was had independently of sense and phantasm, cannot be understood except dependently on a phantasm. Operation follows being; if the intelligible species has being independently of the senses, why can it not operate independently of them? The dependence of the intellect on sensible experience therefore argues for a law by virtue of which the intellect abstracts its object from experience (1). Arg. III™. There is a threefold cognitive power: one which is an act of a bodily organ; another which is neither an act of an organ nor in any way joined to matter, such as the angelic intellect; another, finally, namely the human intellect, which holds a middle mode: it is not an act of any organ, but it is a faculty of the soul which is the form of the body. Moreover, operation is proportioned to the power. Therefore our intellect ought to have its cognition in a middle way between sense and the angelic intellect. But sensitive cognition comes entirely from material objects; angelic cognition originates in no way from material objects. Therefore it is proper to the human intellect to know a form existing in matter indeed materially

and individually, but not (1). « Without image, no concept, that is the law of human knowledge. A very natural law, since the content of the concept is an abstraction from experience, and, consequently, if it opposes experience as abstract, it never ceases to have recourse to it for its use. » P . GARDEL, Ibid.

knowledge almost identical with that of Aristotle is advocated in the 'pure perception' of Mr. H. Bergson. » E. PELLALABE, livre de Philosophie, octob. 1906, p. 428. We, however, consider this to be very far from the truth. (2) Logic, pp. 34-35. (3) Psychol., p. 308.

that both abstractions are a contradictory and false process, because it would be to think something and yet refrain from thinking about it. But they do not understand true abstraction as the Scholastics construct it. « The intellect abstracts those things which are in sensibles, not indeed by understanding them to be separate, but by understanding them separately or separately... If Socrates is musical and white, we can understand whiteness, without understanding anything about music (1). » — « Abstraction can take place in two ways: one by way of composition and division, as when we understand something to be in another, or separate from it. The other by way of simplicity, as when we understand one thing without considering the other. To abstract by the intellect those things which are not abstract according to reality, according to the first mode of abstraction, is not without falsity. But to abstract in the second way those things which are not abstract according to reality, does not have falsity, as is manifest in the senses. For if we understand, or say, that color is not in a colored apple, or is separate from it, there will be falsity in opinion or in speech. If, however, we consider color and its property, thinking nothing about the colored apple, or if we express in words what we understand, it will be without falsity of opinion and speech; for the apple is not of the notion of color. And therefore nothing prevents color from being understood, without understanding anything about the apple. Similarly I say that those things which pertain to the species of any material thing, say a stone, or a man, or a

horse, can be considered without individuating principles, which are not of the notion of species. And this is to abstract the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from phantasms, namely to consider the nature of the species without consideration of individual principles, which are represented by the phantasm (2). » Hence the axiom is understood: There is no falsity in abstraction (3). (1) S. THOMAS, III. De Anima, lect. 12. (2) S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 85, a. 1, ad. 1. (3) « In this operation there can be no error, because neither one denies nor affirms: so that there is nothing clearer than this axiom of the School: He who makes a precision does not make a lie: abstinentium non est mendacium. » Poussart, Logique, liv. I, c. XXIII.

V. — On the order observed in the acquisition of primitive ideas. — The ideas which are acquired first are the more common and universal. Arg. Ium. Everything emerging from potency to act first reaches an imperfect act, intermediate between potency and perfect act, before it reaches a perfect act. But the intellect passes from potency to act, and its perfect act is clear and distinct cognition, but its imperfect act is indistinct cognition: for he who knows indistinctly is still in potency to know the principle of distinctness. Therefore the intellect knows indistinctly before distinctly. But to know indistinctly is to know what is more common; to know distinctly, however, is to know what is less common. Therefore what we know first are the more common. Ideas correspond to cognition. Therefore the first ideas are the more common. The reason for this assertion: To know indistinctly is to know what is more common, is not difficult to understand. To know something in which many things are contained without proper knowledge of each one is to know under a certain confusion: thus the whole can be known confusedly without clear and distinct cognition of its parts. But to know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to have knowledge of what is less common; just as to know animal indistinctly is to know it insofar as it is animal; to know animal distinctly is to know it as rational or irrational, as it is man or lion. Arg. IIum. The intellect follows sensitive cognition. But according to sense we judge

what is

more common before what is less common: both according to place, as when something is seen from afar, it is first perceived to be a body than an animal, and first perceived to be an animal than a man; — and according to time, because children at first distinguish man from non-man before distinguishing this one from another, and therefore call all men fathers, but afterwards determine each one. — Therefore also according to the intellect, what is more common is apprehended before what is less common (1). VI. — On the first of all ideas. But what is most common and more indistinct is being in general. The first

(1) I P . q. 85, a. 3.

idea, therefore, which is produced is the idea of common and indistinct being. This is of a certain rude and imperfect idea, for the scientific idea of being, as it is acquired in Ontology, requires many previous cognitions. Afterwards, the idea of less common and more distinct being is formed, e.g., of substantial being, and then the idea of being still more contracted, and so on. — By seeing, e.g., limits in things, it apprehends the idea of the finite; by removing limits, it generates the idea of the infinite; by knowing body and again removing body and transferring reality to a higher order, it apprehends the incorporeal and spiritual; by seeing something which begins and needs another to begin, it gathers the ideas of effect and cause. More on these in Ontology. VII. — On the formation of other ideas. Having acquired the primitive ideas by abstraction, the intellect can by its own power make them clearer, compose and divide them, form judgments; from compared judgments it can elicit reasonings, and in this way generate new ideas for itself. From primitive ideas it can produce new ones, whether by analogy, synthesis, analysis, by remotion from corporeal things, or by comparison with corporeal things, as we will again declare below, concerning the object of the human intellect. Moreover, on occasion, we explain how different concepts are formed, e.g., the concept of creation (1), the concept of space (2) and time (3), the concept of prime matter (4), of substantial form (5), etc. VIII. — On

generalization. Abstraction is followed by generalization, namely the operation which forms universals. What the universal is, how many kinds there are, by which acts it is constituted, we have fully explained in Logic, pp. 217-224, especially nos. V-VIII. (1) Vol. II, p. 52. (2) Ibid., p. 209. (3) Ibid., pp. 219, 226. (4) Ibid., pp. 128-129. (5) Ibid., 138-139.

ARTICLE SIX — On The Manner In Which Phantasms Concur In The Production Of The

INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES (1).

I. — The question. It is already established that phantasms concur in some way in the production of ideas, but it is asked whether they are instruments, and, this supposed, how they are instruments. Some hold that phantasms do not cooperate e fficiently in the formation of ideas, but only occasionally: so Suarez seems to think. The Thomists and many others admit that phantasms concur indeed instrumentally; but concerning the manner in which they are instruments, there is a wonderful disagreement. We will treat the whole controversy through various conclusions. Let it therefore be II. — First conclusion: Phantasms concur as instruments of the agent intellect for the production of intelligible species. Proof from the authority of St. Thomas: « In the reception by which the possible intellect

essence, it follows indeed that the imagination is made more powerful, and hence it also follows that the phantasm can be elevated by the motion of the intellect. St. Thomas always presupposes this radical illumination (1), but nowhere asserts that it alone suffices. Nor indeed does it suffice. Arg. Ium. For the external sense is also rooted in the same soul in which the agent intellect is. Therefore, if mere rooting in one essence sufficed, sense and sensible species could be said to be illuminated by the intellect. Arg. IIum. Diverse and determinate species are drawn from phantasms. But the rooting of the phantasy in the soul, since it is indifferent to all those phantasms, does not suffice for producing determinate species. Therefore illumination is not fittingly explained by mere rooting of the phantasy and

intellect in the same essence. Arg. IIIum. By reason of radical illustration, the phantasy and its act do not acquire any immateriality or power exceeding the notion of corporeity, but still remain within the limits of the singular and material thing. Therefore this illumination does not render them more proportioned to the immaterial species, and the difficulty always returns as to how they can concur to produce a spiritual thing. V. — Third conclusion: The illumination of phantasms cannot be explained by an objective appearance in the phantasm from extrinsic assistance of intellectual light. This extrinsic assistance either has a true and positive influence for producing the objective appearance in the phantasm, or exerts no action. If none, that objective appearance is not given, and the hypothesis collapses; if it has true action, we argue thus: Since every action requires a term, that action must have its term either in the phantasm itself, or in the possible intellect, or in something adjacent to the phantasm. But none of these can be said. Therefore. First, the term is not in the phantasm itself, otherwise it would posit something intrinsic in it, which the aforesaid opinion does not admit, since it denies any intrinsic change derived from the intellect into the phantasms. Se- essence, it follows indeed that the imagination is made more powerful, and hence it also follows that the phantasm can be elevated by the motion of the intellect. St. Thomas always presupposes this radical illumination (1), but nowhere asserts that it alone suffices. Nor indeed does it suffice. Arg. Ium. For the external sense is also rooted in the same soul in which the agent intellect is. Therefore, if mere rooting in one essence sufficed, sense and sensible species could be said to be illuminated by the intellect. Arg. IIum. Diverse and determinate species are drawn from phantasms. But the rooting of the phantasy in the soul, since it is indifferent to all those phantasms, does not suffice for producing determinate species. Therefore illumination is not fittingly explained by mere rooting of the phantasy and intellect in the same essence. Arg. IIIum. By reason of radical illustration, the phantasy and its act do not acquire any

immateriality or power exceeding the notion of corporeity, but still remain within the limits of the singular and material thing. Therefore this illumination does not render them more proportioned to the immaterial species, and the difficulty always returns as to how they can concur to produce a spiritual thing. V. — Third conclusion: The illumination of phantasms cannot be explained by an objective

appearance in the phantasm from extrinsic assistance of intellectual light. This extrinsic assistance either has a true and positive influence for producing the objective appearance in the phantasm, or exerts no action. If none, that objective appearance is not given, and the hypothesis collapses; if it has true action, we argue thus: Since every action requires a term, that action must have its term either in the phantasm itself, or in the possible intellect, or in something adjacent to the phantasm. But none of these can be said. Therefore. First, the term is not in the phantasm itself, otherwise it would posit something intrinsic in it, which the aforesaid opinion does not admit, since it denies any intrinsic change derived from the intellect into the phantasms. Se- ART.VI.—ON THE MANNER IN WHICH PHANTASMS CONCUR. 87 condly, the term is not in the possible intellect, because in it the species has already been produced, but in the present case we are precisely inquiring how phantasms concur to its production. Thirdly, the term is not in something adjacent to the phantasm, as light is diffused through the air up to the color and remains contiguous to it. For the power derived from the agent intellect is spiritual. But a spiritual power cannot be diffused around a corporeal thing any more than it can be subjected immediately in the phantasm itself. Therefore (1). VI. — Fourth conclusion: Formal illumination by something spiritual derived from the intellect into the phantasms, inhering in them, and rendering them actually intelligible, cannot be admitted. A phantasm is essentially material. But something spiritual can by no means be subjected or inhere in a material thing. Therefore it is incompatible that spiritual light inhere in the phantasm itself. Likewise, it is of

the essence of a phantasm to be only potentially intelligible, otherwise it would in no way be distinguished from the intelligible species. Therefore, if it is rendered actually intelligible by illumination, it is intrinsically changed, and is no longer a phantasm. The adversaries are therefore bound by this dilemma: either phantasms retain the same essence, or they are destroyed. If they cease and are destroyed, they do not concur in the production of the species; if they retain the same essence, they cannot be the subject or place of the immaterial, nor become actually intelligible. VII. — Fifth conclusion: The agent intellect places only something actual in the phantasm, namely a motion by which the phantasm is elevated to produce the intelligible species, in which the object is first represented in an immaterial and intelligible mode (2). From what has been said, the phantasm must concur in the production of the species. But, since it is material, it cannot concur to a spiritual effect by its own power. Therefore it must receive from the agent intellect a certain power by which it is elevated. But again this power cannot be something radical, or something inhering in a permanent

and habitual way, as has been shown in the preceding. Therefore it is some spiritual power communicated in a transient way, or by way of motion. Therefore the agent intellect places in the phantasm some transient power, or some motion by which the phantasm is elevated to produce the intelligible species as an instrument of the agent intellect, and so the phantasm and the intellect mutually influence each other. For, as John of St. Thomas excellently explains, « just as the power of the artisan is determined by the axe to produce a sharp incision, and again the instrument is directed by the art, so that the incision may be made straight or circular; so the power of the agent intellect is determined by the phantasm to elicit the species of such an object or quiddity, and again the phantasm, by that motion and elevation of the agent intellect, produces a species representing that quiddity in an immaterial mode and without the conditions of matter. » VIII. — A double di fficulty is elucidated. Two things, however, remain to be

clarified. In our opinion, transient spiritual power is received in the corporeal phantasm, and the corporeal phantasm concurs in the production of a spiritual effect. Therefore, to more fully vindicate that opinion, it must be shown 1° that an elevated corporeal instrument can concur in the action of a spiritual cause; 2° that spiritual power in a transient mode can be received in a corporeal subject. 1° That a corporeal instrument can cooperate in the action of a spiritual cause is admitted

by Theologians. The fire of hell is corporeal and yet really acts upon the spiritual substance of demons. Corporeal sacraments are divinely elevated to cause spiritual grace. If this happens supernaturally, when corporeal instruments are separate from a spiritual cause, it seems it can happen naturally when the corporeal instrument and the spiritual cause are united in one essence. For not only by theological examples, but also philosophically, the thing can be explained. Just as the body, because it is joined with the soul in one essence, can naturally influence the spiritual soul, so, it seems, the sensible phantasm, because it is joined with the agent intellect in one essence, can naturally be elevated by it to concur in its spiritual action. 2° A complete and permanent spiritual power indeed cannot be subjected in a material thing; because a perfect accident is for the sake of the subject in which it inheres, and therefore must be proportioned to it, hence in this case the axiom holds: Everything received is received according to the mode of the receiver. But a power communicated in a transient way is essentially wayfaring, essentially tending to a term; wherefore it must be commensurate and proportioned to the term, not to the subject. Hence, since it is not for the sake of the subject, the axiom does not hold in this case: Everything received is received according to the mode of the subject. Therefore it is not incompatible that spiritual power be received in a corporeal thing; indeed, this is necessary, so that corporeal things may be subordinated and joined to spiritual things, by which they naturally ought to be ruled and moved. IX. — Other di fficulties are solved. 1° An instrument must have a previous dispositive operation for

the e ffect of the principal cause. But a phantasm does not have a previous dispositive action. Therefore. Resp. : I deny the minor. The phantasm exercises a previous dispositive action, because it operates representatively, and of itself has the power to make a species similar to itself. For phantasms naturally can impress species similar to themselves, and this is the previous dispositive operation; but that these species become spiritual comes from the higher elevating power, and this is the power which phantasms receive from the principal cause. 2° A phantasm is material. But the material cannot become spiritual. Therefore a phantasm cannot become a spiritual species or generate it. Resp. : Let the major pass. Distinguish the minor: The material cannot become spiritual positively and by subsistence, I grant; precisely and by abstraction, I deny. And I deny the consequence. The thing should not be conceived as if the same numerically identical phantasm flits from the imagination into the intellect and becomes spiritual; that is indeed incompatible; but it does not at all imply that the same object which was first represented in the external sense in an intentional mode, and afterwards in the imagination in a still more perfect mode, can finally be represented in a spiritual mode by abstraction from the phantasm. We have let the major pass. It should be noted, however, that

the phantasm, although it is material and singular according to subjective being, nevertheless objectively contains the nature of the universal. Wherefore in it the universal (and therefore the immaterial) exists not formally, but fundamentally. X. — The ultimate di fficulty: how the agent intellect is reduced to act. A cause must be assigned which reduces the agent intellect to act. This, moreover, is either God, or the phantasm, or the intellect itself. But God, although He is the first moving cause, is not however the sole cause; the phantasm, however, does not reduce the intellect to act, otherwise the intellect would depend on the phantasm, and would no longer be considered active. The reducing cause, finally, is not the agent intellect itself. This is shown thus: If the intellect reduced itself to act, it would

operate independently of phantasms. But, when phantasms are lacking, it cannot operate. Therefore. The operation of the agent intellect therefore remains inexplicable. Resp. : The agent intellect, as active, reduces itself to act, always assuming the previous motion of God. To the major of the argument, however, it is replied: The agent intellect would operate independently of phantasms, in this sense that it is not intrinsically changed by phantasms, I

grant; in this sense that it should not presuppose phantasms as objects upon which it acts, I deny. Thus, the powers of the vegetative soul are active, and yet they presuppose an object which they must transmute, and, lacking such an object, their operation fails. So too, the agent intellect, in order to elicit an action, requires the presence of phantasms. If phantasms are lacking, the intellect will cease from action, not from defect of its own power, but from defect of a required condition. XI. — Recent controversy about the agent intellect. The existence of the agent intellect is vigorously attacked by V. Bernies, whose objections are answered by Domet de Vorges, J. Gardair, A. Charousset. It is objected, therefore: 1° If there were an agent intellect, its existence would be known to us by conscience and experience. But conscience and experience do not testify to that existence. Therefore. Resp. : Distinguish the major: Its existence is known to us by ART.VI.—ON THE MANNER IN WHICH PHANTASMS CONCUR.91 conscience and experience, indirectly and by reasoning, I grant; directly and as an immediate object of conscience, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and I deny the consequence. The soul in the present state is conscious of understanding, but it does not intuit its intellective faculty (1), but infers its nature from its act. Just as from the analysis of its act it proves that it has ideas, although it does not intuit ideas, so by experiencing that it understands depending on phantasms, it infers that it enjoys a certain power which draws ideas from phantasms. It is a fact of conscience and experience that « when someone tries to understand something, he forms for himself some phantasms by way of examples in which he may, as it were,

inspect what he is trying to understand (2). » It is likewise a fact of conscience and experience « that when the act of the imaginative power is impeded by injury to the organ, as in the insane, and similarly when the act of the memorative power is impeded, as in the lethargic, intellection itself is impeded (3). » Thus conscience and experience testify that our intellection depends on sensibles; moreover, no reason for that dependence can be given unless it be admitted that our ideas are formed from sensibles. On the other hand, it is clear that sensibles are not the proper and adequate cause of ideas: hence the necessity of a certain intellectual and active power which abstracts ideas from sensibles. Let the arguments by which the thesis was established be recalled. Wherefore the existence of the agent intellect is indeed proved by the testimony of experience and conscience, but by reasoning. 2° The agent intellect, since it is a blind power, cannot produce ideas nor illuminate the phantasm. Resp. : Although the agent intellect is not formally cognitive, it can be the cause of ideas, just as something can illuminate, although it is not formally light. — « Is it not strange that the phenomenon of light, for example the idea, should be the fruit of darkness? — What an anomaly! a blind faculty creator of light! — Neither strangeness, nor anomaly. When you strike a match, you produce light. Is there light in the match and the friction? Not at all; therefore darkness in the cause, light in the effect. Same law in the phe- (1). Cf. S. Tnox. I. P . q. 87 et q. 88. (2). I. P . q. 84, a. 7. (3). Ibid.

nomenon of vision: the heterogeneous produces the heterogeneous. Indeed, vision implies light, knowledge; the visual sense, which is its cause, implies neither knowledge nor light (1). 3° The action of the agent intellect is psychologically and metaphysically inexplicable. Resp. : Although the action of the agent intellect might be difficult to explain, its existence would not therefore be denied, if on the other hand the theory is proved to be the sole hypothesis for explaining the fact of experience that our intellection depends on sensibles. Moreover, a fitting account of that action is given, as is clear from our

conclusions on the illumination of the agent intellect and from the solution of difficulties. a Should the agent intellect be retained? Why not, if by this expression one designates the intellectual activity uniting to produce the idea? This expression is as just as it is venerable (2). 1) A. CHABOUSSET, Revue de Philosophie, février

1906, p. 203 (2). A. CHABOUSSET, loc. cit. p. 207. — For the rest cf. Revue de Philo- sophie, t. IV, pp. 284, 568 ; t. V, 90, 226, 771 ; t. VI, 94 ; t. VII, 593 ; t. VIII, 193. — It is permissible to quote the singular testimony of A. V. Cassy : I may be allowed to confess, I was for several years without understanding the holy Doctor. I saw in this abstraction only a simple dissociation of the elements provided by the senses. Hence I was unable to explain the role attributed to sensible images and to intelligence in the formation of concepts. But since I became aware of the absolute, universal and necessary character of intellectual knowledge, the teaching of the Angelic Doctor has seemed to me to express in a very simple way an operation which we constantly renew consciously. « Etudes comparées sur la Philosopie de S. Thomae d'Aquin et sur celle de Duns Scot, p. 134. Our doctrine is resumed in Thes. XIX approved by the S. Cong. of Studies 27 July 1914 : Therefore we receive cognition from sensible things. But since the sensible is not actually intelligible apart from the intellect formally understanding, an active power must be admitted in the soul which abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. »

ARTICLE SEVEN — On The Relation Of The Agent Intellect To The Possible Intellect.

I. — THE IN FLUENCE OF THE AGENT INTELLECT ON THE POSSIBLE.

We have shown that the agent intellect influences phantasms, using them as instruments; but moreover, according to St. Thomas, the agent intellect illuminates the possible intellect by manifesting through its light the first principles and, mediately, those things which are known through principles. In what this illumination consists must be briefly investigated. II. — Conclusion: The agent intellect

does not illuminate the possible intellect immediately, but by means of abstracted species in which the power of the intellectual light shines. It does not illuminate immediately, neither by knowing nor by producing any habitual light in the intellect. Not by knowing, because the agent intellect is not formally cognitive, as will be said shortly. Not by producing any habitual light. For every habit is either acquired or infused. Moreover, an acquired cognitive habit is generated by cognitive acts, but the acts of the agent intellect are not cognitive; an infused habit, however, proceeds from God alone. Therefore the agent intellect cannot produce a habit, or habitual light, in the possible intellect. The whole light, therefore, which the agent intellect infuses into the possible intellect is derived from abstracted species. The species are immediately abstracted from sensibles by the agent intellect; whence it happens that in these species the object is intelligibly manifested, and the intellectual light shines forth. By means, therefore,

of the species, by means of their light, the agent intellect manifests objects to the possible intellect, and influences all its acts and cognitions. This seems to be the explicit teaching of the Angelic Doctor: « The possible intellect cannot have actual cognition of principles except through the agent intellect; for the cognition of principles is received from sensibles, but from sensibles intelligibles cannot be received except through the power of the agent intellect (1). » III. — Whether the agent intellect and the possible intellect are diverse powers. Some, like Avicenna, Averroes, held that the agent intellect is a substance separate from our soul, and one for all men. This error has already been refuted elsewhere (2). The Nominalists, especially Okam and Gabriel Biel, although they admit that the agent intellect is something of the soul, nevertheless assert that the agent and possible intellect of the same man are simply the same power and do not differ in reality. This opinion has been embraced by the Cartesians, Rosmini, Gioberti, and all who deny that ideas are acquired from the senses by abstraction. Some Scholastics think a virtual distinction suffices; or, in other words, that the agent and possible

intellect are diverse functions of the same faculty. The more prominent Scholastics, however, following B. Albert, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, advocate a real distinction.

IV. — Conclusion: The agent intellect and the possible intellect are two really distinct powers. Proof. From Aquinas himself: « Sometimes four intellects are posited, namely the agent, possible, habitual, and acquired; of these four, the agent and possible are diverse powers, just as in all things there is another active and passive power; but the other three are distinguished according to the three states of the possible intellect (3). » But when he affirms that they are diverse powers, he does not understand a virtual distinction, otherwise intellect and memory

and reason would be diverse powers, which he absolutely denies. Therefore he intends a real distinction. Still more clearly in the II. Sententiarum: « Nor do I again say that these two, namely the agent and possible intellect, are one power differently named according to diverse operations... because whatever operations are reduced to diverse principles, it is impossible to reduce them to the same power. But since to receive intelligible species, which is of the possible intellect, and to make them intelligible, which is of the agent intellect, cannot belong to the same thing; but to receive belongs to something according as it is in potency, and to make according as it is in act, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE THAT THE AGENT AND POSSIBLE NOT BE DIVERSE POWERS (1). » Proof by reason. Powers are diversified by the formally diverse mode in which they relate to their object. But to relate to the object as agent and transmuting, and to relate as passive and transmuted, are formally diverse modes. Therefore the agent intellect, which is transmuting, and the possible intellect, which is transmuted, are really diverse powers. B. Albertus Magnus presents the argument thus: « It is impossible that the same thing according to the same aspect be mover and moved. But the rational soul according to the agent intellect is

mover, according to the possible is moved. Therefore it is impossible that the agent and possible intellect be the same (2). » Although they are two intellects, there is not however a twofold understanding, for the agent intellect does not understand formally, but only efficiently. « It does not follow that there is a twofold understanding in man, says the Angelic Doctor, because for one understanding both of these operations must concur (3). » Cognition, therefore, is integrated by two really distinct powers, one which relates as efficiently cognitive, namely as causative of the species; the other which is formally intellective and productive of the mental word (4). (1) S. THOMAS, q. De Anima, a. 4, ad. 6. (2) Cf. vol. II, pp. 479-480. (3) I. P . q. 79, a. 10. (1) II Sent., dit. 17, q. 2, a. 1.— Cf. ARISTOT. III De Anima, text. 19 (2) B. ALBANTOs MAGNUS, De Homine, Tract. 1, q. 53, a. 4. (3) S. THOMAS, QQ.Diupp, De Anima, a. 4, ad. 8. (4) « The active intellect is an e fficient cause which produces the intelligible

V. — The agent intellect is in no way a cognitive power. Although some Scholastics, such as B. Albert, Scotus, Cajetan, seem to admit that the agent intellect is a cognitive power, the common opinion denies it. And rightly. For that intellect cannot be called cognitive whose action is not intellection; for intellectual cognition other than intellection is not conceived. But the action of the agent intellect is not intellection. Therefore the agent intellect is not cognitive. Proof of the minor. The action of the agent intellect is abstraction, or production of the intelligible species. But the production of the intelligible species is not intellection; for intellection requires a vivid and actual representation of the object as actually known, but the

intelligible species is a representation only in a habitual state. Therefore the action of the agent intellect is not intellection. That faculty, therefore, is intellectual causally, insofar as it forms the idea, but not formally, because it does not elicit intellection. VI. — The diverse functions of the agent intellect. Four can be assigned: 1° to turn itself to phantasms, in which the universal is contained; 2° to illuminate phantasms, as explained in the preceding article;

3° to abstract intelligible species from phantasms; 4° to illuminate the possible intellect. Each of these is clear from what has been said. VII. — What are the operations of the possible intellect. Since, therefore, intellection belongs only to the possible intellect, it is asked what are the operations of understanding. We have assigned a threefold in Logic: first, simple apprehension, by which the quiddity of a thing is understood, without however affirming or denying anything about it; to which operation corresponds the utterance of simple words. Second, judgment, or composition and division, by which we understand one thing by joining it to another, either affirming or denying: to which operation corresponds speech properly so called, which takes place only through propositions. Third, reasoning, by which from one known thing we know another: to which operation corresponds vocal discourse and argumentation. According to this threefold operation, there are three parts of Logic. But a difficulty is raised by the moderns. The Cartesians think that judgment is not an act of the intellect but of the will. It is true indeed that the will applies the intellect to make a judgment, indeed exerts a special influence when the object is not evident: judgment is therefore imperated by the will. But formally and elicitively it is of the intellect. For since judgment is an act in which formal truth is properly and perfectly found, it must belong to that faculty of which truth is the proper object. But truth is the proper and specificative object of the intellect. Therefore. The Kantians contend that the first operation of the intellect is not simple apprehension, but judgment. How far they stray from the truth is easily shown. It is the function of judgment to bind, join, compose, divide simple concepts. But the act of binding presupposes the elements to be bound. Just as, therefore, a mason does not bind stones unless he already has the stones to be bound, so the intellect does not judge unless it first has the concepts to be joined. It is evident, therefore, that apprehension is prior to judgment. Let what we have discussed about the acts prerequired for judgment be recalled (1). There is, however, some truth in that opinion with respect to certain

ideas: for there are many ideas which are generated from various combined judgments. They are therefore posterior to the judgment by which they are produced. But on the other hand they are prior to the judgment which will be formed from them. For when they are taken as elements of a judgment, their apprehension will be prior to that judgment, and thus it is universally verified that apprehension is prior to judgment, and judgment is prior to reasoning. species necessary for the act of cognition; the possible intellect, that is to say the understanding, is the faculty which, as a result of the production of the intelligible species by which it has been informed, accomplishes the cognitive act and deploys the actual thought of an object. But to produce an intelligible form and to receive it, to act by efficiency and to know, are irreducible acts. Therefore the faculties which emit them are irreducible in turn. » Card. Mascuen, Psychol. n. 172. VIII. — On intellectual attention. Among the various acts which are reduced to simple apprehension, attention is especially considered by moderns. Attention is something which has a place in every perception, (1) Logia e. pp. 119-120.

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even sensitive: the subject must attend so that the perception may be fully accomplished. Concerning it, as also concerning conscious or unconscious sensations, we have discussed elsewhere (1). But on the other hand, we must beware of the error of Condillac, de Laromiguière, Taine, etc., who hold that all attention is only a more vivid sensation. On the contrary, there is spiritual and intellectual attention, just as there is abstraction itself. Just as

the mind can consider something separately from others, and thus abstract, so it can reduce its application to one thing rather than others for inspection, as if fleeing from others to fix its gaze on one object for more accurate knowledge, and thus attend. Attention can occur in two ways, as the Angelic Doctor observes: « Sometimes indeed from the fact that a man has a will spontaneously turning away from the consideration of such a principle...; in

another way by the occupation of the mind with other things which it loves more, by which the mind is turned away from the inspection of this principle (2). » A twofold attention is therefore distinguished: one spontaneous and natural, which arises from internal affections and life's necessities. « One can say that if attention has as its cause affective states which have as their causes tendencies, needs, appetites, it is ultimately connected with what is most profound in the individual, the instinct of self-preservation (3). » The other is voluntary, insofar as the act of attending itself is commanded by the will. « The act of reason can be considered in two ways: one in terms of exercise; and thus the act of reason can always be commanded: as when someone is told to attend and use his reason (4). » Voluntary attention can be directed and cultivated, and hence becomes to some extent artificial, concerning whose exercise one may consult Ribot (5). This attention, however, can be disturbed: hence morbid states of attention. They can occur either by excess (hypertrophy of attention). (1) Vol. II, pp. 577, 588-590. (2) II II , q. 15, a. 1. (3) Tn. Ribot, Psychologie de l'Attention. p. 43. (4) S. Thomas, I II , q. 17, a. 6. (5) Tn. Ribot, Op. cit. 2. II. « Absolute predominance of one state, or group of states, which becomes stable, fixed, which cannot be dislodged from consciousness (1).» To this are referred hypochondria, fixed ideas, etc. — Or by defect (atrophy of attention). « In the second group, I will include cases where attention cannot be maintained, nor even often constituted... Numerous examples are found among hysterics, those with irritable weakness, convalescents, apathetic and insensitive subjects, in drunkenness, in a state of extreme fatigue of body or mind (2).» For all these, Ribot may be consulted, but must be read with caution, for this philosopher, although truly distinguished, being devoted to rationalism and positivism, is entirely incapable of understanding spiritual and supernatural phenomena, e.g., the ecstasies of the saints. IX. — On the conversion of the possible intellect to phantasms. The agent intellect is said to abstract from phantasms, but the possible intellect is said to turn itself to phantasms. The necessity of this

conversion is frequently inculcated by the Angelic Doctor. The object of our intellect, as will be shown below, is the quiddity of a material thing. But the quiddity of a material thing exists only in the individual. Therefore the intellect, in order to attain its proper object, must turn itself to individuals, and consequently to phantasms in which singulars are represented. Hence it is that when we try to understand something, we form phantasms in which we inspect, and as it were explore, the truth of singulars. This conversion can be explained in two ways, as Bannez explains: « First, that the intellect itself turns upon the sensitive powers by way of a certain reflection, knowing singulars as they are represented there. This conversion indeed occurs in the explicit knowledge of singulars, but is by no means required in the direct act by which the quiddity of a thing is attained. Second, that the soul through the intellect knows the universal nature itself; through the sensitive power, however, it knows the singular. And in this sense the expositors of St. Thomas commonly take it. (1) Op. cit. c. III, p. 117. (2) Ibid., pp. 118-119.

« But if someone should object: Therefore according to this doctrine the intellect does not know the nature as existing in some particular, but rather the imaginative power itself knows this. It is replied by denying the consequence; rather, just as the imaginative power knows an accident as existing in a substance, although it does not know the substance itself, which only the intellect knows; so conversely the intellect can know the universal nature according to the

mode of existing in some particular, although it does not see the singular itself, which the imaginative power sees. For we do not say that the intellect knows the nature as existing in some particular as in a seen thing; but that it sees the nature according to the mode which it has in some particular, by way however of a universal form, when the imaginative power knows the singular itself (1). » To which it is opportune to add these things. Intelligible species, although they represent the universal nature, are nevertheless drawn from singular phantasms. Since,

therefore, they depend to some extent on singulars in their production, they cannot entirely prescind from the connotation of singulars. Thus, in every cognition the intelligible species, although it does not determinately represent some singular, nevertheless necessarily imports a certain connotation of the singular from which it was abstracted. Therefore, this idea cannot be had except through a certain connotation or order to the singular, and consequently through a certain conversion to it. (1) BAXKER, Comment. in I. P . q. 84, a. 6.

QUESTION THREE.

On the mental word (1). Once the intelligible species is obtained, intellection is not yet had, which is perfected only in the mental word. Hence, having solved the questions concerning the impressed species, the discussion passes to the expressed species, which is the term of cognition.

ARTICLE ONE — On The Nature And Necessity Of The Mental Word.

I. — A threefold word. When the intellect actually understands, four things are present to us: 1° the intellective power; 2° the impressed species, which constitutes the intellect as a proximate and complete principle; 3° intellection, or the proper action of the intellect, which attains the object itself; 4° the term of intellection itself, or the word or concept. A word in general is distinguished in three ways: the external word, or spoken word; the imagined word; and the mental word, or word of the heart, which is treated here. The spoken word is a voice signifying the internal concept; the imagined word, however, is a likeness, or exemplar, of the spoken word existing in the phantasy; the mental word, finally, is the internal concept itself which is manifested by the spoken word. (1) One should especially consult S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 27, a. 1, q. 34, a. 1, q. 37, a. 1 ; I. II , q. 93, a. 1, ad 2; QQ. Diapp., De Potent. q. 8, a. 1, q. 9, a. 5, q. 9, De Veritate, a. 1; Quodlib. 5, a. 9 ; Opusc. 13 et opusc. 14. Cf. JOAK. A S. THOM, Phil. Nat. III.P . q. XI, a. II.

Because the external word, since it is sensible, is more known to us than the internal word, according to the imposition of names, the vocal word is called word before the internal word; but with respect to reality, the mental word is prior. For the oral word does not have the nature of a word unless it refers to some concept by way of a sign. But a sign presupposes the thing which it signifies. Therefore the oral word presupposes a concept, or mental word. External words signify only by human convention, hence they relate to us as certain artifacts. Moreover, in an artifact, first is the intention of the end; second, the devising or imagining of the artificial form; third, the artificial product itself: so likewise, first is the internal concept itself, or word of the mind; second, the exemplar of the external word, and this is called the internal word, which has the image of the voice; and the external expressed word, which is called the word of the voice (1). II. — De finition of the mental word. According to St. Thomas, two things are of the nature of the mental word: 1° that it be the likeness and similitude of the thing understood, and 2° that it be always something proceeding from the intellect and existing in the intellect. It can therefore be defined as: The expressed likeness of an object actually understood, generated by the intellect,

which is the intrinsic term of intellection. 1° It is an image of the object, but of the object as actually understood, an image which is expressed from the impressed species. When the understander and the understood are really the same, the word is an image of the understander himself; otherwise, if the understander is not the understood thing, yet the word is always an image of the thing understood. 2° Generated by the mind, for the word proceeds from the mind as a certain spiritual o ffspring, hence it is called a concept. 3° An intrinsic term, so that it may be distinguished from the extrinsic and objective term, or the object itself which is expressed through the word. III. — Hence it appears how great the di fference is between the intelligible species and the mental word. The intelligible

species is a principle of intellection, but the word is a term. The impressed species is the cause and parent of the word. For the intellect is fecundated by the intelligible species, bursts forth into act, and generates the word.

Thus, the intelligible species and the word relate to each other as principle and term, as cause and effect. Moreover, cause and effect, principle and end, are really distinguished. Moreover, those things which are elicited by diverse faculties are really distinct. But the intelligible species is produced by the agent intellect, the word, however, by the possible intellect, which are two faculties really distinct. Therefore. IV. — A twofold question. It is asked 1° whether the word is distinguished from intellection; 2° whether it is produced in every intellection. These two questions have given rise to many notable controversies among both philosophers and theologians. V. — Conclusion: Intellection really di ffers from the word. Against Suarez, Vasquez, and many others. Proof from St. Thomas: « The word is the term of the intellectual operation, for the intellect by understanding conceives and forms a word (1).» Moreover, a term is really distinguished from the action which produces it, just as an effect is really distinguished from its cause. — « The intellect in understanding can be referred to four things, namely to the thing which is understood, to the intelligible species by which it is made in act, to its own understanding, and to the conception of the intellect, which conception differs from the three said things (2).» By reason. That to which intellection is immediately terminated must be really distinct from it; for unless it really differs, every intellection is really terminated to itself, and thus is really reflexive. But intellection per se first and immediately is terminated to the mental word, not however immediately to the external object, which is not according to itself present in the intellect. Therefore the mental word is really distinct from intellection. VI. — The di fficulty is solved. Intellection is that by which the intellect is constituted in second act. But through the word the (1) IV Contra Gent., c. 11. (2) Q. 8, De Potentia, a. 1.

intellect is constituted in second act. — Therefore the word is intellection itself. Resp. : Distinguish the major: Intellection is that by which the intellect is constituted in second act formally, I grant; that by which it is constituted in second act terminatively, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: Through the word the intellect is constituted in second act terminatively, I grant; in second act formally, I deny; and I deny the conclusion. — The intellect is made in second act in two ways: 1° through that which is actually and formally understanding, and this is intellection, just as generally every cause is actually and formally cause through its action; 2° through that which terminates and completes the action, and this term is the mental word. Moreover, intellection and its term are really distinguished, otherwise every intellection would be reflexive, as has been said. VII. — Whether intellection is the production of the word. The action by which the word is formed is commonly called dictation by the Scholastics, because through it the mind

expresses and says within itself the object. They ask, however, whether dictation is really distinguished from intellection. Those who hold that the word does not differ from intellection introduce a distinction between dictation and intellection. — Cajetan, however, Bannez, John of St. Thomas, and the Thomists generally, hold that the action by which we understand the object and by which we express its word is one and the same. VIII. — Conclusion: Dictation, or the expression of the word, is not an action distinct from intellection in reality, but only modally. Proof from St. Thomas: « That to speak in us not only signi fies to understand, but to understand with the fact of expressing from itself some conception, nor can we understand otherwise than by expressing such a conception, and therefore all understanding in us properly speaking is speaking (1).» By reason. Since the word is an image of the thing, not in any way, but of the thing as actually understood, the word cannot be generated unless the thing is rendered actually understood. But the thing cannot be rendered actually understood except through understanding and being understood. Therefore the word cannot be

produced except through understanding and being understood. By the same action, therefore, the thing is understood and the word is formed. In reality, the expression of the word is an action of the possible intellect; but it is difficult to conceive an operation of the possible intellect which is not intellection, just as there is no act of the will which is not some volition. For what is the word of the mind? It is the manifestation of the thing in the intellect. But what is it to be manifested to the intellect except to be understood by it? Therefore the production of the word cannot be anything else in reality than intellection. However, dictation and intellection differ in mode. For intellection implies only the relation of the understander to the thing understood. But the thing understood does not necessarily derive its origin from the understander; wherefore in intellection the notion of origin is not implied. Dictation, however, denotes the relation of the speaker to the thing spoken, or to the word. Moreover, every word derives its origin from the speaker, just as every speech from the speaker, and every generated thing from its generator. Hence dictation implies the notion of origin, which intellection does not involve. And this distinction has importance especially in Theology, on account of the divine relations, in which the Word has its origin from the Father speaking. IX. — Whether intellection can exist without a produced word. It is clear, therefore, that every dictation is an intellection; but it is asked whether equally every intellection is a dictation. Rosmini contends that the word is produced only in reflexive cognition. The Scholastics, however, commonly teach that the word is always formed in every created intellection; they dispute, however, whether the word is also produced in the beatific vision. Many theologians with Suarez affirm it; but most Thomists reply that the word is not elicited when the divine essence is most present to the intellect and most intelligible. It is not our purpose to decide this theological question in the present context; let it suffice to explain the matter philosophically. X. — Conclusion: In every created intellection (except perhaps the intuitive intellection by which the blessed see

God) a mental word is formed. Proof from St. Thomas: « Whoever understands, from the very fact that he understands, there proceeds something within himself which is a conception

of the thing understood, coming from the intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge. This conception the voice signifies, and is called the word of the heart, the signified of the spoken word (1.) — « Always when something is actually understood, a word is formed (2).» By reason. Every actual intellection requires that the object be intimately present to the intellect, not only in the notion of an intelligible thing in first act, but in the notion of a term actually known. But the object of every intellection other than the beatific vision is either not within the intellect according to itself; or if it is present according to itself, it is not sufficiently actual to be a known term: for no creature has the property of being essentially a term actually known. Therefore every created intellection requires that the object be united to the intellect

through an image of itself as actually known. But this image is not the intelligible species, which is only a habitual representation and constitutes the intellect in first act of understanding. Therefore another species is required, more actual, more vivid, namely the mental word, by which the thing is made known in second act. Therefore in every created intellection a word, or expressed species, is formed. In the intuitive vision, however, the Thomists say a word is not required. For the divine essence is intimately and according to itself present to the blessed intellect; according to itself it is most actual, nor can it be made more actual. Therefore it alone can terminate cognition actually. On the other hand, the word is a likeness of the thing understood; moreover, no created thing can be an adequate likeness of the divine essence. Therefore the vision of the divine essence, far from requiring, indeed excludes the word. To those who object that there is no action without a produced term, they reply that this is to be understood of action which is essentially movement and a way to a term, not however of action which is a perfect act and ultimate

actuality, such as intellection. But more of this by theologians. XI. — Intellection is not strictly in the predicament of physical action. On the occasion of this difficulty, the Thomists show that intellection is not in the strict sense of the predicament of action, but rather in the genus of quality. For predicamental action denotes something flowing with motion, and relates correlatively to passion. But intellection is neither in itself something flowing, nor does it essentially denote passion, but only implies perfection. For intellection is not ordered to an extrinsic work, but to perfecting the operator himself; and in itself it is the ultimate perfection intended by the intellect. « Immanent action, says St. Thomas, is not directly in the predicament of action (1). » Although, therefore, every predicamental operation requires a term, not therefore does every intellection essentially require a produced term. Intellection, therefore, like generally all immanent actions, because it is ordered to the well- being of its subject, is reduced to the predicament of quality. It can, however, be called action in a metaphysical sense, insofar as it is a true actuation and true activity, a true development of intellectual energy. (1) Op. 3a. XLVIII.

ARTICLE TWO.

QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MENTAL WORD (1).

If, however, it is considered as a subjective modification and accident of the intellect, it cannot be known except reflexively, insofar as the intellect returns upon its act by a certain reflection; in this way it is a certain spiritual thing, and relates as the impressed species does, namely it is that by which the thing is understood, not that which is understood first. It can therefore be called the medium by which, but not the medium in which. I. — Whether the mental word is the medium in which a thing is understood. A threefold medium can be distinguished: the medium under which, the medium by which, and the medium in which a thing is understood. — The medium under which is the light of the intellect; the medium by which is the intelligible species; the medium in which is that by which,

once known, another thing is known. Let it be recalled, however, that the word, like the intelligible species, can be taken in two ways: 1° objectively, as it is the image of an actually known object; 2° subjectively, as it is a certain thing, or subjective modi fication of the intellect. With these preliminaries, it is established III. — A di fficulty is met, and it is shown that the word can be called the medium in which without incurring the danger of idealism. We have asserted that the word is the medium in which, or the first term of cognition, but from this a fall into idealism seems to follow. For if the word, and not the object, is first understood, the objective reality of our cognitions is lost. Resp. : The word, as an image, forms one known thing with the thing which is known, just as matter has one being with form; therefore they are not two known things, but one. For the same notion of quiddity is one and the same, whether it is considered outside the mind, in the thing itself, or in the word as it is an image, since they differ only in the mode of being.

II. — Conclusion: The mental word, if considered as an image, is the medium in which a thing is understood; not, however, if it is taken as a subjective modification of the intellect. Proof. The medium in which is that which is first known and the reason for knowing another thing. But both of these belong to the mental word. Therefore it is the medium in which. Proof of the minor. As to the I° part. That is known first which is the first and immediate term of cognition. But what is the first and immediate term of cognition is the mental word, not the external object. Therefore. And indeed, the first thing known by the intellect must be within the intellect itself; this, however, belongs to the word alone, in no way to the object. As to the other part. The reason for knowing a thing is the form itself by which the thing is made actually known. But the thing is made actually known through the mental word, in which it is actually expressed. Therefore the word is the reason for knowing the thing. Under this respect, therefore, the word is essentially representative, and is truly the medium in which. The intellect and the object are so assimilated through the word that they become one known being; hence

the axiom: The intellect by understanding becomes all things. Since the word is essentially representative, what is really attained and known is properly the object, but in the word and by means of the word. It would indeed be idealism, if the word subjectively taken were known first: because then the same motion towards the word and towards the object would not be identical. To understand this, it must be recalled that there is a twofold motion by which the soul is borne towards some image. There is one motion by which the soul tends to the image as a certain thing, and another by which it comes to the image as an image of another. « The first motion by which one is moved to the image, as it is a certain thing, is other than the motion which is towards the thing; but the second motion, which is towards the image, insofar as it is an image, is one and the same with that which is towards the thing (1) ». Thus the motion by which the mind is borne towards the word, as it is a certain thing, or subjective modification of the intellect, is certainly not the same motion as that by which it is led to the object; but the motion

towards the word, as it is an image, does not differ from the motion by which the mind is borne towards the thing itself, since the thing and the word are one known thing. Hence the accusation of idealism is dispelled: the cognition of the word insofar as it is representative is truly the cognition of the object, and therefore is essentially objective. From these explanations it appears with what truth and in what sense the word is said to be that which is understood, that by which it is understood, that in which the thing is understood. It is that which is understood insofar as it is the term known first; it is that by which it is understood insofar as it is the instrument which the mind uses to understand another thing; it is that in which the thing is understood insofar as it is the reason for knowing the thing. IV. — On the di fference between the divine word and the human word. Three principal differences are assigned by St. Thomas (1): 1° The human word is formable before it is formed. For the word is only formed when we perfectly know a thing; but we do not immediately fully know a thing,

but often need much inquiry. The word of God, however, is always in act. 2° Our word is imperfect; hence we cannot say all things which are in the soul with one word; hence we form many words so that each thing may be expressed separately. The word of God, however, is infinitely perfect, and being one, expresses all things. 3° Our word is not of the same nature as we; for it is produced by understanding, which, as an accidental operation, is different from the natural being of the soul. In God, however, the word is of exactly the same nature as God. In us, the word is an accident; in God, the word is a substance. V. — Whether our word is prior or posterior to understanding. According to the di fferent orders, the word is posterior and prior to understanding. Under some respect, the word is the last thing which the intellect can produce, since it is that to which cognition is terminated; in this way, understanding is prior to the word. But under another respect, the word is prior. For the word is that by which the object is had, or is the object itself expressed. But the object is prior to any action terminated to it. Therefore the word is prior to the action terminated to it, namely understanding. Simply speaking, however, the word is posterior. For since understanding is the production of

the word and the word is as it were an effect, simply speaking the word is the last thing in the intellect, just as an effect is posterior to its cause. Hence the word is said to be the ultimate actuality in the intellectual order. VI. — In what way the mental word surpasses the impressed species. The impressed species is a representation in a mere habitual state; but the word is a vivid and actual representation; hence it surpasses the intelligible species as much as ultimate activity exceeds the habitual state. The intelligible species is a likeness merely impressed, merely sayable, merely intelligible; the word is an expressed likeness, a spoken likeness, an understood likeness. The intelligible species does not have the nature of an end, but of a principle; the word, however, is the last thing which the intellect can produce. VII. — Whether the word is illuminated by the agent intellect. It has been said in the

preceding question that the agent intellect influences the possible intellect by means of the light of the intelligible species, and that without that illumination of the agent intellect the possible intellect has no actual cognition of its object. In every actual intellection, therefore, and consequently in every production of the word, there concurs a certain influence of the agent intellect: which illumination, however, is only mediate, as was explained there (1). The word therefore depends to some extent on the action of the active intellect, but simply speaking the light of the word, because it is more actual, is also more perfect and clearer and more vivid than the light of the intelligible species which is derived from the agent intellect and illuminates the passive intellect. VIII. — Why the word is called a concept. It is a metaphor drawn from corporeal generation. A concept in material things is said to be that which by the force of production is assimilated to the generator. But the mental word is something which by the force of its production, namely by the force of intellection, is similar to the object: for cognition (1). In Opuscul. 13, De Diferent. verbi divin. et Hum. (5) Q. II, a. VII, n. II. supra p. 94.

in which the word is formed is a vivid and actual assimilation of the knower to the object. The word is therefore fitly called a concept. The intelligible species, however, although it is similar to the object, is not properly a concept, since it is not a vivid and actual image, but only in habit; it is rather the parent of the word. For the possible intellect is fecundated by the impressed species, because the species actively and efficiently determines the possible intellect, and the intellect thus impregnated produces a spiritual concept, which is the word. The mental word is generated in every intellective cognition, but the oral word is not necessarily formed in either sensitive or intellective cognition; for I can perceive something by sense or mind without expressing it externally in words. The imagined word is not required in every sensible cognition, but only in the cognition of the internal senses; for in the external senses, since the object is present, cognition can be terminated immediately to it, without producing an

expressed species (1). IX. — Whether the mental word depends on the oral word. It has been shown in Natural Philosophy, against De Bonald, that the oral word depends rather on the mental word (1). For the oral word is a sign of the mental concept. Moreover, every sign presupposes the thing signified. Therefore the oral word presupposes the mental word; and thus the oral depends on the mental. However, the oral must serve the mental as the body serves the soul; they must therefore help each other mutually as the soul and the body (2). X. In what way the oral word, the imagined word, and the mental word agree and differ. Each has the nature of a sign, for it is further manifestative; the mental word and the imagined word are indeed formal signs, because they represent by virtue of the likeness itself; but the spoken word is an instrumental sign, which, being first known and insofar as known, leads to the knowledge of another, not by virtue of formal likeness, but by virtue of another connection depending on human convention (3). In nature and dignity, the word of the mind is prior to the imagined and oral, and the imagined itself is prior to the oral; but in the nature of a sign, the oral word holds primacy, for the nature of a sign among men is to be something sensible and external (4). The oral word and the imagined word are of the concrete and singular order, because they are

subject to the conditions of individuating principles; but the word of the mind is entirely spiritual and abstract. XI. The whole process of intellectual cognition is summarized. From all that has been explained concerning ideas and the mental word, it is evident that the intelligible object is in the intellect in two ways: one indeed as impressed and as a principle of cognition, the other as expressed, spoken, and as the term of intellection. The object as impressed is the habitual representation, which is called the intelligible species, and which is fashioned by the agent intellect, with phantasms concurring as instruments, as explained above. That impressed likeness is the principle which determines the possible intellect and with it efficiently concurs in intellection. The object as expressed, however, is the actual

representation, in which the possible intellect says the thing to itself and actually assimilates it to itself. That expressed likeness is called the mental word: it is not intellection itself, but the intrinsic term of intellection, in which the intellect rests and rejoices as in its own and delightful concept and offspring. (1). Cl. Phil. Nat. II.P , q. III, a. ii, n. 1, vol. II, pp. 585-586. ¡¢£€¥ ¦§¨©ª«¬ ®¯°±²³ ´µ¶·¸ ¹º» ¼½¾¿ÀÁÂÃÄ ÅÆÇÈÉÊËÌÍÎÏ ÐÑÒÓÔÕÖ ×ØÙÚÛÜ ÝÞßàáâãäåæçèéêëìíîï ðñòóôõö÷øùúûü ý þÿ On the object of the human intellect (1). The mental word and the object form one and the same intelligible. The consideration of one, therefore, is followed by the consideration of the other; hence the necessity of discussing the object of the intellect both in common and in particular, and therefore of singulars, the soul itself, suprasensible things, etc.

ARTICLE ONE — On The Object Of Our Intellect In General.

I. — The meaning of the question. We have repeatedly distinguished a threefold object: material, formal or proper, and adequate. Here, however, two questions must be dealt with: what is the adequate object of the intellect, and again what is its proper, or formal, or proportioned object. Concerning the material object, no difficulty is raised by anyone. II. — First conclusion: Being in all its breadth is the adequate object of the intellect. Proof. The adequate, or terminative, object of any faculty is all that to which the said faculty can extend itself, whether primarily or secon- (1). One may consult: S. Thomas, in various places as indicated by PARNAS A BIBLIOAMO, in his Table of Contents for all the works of S. Thomas, v. Intellectuals, v. Objectum ; VACANT, Etudes comparées sur la Philosophie de S. Thomas E Aquin et sur celle de Duns Scot, X et XI ; PESCH, Psychol. nn. 719, ss.1 MERCER, Psychol., nn. 154, ss., etc.

darily, whether by its own power or by elevation. But our intellect can extend itself to the whole breadth of being. Therefore being in all its breadth is the adequate object of the intellect. Proof of the minor. If our intellect were unable to extend to the whole breadth of being, this would arise

either from the part of being itself, or from the part of the intellect. But neither can be said. Not the first. — For every being, by the very fact that it is, is true, according to the axiom: being and truth are convertible. But truth implies an order to intellect and is intelligible. Therefore being in all its breadth is intelligible, and therefore can according to itself be attained by the intellect. Not the second. — For experience proves that the intellect perceives the most common notion and the most general concept of being. Moreover, all other intelligible notions, all other concepts, are only determinations of the notion and concept of being: for this most universal notion is imbibed in all the differences which contract it. Wherefore, if the intellect can extend itself to the most common notion of being, it becomes capable of perceiving all other intelligible notions, which are contained under that general notion (1). It therefore attains being

in all its breadth: substances and accidents, material and spiritual things, relations and modes. Hence it also follows that it is not incompatible that the divine essence itself be seen by a created intellect, if it is elevated by a certain superadded power, which is called the light of glory. III. — Second conclusion: The proper and immediate object of our intellect in the present life is the quiddity of a material thing abstracted from individuating conditions. By the name quiddity is understood substance and what can be conceived by way of a certain nature and essence: thus acci- (1). « Intelligence has as its object the real, under its most general or most indeterminate aspect, being. This indetermination, far from voiding reality as such, presents it to us at its highest point of actuality and realization. Everything that is, is being; nothing is except through being. Universal being is stripped of all determinations of things only because it contains them all in its powerful virtuality. From the outset intelligence fixes itself on it, by virtue of an original destination. It deals with the totality of things, under the collected aspect of being, as an equal. Its activity consists in detailing what it possesses from its first step. » P . GARDER, Revue Thomiste, Janv. 1905, pp. 636-637.

dents, indeed, and even singularity itself in general, are understood after the manner of a universal essence. Nor are only the aforesaid specific things understood by the name of quiddity, but also generic and whatever concurs in constituting a species. Arg. I". The proper object must be proportioned and accommodated to the nature of the knower. For the object is received in the knower; moreover, whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. But the nature of the knowing soul is a form not purely spiritual, but a form in matter, without however material conditions. Therefore the object of the intellect is a form not purely spiritual, but a form of a material thing without material conditions. Moreover, the form of a material thing without material conditions is the quiddity itself of the material thing abstracted from individuating principles; for matter is the principle of individuation. Therefore the object of the intellect is the quiddity of a material thing stripped of singular material conditions. But what is abstracted from singulars is universal. Therefore the proper object of the intellect is the universal. It is confirmed. In this way the difference which exists between the human intellect and the angelic intellect is excellently assigned. For the angel, since it is an entirely immaterial form, claims for itself an entirely immaterial object, namely the quiddity of a spiritual thing; but the soul, since it is a form neither material nor purely spiritual, receives an object neither material nor purely spiritual, and this is the abstract quiddity, which is a form of a material thing without material conditions and impediments. Arg. II". The proper object is that which is primarily attained by the faculty and by reason of which other things are attained. But the essence of a material thing is what is first attained by the intellect and by reason of which other things are attained. Therefore. Proof of the I" part of the minor. The primitive ideas which the intellect generates for itself are abstracted from sensibles (1). But an idea acquired from sensibles by abstraction represents the essence of the thing abstracted from sensibles, as is clear. Therefore what the intellect first attains is the essence of the thing abstracted

from sensibles. Proof of the II" part of the minor. The intellect understands nothing except by ART. I. — ON THE OBJECT OF OUR INTELLECT IN GENERAL. 117 conversion to phantasms (1). But what shines forth in the sensible phantasm is the quiddity of the sensible thing, or the universal with respect to the thing conceived. Therefore the intellect knows nothing except after the mode of sensible quiddity; and even incorporeal things, as experience proves, it understands after the manner of corporeal things, namely either by remotion from corporeal things, or by comparison to corporeal things. Therefore material quiddity is the reason for knowing other things. It is confirmed. It has been proved above (2) that nothing is understood by us unless it is made actually intelligible by the agent intellect. Wherefore the proper and connatural object of our intellect is that which is made actually intelligible by the operation of the agent intellect. But only the quiddity of a material thing is made intelligible by the act of the agent intellect; for the

quiddity of a spiritual thing is actually intelligible by itself. Therefore only the quiddity of a material thing is the connatural object of our intellect. Just as, therefore, common sensibles, although they are attained by sight, are not considered its proper object, because they do not move the visual power per se first; so immaterial things, although they are known by the intellect, are not its proper object, because they do not move it primarily and per se. The thesis is therefore confirmed by experience. « In fact, we are conscious that this is so. To think, we use images, not sometimes, occasionally, but normally and always (3). » Therefore we understand other things not immediately, but after the mode of the quiddity of corporeal things. Indeed, the corporeal quiddity itself is not seen intuitively, but only abstractively, through a concept drawn from singulars. Hence in the present life, besides sensitive perception, there is no intuitive cognition, even of our connatural object. The conclusion is to be taken with respect to the present state; however, the proper object of the separated soul is the quiddity of a spiritual thing. For in that state, the soul does not understand by abstraction from sensibles nor by

conversion to phantasms, but either through its own essence (in which way it intuits itself), or through species

infused by God. Moreover, the essence of the soul and divinely infused species represent an entirely immaterial quiddity. IV. — Di fficulties are solved. — On the mode in which spiritual things are understood. It is objected: 1° If material quiddity is the proper object of the intellect, so that we perceive nothing except after the manner of corporeal things, it follows that spiritual things are not truly and really known by us. But we are certain that we possess true cognition of spiritual things. Therefore. Resp. : Distinguish the major: It follows that spiritual things are not known by proper and adequate cognition, I grant; by some true, albeit analogous, cognition, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor; and deny the consequence. — We do not know spiritual things by a proper concept, but rather by way of remotion; for, as St. Thomas says, « concerning higher things in the sciences, we treat mostly by way of remotion (1). » This mode, however, truly leads to a knowledge of the thing, as is explained below (2). 2° Experience testi fies that spiritual things are not known after the manner of corporeal things. For we acquire the notion of knowledge, of virtue, without any reference to corporeal things: the idea of virtue does not suggest the image of some maiden, nor to think of an angel am I forced to imagine a young man; etc. Therefore. Resp. : To understand a spiritual thing after the manner of corporeal things is not always to behold it in some corporeal image, as in the aforesaid examples, but, as we have said, either by comparison to corporeal things, or by remotion. The thing is explained by examples. — Knowledge is cognition through causes. Moreover, the notion of cognition is derived from the cognition of sensibles, which is more manifest to us; the notion of cause and effect is gathered from experience, by which we see one thing arising from another or through another. In the notion of an angel, namely an incorporeal being, there are three things: body, negation of body, finite. I abstract the idea of body from sensibles; the intellect, however, by using its abstractive power, posits the negation of body; then the notion of finite

is added, which is suggested from sensibles which are necessarily limited. And thus by composing diverse elements ART. I.— ON THE OBJECT OF OUR INTELLECT IN GENERAL. 119 I form the idea of some incorporeal and finite being, which is neither the human soul nor God, and which they call an angel. Universally, therefore, it is verified that spiritual things are understood either by abstraction from corporeal things, or by comparison to corporeal things (1). V. — In what way the intellect attains the quiddity of a material thing. Although the intellect attains quiddity directly and primarily, it does not perceive it perfectly except as existing in some particular. So St. Thomas (2). It is understood, however, that this is in the particular formally and under a determinate aspect, just as the nature of a stone is in this stone, and the nature of man in this man. The necessity of this arises both from the part of the sensible nature itself, which, since it exists in particular things, must be known according to the

mode of existing in some particular; and from the part of the intellect in its present state, by reason of which it performs its operation through species received from particular things. Let it therefore be VI. — Conclusion: The intellect in the present state, whether by perfect or imperfect cognition, cannot attain the quiddity of a material thing unless it knows it as existing in some particular. Proof of the I° part, which concerns perfect cognition. Arg. I am. For perfect cognition of anything, the perception of both principle and term is required. But the mode of existing in a particular has the nature of principle and term in relation to the cognition of material quiddity: indeed the nature of principle, for the quiddity was abstracted from some particular in which the universal is represented; the nature of term, for to know the quiddity the intellect must return and be converted to the particular phantasm, where the universal really exists. Therefore for perfect cognition of quiddity, it is required that the mode of existing in some particular be known. (1) See what we have discussed in the periodical Revue Thomiste, sept. 1906, pp. 413-417 and in our work: Réponses Théologiques, Téqui. (2). Art. IV, n. VI.

Arg. II™. In the cognition of sensible quiddity we come to it through sensible e ffects. But sensible effects cannot be perfectly inspected unless in some particular. « Since no one, says Bannez, can perfectly know how intense heat is or how intense cold is unless he experiences it in some particular. » Therefore for perfect cognition of sensible quiddity it is necessary to know the mode of existing in some particular (1). Proof of the II° part, which concerns imperfect cognition. Imperfect and connotative cognition depends much more on matter and material conditions than perfect cognition. The reason is clear; for the degree of perfection in cognition is derived from the different degrees of abstraction from matter. Therefore the freer cognition is from material conditions, the more perfect it is considered. If, therefore, perfect intellection requires that the mode of existing in some particular be known, much more does imperfect cognition require it (2). VII. — Scholion I. Hence it is clear how unjustly the Scholastics are reproached for having totally neglected experience and constructed their systems a priori. For not only do they hold that nothing is in the intellect unless it was first in the sense, but they also proclaim that no essence, whether by perfect or imperfect cognition, can be understood unless it is inspected in some singular. They therefore establish the perception of facts, the experience of singulars, as the basis and foundation of the scientific edifice. Indeed, lacking investigative means, they could not develop the experimental and positive method with the greatest precision, but they acknowledged its necessity and value. VIII. — Scholion II. « We do not therefore say, says the praised Bannez, that it is necessary to know the nature as existing in a particular because of the singular conditions of this man (1). « Each of our intellectual knowledge comprises simultaneously a thought and an image, and the two representations are so closely united, that it is not even easy to dissociate them mentally... Therefore the proper object of intelligence is an object which must be at the same time an object felt and imagined, in a word, a material object. » MARCHE, loc. cit. (2) Cf. CAJETAN., BANNEZ, Comment. in I. P . q. 84, a. 7.

or this horse (for it is of no importance to know what properties this man or this horse has); but because of the mode of being which the material nature itself has on the part of reality: e.g., what figure or quantity the nature of man or lion has, which properties we cannot perfectly know unless we know the nature itself as existing in some particular. Hence, as Cajetan well notes in his response to the third doubt, that particle of St. Thomas's proposition: as existing in the particular, imports the thing known or a condition on the part of the object which must be known. »

(1) Our whole doctrine is resumed in Thesis XVIII approved by the S. Cong. of Studies 27 July 1914: Immateriality is necessarily followed by intellectuality, and so much so that, according to degrees of elongation from matter, there are also degrees of intellectuality. The adequate object of the intellectual is generally being itself; but the proper object of the human intellect in the present state of union is contained in quiddities abstracted from material conditions. Thesis XX, moreover, teaches the doctrine which we will vindicate in the following articles: « Through these species we directly know universals; we attain singulars by sense and also by the intellect through conversion to phantasms; but we ascend to the cognition of spiritual things by analogy. » 1. — Opinions. The quiddity of a material thing abstracted from singulars is universal; hence the universal is said to be the direct object of the intellect. Singulars, however, are certainly apprehended by us, since we both think about them and make judgments concerning them. But concerning the mode in which they are known by the intellect, no small controversy has arisen among the Scholastics. Scotus, Suarez, Valentia, and many others, both among the ancients and the moderns (2), think that the intellect properly and directly knows singulars; but B. Albert, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Capreolus, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, and the Thomists commonly deny it. In cognition, however, two things concur: the impressed species, and the concept, or mental word. It must therefore be asked whether the intellect knows the singular both through a species directly representative of the singular and

through a concept directly expressive of the singular. II. — First conclusion: The intellect in the present state does not know a singular through an impressed species directly representative of the singular. We willingly concede that singularity in general is directly attained by the intellect; in this way singularity is a certain universal. The conclusion concerns the singular concretely taken. (1) Cf. S. Thomas, I. P . q. 85, a. 1, ad. 3, q. 86, a. 1 ; QQ.Dipp. q. 2, De scientia Dei, a. 6 ; Opusc. De principio individuationis ; Scotus, quodlib. q. 13, n. 9 ; III dist. 14, q. 3, IV dist. 45, q. 3 ; VII Metaphys., q. 45 ; De Anima, q. 23 ; FEBRABENESIS, II Gent., c. 110 ; GAPBOLUS, I Sent., dist. 35, q. 2. solut. arg. cont. 4 conclus.; CAJETANUS, BANNER, Comment. in I. P . q. 86; JOANNES A S. THOMA, Phil. Nat. III, P . q. X, a. 4 ; SUAREZ, IV. De Anima, c. 3 ; Disp. Metaphys. VI, sect. VI. (2). Cf. PEACE, Logic. n. 863, Psychol., n. 859 ; TOPOIOROI, Psychol. n. 382. Arg. Ium. That which is the direct object of sense and which is not intelligible by itself cannot be known directly by the intellect. But the singular is the direct object of sense and is not intelligible according to itself. Therefore. The major is clear: for the direct object of the intellect cannot be common to sense and intellect, but must be essentially intelligible. Proof of the minor. As long as an object is inspected under individuating conditions, nothing shines forth in it that is proper to the intellect: on the contrary, all things pertain to sense, which apprehends as its object whatever is clothed in individuality. Hence it is proved with equal evidence that the singular is not intelligible. For the principle of singularity, or individuation, is matter. But matter is an obstacle to intelligibility: for matter and intellection are opposed, as we have often noted. Therefore what is not abstracted from the principles of singularity is not considered intelligible. True, therefore, is the axiom: Sense is of singulars. Arg. IIum. A species directly representing the singular would either be produced by the phantasm alone, or by the phantasm under the influence of the agent intellect. Both, however, are impossible. Therefore. Proof of the minor. The phantasm alone cannot impress the spiritual intellect, because nothing

acts beyond its genus. Nor is the other hypothesis possible, for the species produced from the phantasm through the influence of the agent intellect is necessarily abstract. Moreover, a species of this kind cannot directly represent singulars, since it precisely abstracts from them. Therefore a species directly representative of the singular cannot exist. III. — Second conclusion: There is no concept directly expressive of singulars. — The reason which prevents the impressed species from directly representing the singular is the materiality of the singular and the immateriality of the species (1). But the same reason has more force when it concerns the mental concept: the singular (1). « Our intelligence could grasp the singular, if it were material like the senses. But, since it is immaterial, it cannot have as its object what has its principle in matter. Now the individuation of all material things, the only ones which present themselves directly to our knowledge, has

matter as its principle: consequently, our intellectual knowledge cannot directly bear on any individual and singular being. » VACANT, op. cit. p. 145.

is not made less material, nor is the mental concept less immaterial than the impressed species; on the contrary, it is more spiritual, since it refers to the object as actually understood. Therefore, if the impressed species cannot directly represent the singular, a fortiori a word directly expressive of singulars cannot exist. demonstrates. Hence from that opinion it follows that singulars are apprehended only in common and confusedly. Secondly, it can be understood of reflection properly so called: the intellect, namely, returns upon its own act, from the act comes to the species, and from the species to the phantasm itself from which the species was abstracted and in which the singular is directly represented.

IV. — THIRD CONCLUSION: NEVERTHELESS, SINGULARS ARE KNOWN BY THE INTELLECT WITH PROPER AND

distinct cognition. It is one thing to be known directly, another distinctly; for we know many things by reflection, of

which we nevertheless have clear and distinct cognition. Some Thomists, like Capreolus, Cajetan, thought that singulars are known by a confused concept; but the more common opinion, held by Ferrariensis, Bannez, John of St. Thomas, and others, even non-Thomists, is that expressed by the conclusion. Proof. For proper and distinct cognition of singulars, it suffices that the intellect be able to distinguish and compare singulars among themselves and with the universal. But, as experience testifies, it is clear that the intellect compares singulars both among themselves and with the universal; for by rigorous and scientific induction the ascent and inference is made from singulars to the universal: which requires a distinct notion. It is confirmed. In order for the intellect to be certain of the truth of some proposition, it must distinctly perceive the extremes of the proposition. But often, and especially in historical facts, those extremes are singulars. Therefore, if we lack distinct cognition of singulars, the certainty of those propositions vanishes, which nevertheless no one denies. V. — Fourth conclusion: The intellect knows singulars by a certain re flection upon the phantasm. Cajetan explains the matter thus: The intellect, argumentatively, or by arguing, concludes that the universal quiddity subsists in the singular represented by the phantasm; hence by reasoning it comes to the singular itself. Which explanation is by no means satisfactory. For reasoning only proves that there is some singular in which the universal nature exists; but what that singular is determinately it does not We do not deny that the cognition of singulars sometimes happens in this way; but this reflection properly so called is not universally necessary. For we are conscious that we perceive singulars without directly attending to the act of our intellect. Hence the Angelic Doctor does not require reflection strictly taken, which is a return of the mind upon its own act, but a certain reflection, which can be upon the act of another faculty. Singulars are therefore known by reflection on the phantasm or on the object represented in the phantasm. This action can be explained thus: The intelligible species proceeds from the phantasm and from the singular as from

a term whence. Because, therefore, it depends on the phantasm in its becoming, it must connotatively and indirectly represent the phantasm and the singular. Two things, therefore, are referred to in the impressed species: directly the universal, connotatively and indirectly, the singular. The intellect primarily attains what is directly exhibited in the species; then it can specially attend to what is represented indirectly as to something ultimately intended. But to attend specially to the phantasm and the singular object as to something principally intended is to exercise a certain reflection upon them. Therefore the intellect primarily knows the universal, then the singular, through a certain reflection on the phantasm or on the object represented in the phantasm. VI. — Di fficulties are solved. 1° What is naturally prior in cognition is directly perceived by the

intellect. But the singular is naturally prior in cognition. Therefore the singular is directly known by the intellect. Resp. : Distinguish the major: What is naturally prior in intellectual cognition ought to be directly known by the intellect, I grant; what is prior in sensitive cognition, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: The singular is prior in sensitive cognition, I grant; in intellectual

cognition, I deny, for it has been shown that the singular is not properly intelligible. 2° What the lower can do, the higher can do. Therefore what sense can do, the intellect can do. But sense directly attains the singular. Therefore so does the intellect. Resp. : Distinguish the antecedent: What the lower can do, the higher can do in the same or an eminent way, I grant; always in the same way, I deny. For the higher would become imperfect if it performed what the lower does in the same way, just as God would be less perfect if He formally vivified the body like a soul. But sense directly attains the singular, because it is of the same order as the sensible; but the intellect, precisely because it is higher, neither ought nor can directly perceive singulars as its primary object. VII. — Another di fficulty is solved, and the opinion previously explained about reflection upon the phantasm is vindicated. You will say: It is not intelligible

how a universal species can represent the singular. Therefore the opinion which holds that the singular is perceived in the universal species is inadequate. John of St. Thomas replies (1): « The species representing universally and indifferently is determined to form a concept of a singular thing extrinsically indeed by the phantasm itself as a more determinate object to which the intellect is converted; intrinsically, however, by the abstracted species itself, which indirectly and as a connotation imports a relation to those singulars of the phantasm as to a term from which it is left. For it represents the abstract nature from them, hence it leaves a connotation and relation to them, by reason of which that representation and cognition made through it always depends on phantasms. Thus, the species representing nature also moves to know the indirect and connoted aspect of such a nature and the origin from which it was first abstracted; and similarly to verify that which is known of that nature, because verification is made in order to being and to singulars, in which nature exists. But to know something reflexively, a new species directly representing it is not required, for thus it would not be reflection; but the same one which directly represents suffices for reflection, insofar as it represents another indirectly and as a connotation. » (1) Phil. Nat. III. P . q. 10, a, 4.

ARTICLE THREE.

HOW THE SOUL KNOWS ITSELF (1).

J. — State of the question. A twofold knowledge of the human soul can be had by each person: one by which it is known whether the soul exists, as when someone perceives that he has a soul; another by which it is known what the soul is and what its properties are. How, therefore, does the soul know its essence and its existence? According to the Cartesians, who place the essence of the soul in cognition, the soul intuits itself immediately and through its essence; indeed, this cognition of the thinking subject is the first principle of all Philosophy; and the substance of the soul itself with its affections is the proper object of our intellect.

Others, like Maine de Biran, hold that the existence and nature of the soul are manifested to us through conscience. Others, like Cousin and certain Transcendentalists, contend that the existence of the soul, or thinking subject, can only be proved by reasoning. The Sensists and Positivists acknowledge no force of conscience with respect to the soul, since the soul, according to them, is a mere collection of accidents and affections. II. — First conclusion: The soul knows neither its nature nor its existence intuitively and through its essence, but only through its acts. Proof of the 1° part. Arg. Iun. For some intellect to intuit itself and through its essence, it must be an act in the genus of intelligibles. But the human intellect is pure potency in the genus of intelligibles. Therefore it does not intuit itself through its essence.

(1) Cf. S. THOMAS, q. 8 De Verit. I. P .q. 87, ejusque commentatores in n. I. CARTISUS, Mediat.; Tn. RIND, ESSAI I sur les facultés intellectuelles; MAINE DE BIRAN, Fondements de la Psychologie; COCUS, Introd. à l'hiet. de la philosophie, leg. 6, Introduction aux œuvres de Maine de 34 van, Fragments philosophiques, t. II, leg. sur la philos. de Kant.

The major is declared. Each thing is knowable according as it is placed in act, and not according as it remains only in potency. For a thing is known because it has the notion of being and truth; moreover, nothing receives the notion of being and truth except insofar as it is in act. The thing is made clear by examples. In sensibles, sight does not perceive what is colored in potency, but only what is colored in act; by the same right, the intellect, when it perceives material things, attains in them only what is in act: therefore it knows matter only through its order to form. Therefore, even in spiritual substances, for any of them to be knowable through its essence, it must be act by essence. The essence of God is indeed pure act; wherefore He understands Himself and other things through His essence. But the essence of an angel is indeed act in the genus of intelligibles, but mixed with potency, hence an angel can know itself through its essence, but not all other things.

Proof of the minor. The human soul is not act, but potency in the genus of intelligibles. Although it is entirely spiritual in itself, insofar as it is joined to matter, it is in some way subject to material conditions. Hence in the present state of life the soul pertains to the order of worldly things, which are potentially intelligible. Arg. II«m. Cognition through essence is intuitive cognition. But those things which are seen intuitively are perfectly perceived, nor can error creep into such cognition. Therefore, if the soul knew itself through its essence, there would be no error concerning the nature of the soul, and all men would have the same knowledge of the soul; which is most manifestly contrary to experience. Proof of the II° part, namely that the soul does not know its existence through its essence, but through its acts. Arg. Ium. If the soul knew its existence through its essence, it would also immediately attain its essence. But this has already been disproved. Therefore. The major is manifest; for in this hypothesis the essence would be that by which existence is seen, or the medium which, known first or simultaneously, leads to the knowledge of existence. Therefore it would be entirely impossible to see existence intuitively without the essence being seen at the same time. Arg. IIum. A person perceives that he has a soul and lives and exists because he perceives that he senses and understands and performs other works of life of this kind. But to know that one has a soul from

the fact that he perceives he has works of life, is to know the existence of the soul through its acts. Therefore the soul manifests its existence not through its essence, but through its acts. III. — Second conclusion: If only habitual cognition is spoken of, the soul knows itself through its essence. From the very fact that someone has a habit of some knowledge, from the very presence of the habit he is able to perceive those things which are subject to that habit. But the essence of the soul is intimately present to itself. Therefore, for the soul to perceive that it exists and what takes place in itself, the essence of the soul alone, which is present to the mind, suffices: for from it acts proceed in which it is actually perceived. Hence the cognition of the soul's existence can

be called natural, insofar as it can be had by all who are of sound mind, without any difficult investigation. Hence also the existence of the thinking subject is rightly reckoned among the objects of conscience (1). But internal facts, which are not cognitive nor proceed from cognition, such as vital operations, are not objects of conscience properly so called, which regards the cognitive order; however, they are known experimentally by the soul, which, since it is habitually present to the body,

enjoys habitual cognition of operations which are elicited through the body. IV. — Third conclusion: For the cognition of the nature of the human soul, diligent and subtle inquiry is required (2). The following process occurs in the scientific knowledge of the soul: That which is first discovered is the object; between the object and the act by which the object is attained, there must be a proportion; hence from the knowledge of the object the nature of the act is inferred; secondarily, therefore, the act is known by distinct and scientific cognition, for the act as a fact is immediately reported by conscience. More- (1) Cf. Loge., pp. 317-318. (2). To this belong the words of Tr. REm : « The essence of spirits and that of bodies are unknown to us. We know certain properties of the former and certain operations of the latter, and it is only through them that we can define them, or rather describe them. » Essai I sur les facultés intellectuelles, c. I.

over, the act proceeds from the power as its complement and perfection. Therefore from the act the nature of the power is demonstrated; thirdly, therefore, the faculty is known. But the faculty emanates from the essence of the soul as a result or property. Therefore from the knowledge of the faculty the nature of the soul itself is concluded, and thus finally the essence of the soul is known. As Cardinal Zigliara observes, the knowledge we have of the soul is not psychological, but ontological (1). For we know the soul not from its intrinsic and constitutive elements received from the essence itself, but from elements which are common to

other things; which, however, when united by mental synthesis, belong only to the essence of the soul. For all the concepts we gather concerning the soul are common Ontological notions. We define the soul: A spiritual substance which is the substantial form of the human body. Moreover, the notion of substance which is predicated of the soul is that which is acquired in Ontology; spirituality is also explained by independence from matter in being and in operation. These notions are common; likewise, what a substantial form is we have learned from the principles of natural philosophy. V. — The di fficulty is solved. If the soul does not know itself through its essence, it is known through some species abstracted from sensibles. But from no sensible thing can the soul abstract its own species. Therefore it knows itself through its essence. Resp. : Distinguish the major: The soul knows itself through some abstract species which is a likeness of the soul itself, I deny; through some species from whose nature the nature of the soul can be inferred, I grant. Contradistinguish the minor and deny the consequence. VI. — On the species by which the soul knows itself. The soul is therefore known neither through its essence, nor through a species emitted from itself, but through species received from its object. From various species already acquired, it finally forms an immaterial species by which it knows itself scientifically, which action is a reflexive act. For the intellect knows its object directly; then, by returning to its act and to itself, it elicits a species of its act, and finally of itself. This species is not intuitive, but abstractive: for the soul in it does not intuit itself as it is, but from the analysis of that idea it safely infers its true nature. VII. — On the concept by which the intellect knows its act, its habits, its species. Just as the intellect does not know itself immediately, but through its act, so it does not apprehend its habits immediately, but through the acts of the habits. For a habit is not per se actually knowable, since it is in a certain way intermediate between pure potency and pure act. It is asked, however, whether the intellect forms a concept, or word, when it knows habits, acts, species, etc. Not a few deny it, because

the concept itself, as most spiritual and present to the intellect, terminates cognition, just as light, which is the reason for seeing colors, does not need other light. Others, however, affirm it. For although all those things are absolutely present to the intellect, they are not objectively present in the nature of an actually known term. Moreover, the act and the concept have the function of the intelligible species, or principle; therefore they cannot act as a word, or term, because nothing is simultaneously the principle

and end of the same action. Thus, in the cognition of our concept, a word of such a concept is formed, a reflexive word indeed, because it is expressed upon another word. Likewise, in the cognition of the act, habits, species, a word is formed in which the intellect actually says and expresses its act, its habits, and its species. 1. — A twofold error to be avoided. The question is whether the human intellect can su fficiently know metaphysical, ethical, and religious truths, concerning God, the immortality of the soul, the end of man, etc., so that our moral life may be rightly ordered. The full solution pertains to theologians; there are, however, some aspects which concern the present subject of the object of the intellect, and which we will briefly dispatch. A twofold extreme is to be avoided here: that of the Rationalists, who hold that our reason is fully sufficient in itself to learn all truths; and that of the Traditionalists, who proclaim the absolute incapacity of reason or at least excessively depreciate the intellect. Against the Rationalists will be the following II. — Conclusion: Revelation is morally necessary, so that those things which are not in themselves impervious to human reason in divine matters may, in the present condition of the human race also, be known by all, with facility, firm certainty, and without any admixture of error (1). We say: morally, because the human intellect is physically proportioned to any natural truth to be known. Proof of the thesis. It is necessary for establishing moral life that sufficient cognition concerning God and religious matters be had by all, because all are bound to live rightly; — from the beginning, because man is bound from the beginning to think rightly of God and to live rightly; and

without admixture of errors, because one lives badly when one thinks badly of God. But without revelation cognition cannot be had except by a few, after a long time, and with an admixture (1). Cf. S. THOMAS, I Contra Gent., cap. 4 ; I. P . q. 1, a. 1 ; COSCIL VATTIC, De Revelatione, cap. 2.

of many errors. Therefore revelation is morally necessary. Proof of the minor in parts. 1° By a few. For some are hindered because of a bad physical constitution, from which many are naturally indisposed to know; — some, however, by the necessity of domestic or public affairs, since many must attend to temporal things and the business of the state; — some, finally, by laziness, because the study of God or metaphysics requires much and arduous labor. 2° After a long time. Both because of the depth of truth, which presupposes long exercise of the intellect; — and because of the many things prerequired for this study; — and because in youth, while the soul is agitated by many motions of the passions, it is not fit for so high a contemplation of truth. 3° With many errors. Both because of the weakness of our intellect in judging and the mixture of phantasms; — and because the simple and uneducated remain in doubt seeing that di fferent things are taught by different so-called wise men; — and finally, because among many true things which are demonstrated, sometimes something false is mixed in, which is not demonstrated, but asserted by some probable or sophistical reasoning, which is sometimes regarded as a demonstration. The thesis is invincibly confirmed by experience. There has been no nation, however cultivated, which, lacking divine revelation, attained cognition of divine and moral things free from error. History testifies that we know how many and how great monstrous errors both more civilized nations and celebrated philosophers have held and taught. III. — Traditionalism (1). This is the error which holds that man physically lacks the power to acquire truths concerning divine and moral matters. There are three degrees of Traditionalism: 1° Absolute Traditionalists, or Fideists, with Huet, teach that man without divine (1). Cf. HUNTRUS, De Imbecillitate rationis humanae; BOSNETT, An- nales de philosophie chrétienne, serie 3, 2, série 4, 10 ;

série 5, 1; VESTURA, La Tradition et les serviplegaines de la philosophie ; La raison philosophi- que et la raison catholique ; LAMENNAIS, Essai sur

l'indifférence en matière de religion ; BAUTAIN, De enseignement de la philosophie en France ; Introduction au livre : Philosophie du christianisme ; UBAHIS, Revue de Louvain, 1860, avril, Annales de Philosophie chrétienne, série 5, t. 1.

teaching can know no truth at all. This is the stricter form, to which the opinion that thought depends on speech belongs, and since speech has been communicated to us by God, all cognition originates from revelation. So de Bonald, Lamennais, etc. 2° Mitigated Traditionalism admits that man can know truths of the sensitive order without revelation, but not intellectual and metaphysical truths. So Bonnetty, Ventura, Bautain. 3° Louvain Traditionalism, with Ubaghs, concedes that a man in an educated and cultivated society can by the powers of reason rise to metaphysical truths; but on the other hand asserts that a man left to himself, e.g., brought up in the woods, can without external teaching attain no metaphysical truth, and in the ultimate analysis, without divine revelation. The first form of Traditionalism is certainly heretical; the second form is either heretical or at least close to heresy; the third form is error, but not heresy. IV. — It is refuted. It is of faith that some metaphysical truths, such as the existence of God the Creator, can be discovered by reason alone. For the Vatican Council has this, canon II. On revelation: « If anyone shall say that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural light of human reason. Let him be anathema. » — Among the various propositions which the Holy See proposed to Traditionalists for subscription, we write out the following: « 1° Reasoning can prove with certainty the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the freedom of man. « 2° The use of reason precedes faith and leads man to it by means of revelation and grace (1). » The argument of reason, however, consists in this: There exists between sensible things and God that necessary connection which exists between effect and

cause. But when two things are necessarily connected with each other, as effect and cause, one can be known from the other: this, indeed, is implied by the principle of causality. Therefore from sensibles God can be known, not indeed perfectly, but « because He is and other things of this kind which must be attributed to the first principle (1). » Likewise, there exists between material and spiritual things a certain analogy; which is indeed understood either by way of negation, namely by removing imperfections of sensibles from spiritual things, or by way of comparison, namely by referring spiritual things to sensibles. But one analogate leads to the knowledge of the other, if not proper and intuitive, yet true, indeed even scientific. Therefore from material things can be drawn a true cognition of spiritual things. A fuller demonstration is not strictly psychological, but is to be sought in Theodicy or Theology. V. — We do not know suprasensible things quidditatively, although we attain their quiddity to some extent. To know a quiddity it suffices to know certain essential attributes of the thing, whether through a proper species or through an alien one. But in the present state we know many essential attributes of spiritual things, e.g., that they are substances, that they are independent of matter in being and operation, etc., and we plainly distinguish those attributes from the attributes of other things. Therefore we attain the quiddity of spiritual things to some extent, by a definition or description which belongs to them and to no other object. In order for something to be known quidditatively, however, it must be intuited through its proper species, as it is in itself, with its proper genus and proper difference. But we do not know spiritual substances by their ultimate difference and by their proper differences, because they are of a different nature from material things from which we draw ideas, and they exist more perfectly in themselves than in our concept. Therefore we do not know spiritual things quidditatively. VI. — Whether our concepts of suprasensible things can be called proper concepts. A proper concept can be understood in two ways. In one way, it is called proper which does not belong to another thing. In this sense we produce proper

concepts of spiritual things, for the concept of God as first cause, first (1). Decretum S. C. Iadicis, d. 11 Junii 1836, a Pro IX, 17 Junii appro- batum, apud Dextriorem,

nn. 1506, 1507. (1). I. Cont. Gent. cap. 1.

mover, infinite being, can be ascribed to no other; and the concept we form of an angel is applied neither to our soul nor to corporeal substances. In the second way, and in the strict sense, a concept is called proper by which a thing is known as it is in itself. Moreover, we do not apprehend spiritual things as they are in themselves, but as they are in their effects, or in their likeness. But they are not in their effect or in their likeness except analogically. Wherefore concepts of this kind are called analogous, connotative, not proper, nor quidditative. VII. — On the cognition of supernatural things, or on the nature of the species required for that cognition. It is not our purpose to discuss the possibility and fact of supernatural revelation, but the psychological question is whether, supposing that supernatural things are divinely revealed, species abstracted from material things suffice for their cognition, or whether infused species from God are required. Not a few authors think that supernatural species are necessary. For the species must be of the same order as the cognition itself and as the thing known. But species abstracted from material things are not of the same order as cognition, which is supernatural, nor with the things, which are themselves supernatural. Therefore abstract species do not suffice. We, however, with the disciples of the Angelic Doctor, concede that supernatural species can be divinely infused, indeed in some revelations of the saints are in fact infused; but we think that those infused species are not necessarily required for knowing the things of faith, and that abstract species suffice. If cognition were intuitive, abstract species would not suffice, as is clear. But, because the mysteries of faith are known only by a certain analogous knowledge, natural species will be apt to represent them, if by the impression of divine light they are ordered in a new way and illustrated. But nothing prevents natural species from being ordered and illustrated in a new way by divine

light: indeed, the illumination of the Holy Spirit achieves this most easily. Therefore they will be apt to represent supernatural things; nor would any infused species be required. Wherefore the Angelic Doctor teaches that prophetic supernatural cognition can be without the acquisition of supernatural species, but takes place through a new ordination of acquired

species, under the influence of supernatural prophetic light (1). Thus, species already abstracted are illustrated and disposed in a new way by the Holy Spirit, and concur in supernatural cognition. To the first objection of the opposite opinion, namely that the species must be of the same order as cognition, it is replied: Abstract species, although by their nature they are not of the same order as supernatural cognition, yet from their conjunction with supernatural light they are elevated and in some way transferred to the same order. To the second, namely that the species must be of the same order as the thing known, it is replied: A species which represents a thing adequately, quidditatively, must be of the same order as that thing, I grant; a species which represents a thing inadequately, analogically, must be of the same order as that thing, I deny. The conclusion is distinguished: Abstract species do not suffice for knowing supernatural things adequately and quidditatively, I grant; inadequately and analogically, as they are apprehended in the present by faith, I deny. Thus, to know this proposition: In God there are three persons, the idea of God and the idea of person which we have acquired by the natural process of abstraction suffice.

VIII. — ON THE WORD, OR CONCEPT, REQUIRED FOR SUPERNATURAL COGNITION.

The impressed species, which originates from sensible things, can be natural even in

supernatural cognition, as we have shown. The same, however, cannot be said of the word which is formed in supernatural cognition. The reason is that the word does not originate from things, as the species does, but is the term and effect of supernatural cognition. But the term and effect

of a supernatural action must itself be supernatural. Therefore the word formed in supernatural cognition is of a supernatural order, just as the act from which it proceeds. It is not, however, intuitive, but only abstractive, like the intelligible species from which it is expressed (2). (1). Q. 12 De Veritate, a. 7, ad 3. (2). Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 88, CAJETANUS, BAXNEX, in h. I. — Cf. what we have discussed in the periodical Revue Thomiste, sept. 1906 : What concepts do we have of supernatural truths? The same is found in our work « Rlponese théologiques à quelques questions d'actualité, Paris, Téqui. 1. — Whether the separated soul can understand. There have not been lacking those who thought that the separated soul forgets everything of its past life (1); or who dreamed that the separated soul languishes in a state as if of sleep without any cognition. This opinion Luther made his own; Rosmini also imagined that the separated soul, considering the natural order, is in a condition similar to a state of darkness and perpetual sleep.

On The Cognition Of The Separated Soul (1).

These assertions are easily refuted. Every thing is for the sake of its proper operation, so that, the thing remaining, the operation itself remains. But the most proper operation of the soul is to understand; and therefore, once it is admitted that the soul survives the body, understanding necessarily persists. The difficulty, however, concerns the mode in which intellection takes place. I. — Whether the separated soul retains all its faculties. Those who held the soul to be corporeal, like the ancient Latins, and also Tertullian, consequently thought that all the passions, impressions, sensations of the present life persist in the separated soul. The Cartesians, who hold that all powers, even those which we call organic, are immediately subjected in the essence of the soul itself, maintain that all those faculties actually remain in the soul after death. The true doctrine is briefly explained: 1° The faculties which are immediately subjected in the soul alone, namely the intellect and will, actually persist in the state of separation. The reason is clear, since powers of this kind are not acts of any body, nor do they depend intrinsically on any body in being and operation. 2° The other powers, however, namely the sensitive and vegetative, remain only virtually. For a faculty cannot actually persist unless its proximate subject remains. But, after separation, there is no longer a proximate subject: for that is the composite, or animated organism (2), which is dissolved by the separation itself. Therefore those faculties do not actually remain. Virtually, however, they persist; for the root of all faculties is the essence of the soul, which is immutable. Hence, if the union is repeated, the soul can again communicate to the composite that being which it previously bestowed, namely the being of organic powers. (1). Cf. S. THOMAS,QQ.Disp. De Verit. q. 19 ; I. P . q. 89 ; CAJITATIUS, BANXER, in h. I.; opusc. nostrum: Questions d'actualité; L'état des âmes séparées. (2) Cf. vol. II. p. 535-536 III. — There is a fourfold mode of understanding in the other life, namely 1° through species acquired here, 2° through species infused by God, 3° through the essence of the soul itself, 4° through intellectual speech (2). Each must

be discussed. IV. — On knowledge acquired here. The habit remains according to what it has in the intellect, not however according to what it has in the sensitive part. For habits are similar to the acts by which they are generated. Moreover, the acts of the intellect are principally and formally in the intellect itself, but materially and dispositively in the lower powers which supply phantasms. Therefore habits are principally and formally in the intellect itself, but materially in the lower powers. Since, therefore, those powers no longer persist in the separated soul, what the habit has in the sensitive part vanishes. But as to its formal aspect, which is in the intellect, that habit of knowledge persists. For corruption would occur either per accidens due to the destruction of the subject, or per se if it

were destroyed (1). In this sense Virgil sings: « All these, when they have rolled the wheel for a thousand years, God calls in a great throng to the river Lethe: that they may, indeed, forgetful, revisit the vault of heaven, and again begin to wish to return into bodies. » (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, q. 19, De Verit. a. 1.

by its contrary, as heat by cold. But it cannot happen in either way. Not by destruction of the subject, for the subject is the intellect, which is entirely incorruptible. Not by a contrary, for nothing is opposed to an intelligible intention; hence the axiom: The notions of contraries in the intellect are not contrary because they agree in the same intelligible being. A contrary, namely falsity, can indeed creep into the intellect through judgment or reasoning; but never in simple apprehension, which intuitively perceives the quiddity. Moreover, the separated soul does not use judgment or reasoning, since it has being after the manner of spiritual substances and, in their manner, understands by simple intuition. Wherefore nothing contrary to the acquired species can creep into the intellect of the separated soul. But the acts of knowledge acquired here remain in the separated soul as to substance and species; not, however, as to mode. The species and substance of the act are derived from the object represented by the idea. Moreover, the intelligible ideas which we acquired in life remain: for they

are incorruptible like the intellect itself. Therefore the acts remain as to substance and species. The mode of the act, however, is not the same; for in the present state it takes place through conversion to phantasms, but in the state of separation in another way suitable to separate substances. Now this is the manner of separate substances, that they immediately at the first sight of principles comprehend their whole power, intuiting whatever can be syllogized from them (1). Therefore the separated soul in its species, by a single act without reasoning, but by simple apprehension, knows whatever in the present life it could have acquired by induction or deduction and reflection.

V. — ON INFUSED SPECIES. — THE SEPARATED SOUL UNDERSTANDS BY CONVERSION TO HIGHER THINGS

and through infused species. Proof: The mode of understanding follows the mode of being. But the human soul has a twofold mode of being: one, (1) Cf. S. Thomas, QQ. Disp. De Veri. q. 16, a. 1, ad 1. insofar as it is the form of the body, namely being in the body; the other, insofar as it is an immaterial form attaining in a certain way the dignity of separate substances, namely being independent of the body and without the body. Therefore a twofold mode of understanding must be ascribed to it: one, insofar as it is the form of the body, by conversion to the body, or to phantasms; the other, insofar as it is an immaterial form, by conversion to immaterial things, after the manner of separate substances. But the mode of understanding of separate substances is through species infused by God. Therefore the soul receives new species from God. The necessity of those ideas is proved from another source, because acquired species cannot represent all things which are clearly manifested to the soul in the particular judgment after death, or which it must know in the other life. Moreover, the soul receives those species when it begins to have being and to understand after the manner of angelic substances. This happens at the separation itself. Hence it must be concluded « that the soul after death understands through species divinely infused at its separation from the body (1). » The soul uses those species not through

discourse nor through composition or division, but by simpler apprehension, because this mode is proper to separate substances.

VI. — THE STATE OF SEPARATION AND THAT MODE OF UNDERSTANDING BY CONVERSION TO HIGHER

things is not simply natural, nor properly violent, but preternatural. Proof of the I° part. The rational soul according to its essence is the form of the body. But it is natural for every form to be united to its matter. Therefore it is natural for the soul to be united to the body. Therefore the state of separation is opposed to something natural: from which aspect it is not simply natural. Moreover, the mode of understanding follows the mode of being. Therefore the mode of understanding by conversion to higher things, which follows a state of being not properly natural, cannot be simply and wholly natural. Proof of the II° part. A state is called violent only when a thing does not sustain it by the power of its nature. But the separated soul

sustains the state of separation by the power of its nature. Therefore that state is not properly violent. Proof of the minor. The soul by the power of its nature is incorruptible, and naturally has whatever belongs to an incorruptible thing. But an incorruptible thing by the power of its nature admits the state of separation, since it is independent of the body in being and operation. Therefore the soul sustains the state of separation by the power of its nature. Now, the mode of understanding by conversion to higher things follows the state of separation. If, therefore, the state of separation is not violent, neither will the mode of understanding without a phantasm be violent. Proof of the III° part. The state of separation and the mode of understanding by conversion to higher things, since it is not according to the nature of the soul, can be called preternatural; but on the other hand, because the soul naturally participates in some way in the dignity and operation of separate substances, that state can be called natural in a certain respect. Hence it follows that the operations of the intellect and will after death do not

according to themselves cause pain, but are rather delightful, as fruits proceeding spontaneously from a natural faculty (1).

VII. — THE INFUSION OF INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES BY GOD IS NOT A MIRACLE.

It is objected: This state seems miraculous. For conversion to higher things is through species infused by God. But immediate infusion is considered a miracle. Therefore that state must be considered miraculous. Resp. : In the present state, indeed, immediate infusion of species by God is a miracle, because the natural mode is to draw species from sensibles. But, since the separated soul naturally participates in the state and mode of being of separate substances, it naturally follows that it understands in their manner, namely through species infused by God. Therefore the separated soul naturally, and not miraculously, receives species from God at its separation from the body.

VIII. — THE FITTINGNESS OF THE RESURRECTION. SINCE, HOWEVER, THE STATE

(1) Cf. what we have discussed in our work Réponaes théologiques à quelques questions d'actualité. of separation is in some way preternatural, it is fitting that it should not last longer than the state of union, which is properly natural. But the state of separation will last longer unless the resurrection takes place. Therefore it is fitting that God graciously grant the renewed union, or resurrection. Moreover, it is fitting that the body and soul, which were partners in merit or guilt, should also be partners in reward or punishment together. This fittingness, however, does not create necessity (1).

IX. — ON COGNITION THROUGH THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL; AND ON THE MODE IN WHICH THE SOUL

knows separate substances. 1° The separated soul knows itself through its own substance. Proof. A twofold mode of being, as has been said, belongs to the soul: one insofar as it is the form of the body, namely being in matter; the other insofar as it participates in the dignity of higher substances,

namely being without a body. According to the first mode, it is not in the genus of intelligibles, nor does it intuit itself through itself (2). But according to the other mode, it is actually intelligible like any separate substance. For the obstacle of the body by which its intelligibility was veiled has receded. Hence a brief and effective argument: For the soul to understand itself through itself, two things are required and suffice: that it be present to itself, and that it be actually intelligible. But the separated soul has both of these with respect to itself. Therefore it understands itself through itself. This discussion is only about the impressed species; for in every created intellection the mental word is required. For no creature has the property of being a term actually known and understood (3). 2° It intuits other souls as to speci fic quiddity through its essence; as to existences and individual quiddities, however, it knows them through superadded species. The first part is clear. Since all souls agree univocally in their specific essence, the soul, by contemplating itself, intuits the specific quiddity of all, nor does it need another species. The second part is shown. The essence of the soul acts as an intelligible species only with respect to those things which are contained in itself. Moreover, the existences and quiddities of other

souls are not contained in it; for these are principles by which those souls are distinguished from it. Therefore with respect to these it needs superadded species. 3° It understands higher substances, such as angels, by imperfect and de ficient cognition. The separated soul knows all things through the mode of its substance and according to the mode in which they are in it. But the mode of substance in the separated soul is below the mode of higher substances. Therefore it understands higher substances by deficient and confused cognition. The meaning of the saying: It knows all things through the mode of its substance, is not: that the soul knows all things in its substance as through an intelligible species, or as in a medium known first, for it is certain that the separated soul needs superadded species for understanding other things; but: from the perfection of its substance the perfection of its

cognition is derived. For the more the soul's substance is assimilated to something, the more perfectly it will know it; and the more it differs from the perfect likeness of the thing, the more imperfectly it will perceive the thing. But since the soul's substance differs from a perfect likeness with higher substances, it understands them only imperfectly and deficiently. The reason for that saying, however, is that each intelligible is in the understander through the mode of the understander himself, and is understood through the mode in which it is received in him. Thus, the separated soul knows angels generically, at least, through its substance; but through infused species it knows angels with proper cognition, which, however, does not equal their intelligibility. Finally, the soul knows God to some extent through its essence: for if God's existence and nature can be demonstrated from the spectacle of this sensible world, a fortiori it is gathered from the essence of the soul, which is a more perfect and higher mirror. Through infused species, however, the separated soul clearly knows God's attributes, goodness, justice, etc.; indeed, God's ways concerning human salvation, because about all these there is instruction in the particular judgment after death.

X. — ON COGNITION THROUGH SPEECH (1). INTELLECTUAL

(1) Cf. S. THOMAS. I. P . q. 107 : a. 1; and OQ. Dipp. De Veri. q. 7, aa. 2, 5, 7.

speech does not take place through sensible signs, since it is entirely independent of sensibles, nor through spiritual signs, for besides intelligible species no other spiritual sign is conceived; but it is fittingly explained in this way: For one soul to speak to another, it is required and suffices 1° that the obstacle by which the concept remained hidden be removed; 2° that the hearer be made capable of understanding the speaker; 3° that secrecy can be preserved, since speech is a manifestation of an internal and hidden fact. Now 1° the obstacle hiding the concept is not, as with us, the grossness of the body, but only the will,

which closes the secrets of the heart. But by the very fact that one soul wishes to order its concept to another, the obstacle ceases. 2° For the hearer to perceive, it is required that he have the concept of the other represented in his species and that he receive from God a motion to attend actually. But both of these are had. For infused species represent whatever pertains to the actual state of affairs; moreover, while one soul orders its concept to another, this most pertains to the hearer. Moreover, God, by His providence, must move the intellect to perceive those things which actually pertain to it; and thus the hearer is excited to attend actually. 3° Secrecy can be preserved, for, since the ordering of the concept is subject to the will, the soul can order its concepts to one soul in such a way that they do not at all pertain to another, and therefore they will remain hidden. By speech, moreover, one soul can learn whatever another wishes to manifest. Thus the departed can know the deeds of the living through the souls of those who come to them from here (1).

XI. — WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT THE SEPARATED SOUL KNOWS NATURAL THINGS.

Through acquired species the separated soul knows by simple intuition whatever can be syllogized from them, and therefore all things which the intellect can discover by its own power in the physical, moral, and indeed metaphysical world. Infused species, however, since they are derived from the influence of divine

light, represent all natural things. Therefore the soul in those species can contemplate all natural things. Imperfectly, however. For for cognition to be complete and absolute, it is not enough to have species perfectly representative of things, but moreover it is required that the power be proportioned to those species. Now the power of the separated soul is not entirely commensurate with those species, because those species are of a higher order and the mode of understanding through them is not simply connatural to the soul. The soul therefore knows something about all natural things, but not so perfectly as angels, for

whom intellection through infused species is simply connatural.

XIII. — WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT THE SEPARATED SOUL KNOWS SINGULARS.

The separated soul knows singulars, but not all. It knows first those singulars about which it is judged before the tribunal of Christ immediately after death; and those which pertain to it in the other life. Likewise, singulars of which it had species in this life; for species persist incorruptibly, but the soul uses them in a new mode, by simple intuition, not by conversion to phantasms.

Singulars, however, which cannot be known without the concurrence of phantasms are represented in infused species (1). For infused species are participated likenesses of the divine essence. Moreover, the divine essence is the cause not only of universals but also of individual principles. Therefore those species can represent not only universals, but also singulars, and through them the separated soul can perceive singulars. Not, however, all, since those higher species are not commensurate with the human intellect. Therefore, in order that some singulars be known specifically, the ideas must be specifically determined to them. How, moreover, does this determination take place? Infused species are received in the soul according to the mode of the receiver, and consequently are more determined to those things about which the soul is more disposed. Moreover, the soul is more disposed about certain things, either through preceding cognition, or through some affection, or through a natural inclination, or through divine ordination. Therefore likewise infused species are specifically determined to certain singulars either through preceding cognition, or through some affection, or through a natural inclination, or through divine ordination. It pertains, therefore, to the natural providence of God that no separated soul lacks knowledge of those singulars which it is necessary for it to know. But concerning other singulars, especially those which are done in this world, the separated soul does not have a specific determination. For « the souls

of the dead, according to divine ordination and according to their mode of being, are separated from the conversation of the living and joined to the conversation of spiritual substances, which are separated from the body. Hence they are ignorant of those things which are done among us (1). » — This is true for natural cognition, for supernaturally they can know many things, especially the blessed souls. « However, it seems better to say, according to the opinion of Gregory, that the souls of the Saints, seeing God, know all present things which are done here. For they are equal to the Angels; concerning whom Augustine also asserts that they do not ignore those things which are done among the living (2). » But it seems fitting that the souls in purgatory, united to God and most acceptable, should know singulars which concern them in this world, namely where their bodies are, what prayers are offered for them, what their parents do for them, etc. — But more on these by theologians. XIII. — Scholion — On the movement of the separated soul. The separated soul can transfer itself from one place to another, since, absolutely speaking, it could exist nowhere. For a spiritual substance, just as it could have been created before the corporeal world, or could, the world being destroyed, be preserved without any place, so it can remove itself from a place. Therefore, because a spiritual substance according to itself abstracts from place, an angel or separated soul is not in a place through its substance; nor through contact of quantity, which it lacks; but through contact of power: it is, namely, in a natural place insofar as it (1). I. P . q. 89, a. 8 (2). Ibidem

freely operates there; it is in a violent place insofar as it suffers there against its will. In fact, and by positive divine ordination, separated souls are in a place, glorious or violent, according as they deserved in life; nor can they change place except by divine disposition. If, however, God grants this, souls can be moved; and for this they need no other faculty than intellect and will (1). For a spiritual substance does not receive other powers besides those which emanate from the intellective degree. The executive power, therefore, in the separated soul is not that

locomotive power which was discussed in Natural Philosophy and which is organic, but can be called the moving will, or rather the intellect as moved by the will effectively commanding an external motion. The substance of an angel or soul is not subject to place as contained, but is superior to it as containing; hence it is in its power to apply itself to place, as it wishes, either through a medium or without a medium (2). An angel indeed can move bodies, because by the power of its nature it is a messenger between the spiritual world and the corporeal world, over which it rules, nor is it essentially bound to any determinate body; but the human soul, since it is the substantial form of the human composite, does not move other bodies except by means

and comparing many things with each other: hence it is ascribed to the rational nature; but to apprehend a thing which is an end, animals can do by sense and natural estimative power. Hence the perfect voluntary belongs to the rational creature alone, but the imperfect voluntary also belongs to brute animals. III. — The Will. Although the voluntary is twofold, the name will is reserved for the appetite alone which follows the intellect. Therefore not wherever the voluntary is given is will found, unless this is taken generically, as it designates an elicited appetite regulated by cognition. But will specifically and properly taken is the principle from which the perfect, rational voluntary proceeds; or rational appetite, or inclination following the intellect (1). Many moderns do not wish the rational appetite to be the will, but on the contrary hold that appetite is one thing, will another, since appetite is necessary, but will is free. « Desire is fatal, will is free (2). » Hence they criticize Aristotle, because he confused both (3). But these do not fully understand the breadth of the will. Other philosophers, however, not only Platonists and Peripatetics, but also Cartesians and Leibnizians, ascribe to the will both necessary inclinations and free determinations. IV. — Will and necessity. For a fuller notion of the will, therefore, it must be considered what is opposed to the will: generally, indeed, things are better known from their

contraries. It is asked, therefore, whether necessity is opposed to the will. Necessary is said to be that which cannot not be; which can happen from causes either intrinsic or extrinsic. (1) « The will is an appetite, a tendency, an inclination, but a conscious inclination, an enlightened tendency, an intellectual appetite: it inclines towards being to love it, embrace it and possess it only insofar as the spirit discovers it to it and shows it shining with goodness; it acts only in the light of thought. » G. L A B E R Y R I E , Dogme et Métaphysi- que, p. 143. (2) Cf. C O U S I N , Cours de philosophie morale au dix-huitième siècle, 3e leçon ; A D O L P H

E G A R K I E R , Traité des facultés de l'âme, t. I. liv. V. C. I. : S T O R C H E N A U , Psychol., I. P ., sect. 3. c. 1. (3) Cf. F R A N C K , Dictionn. philos., v. Appétit. Extrinsic causes are two: agent and end. The necessity imposed by the efficient cause is the necessity of coaction; but the necessity arising from the end is the necessity of supposition, or hypothetical; supposing, namely, that one wishes some end, it is necessary that he wish the means without which the end cannot be had. Finally, the necessity which arises from intrinsic causes is natural, or absolute. Let it be recalled, moreover, that the acts which proceed from the will are of two kinds: namely some are elicited, others imperated. Elicited are acts intrinsically voluntary which arise from the will not by means of another power, but are formed by it, such as willing, loving. Imperated are acts extrinsically voluntary which are not exercised by the will itself, but proceed from it by means of another faculty which immediately elicits the acts. Thus, walking is an act elicited by the locomotive power, but imperated by the will, which determines and applies the locomotive power to elicit this act. V. — First conclusion: The necessity of coaction is incompatible with the will; therefore the will cannot suffer violence with respect to elicited acts; although it suffers with respect to imperated acts. A voluntary act is a certain inclination proceeding from an internal principle with cognition. But what is violent and coerced is from an external principle. Therefore it is incompatible that the

voluntary be violent. The major is clear from the preliminaries; the minor is the very notion of violence; for violence is defined: Coaction which is from an extrinsic principle, the patient not contributing to it, that is, the patient not only contributes nothing to the effect, but positively resists and opposes it. « Hence it is contrary to the very nature of the act of the will that it be coerced or violent, just as it is contrary to the natural inclination or motion of a stone to be carried upwards. For a stone can be carried upwards by violence; but that this motion be violent from its natural inclination cannot be; similarly a man can be dragged by violence, but that this be from his will is incompatible with the nature of violence (1). » From which another proof is drawn. Violence is directly opposed

to the voluntary, just as in things lacking cognition it is opposed to the natural. But in things lacking cognition, violence makes something be against nature. Therefore in knowing things, violence makes something be against the will. The argument is clear in itself. For it is common to the voluntary and the natural that they proceed from an intrinsic principle; they differ, however, in that the voluntary is in knowing things, the natural in things lacking cognition. Therefore violence is no less opposed to the voluntary than to the natural. With respect to imperated acts, violence is possible. Since these acts are not produced by the will, violence is not inflicted on the will itself; but the external members are prevented from carrying out the command of the will. VI. — Hence it follows that not even God Himself can in flict violence on the will with respect to elicited acts. God cannot induce repugnant things. But to be from within and to be from without are opposed as two repugnant things. Therefore God cannot make what is from an intrinsic principle, namely voluntary, to be from an extrinsic principle, namely violent. God can indeed incline a will inclined to some object to the opposite by effective motion, but « when God changes the will, says St. Thomas, He makes one inclination succeed a preceding one, so that the first is removed and the second remains; hence that to which He induces the will is not contrary to the inclination

already existing, but to the inclination which was previously present: hence it is not violence nor coaction (1). » The difficulty, however, is whether in cessation from act God can inflict violence on the will. If God, e.g., by withdrawing His concurrence, were to prevent a will inclined to act from proceeding into act, or prevent an act already begun from continuing, as if the Blessed could not continue their beatific love, would it be violence? Many affirm this with Vasquez and

Valentia; the Thomists, however, deny it. And rightly. It is natural for a creature not to be able to act except under the influence of God; wherefore, if the First Mover withdraws His influence, it is natural for the creature to cease from act. Moreover, the creature relates to God as an instrument, which must be moved by the principal cause. But, with the motion of the principal cause ceasing in the instrument, it is natural for the instrument not to operate. Therefore, with God's concurrence ceasing, it is natural for the creature not to operate. In a general way, no creature can suffer violence from God, insofar as He is the universal mover. For a twofold inclination is implanted in every creature: one to its own good, the other to obeying the Creator in all things which He wishes to effect from His creature; and, just as a part is more inclined to the good of the whole than to its own good, so the inclination to obey the First Agent is stronger than the inclination to its own good. Hence an effective proof: What is according to the stronger inclination of a creature is not violent to it. But whatever God can do in a creature is according to its stronger and principal inclination. Therefore it is never violent to it. VII. — Second conclusion: The necessity of the end is not incompatible with the will, nor even natural necessity; indeed, it is necessary that the will adhere to the ultimate end, which is beatitude (1). The I° part gives no trouble. That is certainly voluntary which is implied and included in some volition. But the volition of means is included in the volition of the end. Therefore it is voluntary, and hence the necessity of the end leaves the will intact. Proof of the II° part. Arg. I «. The will relates to the end and beatitude in common as the

intellect relates to first principles: because the end is in the order of operation as a principle is in the order of speculation, which comparison will be further explained below. But the intellect necessarily adheres to first principles. Therefore the will necessarily adheres to the ultimate end. Arg. II «. In all things, those things which are not present per se are reduced to something which is present per se, as to a first; for what is per se must always be prior to what is per accidens. But among the motions of the will, some are per accidens; for many things are found which the will wills contingently. Therefore they must be reduced to some principle willed per se. But what is willed per se is naturally, or necessarily, willed. Therefore it is necessary that the will will something of necessity. (1) S. THOMAS, q. 22 de Verit., a. 8.

It is confirmed. The free is like the mobile, the necessary like the immobile. But the mobile requires the immobile beforehand. Therefore the free requires the necessary beforehand. Therefore, if the will wills something freely, it must also will something necessarily. That reason, which seems paradoxical, is most profound and beautiful. Just as grace presupposes nature, just as what is per accidens is reduced to what is per se, so the contingent and free presuppose the necessary. Which is again shown by the following argument. Arg. IIIus. The will is founded in nature and is itself a certain nature. But precisely because it is founded in nature, it is necessary that a mode proper to nature be participated in to some extent by the will. Therefore it is necessary that the will will something after the manner of nature. But what is after the manner of nature is necessary. Therefore the will wills something necessarily. VIII. — What, however, it desires necessarily. The good in common, towards which it tends naturally, like any power towards its object, and universally all those things which agree with the will according to its nature. For through the will we desire not only those things which pertain to the power of the will, but also those things which pertain to each power and to the whole man. Hence a man naturally wills not only the object of the will, but also those

things which agree with other powers: such as the cognition of truth, which agrees with the intellect, and to be and to live, and other things of this kind which regard natural consistency, all of which are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain particular goods (1).

The will, therefore, can be considered as a certain nature, and so it is a principle of volitions which occur naturally or necessarily; and reduplicatively as will, and thus it is a principle of volitions which occur freely, or by choice.

IX. — A THREEFOLD OTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE WILL.

First, the will is to be considered as a certain power, and in this way there corresponds to it the good in common as a universal object, by which it is specified. Just as the intellect is a power whose specificative object is all truth, so the will is a power whose specificative object is all good. In this way it necessarily wills its object without which it cannot be, just as every faculty naturally desires the object to which it is essentially ordered. Secondly, as a rational power, which is directed by reason, and tends from one thing to another, just as reasoning is a motion from one known thing to another to be discovered. Taken in this way, there corresponds to it the ultimate end as its primary and connatural object, from the desire of which it is moved to other particular goods; just as the intellect from assent to first principles is moved to assent to conclusions. Necessarily, therefore, it wills the ultimate end, and the means which have a necessary connection with the end, just as the intellect necessarily adheres to principles and to conclusions which are necessarily and evidently derived from principles. Thirdly, finally, the will is considered as the appetite of the whole man; for through the will we desire not only the good of the will, but also the good of every faculty and the good of our whole nature. In this way the will naturally, or necessarily, desires those goods, even particular ones, which have a connaturality with man, such as to be, to live, etc. In this threefold acceptation, the will is

a certain faculty distinct both from the essence of the soul as an immediately operative principle from a radical principle, and from the intellect and other faculties, since it regards a special object. X. — The aforesaid necessity is with respect to speci fication, not with respect to exercise. The will is not actually borne towards anything except what is actually proposed by the intellect. But the intellect is not necessitated to propose in act the ultimate end or other goods of which we have just spoken: for it does not always think of them nor always present them to the will. Therefore the will is not necessitated to desire them actually, but remains free with respect to exercise. Supposing, however, that it exercises an act concerning them, it is impossible for it not to will beatitude, to be, to live; or it is necessitated with respect to specification. These will be clearer from what will be said below concerning freedom and the indifference of freedom.

XI. — Rational appetite is not divided into irascible and concupiscible. A power which regards some object according to a common notion is not diversified by special differences contained under that common notion. But the will regards the good under the common notion of good; for the delightful good and the arduous good it attains under the same motive. Therefore the will is not diversified according to the special differences of arduous good and delightful good. Therefore it is not divided into concupiscible and irascible, as is the sensitive appetite. The major is clear in itself. Thus, because sight regards the visible according to the notion of the colored, it is not diversified according to different species of colors. If, however, there were a power which regarded white insofar as it is white, and not insofar as it is colored, it would be diversified from the power which regarded black insofar as it is black. The minor is declared. Just as sense does not know the universal, so neither can the sensitive appetite regard the common notion of good; and therefore according to special differences of good, namely delightful good and arduous good, the sensitive appetite is diversified. But the will follows the intellect, which perceives the universal

notion of good, and hence can regard the good under the common notion of good. XII. — Hence the de finition of the will is gathered. The inorganic, or spiritual, faculty of appetiting good known by the intellect. It is called 1° a faculty, because it is not an innate

appetite, but a predicamental accident (1) from which proceed acts of elicited appetitions. 2° Inorganic, namely of the same order as the intellect, needing no constraint of an organ, but immediately subjected in the essence of the soul itself. — 3° Of appetiting, because the will is an inclination, as just explained, n° III and seq. — 6° Good, so that its proper and specificative object may be assigned, n. IX. — 5° Known by the intellect, so that it may be indicated that the will proceeds from the soul through the intellect and has as its object universal good, just as the intellect attains universal truth. But it desires good sometimes necessarily, sometimes freely, just as the intellect apprehends truth sometimes immediately without motion, sometimes with motion and reasoning. 1. — Freedom in general. It is clear that the will desires something of necessity; but the fundamental question, on which the whole root of the morality of human acts depends, is whether the will desires everything it desires of necessity or not, that is, whether man enjoys freedom of choice. By the name freedom is implied a certain immunity. Hence a multiple acceptation of freedom. First, freedom of nature, freedom of grace, freedom of glory are distinguished. Freedom of grace is immunity from sin, freedom of glory is immunity from misery. In the present context, as is clear, only freedom of nature is discussed. This, however, is immunity from coaction and absolute necessity, or it excludes determination to one thing after the manner of nature, by which natural agents operate, and implies a true power to opposites. This power can be either to acts contrarily opposed, such as love or hatred, or to act and negation, or its cessation, such as to will or not to will, to act or not to act. In the first case it is called freedom of specification, or contrariety; in the other it is freedom of contradiction, or exercise. In both cases, however, it is implied that the will

has full dominion over its act. II. — The proper de finition of freedom. Freedom is defined by St. Thomas as: The elective power of means, with the order of the end preserved. It is called 1° power, that is, potency, or faculty. For free choice is the principle of a free act. Moreover, a principle of act is (1) One may consult: S. Thomas, I. P . q. 83 and I° II°, q. 13, and his commentators already cited; q. 24 De Verit. : q. 6. De Malo ; Joannes A S. Thomas, q. XII, a. II; Bossuert. Traité du Libre Arbitre ; Gandari, Les passions et la volonté ; Fanoes, Les fondements de la morale ; Alibert, La Psychologie thématie, pp. 330, sa. ; Cl. Plaet, La Liberté ; Janvier, La Liberté, Carême 1904. either a habit or a power. Now free choice is not a habit: not acquired, since it is something implanted in all; nor natural, for with respect to those things concerning which we have a natural habit, we are naturally inclined, such as to assent to first principles; but those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free choice. Therefore it is a power. It is called 2° elective, that is, possessing the power to accept one thing while refusing another. Choice, however, is a pre-deliberated appetite, and pertains at the same time to the intellect and to the appetite. « On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which it is judged what is to be preferred to the other; on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that what is judged by counsel be accepted by appetiting (1). » Choice, however, formally and elicitively is of the will. For the object of choice is assigned to that which is for the end and which has the notion of useful good. But good as such is the object of the will. Therefore choice is from the will formally, although presuppositively from reason. Free choice, therefore, which is the elective power, can rightly be called a faculty of the will and of reason: of the will formally, of reason originatively and regulatively. It is called 3° of means, because concerning the end as end, there is no choice nor freedom; indeed, it is clear that the will necessarily desires the end and beatitude in common. For freedom relates to the will as reason relates to the intellect. For just as the intellect is concerned with those things which are known by

themselves, without comparison and discourse, so the will is concerned with those things which are desired for their own sake. But those things which are known by themselves are first principles, and what is desired for its own sake is the end. The intellect, therefore, is concerned with first principles and the will with the ultimate end. Reason, however, is concerned with those things which are not manifest by themselves, but are deduced from others by argumentation: for to reason properly is to attain knowledge of one thing from another. Similarly, choice and freedom are concerned with those things which are sought not for themselves, but for the sake of another. But those things which are deduced from others by reasoning are conclusions, and those which are desired for the

sake of others are means. Reason, therefore, is concerned with conclusions, and freedom with means. Just as, however, reason and intellect are not really distinguished, but according to various functions, so the will and free choice are one power, which nevertheless performs diverse duties. (1) S Thomas, q. 83, a. 3.

Finally, it is said with the order of the end preserved. Just as it pertains to the virtue of reason to elicit conclusions with the order of principles preserved, and, on the contrary, to proceed to a conclusion while omitting the order of principles implies a defect of intellect and a sin against logic; so it pertains to the perfection of freedom that it be able to choose different things with the order of the end preserved; but that it choose something while diverting from that order argues a defect of freedom and a sin against ethics. Hence in God, Christ, the Virgin, and the Saints, who cannot divert from the order of the end, there is greater and more perfect freedom than in us, who can decline from the order to sin. III. — It is explained how freedom is originatively of reason, formally of the will. On this matter there are three opinions. Henry of Ghent thinks that the adequate principle of freedom is to be placed in the will alone; however, the judgment of reason, not as a principle,

but as a condition or sine qua non cause, is prerequired. Scotus holds almost the same. On the other hand, Durandus holds that freedom is first in the intellect, not only radically, but also formally and properly. The third opinion, held by St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and the Thomists and Scholastics generally, holds that freedom is originatively and causally in the intellect, but formally in the will alone. The first opinion is briefly refuted. Since freedom is indifference in appetiting, that is the cause of freedom which produces indifference. But the intellect produces that indifference. Therefore it also produces freedom. Proof of the minor. That produces indifference in appetiting by virtue of which the will desires the object indifferently. But what makes the will desire indifferently is the indifference of the intellect: for the will desires the object, indifferently or necessarily, according as the dictate of reason proposes it. Therefore reason causes indifference in appetiting. This will again be clear from what will be said concerning the roots of freedom, n. IX. It is confirmed. Freedom consists in choice. But choice originates from and is caused by counsel. Therefore freedom is originatively and causally from the faculty of counsel, which is reason. It is proved, however, against Durandus, that freedom is formally in the will. Every form, or property, is formally and principally in that thing by reason of which and in order to which other things are said to be and are such. Thus, because other things are denominated true in order to the intellect, truth is formally and principally ascribed to the intellect. But other things are constituted free in order to the will, for the acts of other powers and the powers themselves are considered to enjoy freedom insofar as they participate in something of the freedom of the will and are commanded by the will. Therefore freedom is principally and formally to be placed in the will. It is confirmed. Freedom properly belongs to that to which merit and sin are properly ascribed, and by reason of which we have dominion over acts. But merit and sin, as also dominion over acts, are properly attributed to the will, not to the intellect, for sometimes an act of the intellect is considered neither meritorious nor demeritorious, nor is it

in our power. Therefore freedom is properly and formally in the faculty of the will. IV. — On the distinction between will and freedom. It was the opinion of some that freedom is not a power, but a habit. But from the very definition it is clear that freedom is in no way a habit, neither natural nor acquired, n. II. They replied, however, that that habit is not really distinguished from the will, but is the faculty itself, or the ability of the will to elicit free acts.

Which assertion is self-contradictory. For, since a habit is something intermediate between power and act, it is incompatible that freedom be a habit and yet not be distinguished from the power itself. Moreover, a habit by its nature disposes well or ill in order to operation: hence no one uses a good habit badly, and no one uses a bad habit well. But free choice relates indifferently to choosing well or badly. Therefore it cannot be a habit. Another opinion, however, holds that free choice is a power which arises from the soul through the intellect and will, distinct from both, as a kind of middle thing participating in something of each power: from the intellect, judgment; from the will, desire. The common opinion, however, holds that the will and free choice differ only in reason and according to diverse functions.

We have already (n. II) adduced proof which eliminates the second opinion and establishes the third. Just as on the part of the cognitive power, intellect and reason relate to each other, so on the part of the appetitive power, will and free choice, which is the elective power, relate to each other. But intellect and reason are not distinguished really, but only according to diverse functions. Therefore the same must be held of will and free choice. The major is declared. Just as to understand implies a simple acceptance of a thing, so to will implies a simple appetite for an object; and, just as to reason is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another, so to choose is to desire something for the sake of another to be obtained. Therefore to understand and to will, intellect and will, correspond to each other, and likewise to reason and to choose, reason and free choice. V. — Haters of freedom. These are all who deny the spirituality of the

soul, such as Materialists and Sensists, or human personality, such as Pantheists; but especially Fatalists, such as the Manicheans, Waldenses, Albigenses, and later Lutherans and Calvinists. Fatalism was restored with new apparatus in the 17th century by Bayle. In our days this error is spreading very much; it is called determinism, because, as they say, the will in its choices is ultimately necessarily determined. A threefold determinism is distinguished: physical, psychological, metaphysical, concerning which below nn X-XII. The Catholic Church, however, has always strenuously defended human freedom as a dogma (1). VI. — The first demonstration of freedom: the testimony of common sense. Common sense is infallible concerning universal and constant judgments among all peoples, especially if these principles are contrary to passions, because then no cause of error can be assigned (2). But the existence of free choice is a judgment of common sense which has always been constant among all peoples, and which is opposed to passions. Therefore such a judgment is to be admitted as true and infallible. (1) Cf. JANVIES, Carême 1904. Première conférence, Les luttes de la religion en faveur du dogme de la liberté. (2) Cf. Logic., pp. 350-351. The minor is declared. 1° It is universally believed by all peoples that man is subject to laws and precepts, and is inclined by counsels and exhortations. But, with freedom taken away, laws and counsels are futile and impossible; for counsels or laws are not given to agents acting by nature. 2° Among all peoples there has existed some sanction for human acts, rewards and praises for certain acts, censures and punishments for others. But, if man lacks freedom, he is undeservedly rewarded and unjustly punished. Nor let it be said that he is rewarded or punished as an example, for an example should not be made unjustly, nor does it avail where necessity prevails. 3° Among all peoples there has been some notion of morality; hence Ethics, or Morals, has always been numbered among the parts of Philosophy. Morality, however, with freedom taken away, cannot even be conceived: for a human act is an act proceeding from freedom. Duty likewise without

freedom would be a fiction: he who ought, can; he who is bound to fulfill something is able to fulfill it. All peoples proclaim this, who distinctly distinguish the moral law, for free beings, from the physical law, or ineluctable (1). We add: Here there can be no cause of error; for such a judgment is opposed to passions. For once freedom is called into doubt, the reins are loosened for concupiscences and vices, and

true moral sanction becomes impossible; but with freedom and imputability of actions admitted, a firm bond is present to restrain passions. This proof suffices for our purpose; the argument is fully developed by Farges, Fondements de la Morale, Janvier, La Liberté, Alibert, etc. VII. — The second demonstration: the testimony of conscience. Our conscience reports some of our actions as free, some as necessary. But no reason for this distinction can be assigned unless freedom exists. Therefore. For conscience is a witness of those things which we experience inwardly. But if there is no free action, why do we experience some to be free, others necessary? (1) - It must be said with Kant: « A free will and a moral will are one and the same thing »; with St. Thomas: « The moral act and the free act are one »; with St. Augustine: « Suppress freedom and you destroy from the very foundation moral life »; such is the teaching of God, such is also, despite everything, the teaching of humanity. » E. JANVIES, La Liberté, II° conf.

Indeed, so great is the force of this testimony that wonderful and heroic choices arise from it. From the consciousness of freedom, indeed, it proceeds that heroes and magnanimous men raise themselves to great deeds, nor is their hope deceived. But if the consciousness of freedom were a mere illusion, it could not so universally produce wonderful results, and those who trust in it would be deceived at least sometimes. Therefore the testimony of conscience is an invincible argument for freedom (1). Against this kind of reasoning, determinists gather many objections. They say 1° : Conscience testifies only to those things which we now feel or do, not to those which we will do; it concerns the present, not the future. Therefore

through conscience we cannot know whether in the future we will choose one thing rather than another, or whether we possess the power of free choice. Conscience can therefore testify to acts but not to the power, or faculty. Resp.: Conscience testi fies that present or past acts are free. Moreover, from the nature of a fully conscious act, the nature of the power is safely inferred: if all acts in the present and past are free, not once, but constantly and very frequently, it must be concluded that there is in us some faculty of acting freely, not once, but repeatedly and constantly. Hence the testimony of conscience is the unshakable foundation of the argument by which the power of free choice is invincibly proved. They say 2° : We are indeed conscious that we choose one thing rather than another, but perhaps there is hidden some cause which necessarily determines us to accept one rather than the other. Hence it is rather an unconsciousness of necessity than a consciousness of freedom in us. Resp. : We have not only an unconsciousness of necessity, but also a positive consciousness by which we distinctly distinguish free actions from necessary and fortuitous ones. We act not hesitatingly or doubtingly, but with full persuasion of freedom, nor does this persuasion deceive us. Indeed, those who seem to doubt about freedom practically affirm it (2). (1) « A man who is not insane does not need to be convinced of his free will, for he feels it; and he does not feel more clearly that he sees, or lives, or reasons, than he feels capable of deliberating or choosing. » Bossuert, Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même, c. 1. n. XVIII. Cf. Léon Nord, La conscience du libre arbitre, Paris, Lethielleux. (2) Hence Fenelon acutely observes: « Is it not certain that this bizarre philosopher, who denies free will in the school, will suppose it as indubitable in his own house, and that he will be no less implacable against The possibility of this hidden cause, which would necessarily determine us to choose one thing rather than another, would have to be proved. Experience does not detect nor suspect that cause; reason, on the contrary, proves that it is incompatible, from the very nature of man, that there be some intrinsic cause

which necessarily moves and determines us. Not only are we unconscious of that necessitating cause, but we scientifically know that such a cause cannot exist. This impossibility arises from the nature of man, as the following argument shows. VIII. — The fundamental proof: the nature of rational substance. The will arises from the essence of the soul through the intellect, and, since it is a blind power following apprehension, the will desires things in the way they are proposed by the intellect as desirable. But beatitude

in common and means necessarily connected with it, the intellect apprehends and proposes as necessarily desirable; but particular goods, since they do not have a necessary connection with the end, the intellect apprehends and proposes as indifferently desirable. Therefore the will, which is necessitated concerning beatitude in common, remains indifferent concerning particular goods. Moreover, that indifference is freedom. Therefore rational substance enjoys freedom. The minor is declared. In all particular goods, the intellect apprehends the notion of some good and the defect of some good; in chastity, e.g., there is the notion of good, namely the beauty and merit of virtue, but there is also the notion of some defect, namely difficulty, constant struggle against the motions of concupiscence, etc. But defect has the notion of evil. Because, therefore, the object in itself receives the notion of good, it is eligible, and because it assumes the notion of some evil, it is avoidable. The intellect, therefore, cannot propose it as necessarily eligible or necessarily avoidable; but it presents it indifferently as eligible or avoidable. On the contrary, beatitude in common, since it is a perfect good lacking no perfection, cannot be apprehended under the notion of some evil or defect, and therefore is proposed as necessarily desirable. In another way. The mobile is not moved necessarily except by a mover persons than if he had maintained throughout his life the dogma of the greatest freedom? It is therefore visible that this philosophy is no philosophy and that it belies itself without any shame. »

which exceeds the power of the mobile. But no particular good exceeds or equals the power of the will. Therefore no particular good moves the will necessarily. — The reason for the minor is that the power of the will is concerned with the infinite. For the will, as has been said, follows the intellect, which apprehends the infinite. Hence, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth, so the object of the will is universal good. But every particular good is finite and limited. Therefore it cannot equal the power of the will. Therefore from the intrinsic nature of the intellect and will, freedom arises (1). If, indeed, the intrinsic nature of the will causes freedom, it is incompatible that there be some hidden intrinsic cause, as determinists contend, which would necessarily impel us to one thing. The existence of freedom, therefore, is proved not only a posteriori from the consensus of the human race and experience, but also invincibly a priori by apodictic demonstration. Some moderns deny the demonstrative force of that argument, because, they say, there are some particular goods which nevertheless do not leave indifference in the will, but immediately generate in it complacency, affection, delight, as is clear in the motions which are called first- first. But the argument of St. Thomas concerns particular goods not taken in any way, but proposed by the intellect through an indifferent judgment; however, first-first motions anticipate or bypass the indifferent judgment. Moreover, when we say that the will remains indifferent concerning finite goods, we do not intend that it lacks all complacency concerning them, but only that it can finally abstain from accepting them. The intellect necessarily sees that the object, even a finite one, has the notion of some good, nor could it, except by error, propose it as simply avoidable. Thus, the will can necessarily experience some complacency in that object, just as someone, looking at a beautiful painting, necessarily delights; but that complacency is not so great that the object is chosen as a necessary means. In- (1) « Man is free because he is intelligent; free will is an apanage and a privilege of the spirit. Wherever there is spirit, there is freedom, the perfection of spirit goes hand in hand with the

perfection of freedom! » E. J A N V I E R , La Liberté, 2e conf. deed, although the intellect necessarily apprehends the thing as some good, it elicits an indifferent judgment, because on the other hand the object has the notion of evil and avoidable. Similarly, the will, although it necessarily delights to some extent in a finite good, remains indifferent to finally choosing it. The proof therefore stands, just as the psychological principle stands: an indifferent judgment is followed by an indifferent will. Cf. art. III of this question, n. VII. and art. III q. II, nn. VI and VII. IX. The roots of freedom are assigned. — We will place the matter more clearly before our eyes

by assigning the roots of freedom. The root of freedom is twofold: one intrinsic, the other extrinsic. The extrinsic root is God. For God is the cause of all being and of all its differences. Moreover, necessity, contingency, and freedom are modes of being. Therefore God is the cause of contingency and freedom; and, since His will is most efficacious, He makes our acts, which He wishes to be free, to be truly free (1). The intrinsic root of freedom immediately is the breadth and universality of the will, and its eminence over all particular goods; the mediate root, however, is the breadth and universality of the intellect in knowing and judging; the remote root, finally, is the universality and breadth of the rational nature itself in being. All these will be clear with a brief explanation. — First indeed, the rational nature has a certain universality in being, insofar as, through apprehended forms, or intelligible species, it can become all things in a certain way and receive the natures of all things, not indeed in real being, but in representative and intelligible being. From this first universality arises the universality of the intellect (1) « God, whose knowledge and will always go to the last precision of things, is not content to will that they be in general, but descends to what is called such and such, that is to say to what is most particular, and all this is included in his decrees. Thus God wills from eternity all the future exercise of human freedom, in all that it has of good and real. What is more absurd than to say that it is not, because God wills

that it be? Must we not say, on the contrary, that it is because God wills it; and that, just as we are free by the force of the decree which wills that we be free, so also we act freely in such and such an act, by the force of the same decree which descends to all this detail? » Bossuet, Traite du Libre Arbitre, c. VIII.

in judging. For from the fact that the rational nature has eminence over matter, which is the principle determining to one thing, it follows that the judgment of the intellect is not restricted to one thing, but can attain the object under all respects, turn it in every direction, and in it inspect those things which are worthy of love or hatred, which are useful or harmful, etc. From this consideration arises the indifference of judgment. From the breadth and universality of the intellect in judging, the universality of the will in appetiting is produced. For the will follows the intellect, and an indifferent judgment is followed by an indifferent appetite. From the fact, therefore, that the intellect retains universality concerning all truth, it follows that universality concerning all good must also be ascribed to the will. But if the will is concerned with universal good, its capacity cannot be filled and satisfied by particular goods, but has eminence and independence over all those goods. From this eminence arises the indifference of appetite, which properly constitutes freedom. Hence the universality, or spirituality, of the rational nature in being causes universality and indifference in judging; universality in judging causes immediately the universality and indifference of the will in appetiting, in which freedom is formally placed. The fundamental and first root of freedom, therefore, is the spirituality of the rational nature (1). This is again clarified by comparison with things lacking reason. Every form is followed by a proportioned inclination. A form entirely immersed in matter is followed by a single inclination determined to one thing; therefore in such things no species of freedom is manifested. Forms, however, which emerge somewhat from matter, as in brutes, claim some breadth for themselves; for they receive forms of other things with a certain independence from matter: at one time one form, at

another another, now the form of the pleasant, now of the sad. Hence brutes do not have an appetite invariantly determined, but now delight, now grieve; and hence some imitation and likeness of freedom is perceived in them. But, because the forms received in them are not entirely and simply immaterial, but subject to material conditions, since they depend on a bodily organ, they retain a principle determining to one thing. Hence their inclination is not properly indifferent and free. But intellectual forms, since they receive forms of things without any condition of matter, lack all principle determining to one thing, and therefore have full indifference and freedom (1). X. — A di fficulty drawn from the conservation of energy is solved. There is, as we have said, a threefold determinism. The first is called physical, because it draws arguments from the laws of the physical world, especially from the law of conservation of energies.

It is objected: The world is a system of forces which is subject only to its own mutual actions, and in which the sum of energies, both potential and actual, is always constant and the same. But if free will exists, there will be changes and variations in this system of forces, and the sum of forces will no longer be the same. Therefore free will is impossible. Resp.1e: The aforesaid difficulty concerns only imperated acts, which are exercised through the body and which are called free extrinsically, not truly intrinsically free acts, namely the elicited acts of the will, which are entirely immaterial and in which no corporeal energy intervenes or can intervene. For the determination of freedom is an act of a completely spiritual, incorporeal, supersensible faculty, existing outside the cosmic order; consequently, an operation of this kind is not a production of any material and mechanical energy. Moreover, if the operation and intervention of the will is not a production of new energy, the will can act without in any way varying the sum of actual and potential (1). Cf S. Thomas, q. 23, De Verit. a. 1.—« The human will is free, because it is an energy capable of grasping the universal and absolute good; this immense dimension comes to it from intelligence and the soul, and

the soul and intelligence derive it from their independence from matter or, if you will, from their spirituality. Hence spirituality of the soul and freedom, it is all one. These two dogmas of reason hold together in our minds by the golden and indestructible thread of wisdom, as they hold together in reality by the bond of an immortal life. » E. J a x v i s n , loc. cit.

energies. Therefore the intervention of freedom, taken under that respect, leaves the law of conservation of energies entirely untouched. Resp. 2e and principally: I deny the supposition. The adversaries suppose that material forces are subject only to their own mutual actions, and that there cannot be any superior cause which can direct those forces. This supposition, however, is gratuitous and inept (1). Certainly vital forces, sensitive or intellectual powers, are superior to material energies; why, therefore, could they not have an influence upon them? Let the adversaries prove that the intervention of a superior cause in material forces is incompatible. Physical facts by no means show this repugnance; philosophy, on the contrary, demonstrates that the action of an intellectual cause upon material forces is possible, indeed necessary, both of a created intellectual cause and especially of an infinite intellectual cause, which, as it freely established material forces and energies, so can freely modify them. There exists, therefore, a spiritual principle directing energies and superior to them. Indeed, even in the material order, there is some directing principle. We showed in Natural Philosophy (2) that it is incompatible that everything be reduced to purely mechanical motion; but that in bodies there exists a twofold element: one material, which is the root of quantity, extension, divisibility, etc.; the other formal, specificative, which is the cause of unity and activity. (1) « The law only applies by supposing the universe a closed system to any external action; this hypothesis, necessary to establish the law, cannot be its corollary. If, therefore, spiritual substances intervene in the material universe, the demonstration of the law will be defective, we will be incapable of foreseeing, in the name of physics, the consequences of such an

intervention. It seems, therefore, that it is quite wrongly that certain spiritualist philosophers have seen in the principle of the conservation of energy an objection against human freedom. Even if human freedom modified the quantity of total energy of the universe, the physicist would still have the right to proclaim the conservation of the energy of the material universe, the only one with which he is concerned, for what interests him is not to maintain constant a sum which he does not know, but to know that the phenomena he studies are incapable of making it vary. The law therefore does not affect human freedom any more than divine freedom, it is no objection against either one or the other. » R. P . HEMEN, Revue Thomiste, t. XIII, p. 726. (2) Cf. vol. II, Tract. II, q. I and q. III., a. VII. The formal principle, however, rules and dominates matter: which is proved both from the direction of mechanical motion, for, given the same total energy, motion is directed in this rather than that direction; and from the formation of crystals; and from the unity of a being; and

from the internal tendency which is especially found in living things. Let what we have discussed concerning the existence of matter and form be compared (1). Therefore form is the directing and specificative principle; matter, however, is the quantitative and invariable principle. With the scholastic system of matter and form admitted, therefore, the law of conservation of energies is not difficult to understand. The quantity of energies does not vary, because matter, the root of quantity, is the permanent and invariable principle; but the human soul can direct energy, because generally every form, even in an organic being, can direct and dominate matter and quantity, despite the invariability of matter and quantity. Therefore physical determinism is excellently refuted from the twofold Scholastic principle: the material, which is quantitative and invariable; the formal, which is specificative, qualitative, and directing. Hence the law of conservation of energies, far from impeding freedom, would rather confirm the existence of prime matter (2). In form: The sum of energies is always the same as to quality, I deny; as to quantity, I

subdistinguish: the same materially, I grant, formally, I deny. — Contradistinguish the minor: If freedom intervenes, the sum of energies will not be the same as to quality, I grant; as to quantity, I subdistinguish; it will not be the same formally, I grant; it will not be the same materially, I deny, and I deny the consequence. The only thing that science can prove is the material identity in the sum of energies; but concerning the identity of qualities or even the formal identity of quantity, it is silent and will forever be silent; for these are objects of Philosophy. Therefore, to satisfy the objection, it suffices to show that the intervention of freedom does not impede the material identity which is found in the sum of energies. (1) Cf. vol. II, p. 114, ss. (2) Cf.P . DE MUNNIXK, O.P ., La Conservation de l'Energie et la Liberté morale, collect. Science et Religion ; P . COVALLNAC, S. J., La Liberté et la Conservation de l'Energie ; DE MUNNIXK, Revue Thomiste,sept. 1899; DARLHY , O. S. B., Revue Thomiste, sept. 1899, nov. 1900.

This we indeed do. For what does the intervention of freedom effect? It changes quality, by directing forces, and by affecting quality it also modifies quantity to some extent, which is the subject of quality. But this is only a formal change, which leaves quantity the same materially; just as generally in any change of forms, the same matter and the same quantity always remain, which arises from matter as from a root. Science, therefore, proves material identity, and freedom leaves this untouched, for quantity persists the same under diverse changes; but freedom does indeed change quality or even the formal identity of quantity; but science is not concerned with those changes, while Philosophy, on the other hand, shows that such changes can take place, indeed do take place in fact, by form directing matter and energies, despite the material invariability of energies. The question, therefore, is concluded in one word: Quality is varied, which does not concern scientific men; quantity remains, which science establishes; quantity is also varied formally, about which variation science is not concerned, but quantity remains the same materially, about which identity physicists only care. For a fuller

understanding of how quality can be modified by the soul without quantity being varied, the distinction between transient and immanent action must be recalled. In transient action, which is with some collision and mechanical motion, there is a loss of forces, and new energy is required to produce that mechanical change. But in immanent action no collision intervenes, and the soul behaves as an immobile mover, which is not moved in the same genus of motion. It can therefore move, or reduce from potency to act, not by motion of the same genus, but only by qualitative operation, without mechanical and quantitative motion; and accordingly it can act upon quantity, not by means of another quantity, but only by qualitative action, just as if God or an angel acted within something, not by moving locally and mechanically, but by immanent operation. The soul can therefore modify the qualities of forces, their quantity remaining unchanged (1). (1) Cf. FANOS, Les Fondements de la Morale, pp. 166, ss. These replies fittingly solve the objection; therefore we propose them. But, as others reply, there is no need to labor so much, since the law concerns something else. For what is the

force of the celebrated law? Physics, attending to the law of conservation of energy, cannot foresee the intervention of the will, any more than of an angel or God; hence it practically ignores those interventions, because they are outside its scope; but it by no means testifies that the action of a superior cause which changes the cosmic order and modifies the quality or quantity of energies is impossible. That law, therefore, attends to what takes place in the cosmic order: it is certain, namely, that phenomena which Physics knows and predicts introduce no variation in the sum of energies; but concerning other phenomena which science does not foresee, but which suppose a superior and free cause, the law does not concern itself. « The law therefore does not a ffect human freedom any more than divine freedom, it is no objection against either one or the other (1).» Moreover, the most learned P . Duhem observes: « For us, the principle of conservation of energy is in no way

a certain and general affirmation concerning really existing objects. It is a mathematical formula which posits a free decree of our understanding, so that this formula, combined with other similarly postulated formulas, allows us to deduce a series of consequences, and that these consequences provide us with a sufficient representation of the laws observed in our laboratories... It is already clear that this question: 'Is the law of conservation of energy compatible or not with free will?' can have no meaning for us... We were certain in advance that in the classification we were combining, no place was reserved for free acts. If we then find that a free act cannot be included in our classification, we would be very naive to be astonished and very foolish to conclude that free will is impossible (2). »

XI. — PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINISM IS REFUTED. THE SECOND

(1) Cf. P . DUNN, Physique de croyant, pp. 19-21. Libr. BLOUD, ex- trait des Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne, 1906.

determinism is called psychological, because it draws arguments from the very faculties of the soul. They object 1° : For a choice to be reasonable, there must be a determining motive to choose one thing rather than another: if one motive does not determine, another will do so, because there is no infinite process. Choice is always therefore caused by a determining motive. Now, if a determining motive impels the will, the will is not free. Therefore the very nature of choice makes freedom impossible. Resp. : Distinguish the major: For a choice to be reasonable, there must be a determining motive, that is, a sufficient reason for willing one thing rather than another, I grant; a motive necessitating the choice of one thing rather than another, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence. A choice would indeed be irrational if it were made without a fitting reason: therefore it must be admitted that in every choice a sufficient motive concurs; but we deny that there is a necessitating motive. The ultimate end is indeed a necessitating motive, but concerning the end there

is no choice; particular goods, however, can have a sufficient reason for being chosen, insofar as in them is considered the notion of a means to the end; hence, if the will chooses one rather than another, it does not proceed blindly. But none of them has a necessary reason for being chosen rather than another, because, as has been said many times, no particular good is necessarily connected with the end. If, therefore, one is chosen, the others being rejected, this arises from the full independence of the will. 2° You will object: The will necessarily follows the ultimate practical judgment. Therefore it is not free. Resp. : Distinguish the antecedent: It follows by hypothetical necessity, I grant; by absolute necessity, I deny; and I deny the consequence. By the very fact that the will applies the intellect to elicit a practical judgment, it implicitly wills to follow that judgment, nor can it without contradiction dissent while that judgment stands. This, however, is hypothetical necessity, which supposes freedom. For the will could have applied the intellect to another judgment, indeed it can even now divert the intellect to the opposite judgment.

3°. Other objections seem to rest on experience. Physiological conditions, passions, moral inclinations, impose necessity; hence we see men infallibly impelled and determined to certain actions. Resp. : The aforesaid influences can sometimes disturb reason; in which case freedom is manifestly absent. But commonly they do not remove the judgment of reason; and therefore free choice persists, although inclined and weakened. Obstacles sometimes arise from sensibility, which is altered and no longer follows the impulse of the will. This, however, does not prove that freedom is lacking in man, but that the concurrence of the sensitive or motive power is insufficient. The physiological conditions of freedom, therefore, are lacking, not the power of freedom itself, just as intellection is sometimes disturbed, not by defect of the intellective power, but by defect of extrinsic conditions which are prerequired for intellection. These cases concern certain diseases (1); nor do they prove anything with respect to those who are healthy and in possession of all their

faculties. More on these again below, q. IV, a. I.

XII. — METAPHYSICAL DETERMINISM. IT RESTS ON SEVERAL RUINOUS FOUNDATIONS.

1° It posits that the order of the universe is necessary. — The refutation is had from Cosmology, where it was shown that neither the world itself nor the order of the world is necessary (2). 2° If free will exists, moral evil can exist. But God cannot permit evil. Therefore. Resp. briefly: God can draw a greater good from evil. Moreover, evil will finally be punished and reduced to the order of divine justice. 3° Divine foreknowledge is incompatible with free will. Either, therefore, divine foreknowledge must be rejected or free will must be denied. Resp. : Both of these must be held as two fundamental and most easily provable dogmas: divine providence (1) On these diseases one may consult Th. Ribot, Les Maladies de la volonté, but he is not to be accepted in all things, since he reckons divine existence among the diseases of the will. (2) Cf. vol. II, Tract. I, q. I. and Tract. II, q. I, aa. I, II, III.

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foreknows all things and man enjoys freedom of choice (1); although the harmony is not easily known. But more of these in Theodicy or Theology. (1) « If we had to destroy either freedom by Providence, or Providence by freedom, we would not know where to begin; so necessary are these two things, and so evident and indubitable are the ideas we have of them. » Bossuet, Traité du Libre d'idées, 2. 16. The doctrine of the will and freedom is thus resumed in Thesis XXI approved by the S. Cong. of Studies 27 July 1914 : « The will follows, not precedes, the intellect, and necessarily desires that which is presented to it as good fully satisfying its appetite; but among several goods, which are proposed as desirable by a mutable judgment, it chooses freely. Choice therefore follows the ultimate practical judgment; but that it is ultimate, the will makes it. »

ARTICLE THREE — On The Indifference Required For Freedom.

I. — Freedom of spontaneity and freedom of indi fference. Having vindicated freedom against determinists, it is now necessary to scrutinize more intimately the nature and properties of freedom. Freedom is sometimes taken for immunity from coaction, and is called freedom of spontaneity, which is the same as the voluntary. In this sense the Angelic Doctor asserts that God freely loves Himself; that the Father and Son freely produce the Holy Spirit (1). But freedom properly so called is freedom of indifference, or immunity from necessity, which is

opposed to natural determination to one thing. The Jansenists, following the Calvinists, hold that immunity from necessity is not of the essence of freedom. Thus the third proposition of Jansenius states: « For merit and demerit in the state of fallen nature, freedom from necessity is not required in man, but freedom from coaction suffices. » A proposition condemned as heretical (2). The aforesaid opinions fully agree with determinism; they leave freedom only in name, but take it away in reality. II. — Conclusion: Indi fference, or immunity from necessity, is of the essence of freedom. Arg. Ium. It is of the nature of freedom that we retain power and dominion over our acts. But mere spontaneous and necessary acts, although they are done with advertence of reason, are not in our power. Therefore acts that are spontaneous and immune from the necessity of coaction are not free. Therefore for freedom, immunity from coaction does not suffice (3). Proof of the minor. Natural volition, (1) CI. S. THOMAS, q. 24, De Verit.a. 1, ad 2, and q.10 De Potentia, a. 2, ad 5. (2) CI. DENIKIORS, Enchiridion, n. 968. (3) CI. S. THOMAS, II. Sent. dist. 24, a. 3.

e.g., the love of the ultimate end, is entirely spontaneous and voluntary, and takes place with advertence of reason. Nevertheless, natural volition is not in our power; for natural things precede our dominion, hence the axiom: What nature has given, no one can take away. Therefore

mere spontaneous and necessary acts, although they take place with advertence of reason, are not in our power. Arg. Ilum. Freedom is the principle of morality, and according to common acceptation, free act and moral act are the same thing. But for moral acts, immunity from coaction does not suffice. Therefore neither for free acts. Proof of the minor. Acts are called moral insofar as they are subject to rules of morals and regulated by them. But acts immune only from coaction, namely spontaneous and necessary acts, cannot be subject to rules of morals: for they are determined, invariable, but an invariable act would be vainly subjected to any rule. Therefore. III. — Passive, active, privative indi fference. It is clear, therefore, that indifference pertains to freedom. But there are many species of indifference. First, passive indifference and active indifference. Passive is mere potentiality, or capacity to receive multiple determinations. This is an imperfection, nor does it conduce to action, but rather hinders it. For the more something is potential and indeterminate to many things, the more it is removed from act. It is not, therefore, of the nature of freedom; but, the more this potentiality is removed, the more freedom is perfected, because it is reduced to act. Active indifference is the power indifferently productive of diverse acts, or effects, and which has such eminence to many things that it cannot be restricted to one, but can act or not act. Privative indifference is also distinguished, which is the indifference of an active power with respect to second act. It is partly active, insofar as it is a certain independence of the active power: partly passive, insofar as it is potentiality to second act, depriving the will of some perfection. IV. — Active indi fference is required for freedom. Freedom consists in the dominion which the will has over its acts. But dominion does not belong to the patient as such, but rather

ART. III. — ON THE INDIFFERENCE REQUIRED FOR FREEDOM. 18:1

resides in the agent, whose role is to dominate the passive. Therefore freedom demands active indifference. This, however, in creatures has mixed with it privative indifference: for the created will is not its acts, but always

remains in potency to them. In God, however, there is nothing of passive or privative indifference, since God is His own acts freely, pure act, incapable of any addition. Indifference in God, therefore, is purely active and positive. V. — Objective and subjective indi fference. Objective indifference is on the part of the object, in which appear both the goodness by which it can be desired, and the defect of goodness, or evil, by which it can be rejected. — Subjective indi fference, which is called formal, is on the

part of the subject, which can indifferently be borne to either, indifferently will or not will the object proposed to it. VI. — Indi fference of specification, or contrariety, and indifference of exercise, or contradiction, etc. Specification is that which regards terms contrarily opposed, such as love and hatred, good and evil; or even terms privatively opposed, such as obedience and disobedience, insofar as disobedience implies some act and the privation of due obedience. The indifference of contradiction regards terms contradictorily opposed, such as to will and not to will, to love and not to love. It is called of exercise, because its extremes are to exercise the act and to cease from such exercise. The indifference of contrariety already imbibes the indifference of contradiction, just as contrary opposition includes contradiction. For he who, e.g., is indifferent to love and hatred is a fortiori indifferent to non-love. Finally, physical indifference is distinguished, which is concerning the positing or not positing of the physical act itself, and moral, which concerns acting well or badly in the moral order. VII. — Objective indi fference is essentially required for freedom. Freedom implies that the will is not moved of necessity. Moreover, where objective indifference is absent, the will is moved of necessity. Therefore. For objective indifference consists in this, that the object is proposed to the will

under the notion of some good, by which it can be desired, and under the notion of some evil, by which it can be avoided. But, if such indifference is lacking, namely if the object is proposed as universally good, the will necessarily desires it: for then the object has the notion of infinite good,

and therefore of the ultimate end, by which the will is necessarily moved; if the object is proposed as universally evil, the will necessarily avoids it, since it cannot tend to evil under the notion of evil. Therefore, if objective indifference is lacking, the will is impelled of necessity. On the contrary, if objective indifference is present, the will cannot be necessitated even by God, while the indifferent judgment stands. So the Thomists, against Suarez. For the will is an essentially blind faculty, which is regulated by cognition. Hence, just as it is incompatible for the will to desire an unknown object, so it is incompatible for it to desire an object otherwise than it is proposed. But the object, as the hypothesis has it, is proposed as indifferent. Therefore it is incompatible for the will to desire it of necessity, while this indifference stands. Indeed, if the will necessarily desired what the intellect proposes as indifferently desirable, it would no longer be a faculty following cognition and regulated by cognition, and its very nature would be changed. VIII. — Subjective indi fference is of the essence of freedom. Freedom is an elective faculty. But an elective faculty is in the subject itself and supposes on the part of the subject a power indifferently to accept one thing rather than another. Therefore freedom implies subjective indifference. Indeed, subjective indifference properly and formally constitutes freedom. For objective indifference relates by way of foundation and root: the indifferent proposition of the object is indeed a cause by which the will indifferently tends to it, but the proposition itself is not formally free. That which is formally free is the faculty of tending indifferently to the object. Moreover, the faculty of tending indifferently to the object is subjective indifference itself. Therefore. IX. — The indi fference constitutive of freedom is the indifference of exercise; but the indifference of contrariety relates only per accidens to freedom, insofar as it includes the indifference of contradiction. That indifference

is constitutive of freedom by reason of which the will is mistress of its act. But the will has dominion over its act per se from the indifference of exercise alone. Therefore this

alone per se constitutes freedom. Proof of the minor. The will is mistress of its act by the very fact that it can elicit it or not, continue or suspend it. Moreover, the indifference of exercise is the very faculty

of doing or not doing, continuing or suspending an act. Therefore from the indifference of exercise alone does the will have perfect dominion over its act. The indi fference of contrariety, however, extends the indifference of contradiction to more objects, but does not make the will have fuller dominion over each. Because I can elicit an act of hatred, I do not therefore have fuller dominion over the act of love; and, because I can love, I am not made fuller master of the act of hatred. Per se, therefore, the indifference of contrariety does not constitute freedom. It only contributes to freedom per accidens, insofar as it includes the indifference of exercise. For although the will had the power for two contrary acts, e.g., love and hatred, if however it could not not love or not elicit hatred, neither act would be free. Therefore the indifference of contrariety to love and hatred contributes to freedom only insofar as it includes the indifference of contradiction, namely indifference to love and non-love, to hatred and non-hatred. X. — Indi fference to good or evil, and therefore the power of sinning, is not of the essence of freedom. The conclusion is against some moderns, especially Liberals, who think that freedom essentially implies the power of good and evil; and therefore that civil society is bound to grant citizens freedom in good and evil; that man also has a right externally to profess whatever religion he wishes, and that no civil law can restrict this power, which is natural and of the essence of freedom. The thesis is proved, which St. Thomas repeatedly inculcates (1). Arg. Ium. To tend to an object because of some defect

is not of the perfection and essence of a faculty, but rather argues a defect of the faculty. But free choice cannot tend to evil except because of some defect. Therefore to tend to evil is a defect of free choice, far from being of its essence. Proof of the minor from St. Thomas: « Free choice is per se ordained to good, since good is the object of the

will, nor does it tend to evil except because of some defect by which it is apprehended as good, since there is no will or choice except of good or apparent good. And therefore where free choice is most perfect, it cannot tend to evil, because it cannot be imperfect (1).» Arg. Illum. Nothing is weakened and diminished by the use of what is natural and essential; for whatever is ascribed to essence contributes to the perfection of a thing. But free choice is weakened by the use of the power of sinning. Therefore the power of sinning is not of the essence of freedom. Proof of the minor. Every thing is perfected by union with its principle and weakened and diminished by recession from it. But the principle and source of all freedom is God. Therefore the more freedom adheres to God, the more perfect and noble it becomes, and the more it is turned away from God by sin and adheres to creatures, the more it is weakened and becomes worse. Arg. IIIum. There cannot be an obligation to abstain from what pertains to the essence of a faculty; on the contrary, by the very fact that something is of the essence of a thing, it confers an inviolable right. But there is a strictest obligation not to use the power of sinning. Therefore the power of sinning cannot be of the essence of freedom. XI. — Whether the power of sinning is at least a part of created freedom. Resp.:1°It is not a part of created freedom considered according to essence, according to that of St. Anselm: « Nor is the power of sinning freedom nor a part of freedom (2). » For if it were a part of freedom according to essence, all who are impeccable would lack some part of freedom, and therefore the essence of freedom would not be found in them integrally and totally, although it is clear that impeccability perfects freedom. Resp. 2°: It can be called a part of freedom considered according to the accidental and imperfect state which it has in us wayfarers. For sin is a free act in second act, hence it is rightly imputed to punishment. But second act supposes a first act proportioned to it. Therefore the power of sinning is some true freedom in first act: therefore it is some part of freedom (1). Some, however, object: 1° A part of freedom is a perfection. Therefore, if the power of sinning is a part of freedom, it will be a perfection,

which is absurd. Resp. : A part of freedom considered according to essence is a perfection, I grant: of freedom considered according to the accidental state which it has in wayfarers, I deny; for this state

implies defectibility on the part of the subject. And I deny the consequence. 2° To err is not a part of science. Therefore, by parity, to sin is not a part of freedom. Resp. : I deny the parity; for to err is not to know, or is not an act of science; while to sin is to act freely, or a free act in second act. XII. — Di fficulties are solved by which adversaries attempt to show that indifference is not required for freedom. 1° Free is that which is in our power. But for something to be in our power, freedom of spontaneity suffices, and indifference is not required. Therefore for freedom indifference is not required. Proof of the minor. That is in our power which we do when we will. But every voluntary act, even one proceeding from freedom of spontaneity alone, is done when we will. Therefore it is in our power. Therefore, for something to be in our power, freedom of spontaneity suffices. Resp. : With the major granted, I deny the minor, and to its proof distinguish the major: That is in our power which we do when we will and are not determined to willing, namely when we will with a will formally taken, I grant; which we do when we will and are determined to willing, namely when we will with a will taken as nature, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence. (1) S. THOMAS, loc. cit. Sent. (2) C. S. ASSEMUS, Dialog. De Libero Arbitrio, c. 1. (1) Cf. GOSER, Clypeus Theol. Thomist., De Actibus humanis, disp. II, a. III, § V, n° CCVIII-

For something to be in our power, it is required that the whole reason for willing be on the part of the will, so that the will determines what we do; if the reason for willing arises from nature, or if nature impels us to one thing, the act already escapes our power. Certainly one is absurdly said to have in his power that to which he is necessarily moved by another. Moreover, in the case of pure spontaneity, the reason for willing what we do is not from the will, but from nature, which necessarily determines. 2e

The act which follows the judgment of reason is a human act, or free act. But the act proceeding from spontaneity alone follows the judgment of reason. Therefore it is free. Therefore spontaneity suffices, and indifference is not required. Resp. : Distinguish the major: The act which follows an indifferent judgment of reason is a human act, or free, I grant; the act which follows a judgment determined to one thing is free, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence. The will follows the guidance of the intellect. If, namely, the intellect judges the object to be indifferently desirable, the will enjoys freedom; if, however, the intellect judged the object to be necessarily desirable, the will would not have the act in its power, but would be necessarily drawn. Therefore for a human act, not just any judgment suffices, but an indifferent judgment is required. 3e What is done with love and delight is done freely. But every act proceeding from spontaneity alone is done with love and delight. Therefore it is done freely. Resp.: Distinguish the major: What is done with vincible love and delight is done freely, I grant; what is done with invincible delight, I deny. For what is invincible with respect to the will is not in the power of the will. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence. 4e Free is the perfect voluntary. But there is a perfect voluntary without indifference. Therefore there is freedom without indifference. Resp.: The perfect voluntary can be taken in two ways. First, as it is opposed to the imperfect voluntary, which is in brutes, and in this sense it is defined: That which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with intellectual cognition of the end; while the imperfect voluntary is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with sensitive cognition of the end. If the adversary contends that the perfect ART. III. — ON THE INDIFFERENCE REQUIRED FOR FREEDOM. 187 voluntary in this sense is free, he precisely supposes what is to be proved. Secondly, the perfect voluntary is said to be that which proceeds entirely from the will formally

taken, so that the reason for willing is the choice of the will, not the determination of nature. In this acceptation, the

perfect voluntary is free; but manifestly it supposes indifference in the will choosing and determining itself. In form, therefore, I respond: Free is the perfect voluntary, that is, that which adequately proceeds from the will formally taken, or from the will determining and choosing itself, I grant; only that which is opposed to the imperfect voluntary of brutes, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor and deny the consequence. 1. — Reason for the article. We know (art. I) that the will desires some things necessarily and some freely, or indifferently (aa. II and III). Hence it already appears what is the object of the will, namely good proposed by the intellect. Some things, however, must be added to complete the doctrine. II. — Whether only good is the object of the will. Some of the Nominalists thought that the adequate object of the will is indifferent to good and evil, and therefore that the will can tend to evil under the notion of evil. Scotus, however, although he does not advocate that opinion as his own, hesitates and contends that it has not yet been proved that the will cannot tend to evil under the notion of evil, or desire good under the notion of good (2). That question is touched upon and solved in his own way by Æmil. Saisset(3). The common opinion holds that the object of the will is only good as abstracted from what is true or apparent, so that the will can indeed tend to known evil under the notion of good, or to apparent good, but never to known evil proposed under the notion of evil. Proof briefly. Arg. Ium .The will relates to good as the intellect relates to truth. But truth is so the adequate object of the intellect (1). Cf. S. Thomas, I II and his commentators already cited. (2). Cf. Soor., I Sent. dist. I. q. 4. (3). Cf. Saussur, Dictionn. philos. v. Libert. «L'hône» does evil, not for evil itself, but to pursue happiness. More enlightened, he would understand that true happiness is inseparable from virtue and would not exhaust in an insane struggle the best half of his life.» Suprascriberet: « In a word, I reject the good, knowing it is the good, and I do evil knowing it is the evil, although evil itself is not the goal of my action. » that it is incompatible for the intellect to assent to falsehood under the notion of falsehood. Therefore good is so the object of the will that it

is impossible for it to desire evil under the notion of evil. Wherefore, just as the intellect errs because it adheres to falsehood under the notion of truth, so the will fails insofar as it adheres to evil under the notion of good. Arg.IIum .The will is rational appetite. But every appetite tends to good. Therefore the will cannot tend except to good. Proof of the minor. Appetite is an inclination to something suitable. But nothing is considered suitable unless it is good or apprehended as good. Wherefore every appetite tends to good. Natural appetite indeed, because it accompanies natural and infallible form, always pursues true good; but rational appetite accompanies an apprehended form and, because it happens that something is apprehended as suitable which is really harmful, hence the will can desire mere apparent good, that is, evil under the notion of good. Arg.IIIum.Experience testifies that all who act always seek in their acts some notion of good. Even those who delight in evil, who intentionally hate God and break out into blasphemies, who choose evil action because it is evil, always intend some good; for in all these they find some complacency and joy, and they hold all these as means to satisfy their will and their passions, which satisfaction appears to them a delightful good. III. — Whether the good, the object of the will, is only the good of the end, or also the good of means. Many philosophers think that the goodness of the end is the total and adequate object of the will, so that means do not participate in the notion of good except denominatively and extrinsically, just as medicine is called healthy from the health of an animal. It must be held, however, that the goodness of the end is indeed the primary and principal object of the will, but not the sole and total, and that means have real and intrinsic goodness, although secondary and depending on the end. Proof from the authority of St. Thomas: « The will extends to the end and to those things which are for the end. For each power extends to those things in which the notion of its object can be found; just

as sight extends to all things which in any way participate in color. But the notion of good, which is the object of the power of the will, is found not only in the end, but also in those things which are for the end (1). »

QUESTION TWO.

Proof by reason. That has intrinsic goodness which by reason of its own nature is appetible; for good and appetible imply each other. But means by reason of their own nature are appetible, since they have order, proportion, and adaptation to the end. Therefore they have intrinsic goodness, and therefore are an object of the will, albeit secondary. On the will in relation to other powers. The will can be considered in relation to other faculties in three ways. First, as a power, and hence the controversy whether the will is a more perfect power than the intellect; second, as a mover, and hence the question how it moves other powers, or is moved by others, or moves itself; third, by reason of the acts it elicits, and hence certain things are discussed concerning the acts of the will with their order to acts of the intellect. IV. — Corollaries. Hence it is gathered: 1° That good belongs to the end and means analogically, by analogy of proportion. It does not belong univocally, because it is attributed to the end primarily and principally, but to means secondarily and in order to the end. It belongs, however, by analogy of proportion, and not of simple attribution, because the form, namely goodness, is found intrinsically in both analogates, both in the end and in the means (2). 2° That every act of the will necessarily concerns the end or means: therefore a neutral act, which terminates neither to the end nor to means, is incompatible. For it is incompatible that an act be borne outside the adequate object of a faculty. Moreover, a neutral act would be outside the adequate object of the will. Therefore. Proof of the minor. The adequate object of the will is good, which indeed can only be threefold: honest, delightful, and useful. But a neutral act, which terminates neither to means nor to the end, cannot be borne to useful good, which has the notion of means, nor to honest good or delightful good, which are sought for themselves and have the notion of end. Thus a neutral act would be borne outside the adequate object of the will. (1) 8. THOMAS, I. 11°, q. 8. A. 2 (2) Cf. Logic, pp. 45-48.

ARTICLE ONE.

WHETHER THE WILL IS A MORE PERFECT POWER THAN THE INTELLECT (1)

1. — Opinions. St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Ægidius Romanus, and many moderns a ffirm it. — St. Thomas, however, and the Thomists, Suarez, Vasquez, the Conimbricenses, and many others, teach that the intellect is simply more excellent than the will; but that the will can be more perfect than the intellect in a certain respect. In our days the question is renewed under another aspect. The pre-eminence of the will is extolled by many who defend pragmatism and advocate the primacy of action. It must not be denied that action has the greatest importance and that the will has the greatest

part in action; that the will intervenes in every choice and practical judgment, applies all faculties to act, moves the intellect to understand or diverts it from intellection, determines it to the assent of faith in the supernatural order, etc. We profess, therefore, the moral and practical pre-eminence of the will; but the whole question concerns physical and psychological perfection. In this sense, the excellence of the intellect cannot be denied, even if a certain primacy of action is admitted (1). II. — The Thomistic opinion is chosen and proved. Arg. Ium. The perfection simply of any

power is that which pertains to the essence of the power itself. But a power is essentially constituted by its order to the formal and specificative object. Hence perfection simply is derived from the genus of objective and specificating cause. But perfection in a certain respect arises from other conditions pertaining to the material object, or to extrinsic circumstances, beyond the genus of specificating cause. From which we argue thus: The perfection simply of any faculty arises from the genus of objective and specificating cause. But on the part of the objective and specificating cause, the intellect is more excellent than the will. Therefore the intellect is simply more excellent. Proof of the minor. The specificating cause of faculties is the object.

Moreover, the object of the intellect is more noble and higher than the object of the will. Which is shown thus: That object is more noble and higher which is simpler and more abstract from matter: for immateriality is the cause of actuality and perfection, while, on the other hand, imperfection is founded in materiality or potentiality. But the object of the intellect is simpler and more abstract than the object of the will. Therefore. Proof of the minor. The object of the intellect is being as it abstracts from singularity and material conditions; but the object of the will is being concreted by existence and singularity; for the will is not borne to universals, but to things as they exist in themselves. (1) On moral dogmatism one may consult P . ScwvAIM, O. P ., Revus Thomiste, novemb. 1898, C. LABEVHIE, Dogme et Metaphysique, I. P . c. V. Cf. Encyclie. Pr. P . X., Pascendi dominici gregis, 8 sept. 1907.

Moreover, the object of the will is an appetible thing; the object of the intellect is the notion, or quiddity, of a thing. But the notion, or quiddity, of a thing is simpler and more abstract than the thing itself, which is something concrete consisting of quiddity and existence. Finally, an object is the more immaterial the more it extends to many things. But truth, the object of the intellect, extends to more things than good, the object of the will: for good is properly said of existing things, but truth is said of any being, however taken. Therefore the object of the intellect is more immaterial and abstract. Arg. IIum. Since a faculty is specified by the mode of attaining its object, the faculty which attains its object in a more noble mode is simply more noble. Now the intellect attains its object in a more noble mode than the will. Therefore. Proof of the minor. The intellect so attains its object that it can penetrate all things which are involved in the object, under any condition, whether of existence or non-existence, by prescinding, composing, dividing. The will, however, does none of these things, but supposes the fact done by the intellect; nor can it be inclined to the object otherwise than according to the mode in which it is proposed by the intellect. Moreover, the intellect by understanding draws things to itself, but the will

by appetiting is drawn to things. Per se, however, it is better to draw the perfection of a thing to oneself than to be drawn to it. We admit indeed that with respect to things which have a more noble mode of being in themselves than in our intellect, love is better than cognition. But this is per accidens. For if those things could receive in our intellect the same mode of being which they have in themselves, the cognition of them would be more perfect than the love of them, for the reason assigned, namely it is better to draw to oneself than to be drawn to another. Arg IIIum. The more immediate and proximate some passion, or property, is to the essence from which it emanates, the more perfect it is considered, just as everything, the closer it is to its principle, the more perfectly it exists. But the intellect is a property more immediate and proximate to the essence of the soul than the will; for the intellect arises from the soul through no other mediating power; the will, on the contrary, supposes and follows the intellect, just as inclination supposes and follows form. Therefore.

No one, however, denies the pre-eminence of the will in a certain respect. The will is the first mover in the genus of applying other powers with respect to exercise; but this the intellect does not achieve, which only moves objectively. Under this respect, therefore, the will surpasses the intellect. Moreover, the arguments of adversaries show that some accidental

excellence over the intellect belongs to the will; as will be clear shortly. Moreover, the intellect and will mutually surround each other, for the intellect, as a certain good, is contained under the object of the will, and the will, as a certain truth, under the object of the intellect. III. — Di fficulties are solved. 1° That power is simply nobler whose principal act is nobler than the principal act of the other. But the principal act of the will, namely the love of God, is more perfect than the principal act of the intellect, namely the cognition of God. Therefore. Resp. : Distinguish the major: The faculty whose act is nobler in physical being is nobler, I grant; in moral being, I deny; contradictinguish the minor, and deny the conclusion. In moral being indeed we

ought to prefer the love of God to His cognition, because love is entirely owed to Him; hence even hatred of God in ethical being is worse than the privation of divine vision. But in the present context we are only concerned with the physical perfection of powers. 2°You will object: But also in the physical order the love of God is more perfect than the cognition of Him, just as it is more perfect to love higher things than to know them. Therefore the difficulty remains. — Resp. : The love of God is more perfect than abstractive cognition of God and through effects, I grant; than intuitive cognition, I deny. In the present life, since God is not attained by the intellect as He truly is, the love of God is more perfect than the cognition of Him; but if God is seen intuitively as He is in Himself, cognition will be more excellent. According to itself, therefore, cognition is more powerful, although per accidens and by reason of the imperfect state of the way, love excels. 3° The mover is nobler than the moved. But the will is the mover, the intellect is moved. Therefore the will is nobler than the intellect. Resp.1°: The mover is nobler than the moved in the order of moving cause, I grant; simply and in every order, I deny. Therefore the will is nobler than the intellect in a certain respect, I grant; simply and absolutely, I deny. — The greatest excellence of powers is to be esteemed,

not from the mode of moving, but from the excellence of the formal object. The reason is that the species and essence of a faculty is derived from the formal object. Resp. 2° : Distinguish the major: The mover in the genus of e fficient cause is nobler than the moved which is in no way moved by it, I grant; the mover in the genus of efficient cause is nobler than the moved which is also moved by it in the genus of final cause, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: The intellect is moved, but in such a way that it is a mover in the genus of final cause, I grant; that it is only moved, I deny, and I deny the consequence. As will be explained below, the intellect is moved by the will efficiently, but again it moves the will with respect to specification and in the genus of final cause. But since the end is the most powerful of all causes, it is simply more

noble to move in the notion of end than in the notion of efficient cause. Simply, therefore, the intellect is more excellent. IV. — Whether abstract quiddity is truly more perfect than existing thing. The Scotists object: Quiddity with existence is much more perfect than quiddity alone in a state of mere abstraction. Therefore the foundation of the Thomistic opinion collapses. Resp. : It happens in two ways that something is more perfect than another: in the being of the thing and in the being of the object. In the being of the thing indeed, that which is clothed with existence is better than that which prescinds from existence, just as real and actual being is better than ideal being. But in the being of the object, abstract quiddity is simply more excellent. For an actually existing thing is individual, composite, and mixed with imperfections of singulars; but abstract quiddity, since it is universal, is purer, simpler, more immaterial, more intelligible. It can therefore terminate a power in a more spiritual and noble way. Moreover, when it concerns the species and nobility of faculties, it is not the being of the thing, but the being of the object, from which specification is derived, that is considered. V. — In what way truth is a nobler end in order to the intellect than good in order to the will. « Good can be considered objectively, or as it is an object from which powers derive goodness and perfection, just as they derive species. In which consideration, the object of the will is good under the common notion, just as the object of the visual power is color under the common notion; but the object of the intellect

Proof of the conclusion: Since every act must necessarily be placed in some determinate species, no act can be elicited except dependently on the faculty from which it derives its species. But the act of the will is specified by the intellect, as has been said. Therefore, unless the intellect precedes, the will will remain indifferent to many things, nor will it choose anything: no desire for the unknown. Moreover, it has already been shown that the cause and root of the free act is the indifferent judgment of the intellect (1). Finally, if the object becomes good because it is chosen, as the adversaries contend, then the will becomes

the sole norm of good and evil, and the objective foundations of morality collapse. As to the II° part, all Scholastics hold that at least a speculative judgment is prerequired for a free act; but Suarez thinks that suffices, and that a practical judgment is not always and absolutely necessary; the more common opinion, however, holds that a free act never takes place unless a practical judgment precedes. This doctrine is chosen and proved. The will is effectively determined only by that judgment which does not consist in mere contemplation of truth, but regards practice, and says that the object is here and now suitable or unsuitable, desirable or to be avoided, and that the act is here and now to be placed or omitted. But a merely speculative judgment rests in the contemplation of truth; it says indeed that the object is true or false, good or evil, but it does not pronounce that the object is here and now to be desired or avoided, the act here and now to be placed or omitted: for all these are proper to a practical judgment. Therefore the will does not burst into act unless a practical judgment precedes. Indeed, many practical judgments can be made, but there is one which is called ultimate and is commanded by the will, with which standing the will is infallibly moved, nor can it dissent in the composite sense, otherwise it would contradict itself. — More on these below, art. III, nn. VI and VII. — On the di fference between practical judgment and command, below, art. III., n. XII. III. — In what, however, does the motion of the intellect into the will consist: is it in the genus of efficient cause, or in ART. II. — ON THE WILL AS MOVER. 199 the genus of final cause? Cajetan, Conrad, Medina hold that this influence is in the genus of efficient cause; others, however, such as Ferrariensis, Bannez, Gonet, deny it. We embrace this last opinion, which is St. Thomas's: « The intellect moves the will not after the mode of an efficient cause, but after the mode of a final cause, by proposing to it its object, which is the end (1). » Proof by reason. The principle by which an efficient agent acts must be intrinsic to the power, just as the principle of heating is intrinsic to fire. But a known object does not intrinsically affect the will, since it is not

received in it, but in the intellect, through the impressed species. Therefore it does not concur efficiently to volition by way of a principle by which. The object, therefore, moves the will insofar as it receives the notion of goodness. But goodness moves only in the genus of final cause. Therefore the object moves the will in the genus of final cause. It acts, moreover, in the notion of an extrinsic formal cause, insofar as it is an extrinsic form inclining and determining the will to this act rather than that. IV. — The sensitive, cognitive and appetitive faculties move the will with respect to specification, indirectly and mediately. With respect to the cognitive faculties, this is already clear. For they prepare and supply to the intellect the matter from which it draws its object, and by means of the intellect they move the will. With respect to appetite, it is proved. From passion, a man is disposed so that the object appears suitable or unsuitable to the intellect, according to the saying of the Philosopher: As each man is, such does the end seem to him (2), namely according to the mode in which one is disposed, he judges the end, or object, to be good or evil. Appetite, therefore, moves the intellect by reason of the object. The intellect again moves the will by reason of the object. Hence passions have an influence on the will by means of the intellect.

Passions also sometimes produce certain changes in the body, which can in some way impede the judgment of the intellect, and by reason of the judgment influence the will mediately.

The vegetative faculties, finally, also have a certain remote influence on the will, insofar as functions or physiological conditions overflow into the appetite, and through the appetite into the imagination and intellect, and through the intellect into the will. All those things which constitute temperament and moral character influence the human will indirectly; these will be more fully known when we speak of dispositions and habits (1). V. — The will moves with respect to exercise the intellect and other powers, excepting the powers which serve vegetative life. Among all ordered powers, that power which attends to the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. But the

will regards the good and the end in common, but each power is compared to some good proper to itself, such as sight to the perception of color, intellect to the cognition of truth (2). Therefore the will moves all the powers of the soul to their acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our choice. For a full understanding of this, it must be recalled that the will commands the sensitive appetite with a political rule, although not despotic (3). VI — But it is asked whether the will, by moving other powers, impresses something real and physical upon them. There is a twofold opinion among the Scholastics. Some hold that other powers, by the very fact that they are rooted in the same essence of the soul as the will, have a certain natural sympathy and connection by virtue of which they carry out the command of the will, without needing to posit any real and physical influence derived from the will. So the Conimbricenses, Vasquez, and many others. The other opinion teaches that the will impresses something physical on the moved powers, by virtue of which they are subordinated. So Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, and commonly the Thomists. We choose this opinion. It is proved first from the authority of St. (1) Metaphysic. Ontolog. Tract. III. (2) S. Thomas, I. P . q. 82. a. 4. (3) Cf. vol. II, pp. 613-615. Thomas. « They (the powers) are compared to the will, by which they are applied to act, as instruments to the principal agent (1).» Moreover, it is the constant doctrine of St. Thomas that the principal agent impresses something real and physical on the instrument, as will be explained in Ontology. Proof by reason. From the motion and application of the will, some perfection, some mode of freedom, flows into the other powers, which they would not have unless they were applied by the will and freedom, and by virtue of which they are determined to this end rather than that. But sympathy and natural connection add nothing at all; and, since it is common and indifferent to all acts and powers, it determines no more now than before to this end rather than that. Therefore that sympathy must be considered insufficient. It is confirmed. Sometimes other faculties resist the will, as is clear of the intellect, which is

distracted to other things against the will. Therefore, in order that they be effectively moved by the will, something really impressed by the will is required, whose impulse can overcome the resistance of the other powers. Moreover, the aforesaid sympathy operates by way of natural consequence, or connection. But natural consequence cannot have place in those things which are done by the free command of the will. Therefore. That the will can impress something real on other powers, however, is not too difficult to understand. For although the operation of the will is formally immanent, it can be virtually transient. Hence it will produce a twofold effect: one indeed in itself, another in other powers, and this will be some motion, or some flowing and transient power, by which faculties are effectively and physically reduced to act, just as an instrument is applied by the principal agent. VII.— How the will moves itself. For a fuller understanding of the nature of the will as mover, it is asked whether and to what extent it moves itself, whether in its free actions or in the first

volition of the end. VIII. — First conclusion: The will in every free action moves itself with respect to exercise. The will is mistress (1) S. Thomas, I. II, q. 16, a. 1.

of its act. But no one is considered master of his act unless he can move himself to it, and can place or suspend it. Therefore. It is confirmed. The end relates to appetible things as principle does to intelligible things. But the intellect, by knowing a principle, reduces itself from potency to act and moves itself to know conclusions. Therefore the will, from the fact that it wills the end, reduces itself to act and moves itself to will those things which are for the end. You will object: The mobile is moved to the presence of its mover. But the will is always present to itself. Therefore, if it moves itself, it will be in continuous motion, which however is found to be false. Resp. : Distinguish the minor: The will is always present to itself in the notion of mover, I deny; in another respect, I grant, and I deny the consequence. The will is not always present to itself in the notion of mover, because the actual volition by which the will stirs itself to choice of means is not always

present. IX. — Second conclusion: The will in the first volition of the end does not move itself with respect to exercise; but this first intention of the end proceeds from God as a special mover. The first volition of the end can be understood as that which is first simply and with respect to the whole life, and which man elicits at the beginning of moral life, when he first attains the use of reason; or first in a certain respect, in some order or business, as when someone first wills to wage war or enter military service, etc. The conclusion concerns the first volition simply taken. But when we say that the will does not move itself in the first volition, we do not deny that it truly acts, which is to move itself in a broad sense; we only deny that the will moves itself properly, namely from some prior act reducing itself to act. Proof of the conclusion. Nothing can move itself to that with respect to which it is not in act, but only in potency: for each thing moves according as it is in act. But with respect to the first volition, the will is not in act, but only in potency. Therefore the will cannot move itself to the first volition of the end. The minor is clear. The volition of the end, since it is the first of all, supposes no other by reason of which the will would be constituted in act and reduce itself from potency to act. It is necessary, therefore, that the will, which is in potency, be moved by that which is simply in act, and this is God. Without this first actuation, man cannot will anything; but once this first motion towards the universal good is placed, the will can stir itself, determine itself to this or that good, with divine concurrence indeed. There is, therefore, a great difference between the mode in which God moves the will in the first volition and in other volitions. For in the first volition God moves the will and so moves it that the will does not move itself. This volition is called universal by St. Thomas, both because it proceeds from God as universal mover, and because it is towards universal good, which is the object of the will. In other motions, however, God indeed moves the will, indeed premoves and predetermines it; but this is the common action of the first mover, which notwithstanding « man by reason determines himself to will this or that, which

is true good or apparent good (1).» In short: in the first volition the will is moved, but does not move itself, although it truly acts; in other volitions the will determines itself by the judgment of reason; it is moved, indeed premoved by God, but in such a way that it moves itself. The first volition of the end is free with respect to exercise, for the will has the faculty of eliciting it or not; and it can be meritorious (as Theologians hold it was meritorious in angels and in Christ). However, in this first beginning of moral life, several instants must be distinguished with respect to sin. In the first instant indeed in which it is specially moved by God, the will cannot sin, otherwise sin would be referred back to God the mover; but in subsequent instants it is capable of sin, insofar as it can by counsel determine itself to some evil. X. — Third conclusion: In the first volition of the end in a certain respect, as when a man begins new affairs, intends a new end, the will sometimes does not move itself, but is moved by God

alone; sometimes it moves itself from some presupposed act, formally or virtually perduring. The I° part is declared. As Cajetan observes (2), God, as the author of nature, to demonstrate the particular providence 2 0 4 M E T A P H Y S I C A P H Y C H O L O G I C A , T R A C T . I I . Q . I I . which He has for the intellectual nature, sometimes moves to works about which one had not thought, such as seeking treasure, pursuing enemies, etc. In which sense the author of Maccabees says: A good counsel fell upon them (1). This appears especially in the supernatural order. « God sometimes specially moves some to will something determinate, which is good; as in those whom He moves by grace (2). » Sometimes God suddenly excites someone specially, e.g., a faithful and pious man to love, a sinner to penance, an infidel to faith. — These motions, however, are from the will, not moving itself but moved by God. The II° part is also clear, namely that in the intention of a new end and in the undertaking of a new business, the will is not always specially moved by God. Both because a man can fail and sin in such a volition, and because he can be excited by the suggestion or impulse of sensitive appetite, and also

because it has a connection with another act, and follows from another affection, e.g., of one's own good, delightful good, etc. Moreover, from a preceding act the will can move itself to the first volition of a particular end. A special divine motion is therefore not required, although the concurrence of the First Mover always intervenes. (1) I. Machab. IV, 45. (2) S. Thomas, I- II", q. 9, a. 6, ad. 3.

ARTICLE THREE

ON THE ACTS OF THE WILL WITH THEIR ORDER TO ACTS OF THE INTELLECT (1). I. — There are six human acts elicited by the will: volition, fruition, intention, consent, choice, and use. Proof. Every human act elicited by the will either concerns the end or means. Concerning the end, indeed, there are three. For either the will is borne towards the end absolutely, which act is called simple volition; or as resting in the end, and hence results fruition; or towards the end as to be attained through means, and thus intention is constituted. Concerning means, there are also three acts. For either the will wills the means absolutely, and thus consent is had; or it wills one means rather than another, and thus choice takes place; or it applies means to something, and thus use is posited, which is the application of the executive power to a work. Concerning simple volition, we have already treated in the preceding: for what we have discussed concerning the object of the will, q. I, a. IV, and concerning the mode in which the will is moved or moves itself, in the preceding article, holds for it; but some things concerning the other acts are briefly explained. II. — On fruition. Intention is indeed prior to fruition, but we treat of fruition first, because it concerns the end absolutely, while intention concerns the end in order to means. Fruition is defined as: The joyful rest of the lover in the possessed end. The (1) Cf. S. Thomas, I- II", q. 11 ad q. 18, and his commentators already cited; GARDINI, La Credibilità, c. 1.

name of fruition is derived from sensible fruit; in which two things are implied: first that it has sweetness, second that it is the ultimate thing expected from the tree or field. Wherefore fruition implies a certain sweetness, or delight,

concerning the ultimate expected, which is the end. Fruition is an act of the will, both because delight pertains to appetite, and because fruition concerns the end, which is the object of the will. Three acts are required for fruition: possession of the good, love of it, and delight, or rest in it. The two former are required as causes, because we do not enjoy an absent thing, or a thing not loved; but formally fruition consists in delight, or rest. For possession and love do not always produce fruition, for we do not enjoy bitter medicine, although possessed and loved; but delight and rest are that by which we are made happy and enjoy. Perfect fruition is only of the ultimate end, or beatitude, for the ultimate simply expected by

man is the ultimate end, which totally quiets the appetite. An intermediate end, however, since it is in itself delightful and determines the motion of the will, implies a certain rest, or imperfect fruition. III. On intention. Intention is defined as: The efficacious desire of the end to be attained through means. It does not concern the end absolutely considered, but the end in order to means, and hence is distinguished from fruition. It is an act of the will, because to intend, or tend to the end, is of that faculty which has the end for its object, and which stirs itself and other powers towards the end, which pertains to the will. It presupposes, however, an act of the intellect, since nothing is willed unless foreknown. It concerns both the ultimate and the intermediate end. For it regards the end as the term of the motion of the will; but a term can be either the simply ultimate term of the whole motion, or the term of some part of the motion. Intention, therefore, can be borne to two different things: to the ultimate end and to the proximate end; indeed, even to two ends not subordinated, for a man prefers one means to another, and thus manifestly intends several things. Those ends, however, not subordinated, agree in some one which is first and per se willed (1). (1) Cf. S. Thomas, I: II", q. 12, a. 4.

ART. III. — ON THE ACTS OF THE WILL.

IV. — The notion of choice. Choice is de fined as: The discerning acceptance of one means rather than another for attaining the end. Discerning acceptance requires cognition: wherefore choice implies something pertaining to reason and something pertaining to the will. Primordially and originatively it is of reason, because choice follows the counsel of reason and the ultimate practical judgment: hence it is called a deliberated appetite. Elicitively, however, it is of the will. For the act is properly to be ascribed to that faculty to which its object properly pertains. But the object of choice properly pertains to the will; for the object of the will is good in common, but the object of choice is good ordered to the end, which is contained under good in common. Therefore the act of choice is properly ascribed to the will. Moreover, choice is an act of freedom, but freedom is properly of the will (1). Under this respect, choice can be said to be formally of the will, that is, properly and elicitively. Under another respect, however, it is said to be formally of the intellect, materially of the will (2). For that act can be said to be formally of that faculty from which it receives its form, or species. But choice is an act which receives its form, or species, from reason. Therefore it can be said to be of reason formally. Proof of the minor. Since a man can attain the end through several and diverse means, the will is not more determined to choose one means rather than another, but relates indifferently to either, even supposing an efficacious intention of the end. It must, therefore, be determined by counsel and deliberation to accept one means rather than another. Hence in choice, reason is as determining and regulating, the will as regulable and determinable. Moreover, determining and regulating relate as formal principle, but determinable and regulable as material principle. Rightly, therefore, under that respect, choice is said to be of the intellect formally, of the will materially. V. — Concerning what choice is. 1° Choice concerns means, not the end. Choice relates in operative matters as discourse does in speculative matters. Moreover, discourse is not made concerning principles, but concerning conclusions. Therefore neither is choice made

concerning the end, but concerning means. (1) Cf. supra, q. I, a. II, nn. II-IV, pp.161-163. (2) Cf. S. Thomas. I: II", q. 13, a. 1 2° Choice concerns things which are done by us; for a means is either our action, or is something which is subject to our action. 3° Choice is not of the impossible known as such. Choice, indeed, proceeds from an efficacious intention of the end. But efficacious intention does not tend to impossibles nor incline. Therefore. VI. — Choice is caused by the ultimate practical judgment (1). It does not necessarily follow the speculative judgment: for a man often tends to that which he speculatively pronounces evil and to be avoided. But, with the ultimate practical judgment standing, choice infallibly follows. For, since the intellect is indifferent to making such a practical judgment, the ultimate judgment is not elicited unless the will forces and applies the intellect to such assent. But the will, by

forcing the intellect to judgment, implicitly wills to follow it, otherwise it would not apply it; nor can it without open contradiction dissent in the composite sense, that is, with this judgment standing. This, however, is hypothetical necessity; supposing, namely, that the will determines and forces the intellect to the practical judgment, choice infallibly follows, but the will could have not applied the intellect, and can still divert it to another judgment. Hence dissent is possible in the divided sense.

VII. — IN THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE INTELLECT PRACTICALLY JUDGES TWO MEANS TO BE EQUALLY USEFUL,

or one less and the other more useful, what will the will do? The will can certainly choose the means which the intellect speculatively judges less good; it can also move the intellect to devise new reasons and motives by reason of which the object otherwise less suitable may be rendered more suitable, at least apparently, and thus be chosen before the other. But the difficulty is whether, with two goods proposed by practical judgment as equal, or one lesser and the other greater, the will can, without changing the judgment or finding a new motive, choose the lesser or

the equal. Suarez, Valentia, Pesch, etc., affirm; the Thomists, Vasquez, Bellarmine, however, deny (2). (1) Cf. S. THOMAS, QQ. Dipp., De Veri. q. 22, De Volunt. a. 6, De Malo, q. 6, De electione human, art. unic. (2) For the Thomistic opinion one may consult GONET, disp. IX, a. 3; for the proposed opinion, PESCH, n. 1069.

This last opinion is brie fly proved. The will, being an essentially blind power and following the guidance of the intellect, cannot prefer except what the intellect shows and proposes practically as preferable. But the intellect does not propose as practically preferable what it practically judges to be less good or equal, for that would be a contradiction. Therefore, with the aforesaid judgment standing, the will can choose nothing. If the means is proposed practically as less good, the will rejects it, otherwise it would not follow the guidance of the intellect and its nature would be changed. If it is proposed practically as equal to the other, the will remains indifferent. For it can be determined by nothing: not by itself, because it follows the dictate of the intellect proposing the object; not by the object, because, as the hypothesis has it, there is no greater reason in one than in the other. Therefore no choice will be made, until the intellect, moved by the will, devises in one some suitability by reason of which it surpasses the other; and this will easily happen in practice. It is objected: It is of the nature of freedom to have indifference by which it can choose whatever it wishes. Therefore, whatever the proposition made by the intellect, the will remains indifferent to choosing. Resp. : Distinguish the antecedent: It is of the nature of freedom to have indifference after a speculative judgment, I grant; after a practical judgment, I subdistinguish, with that judgment changed, I grant, with that judgment standing, I deny. And by the same reason, the consequence is distinguished. — The reason of freedom consists in this, that whatever the speculative proposition of the object made by the intellect, the will remains indifferent. But given the ultimate practical judgment, the will is necessarily moved. In this, however, no injury is done to freedom, for the ultimate practical judgment is the work of

freedom itself, insofar as the will itself forced the intellect to elicit the judgment; and on the other hand it remains free to change the judgment. Hence it follows: If the will intends the end efficaciously and the intellect practically judges there is only one means to obtain the end, the will infallibly chooses that means. For the will, by intending the end efficaciously, thereby wills that without which the end cannot be attained; otherwise it would not be a true and serious intention. But the end cannot be attained without that which is practically judged to be the only means. Therefore, if the will intends the end

efficaciously, the choice of the means practically judged to be the only one follows infallibly (1). (1) Cf. GONER, Disp. 3, a. 4.

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an act of reason, necessarily presupposing an act of the will. Three things concur here: 1° the ordering of the subject or subjects to do a work; 2° the intimation of the thing to be done, not merely in an indicative and speculative way, saying: This is to be done, but in an exciting and imperative way, saying: Do this; 3° the application to the work. But 1° ordering implies a comparison of one thing to another; and therefore formally includes an act of reason, whose function is to compare; — 2° intimation is a certain manifestation, or declaration and speech, which indeed belongs formally to the intellect; — 3° motion and application to the work, although per se first belongs to the will, is secondarily and participatively ascribed to the intellect from the preceding act of the will. Therefore command is properly of reason; it presupposes, however, an act of the will, from which it participates the applicative efficacy, or the power of moving. XII. — Command is distinguished from practical judgment. Command pertains to the practical intellect, for it regards work; but it is not to be confused with the judgment of practical reason. For command is expressed with a certain intimation, by way of imperative, saying: Do this; but practical judgment is expressed only by way of indicative, for it is an act by which

something is indicated to be suitable or unsuitable. Moreover, in practical judgment there can be truth or falsity; not, however, in command, for to the one commanding or saying: Do this, it is replied: I will or will not do it, but in this no question of truth or falsity is involved. XIII. — On the necessity and e fficacy of command. For all deliberate acts, the command of reason is necessary. The will, even after consultation and the judgment expressed by way of indicative, remains, according to itself, indifferent to choosing or not choosing, and to choosing this or that. Therefore it must be directed and determined by command to choose or not choose, and to accept this rather than that. It is confirmed: The natural order is that the first mover moves only through the second. But the first mover is the will, the second mover is the intellect through command. Therefore the will does not move other faculties nor apply them to work except through the command of reason.

The aforesaid command, moreover, is of the greatest efficacy, for through it the executive faculties are immediately moved to execute what the will chooses. For the will intimates its affect and impulse to the powers through command, and by virtue of this intimation the executive powers are moved and applied. Through other acts, even through practical judgment, only the intention and affect towards the end is indicated; but through command one tends to the end by way of execution and efficacy. XIV. — Whether command precedes or follows choice. Some hold that command precedes, others that it follows choice. Cajetan, however, distinguishes a twofold command. One by which one commands himself to choose, and this command manifestly precedes choice, since it is its cause. Another by which the executive powers are applied to work, and this follows choice; for the will does not apply faculties unless it has first chosen that to which it must apply them (1). XV. — Which acts can be commanded? In general, all acts which are subject to our choice. The following can therefore be commanded: 1° Acts of the will, except the first volition of the end, in which the will does not move itself (2). 2° Acts of reason, but not all, because not all

are in our power; for thoughts take place in the presence of an object even against the will. 3° Acts of the sensitive appetite, insofar as they depend on the soul, not however insofar as they depend on the disposition of a bodily organ. 4° Motions of members which are moved by sensitive powers, such as foot, arm; not however motions of members which are moved by vegetative powers, such as the motion of the heart. XVI. — The ordering of acts of intellect and will. The acts of intellect and will can be ordered thus: The first of all acts is the apprehension of good, to which corresponds on the part of the will simple volition; third is the judgment by which reason proposes (1) Cf. CARTAN. and MEDINA, Comm. in I— II—, q. 17, a. 3. (2) Cf. art. proced. a. VIII pp. 201-202.

the end as expedient and attainable, and follows on the part of the will the intention of the end. Afterwards comes inquiry about means. Hence the fifth act is counsel, in which there are three degrees: 1° investigation of means, 2° weighing the utility of each, 3° judgment dictating to the will what means are to be accepted. To counsel corresponds on the part of the will consent. After consent follows the discerning and practical judgment concerning means, and to this corresponds on the part of the will choice, which is the eighth act. Then acts concerning means in the order of execution take place. Hence command is placed ninth, to execute the means; to command corresponds on the part of the will active use, and on the part of the moved powers passive use. With all means applied, there is had the joyful possession of the end and delight in the end, or fruition. Hence fruition is the twelfth and last act, in which the will rests.

QUESTION THREE.

On the will as an affective power. Just as in the sensitive appetite certain emotions arise which are called passions, so in the rational appetite emotions of the spiritual order can arise, which are usually called affections, or affects. Hence some things concerning affections, both in common and in particular, are subjoined. Here is the schema: On the part of the intellect. Concerning the end. On the part of the will. 1° Apprehension of good. 3° Judgment proposing the end. Iniecti. Order 2° Simple volition. 4° Intention of the end.

ARTICLE ONE.

Concerning means. 5° Counsel. 7° Discerning and practical judgment. 9° Command. 11° Passive use. act. Order 6° Consent. 8° Choice. act. Order 10° Active use. 12° Fruition.

ON AFFECTIONS IN GENERAL.

I. — The notion of a ffection. Affection can be defined as: An operation of rational appetite arising from intellectual apprehension of good or evil, which moreover overflows in some way into the sensitive part. It relates, therefore, in the rational appetite as passion in the sensitive appetite: passion indeed is generated from sensitive apprehension, affection from intellectual apprehension of good or evil. Passion is properly found where there is bodily transmutation; but affection in itself does not undergo that transmutation, but is of a spiritual order and attains a supersensible object. In which sense the Angelic Doctor says: « The passion of divine things

is called affection towards divine things and union with them through love, which however takes place without bodily transmutation (1). 1. However, affection does not designate a spiritual act merely taken, as it is performed in intellectual beings, but insofar as, because of the unity of the human composite, a certain transfusion and redundancy from the intellectual part into the sensitive takes place. Hence affections cannot be ascribed to God and angels

except metaphorically. II. — The existence of a ffections in man. Supersensible emotions are commonly admitted by

modern philosophers who advocate the spirituality of the soul, such as the Scotist school, Cousin, etc. (2). Nor do the ancient Scholastics dissent, who acknowledge delights of both appetites, both sensitive and rational (3). Some moderns seem to confuse emotions with sensation (4). To prove the existence of affections in man, however, it will suffice to show two things: 1. that there are in us emotions of a spiritual order; 2. that they overflow in some way into the sensitive part. Both, however, are concluded from the principles of the Angelic Doctor. The first indeed is clear. From every apprehension follows a proportioned emotion in the appetite, pleasant or unpleasant according as the object is presented as suitable or harmful. Since, therefore, there are in us two apprehensions and two appetites, two genera of emotions also arise: from sensitive apprehension, indeed, sensible emotions arise, which have sensible good as their object; from intellectual apprehension, however, spiritual emotions are generated in the rational appetite, which concern a spiritual object. The second is also clear. Because the essence of man is one, which is composed of intellectual and sensitive nature, and because all faculties are rooted in the same primary subject, a certain transfusion from the higher to the lower must take place (5). (1) S. THOMAS, I° II°, q. 22, a. 3, ad 1. (2) Cf. COUSIN, Philosophie écossière, lec. II, III, IV; Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien, pp. 106-107. (3) Cf. S. THOMAS, I° II°, q. 31, a. 4. (4) Cf. W. JAMES, La Théorie de l'émotion; concerning which theory F . PILLON makes many observations, Sur l'Imagination affective, Revue Philosophique, mars 1907. (5) Cf. S. THOMAS, q. 26 De Vert. a. 10. Just as the operation of the intellect influences the body itself, as has been shown elsewhere (1), so the emotion of the rational appetite is in some way transfused into the sensitive appetite. There are, therefore, emotions of a spiritual order, which nevertheless result in lower parts, and which are called affections. III. — To which faculty do a ffections belong? After Leibniz and Wolf, many moderns ascribe affections to a certain faculty entirely of its

own kind, distinct from apprehensive and appetitive faculties. Hence three genera of faculties: of apprehension, of appetite, of affection. So the Kantians, as well as A. Bain, Hamilton, etc. — Cousin, Hutcheson, call that faculty a new sense, a reflex sense (2). The ancient philosophers, however, not excluding the Cartesians, acknowledge no affective faculty which is really distinguished from the apprehensive and appetitive. IV. — Conclusion: The a ffective faculty is not a new faculty of its own kind distinct from the cognitive and appetitive. Arg. I™ . Since faculties are speci fied by their object, there is no special faculty where no special object concurs. But in affection the object, namely spiritual good, is not special and new, but is already ascribed to the appetitive faculty. Therefore it is not a special faculty distinct from the appetitive. Arg. II™ . To explain a ffections, it is required and suffices 1. that emotions of a spiritual order arise in us; 2. that from this a certain transfusion into the lower powers results. But all these can be excellently explained from the cognitive and appetitive powers alone, without any new faculty: from spiritual apprehension, indeed, a proportioned spiritual emotion naturally arises in the intellectual appetite, pleasant or unpleasant according to the nature of the object; on the other hand, because of the coherence of faculties (3), transfusion from higher to lower necessarily follows. « According to the order of nature, says the Angelic Doctor, because of the connection of the powers of the soul in one essence and of the soul and body in one being of the (1) Cf. vol. II, pp. 445-446. (2) Cf. COSSIN, Philosophie écossière, II° leçon (3) Cf. vol. II, pp. 543-544.

composite, the higher and lower powers, and even the body, pour themselves forth into what superabounds in some of them (1). »

An affective faculty distinguished from the cognitive and appetitive is therefore superfluous. On the aesthetic faculty, however, there will be discussion in Ontology, concerning the Beautiful. V. — The subject of a ffections. Because the

affective faculty is properly rational appetite, namely the will, affections are in themselves spiritual and are received in an entirely immaterial subject; insofar, however, as they overflow into the lower powers, there results a certain impression which is subjected in the animated organism (2). VI. — On the sense (of sentiment). By this name some understand a certain blind instinct by which men are impelled by nature itself to adhere to certain « first principles, especially in the moral and religious order »: hence they say that in believing, sentiment prevails over reason. This opinion is by no means approved: for necessary and immutable judgments cannot be regulated by a variable and contingent affect (3). Others confuse sentiment with passion itself, and not rightly; since from this the existence of supersensible emotions seems to be denied. This observation also affects those who identify sentiment and sensation (4). The more common and accurate acceptation, however, is this: While sensation is an affection of the sensitive appetite, sentiment designates the affection of both appetites, especially the rational: hence what we have just discussed concerning affections holds for it. How rightly the word sentiment is transferred to spiritual things, the Angelic Doctor explains. « Operations of the sensitive part are more known to us than operations of the intellective part, because our cognition begins from sense and ends in intellect. And, since from more known things less known things are known, and names are imposed on things for the purpose of being known, therefore names of the sensitive part are transferred to operations of the intellective part (5). » (1) S. THOMAS, QQ. Disp. De Veri. q. 26, a, 10. (2) Cf. vol. II, pp. 535-536, and 600-601. (3) Cf. Logie. pp. 359-362. (4) Many, however, acknowledge the distinction « Sentiment clearly appears, in some experiments, as an element different from sensation properly so called. » HARALD-HOFFDISO, Esquisse d'une Psychologie fondée sur l'expérience, VI, Psychologie du Sentiment, a. 2. (5) III Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 5. Therefore he who fully understands the knowledge of passions and affections, and at the same time knows the mutual coherence, connection, redundancy

of both appetites, will have acquired an adequate notion of sentiment. VII. — In what way a thing is in the a ffective faculty. Cognition and affection differ principally in this, that in cognition the object is drawn to the knower; in affection, however, the faculty is drawn to the object: hence it happens that the known is properly in the knower, but the lover is properly in the beloved. However, the beloved object is to some extent present in the lover, just as the known is present in the knower. Indeed, the known is in the knower in two ways: 1° as impressed, by way of a determining principle, which takes place through the intelligible species; 2° as expressed, by way of a term actually known, and this takes place through the mental word, in which the intellect rests and delights as in the ultimate offspring of cognition (1). Likewise, the beloved is in the affective power in two ways: one indeed as a determining principle of it, through its impulse, by which it inclines and attracts the will. « The beloved exists in the will as inclining and in a certain way impelling the lover intrinsically towards the beloved thing (2). » Secondly, as a term, in which the will rests, because of the adaptation and suitability which the lovable object has. « What is loved... is in the will of the lover, as the term of motion in the proportionate motive principle through the suitability and proportion which it has to it (3). » Hence it follows that there is a threefold presence of something in something (4): 1° real presence, such as the Holy Spirit is present in the soul of the just; 2° presence according to cognition, and this is considered according to the likeness of the species, because cognition is essentially a vital and intentional assimilation; 3° presence according to a ffection, which is according to the adaptation of affection, and implies complacency in the beloved good. This indeed does not consist in the likeness of the species, because affection is not an assimi- (1) Cf. supra, Tract. I, q. III, a. II, n. XI. pp. 113. (2) S. THOMAS, IV. Contra Gent., c. 19. (4) Cf. CAPRROL, Nova edit., t. II, pp. 12-14.

 lation, like cognition; but it supposes a

certain likeness, since likeness is the cause of love. « Union, says the Angelic Doctor, relates to love in three ways: some union is the cause of love; and this is substantial union with respect to the love by which one loves himself, but with respect to the love by which one loves other things, it is union of likeness. Some union is essentially love itself, and this is union according to adaptation of affection... Some union, however, is the effect of love; and this is real union, which the lover seeks with the beloved thing; and this union is according to the suitability of love (1). » This presence according to affection is so intimate and efficacious that the beloved is the form of the lover. For just as form actuates the subject and is its principle of acting, so the beloved transforms the lover and is his reason for acting. « Through love... the beloved has been made the form of the lover... Hence love is nothing other than the transformation of affection into the beloved thing... Hence the lover, whatever he does or suffers for the beloved, is all delightful to him, and he is always more inflamed towards the beloved, insofar as he experiences greater delight in the beloved in those things which he does or suffers for it. For when the lover has assumed the beloved, as it were the same as himself, it is necessary that the lover act, as it were, the person of the beloved in all things which pertain to the beloved, and thus in some way the lover serves the beloved, insofar as he is regulated by the terms of the beloved (2). » (1) S. THOMAS, I° II°, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2. (2) S. THOMAS, III Sent. dist. 27, q. 1, a. 1. — On that union and a ffective presence, read Cocosnien. La Charité, Revue Thomiste. Mars-Avril 1907.

ARTICLE TWO.

ON AFFECTIONS IN PARTICULAR.

1. — Various opinions on the division of a ffections. Some divide affections differently. Malebranche acknowledges three genera of affections: towards truth, towards oneself, towards men (1). — Others distinguish a ffections towards truth, towards beauty, towards good, towards God. — Others distinguish egoistic a ffections, towards oneself; philanthropic, towards men; domestic, towards the family;

social, towards society; moral, in order to rules of morals; religious, in order to God and things pertaining to religion; intellective, with respect to intellective operations; aesthetic, which imply complacency in beauty and displeasure in ugliness. — Others distinguish personal, real, ideal a ffections. Personal are those whose subjects are human persons, or other men, and are divided into benevolent or malevolent, according as we desire good or evil to other men. Real affections are understood as those whose objects are things necessary or useful in social life; wherefore they are also called social. — Ideal a ffections are considered to be those which concern goods of the intellect or will, namely truth, good, beauty, and therefore concerning God, who is the first and supreme truth, the first and supreme good, the first and supreme beauty (2). (1) Cf. MALEBRASCH, Recherche de la vérité, liv. IV, c. I. (2) On the psychology and division of affections in Modern Philosophy, one may consult HARALD-HOFFDRIX, Esquisse d'une Psychologie fondée sur l'expérience, VI, Psychologie du Sentiment. — Let what he discusses concerning the sense of the sublime and ridiculous be especially read. Ibid. E. nn. 8 and sqq.

II. — A general division which embraces the others. Because a ffections relate in the rational appetite as passions do in the sensitive appetite, they can be divided like the passions themselves, with this difference, however, that transmutations and imperfections which concur in passions are excluded, and that the delightful good and the arduous good are attained under the same notion and referred to the same power. There will therefore be eleven genera of affections: love, hatred, desire, flight, joy, sadness, hope, despair, daring, fear, anger. « They signify a simple act of the will with a likeness of effect without passion (1). » This is the more

general division, which embraces the other divisions already assigned, for love, desire, etc., according to various objects, can be personal, real, ideal, etc. III. — On love as an a ffection. Love in the present context designates the complacency of the will in good apprehended by the

intellect. « Love regards good in common, whether it is possessed or not possessed; hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; and therefore all other appetitive motions presuppose love as their first root; for no one desires anything unless a loved good; nor does anyone rejoice except in a loved good; hatred also is only of that which is contrary to the loved thing; and similarly sadness, and other things of this kind, are manifestly referred to love as to a first principle. Hence wherever there is will, or appetite, love must be present (2). » Intellectual love can become dilection and charity. « The act is, however, differently signified by these three words. For love is the most common of them: for every dilection or charity is love, but not conversely; for dilection adds to love a preceding choice, as the word itself indicates; hence dilection is not in the concupiscible but in the will only, and is in the rational nature alone; charity, however, adds to love a certain perfection of love, insofar as what is loved is esteemed of great value, as the word designates (3). » The motion of love tends to two things, namely to the good which one wishes (1) S. THOMAS, I° II°, q. 23, a. 3, ad. 3. (2) S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 20, a. 1 to someone, either to oneself or to another, and to that to whom he wishes good. With respect to that good which one wishes to another, there is love of concupiscence; but with respect to that to whom one wishes good, there is love of friendship (1). In itself and essentially, love is an affective union by virtue of which the beloved is in the lover and becomes the form of the lover, as was said in the preceding article, n. VII. Love can be considered in many ways, according to its causes and its effects, and according as it is friendship or supernatural charity. But these aspects pertain to moralists and theologians (2). IV. — On hatred as an a ffection. Hatred is the aversion of the will from evil apprehended by the intellect. Just as love is a certain consonance of the intellectual appetite with what is apprehended as suitable, so hatred is a certain dissonance of the same appetite with what is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. But just as every suitable thing, insofar as it is such, has the notion of good, so every

repugnant thing, insofar as it is such, has the notion of evil; and therefore, as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred (3). — Moreover, the suitable must be attended to before the repugnant: for by this a thing is repugnant to another, because it is corruptive or impeding of what is suitable. Hence it is necessary that love be prior to hatred, and that nothing be hated except what is contrary to the suitable thing which is loved. And according to this, all hatred is caused by love (4). V. — On desire and flight as affections. Just as concupiscence as a passion is a motion of the sensitive appetite towards sensible good apprehended as absent but future, so desire as an affection is a motion of the will towards good apprehended by the intellect as absent and future. While love concerns good absolutely, whether present or absent, desire concerns good (1) Ibid, a. 4. (2) One may consult S. THOMAS, I° II°, q. 26 ad q. 28 ; and II° II° De Charitate ; P . COCCONNIER, La Charité, Revue Thomiste, Janvier 1905, Mars 1906, Mars 1907. (3) S. THOMAS, I° II°, q. 29, a. 1. (4) Ibid. a. 2.

not had, which is nevertheless apprehended as attainable, indeed to be had in the future. Desire arises from love: for the will tends to future good because it wills and loves it. Just as love is a certain adaptation between lover and beloved, so desire in some way makes the desirer fit and prepared to receive the desired thing (1). From the opposite of desire, what flight is, is understood. It is the recession of the will from evil apprehended by the intellect as absent but future. VI. — On delight as an a ffection. It can be defined as: The rest of the will in possessed spiritual good. It is essentially distinguished from delight as a passion, which implies bodily

transmutation and is the rest of the sensitive appetite in a possessed sensible good. It is also called joy. « The name of joy has no place except in delight which follows reason. Hence joy is not attributed to brute animals, but only the name of delight (2). » The cause of delight and joy is the presence of good; but good does not become present to us except through operation. Hence operation is said to be the first and proper cause of delight: first indeed, because

operation precedes to acquire and obtain the good, and afterwards there is actual acquisition and attainment of the good; and also proper, because operation causes delight not as something extrinsic, but is proper to the one who delights, namely that one who experiences delight. « For delight, says the Angelic Doctor, two things are required: namely the attainment of suitable good and the cognition of such attainment. But both of these consist in some operation: for actual cognition is a certain operation; likewise, we attain suitable good by some operation; the proper operation itself is also a certain suitable good. Hence it is necessary that every delight follow some operation (3). » Objects, indeed, are causes of delight, but not immediately, through operation. For the operation itself cannot produce delight if the object is not delightful, but the object does not become delightful to us except through operation. « The objects of operations themselves are not delightful except insofar as they are joined to us either through cognition alone, as when we delight in the consideration or inspection of some things; or in any other way together with cognition: as when someone delights in knowing that he has some good, such as riches, or honor, or something of this kind; which would not be delightful unless they are apprehended as possessed. For as the Philosopher says, in II Politic., cap. 3, it gives great delight to think something is one's own; which proceeds from the natural love of someone for himself. But to have such things is nothing else than to use them or to be able to use them; and this is through some operation. Hence it is manifest that every delight is reduced to operation as to a cause (1). » Thus delight does not consist in idleness, as some imagine, but in activity. The more activity is intensified, the more delight increases, and the longer activity, or operation, continues, the longer delight and joy last. In the present life, moreover, operation cannot be continued indefinitely, because of the labor attached to it: the body, or bodily organ, serves the operation, even the intellectual, mediately at least and instrumentally, which is weakened by prolonged action. « (Aristotle) assigns the reason why delight cannot

be continuous. And he says that no one continually delights, because he labors in the operation which delight follows. And thus the operation is not made delightful. This, however, is because all things which have passible bodies cannot operate continuously, because their bodies are changed from their disposition by the motion which is joined to the operation... Thus, since operation cannot be continuous, neither can delight be continuous: for delight follows operation, as has been said (2). » Hence in some sense, indirectly and per accidens, idleness concurs in delight, not insofar as it is a lack of all operation, but insofar as it is rest from fatigue. « Leisure and play and other things which pertain to rest are delightful insofar as they remove the sadness which arises from labor (3). » (1) Cf. I. P ., n. 12, a. 6. (2) I° II°, q. 31, a. 2. (3) I° II°, q. 32, a. 1. (1) Ibid., ad 1. (2) S. T. HOMAS, Comment. in X Ethic., lect. 6. (3) I° II°, q. 32, a. 1, ad 3.

Let it be noted, therefore, that not just any operation is delightful, but only that which is suitable to the operator. « Operations are delightful insofar as they are proportionate and connatural to the operator. But since human power is finite, according to some measure operation is proportionate to it. Hence if it exceeds that measure, it will no longer be proportionate, nor delightful, but rather laborious and fatiguing (1). » Moreover, nothing is more suitable to the operator than what agrees with its nature, or what is natural. Hence operations are made more delightful the more natural they are; and thus the most delightful operation for man ought to be the contemplation of truth, which agrees with him according to his nature, insofar as he is rational.

Finally, for delight to result from operation, it is necessary that the operation not be impeded and imperfect, otherwise labor is introduced, not full rest in the possessed good. Hence delight is called by St. Thomas the perfection of operation (2). Moreover, that perfection is present when the operation is excellent both subjectively, insofar as the faculty is best disposed and exerts full power; and objectively, insofar as the object is most suitable and

proportioned to it. « If, therefore, perfect operation is delightful, and the most perfect most delightful, it follows that operation, insofar as it is perfect, is delightful. DELIGHT,

THEREFORE, IS THE PERFECTION OF OPERATION (3). »

VII. — On pain and sadness as a ffections. Pain here is understood as a certain affliction of the will arising from the presence of evil actually inflicted. Just as two things concur in delight, the conjunction of some good and the perception of such conjunction, so two things are required for pain, namely the conjunction of some evil, which is evil because it deprives of some good, and the perception of this conjunction (4). Delight and pain, therefore, relate as two contraries: the object of delight is present good, known as present and possessed; the object of pain is present evil, known as present and actually inflicted. Pain is called sadness when it is caused by the apprehension of the internal (1) Ibidem. (2) Lect. 6 in X. EtAie. (3) Ibidem. (4) I-II , q. 35, a. 1. sense, whether the intellect or imagination. Insofar as it arises from the apprehension of the imagination, it is a passion and is subjected in the sensitive appetite; insofar as it follows the apprehension of the intellect, it is an affection and is ascribed to the will. Every sadness, therefore, is pain, but not every pain is sadness. « Internal apprehension, however, extends to more things than external, because whatever falls under external apprehension falls under internal, but not conversely. Therefore only that delight which is caused by internal apprehension is called joy; and similarly only that pain which is caused by internal apprehension is called sadness. And as that delight which is caused by external apprehension is indeed called delight, but not joy, so that pain which is caused by external apprehension is indeed called pain, but not sadness. Thus, sadness is a certain species of pain, just as joy is a species of delight (1). » Pain as opposed to sadness is properly concerning present evil; sadness, however, can be concerning present, past, and future evil. « The external sense perceives only the present;

but the internal cognitive power can perceive the present, past, and future: and therefore sadness can be concerning the present, past, and future; but bodily pain, which follows the apprehension of the external sense, can only be concerning the present (2). » Simply and per se speaking, internal pain is greater than external pain. « For internal pain arises from the fact that something is repugnant to appetite itself; but external pain arises from repugnance to the body. But what is per se is always prior to what is through another. Hence from this aspect internal pain excels external pain. Similarly also from the aspect of apprehension: for the apprehension of reason and imagination is higher than the apprehension of the sense of touch. Hence, simply and per se speaking, internal pain is greater than external pain. A sign of this is that one voluntarily undergoes even external pains to avoid internal pain; and insofar as external pain is not repugnant to internal appetite, it becomes in some way delightful and pleasant to internal joy. — Sometimes, however, external pain is accompanied by internal pain, and then pain increases: for not (1) Ibid., a. 2. (2) Ibid., ad 2.

only is internal greater than external, but also more universal. For whatever is repugnant to the body can be repugnant to internal appetite; and whatever is apprehended by sense can be apprehended by imagination and reason, but not conversely (1). »

Finally, pain, or sadness, as an affection, is greater than pain, or sadness, as a passion. First, because it is repugnant to a nobler appetite: pain as a passion is repugnant to the sensitive appetite, pain as an affection is repugnant to the intellective appetite. Secondly, because it is higher: for affection follows the apprehension of reason, which is higher than the apprehension of the imagination from which passion arises. Thirdly, because it is more universal: as reason apprehends more things than imagination, so pain as an affection extends to more things than pain as a passion. VIII. — On hope and despair as a ffections. Hope as a passion is a motion of the irascible appetite towards sensible arduous good, absent, attainable; but hope as an

affection is a motion of the will towards intelligible arduous good, absent, attainable. It is required first that it concern good, and in this it differs from fear, which concerns evil. Secondly, that the good be future, in which it is distinguished from joy, which concerns present good. Thirdly, that it be something arduous, attainable with difficulty: for no one is said to hope for the least thing which is immediately in his power to have; and by this hope differs from desire, which concerns future good absolutely. In the lower appetite indeed, good absolutely and arduous good diversify the powers; hence desire is in the concupiscible appetite; hope, however, in the irascible; but in the intellectual order, good simply and arduous good, since they are attained under the same common notion, are referred to the same power, namely the will; hence hope and desire are subjected in the same faculty; but, just as good simply is prior to arduous good, so desire is prior to hope. Fourthly, it is necessary that that intelligible arduous good be attainable, for no one hopes for what he cannot at all attain (2). Hence it follows 1° that hope is only concerning those things which are not yet had by the hoper, (1) Ibid. for if they are already had, it is joy (1); and 2° that hope is concerning those things which the hoper can attain either by himself or through another: and therefore hope can concern an act of virtue which is established in our power (2). Hope can be a virtue, indeed even theological; but this aspect is foreign to the present matter. On the contrary, despair is a recession from intelligible arduous good, absent and unattainable. IX. — On fear as an a ffection. Fear is a motion of dejection caused by imminent and inevitable arduous evil. Just as the object of hope is future, arduous, attainable good, so the object of fear is future, difficult evil, which cannot be resisted (3). As a passion, fear is the dejection of the irascible appetite caused by sensible arduous evil, future but inevitable; as an affection, it is the dejection of the will caused by intelligible arduous evil, future and inevitable. Since fear implies a certain flight, it primarily and per se regards evil as its proper object. « It can, however, also regard good insofar as it has a relation to

evil, which can be in two ways: one indeed, insofar as good is deprived by evil; from this very fact something is evil because it is privative of good. Hence, since evil is avoided because it is evil, it follows that it is avoided because it deprives of the good which one pursues by loving... In another way, good is compared to evil as its cause, insofar as some good by its power can bring some harm to a loved good. And therefore, as hope regards two things, namely the good towards which it tends, and that by which it hopes to attain the desired good, so fear also regards two things, namely the evil which it flees and that good which by its power can inflict evil. And in this way God is feared by man, insofar as He can inflict punishment, either spiritual or corporeal; and in this way also the power of some man is feared, especially when it is harmful, or when it is unjust, because then it is ready to inflict harm (4).» (1) Cf. III. P . q. 7, a. 8, ad 2. (2) 1° II°, q. 42, a. 3, ad 3. (3) 1° II°, q. 41, a. 2. (4) 1° II°, q. 42, a. 1.

X. — On daring as an a ffection. Daring is a motion of the will towards intelligible arduous evil, imminent but surmountable. It is opposed to fear: the latter has as its object future arduous evil which is inevitable, but daring has as its object arduous evil, or imminent danger, which is

thing is voluntary, according as the voluntary is said to be what is in the power of the will, namely not to act and not to will; similarly also not to consider: for the will can resist passion (2). » Consequent passion, however, since it arises from the command of the will itself and therefore is aroused by the will in order to attain the object more effectively, does not diminish the voluntary or free, but is a sign of intense will, of which it is the effect. It can indeed happen that consequent passion, freely aroused by the will, afterwards surpasses the intellect's foresight and against the will's intention is increased, and produces new effects not foreseen; but with respect to those it is truly antecedent. Wherefore it is simply verified that consequent passion does not diminish the voluntary. (1) S. THOMAS, I° II°, q. 6, a. 2. (2) Ibid., ad 3. 111. — Obstacles on the part of habits (1). A habit, as the axiom has it, becomes a second

nature; hence, if it is bad, the will is inclined to evil as if naturally, although it can resist. A habit can be willed in act, and then it is a sign and effect of the will, and increases the voluntary; or only willed in cause, and then it is less imputable than the free in act; however, it does not simply remove the voluntary, unless it is effectively withdrawn: because he who voluntarily places a cause, also freely places the effects foreseen in the cause, as long as he does not effectively remove the cause. — More on these by the Moralists. IV. — Obstacles by reason of violence and fear. Violence is opposed to the voluntary; hence the will cannot suffer violence with respect to elicited acts, but only with respect to imperated acts (2). If violence is absolute, so that the agent resists both externally and internally, freedom is simply removed, as is clear. If, however, the agent resists only externally, but internally consents, freedom is indeed diminished, insofar as the indifference in which freedom is placed is diminished (3); but it remains per se free, because the will, which in fact consents, has a true power of dissenting. If, finally, it resists internally, but not externally, since it can and ought, the action is imputed to the will, because on the one hand it truly enjoys the power of resisting, and on the other hand it is bound to use that power. Fear, or timidity, can be a passion or affection, and concerning it what we have discussed above holds (4). If it is so vehement as to disturb the right use of reason, it simply impedes and removes the voluntary and free; but, per se, even grave fear, although it diminishes freedom, nevertheless leaves it simply. It diminishes indeed, for it diminishes the indifference necessary for freedom; it does not, however, simply remove it, because, per se, it does not exclude the practical judgment nor the final consent of the will: hence the will, although in another hypothesis it would not will, in fact, all things considered and weighed, simply chooses those things which are proposed under fear.

If one rightly considers, such things are more voluntary than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, involuntary in a certain respect..., that is, insofar as they are considered outside this case (1).» V.— Obstacles on the part of bodily

dispositions. The body in fluences the will by reason of physical and physiological dispositions and qualities, which overflow in some way into the higher part. Some are transmitted by heredity, either immediately, as are many propensities which are called hereditary, or mediately, from grandparents to grandchildren, as in cases of atavism (2). With respect to parents, the matter is psychologically explained thus: Parents, by transmitting the body, also infuse dispositions, and, because of the substantial unity of the human composite, redundancy takes place from the body into the soul (3). « The disposition of the rational soul follows the disposition of the body itself; both because the rational soul receives from the body, and because according to the diversity of matter, forms are diversified (4). » The Angelic Doctor also gives the reason for atavism: « The assimilation of the generator to the generated does not take place because of matter, but because of the form of the agent, which generates something like itself. Hence, for someone to be assimilated to a grandfather, it is not necessary that the corporeal matter of the seed was in the grandfather, but that there is in the

seed some power derived from the grandfather through the father (5). » Sometimes diseases which induce madness and remove all will are transmitted by heredity; but generally they leave the use of reason and therefore free choice. Freedom is somewhat impeded by such propensities, because they diminish indifference; but it remains simply, for it is clear that many men can resist them, and that those inclinations can be gradually reformed by exercise, education, virtue. « Man, inheriting the modes of feeling and thinking of his fathers, is solicited to will and consequently to act like them. This heredity of tendencies constitutes for him an order of internal influences in the midst of which he lives, but which he has the faculty to judge and to overcome. They do not entail any more than other internal or external circumstances the suppression, the annihilation of the personal factor (whatever its nature), the irresistible necessity of acts (1).» The same is almost to be said of temperament and moral character: they diminish

the indifference of the will, and therefore freedom, but they do not remove it, for experience testifies that many resist them, indeed dominate them. VI. — Obstacles on the part of defects or diseases. — Aboulia. Diseases or defects can affect the nervous system, sensibility, motive power, and, by reason of the frequently mentioned redundancy, influence the will. Pathological states of this kind, however, can occur either by defect of impulse, or by excess of propensity. Defect of impulse induces aboulia. Aboulia, however, is a certain incapacity to will effectively and to execute what one has in mind. It can be universal, or particular, for some kinds of acts, or at certain times. It does not affect the acts of volition and intention themselves, for the aboulic wills and intends many things; nor even choice, for he chooses and proposes many things for himself; but it affects effective command and effective use (2): for that will which passes to effect and practice is lacking. « Guislain has described in general terms this weakening which physicians designate by the name of aboulia. « The patients know how to will inwardly, mentally, according to the exigencies of reason. They can feel the desire to act; but they are powerless to act properly. There is at the bottom of their understanding an impossibility. They would like to work, and they cannot... Their will cannot cross certain limits: one would say that this force of action undergoes an arrest: the 'I will' does not transform itself into impulsive will, into active determination. Patients themselves are astonished at the impotence with which their will is struck... When they are left to themselves, they spend entire days in their bed or on a chair. When one speaks to them and (1) Rmorr, L'herédit psychologique, p.324. (2) Cf. supra, q. II, a. III. De actibus voluntatis.

excites them, they express themselves fittingly, although briefly: they judge fairly well of things. (1) » This disease also affects those who are of sound and intact mind. « It is certain, said a magistrate, that I have only the will not to will; for I have all my reason; I know what I must do; but the force abandons me when I should act (2). » Other facts prove that aboulia can be attenuated and corrected by

hypnotic suggestion. « Delivered then to the will of another, the patient accomplishes without difficulty a fatiguing work which his personal will would be quite incapable of sustaining. Dr. P . Janet studied an aboulic who strives in vain to perform an act: after desperate attempts, she is obliged to confess her impotence. But if, on the contrary, while she is talking with another person, one suggests to her quietly to do this act, she accomplishes it immediately (3). » VII. — Whether aboulia is a disease a ffecting the will intrinsically. Aboulia is commonly exhibited as a disease, or psychological state, of the will itself; and hence it is proved that it affects men otherwise robust, of sound body and sound mind. — But this mode of speaking is certainly improper. For neither the power, or faculty, itself can be lacking; nor can it be intrinsically corrupted or altered. All powers result from the soul by necessary and ineluctable emanation; the action of God creating the soul is also terminated to the faculties, nor can any ever be lacking. Moreover, faculties that are entirely spiritual, such as intellect and will, can indeed contract moral diseases, namely error and sin, but no physical disease which

intrinsically affects the power; for an immaterial subject is incapable of any alteration. Organic powers, which are attached to the body, can be more easily injured; but intellect and will, since they are not acts of any organ, always remain intrinsically sound and intact. Therefore aboulia affects the will only indirectly and extrinsically, insofar as conditions on the part of the inferior powers required are lacking. Just as intellection is disturbed by lack of extrinsic aids which are presupposed for intellection (1), the intellect remaining intrinsically sound, so the will becomes ineffective by lack of extrinsic conditions, although it itself remains intact. It is objected 1° : Nothing is lacking on the part of the body, since aboulia a ffects those who are robust and sound of mind. Resp. : Although the body is otherwise healthy, something is nevertheless lacking on the part of the powers which serve the will, either on the part of the sensitive power or on the part of the motive power. Hence it is that even those who exhibit aboulia as a disease

of the will itself seek causes extrinsically, namely either in a defect of sensibility or in a defect of motility. « The cause is therefore a relative insensibility, a general weakening of sensibility; what is affected is the affective life, the possibility of being moved... One can risk another hypothesis and seek the explanation of aboulia in the order of motor manifestations (2). » It is objected 2° : Hypnotic suggestion removes aboulia; which proves that this disease is in the will itself. Resp. : This only proves that suggestion removes the extrinsic impediments of the will, by no means that the will is intrinsically affected by disease. Suggestion, through the imagination, influences the nervous system, the sympathetic system, and finally sensibility and motive power; but with the impediments of the sensitive or motive power removed, nothing now hinders the will, and it becomes extrinsically capable, which it remained intrinsically sound. Therefore aboulia and other aberrations would more rightly be called impediments of the will rather than intrinsic diseases of the will. VIII. — Excess of propensity. Many propensities are enumerated by which the will is impelled almost ineluctably to do those things which it in no way wills. They are in two differences: some happen suddenly and almost unconsciously, others consciously, in which however the will succumbs unless aided by external help. « In the first case, the impulse can be sudden, unconscious, followed by immediate execution, without even the understanding having had time to take cognizance of it.... In (1) Apud Rmoor, Les maladies de la volonté, pp. 38-39. (2) Ibid. (3) Raui et Rrvaulx, Psychologie, p. 282. (1) Cf. vol. III, pp. 326-327. (2) Rmoor, Les maladies de la volonté, pp. 53-54.

certain patients, the over-excitation of the motor forces is such that they walk for hours without stopping, without looking around them, like mechanical devices that have been wound up (1).» « The facts of the second group deserve to be studied longer: they highlight the defeat of the will or the artificial means that maintain it. Here, the patient is fully conscious of his situation; he feels that he is no longer master of himself, that he is dominated by an

interior force, invincibly pushed to commit acts which he condemns. Intelligence remains sufficiently sound, delirium exists only in the acts... A woman, of great intellectual culture and full of affection for her parents, begins to strike them despite herself and asks for help by being tied to a chair (2). » — Whatever the physiological causes, the matter can be explained as was said of aboulia: the will remains intrinsically sound, but the extrinsic conditions which its exercise presupposes are lacking: the force of coordination is too relaxed, the force of impulse is too intensified (3), and hence acts are withdrawn from the command of the will. These facts do not attack the spirituality of the will, but illustrate the scholastic doctrine of the coherence of faculties (4) and of the substantial unity of the human composite (5). (1) Ibid., p. 75. (2) Ibid., pp. 77-79. (3) « By comparing aboulia with irresistible impulses, one will note that the will fails because of entirely opposite conditions. In one case, intelligence is intact, impulse is lacking; in the other,

the power of coordination and restraint being lacking, the impulse is expended to the benefit of automatism. » RINOT, op. cit., p. 95. (4) Cf. vol. II, pp. 543-544. (5) Cf. vol. II, pp. 445-446.

ARTICLE TWO — On The Aids Of The Will

I. — Aids on the part of the intellect. Because the will is regulated by the intellect, all those things which aid, strengthen, and elevate the intellect indirectly perfect the will itself. Hence, if the intellect is freed from its defects, namely ignorance, error, precipitation, levity, prejudices, the will will become freer. Hence also it is that from prudence, an intellectual virtue, the moral virtues which are subjected in the will receive direction and firmness. The education of the intellect, therefore, provides a certain education for the will. The study of truth also greatly serves, especially the meditation of those truths which pertain to the formation of morals or which regard the ultimate end of all human life, such as religious truths. Those aids of truth, the subsidies of faith itself with respect to the will, even unbelievers are forced to admit. « Religious faith could be the best preservative against diseases of the soul and the most powerful means of healing it, if it were alive enough to create in its followers a true Christian stoicism. In this state of soul, alas! so rare in well-intentioned circles, man becomes invulnerable. Feeling supported by his God, he fears neither illness nor death. He may succumb under the blows of a physical disease, but morally he remains upright in the midst of suffering; he is inaccessible to the pusillanimous emotions of the neurotic (1). » II. — Aids on the part of appetite and passions. Because the higher part dominates the appetite with a political rule, passions can serve the will in good; hence it is that (1) DURDON, Les Psychénovroces et leur traitement moral, pp. 245-246. — Cf. PAROT, L'éducation de la volonté, liv. III.

we have said (1) that there are no excellent poets, orators, or saints who are not moved by true passions. It is a pleasure to quote what Ad. Tanquerey wisely and excellently observes on this matter: « The best means, finally, is to order passions to better goods: since they add strength to the will, the will will greatly benefit if it uses them to pursue good vigorously. Thus those who are more

easily captivated by sensible love should turn to Christ hidden under the Eucharistic species, and rest sweetly in his bosom; the ambitious should promote the glory of God and the salvation of souls with burning zeal; the fearful should fear not men and their vain judgments, but him who can cast both soul and body into hell; and so on (2).» III. — Aids on the part of habits. Good habits not only make the will good and render its act good, but also dispose it to act properly, easily, and sweetly, and, by reason of that pleasantness they provide, add strength to the power itself; and the power is perfected. These aids on the part of habits are summarized by E. Rabier: « In the first place, habit gives cohesion and unity to life: through it, according to Leibniz's word, 'the present is charged with the past and pregnant with the future'... In the second place, habit is the condition of all progress. It is progress itself. » — Which A. Lemoine explains: « If the will always had to make the same efforts to direct the movements of the members, if no trace of yesterday's exercise remained today, man would not walk; he would barely crawl like a young child. If it always had to overcome the same resistance of instincts and passions without the passion losing its force, without that of the will increasing, the most valiant would soon be at the end of his moral energy... It is thanks to habit that man can run instead of crawl, that sciences are constituted and enriched; that virtue is acquired, that in all things progress is accomplished. To the extent that the act no longer requires, to be repeated, a smaller effort, the surplus of power, which the

cause does not spend to reproduce it, (1) Vol. II, p. 613. (2) Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, t. secund., p. 59. — Cf. J. AAVIEN, Le Passion. — l'AYOT, L'éducation de la volonté, liv. II, c. II, liv. IV.

ART. II. — ON THE AIDS OF THE WILL.

becomes in some way available for new and superior efforts (1).» Moreover, the good habits which add so much strength to the will are virtues: there are innumerable, namely justice and all virtues which are annexed to justice

(2). IV. — Aids on occasion of violence and external causes. Although those external causes are opposed to the will, they can be an occasion of more perfect virtue; and, because greater exercise is required and greater energy is drawn forth, the will is ennobled and strengthened by the very triumph. Just as men become strong in war, heroes become in persecution: hence the will of the martyrs, under fear and violence, not only persisted invincible, but became sublime. V. — Aids on the part of the body, etc. The ancient saying was: A sound mind in a sound body. Just as those in whom the imaginative and memorative power is better disposed are better disposed to understand, for which reason Aristotle said: « We see those with soft flesh are well suited in mind (3) », so in those in whom the body is healthy and the sensitive and motive power is ready, the will is also freer and more ready. Hence physical education of the body provides strong aids for the will. « Let us therefore be healthy to provide our will with supplies of physical energy without which every effort, of whatever order, remains futile and unfruitful (4). » Morbid dispositions, however, infirmities, difficulties of temperament or moral character, can per accidens add strength to the will, insofar as they are an occasion of greater exercise: hence many saints, by tolerating diseases, conquering temperament and character, have drawn forth wonderful energy and cultivated the will in a wonderful way, even to the highest point of heroism. (1) Cf. RABIN. Psychol., pp. 585-587. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, II° I", qq. 57-122 (3) ARISTOT., II De Anima, text. 94 ; cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 85, a. 7. (4) PAXOT, L'Éducation de la volonté, p. 185. — Cf. the whole chapter: L'hygiène exprofelle. However, this author is to be distrusted as an offender of Catholic doctrine.

VI. — Aids on the part of action and exercise. The will, even if equipped with excellent habits, does not make much progress unless it is exercised by continuous acts. By repeated action the habit is perfected, the facility of acting increases, the power itself is strengthened; and, on the other hand, by cessation from action, the habit is relaxed, the faculty is somewhat weakened, and the danger of

aboulia is induced. — But concerning these exercises of the will, let the moralist and ascetic be consulted (1). VII. — Supernatural aids. Just as grace surpasses nature immensely, so all the aids enumerated thus far are almost infinitely surpassed by supernatural helps. These helps, however, are: 1° sanctifying grace, which informs the whole essence of the soul and admirably adapts it in order to being and, indirectly, in order to faculties and operations; 2° infused virtues which are immediately subjected in the will and dispose it proximately to act well, easily, promptly, and delightfully; 3° actual graces, by which the power and habit are reduced to second act. — More on these by theologians. All that we have discussed thus far concerning the intellect and will proves that the nature of man is most excellent, who in understanding and willing exercises an operation so sublime and entirely independent of matter. That wonderful Psychology appears wholly in Christ the Lord, whose intellect and will were equipped and adorned with all the perfections of nature and grace, which consideration is most delightful to the theologian.... Having learned, therefore, what the intellect is, in what way it understands, produces a word,

assimilates an object to itself; having learned what the will is, in what way it is free, what its object is, how it moves itself and other faculties, what are its elicited or imperated acts, what are its affections, its impediments and aids; it remains that the intellect unfailingly adhere to truth, that the will be perfected by good, that man with all his effort pursue his ultimate end, which is beatitude, or the good of every good, namely God.

END OF PSYCHOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS.

Ontological Metaphysics contemplates Being and those things which follow upon it: Namely being in common; the transcendental properties of Being; the general modes in which Being exists; and finally Being as it acts. Hence a fourfold treatise: 1° On Being in common; II° On the properties of transcendental Being; III° On Being as it is divided into predicaments; IV° On Being as it acts, or on

Causes.

FIRST TREATISE.

Although, therefore, thing and being are used promiscuously, strictly speaking they differ somewhat: for being is taken from the act of being, but the name thing expresses the quiddity or essence of a being. In order, therefore, that a full notion of being may be acquired, some things concerning essence and existence must be briefly explained here, concerning which there will be fuller discussion below, q. III. 'II — Essence. It is that by which something is constituted in a determinate degree of being. Created things, however, are placed in a determinate degree of being through genus and difference. Hence created essence can be defined according to St. Thomas (1): « That by which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species ». That by which an animal is constituted in its genus is the essence of an animal; that by which man is constituted in his species is the essence of man. In other words, essence is that which is expressed by a definition; but a definition answers the question: what is the thing? and under this respect essence is called quiddity. The name essence is derived from being; and, since being is divided into ten predicaments, it is necessary that essence be something common to the ten predicaments; for whatever is placed in a predicament is some essence, or has some essence. But, because being absolutely and primarily is said of substances, and later, in a certain respect, of accidents, hence it is that essence is properly and truly in substances, but in accidents in a certain way and in a certain respect. Other matters concerning essence, namely its division and properties, etc., will be dealt with in q. III. IV. — Existence. The subject which receives being, namely the thing or essence, does not

imply in its concept the actual exercise of being, but only the capacity, or potency, for being; but that by which essence is placed in the actual exercise of being is called

being. Being, therefore, is the ultimate actuality of a thing, or the act by which something is formally denominated being or existing, just as life is the act by which something is called living; it is that by which a thing issues from a state of possibility and is placed in a state of reality; that by which the question: does the thing exist? is answered. Being is more often called existence by the Moderns; St. Thomas and the Ancients rather abstain from the word existence. To exist according to the force of the name is to stand out from, or implies a procession from some cause. Created being indeed stands out from some cause, and can rightly be called existence, but being according to itself implies no procession from anything; wherefore the verbal noun is more fitting for designating being according to itself: being taken and being as it belongs to God. The matter, however, is not of the greatest importance; wherefore in practice we use being or existence promiscuously. V. — Being. Being in the strict and proper signi fication designates the act of being. But it happens that words which primarily designate an act, by a certain analogy, are transferred to the potency itself which is informed by such an act. Hence the name being is secondarily and analogically attributed to the essence which is informed by the act of being; and thus in the schools the being of existence and the being of essence are distinguished. And finally it is transferred to signify the truth of composition in propositions, according as being is said to be the copula. Thus, being properly speaking designates the act of being, or existence; in a less strict sense, the essence itself, and finally, logically, the copula in propositions. VI. — In which acceptation is being the principle of categories or predicaments. Being is called transcendent because it transcends all categories and is contained by none; however, it is found in each and predicated of each: it is therefore the principle of categories. In what acceptation, moreover, is transcendent being, which wanders through the ten predicaments, to be taken? Kant, Rosmini, contend that transcendent being is that first thing which has being in the soul and is placed as the copula in a proposition; others, holding with Scotus that

essence and existence are not really distinguished, maintain that being, the principle of categories, is being which signifies mere and naked essence. The opinion of the Thomists and most scholastics, however, is proposed in the following conclusion: VII. — Conclusion: Being which is divided into the ten predicaments is not that which signi fies the truth of a proposition; it implies a composite of essence and being, in such a way, however, that it is placed in a genus not according to being, but by reason of quiddity.

Proof of the I° part. Since predicaments designate certain modes of being, being which is divided through predicaments must be said of those things which posit something in reality. But being which signifies the copula of a proposition is said also of those things which posit nothing in reality. Therefore that cannot be the principle of categories. Moreover, if being which is divided into predicaments had being only in the soul, it would follow that categories are figments of the soul and that our intellect is the first source of being and truth; which is subjectivism and idealistic pantheism. Proof of the II° part. Predicaments imply diverse modes of being, according to which being exists in itself or in another, and accordingly present essence as determined by diverse modes of being. Wherefore being itself which is divided into predicaments implies essence as determined in diverse modes of being. But essence determined by a certain mode of being connotes being, as is clear. Therefore transcendent being itself connotes a composite of essence and being. It is con firmed. Transcendent being is that which is contracted to some mode of being in the diverse predicaments. But that determination takes place insofar as being is received in a subject, for unreceived being is infinite and indeterminate. Therefore transcendent being implies being with a subject in which it is received, and therefore a composite of essence and being. The III° part is proved. « Because nothing is placed in a genus according to its being, but by reason of its quiddity, says the Angelic Doctor; which is clear from the fact that the being of

each thing is proper to it and distinct from the being of any other thing (1). » Moreover, that is first divisible into predicaments which is first diverse and by reason of which another thing becomes diverse. But essences, or quiddities, are first diverse; being, however, becomes diverse because of the diverse essences which receive it. Therefore, although the whole existing thing, or the whole composite of essence and being, is in a predicament, that which is first divisible into predicaments is essential being, or quidditative being, not existential being. That indeed, by analogy, can be divided in some way into genera, insofar as every existence is substantial or accidental, but this is because existence is received in substantial or accidental essence. It remains, therefore, that predicaments properly and first divide essential being, although they imply a composite of essence and being. VIII. — A fourfold division of being: 1° per se and per accidens, 2° of reality and of reason, 3° into ten predicaments, 4° into potency and act. Being per se is being properly so called which has true unity. Being per accidens is that which does not properly have a cause, nor properly unity, such as fortuitous things, and those which are a certain aggregate of several beings pertaining to diverse categories. Being of reality, or real being, is that which has or can have being in the nature of things. It is twofold: actual and ideal. Actual is said to be that which actually has being on the part of reality; ideal, however, is that which does not yet have being, but can be given in the nature of things. Being of reason, however, is said to be that which has being objectively only in the mind and to which, accordingly, no being in the nature of things corresponds. It neither exists nor can exist outside the mind, and its whole being consists in its being apprehended by reason. It differs, therefore, entirely from ideal or possible being, which, although it does not exist, can be endowed with existence. IX. — Being of reason is twofold: negation and relation. Concerning the division into being of reason reasoning and being of reason reasoned, let what has been handed down in Logic be recalled. Here, however, it must be added that being of reason is divided into

negation and relation (1). Under negation is comprehended privation, which is the negation of a due form. « That which is of reason, says the Angelic Doctor, can only be twofold, namely negation or some relation. » Proof. The nature of being of reason formally consists in its opposition to real being, namely that it is not capable of existence. But that which is not capable of existence is either something positive or something non-positive. If it is not positive, it is negation or privation. But what is positive is either absolute or relative. (1) JOAN. A S. THOMA, Logic., II P . q. II, a. 1. — KANTIUS exhibits negation as a category which he opposes to reality. Concerning his opinion cf. BALMBS, Philos. fondament. liv. V, cc. XIII and XIV.

But being incapable of existence cannot be something absolute. It remains, therefore, that it is a relation. Wherefore being of reason is either negation or relation. The reason for the ultimate minor is this: « Every absolute position, says St. Thomas, signi fies something existing in the nature of things. » For the absolute implies a concept in, and therefore signifies something existing in itself or in another, and implies some reality; but a relation « because it does not say only a concept in, but also a concept towards, by reason of which precisely it does not say existence in itself, but an extrinsic attainment of a term, therefore it is not incompatible to be conceived without reality, and hence as a being of reason, by conceiving not as in another, or as in itself, but as towards another with a negation of existence in something (1). »

X. — BEING OF REASON IS FORMED BY THE INTELLECT ONLY THROUGH SOME COMPARATIVE ACT.

Proof of the I° part. First, the will does not form any object, but presupposes its object proposed by the intellect, whether true or apparent. Second, sense, whether external or internal, is borne only towards an object which has the notion of sensible. But being of reason does not assume the respect of sensible, but only the respect of being in common, which transcends every sensible order. Hence the senses are entirely incapable of fashioning being of reason.

Proof of the II° part, namely: The intellect needs a comparative act to form being of reason. For being of reason is either relation or negation. If relation, it requires an act by which it is compared to its proper term. If negation, since this according to itself exhibits nothing, it cannot be conceived in itself, but is conceived after the manner of another, namely after the manner of being. But to conceive after the manner of another is to conceive by comparison to another. Therefore the concept of negation implies and requires comparison, or a comparative act. Let it be noted that the discussion concerns being of reason formally taken. For being of reason taken fundamentally, as the nature prescinded from individuals, requires only abstraction. But then there is not had formally the logical universal, nor formally being of reason, but the metaphysical universal, which is the foundation of logical intention (1). The third division, of being into ten predicaments, is dealt with below, Tract. III. The fourth division, into potency and act, is discussed shortly, namely, q. II. XI. — The distinction of being from the absolute. Absolute is said to be that which is independent of any other. Something can, however, depend on another as on an efficient cause, as on a subject of inherence, and as on a correlative. In three ways, therefore, something can be independent, or absolute. Independent of every efficient cause is the absolute properly so called, or transcendentally, and this is God alone; independent of a subject of inherence is substance, and it is called absolute predicamentally; independent of a correlative is that which does not have an equal, or unequal, etc., and it is called absolute disparate. According to Herbart, being in common is confused with the absolute, or is an absolute term excluding all negation and relation. This notion is pernicious and most false. For being comprehends whatever is knowable. Moreover, not only absolutes, but also relatives, are knowable. Therefore being is common to both absolute and relative. It is not, therefore, absolute: neither transcendentally taken, otherwise God alone would have the notion of being; nor predicamentally, otherwise only

substance, not accident, could be called being. A fortiori it is clear that being is not absolute disparate. XII. — The distinction of being in common from divine being. God is the most actual being and of greatest comprehension, whose concept excludes all addition. Being in common, however, is potential and is contracted in its inferiors; it is of least comprehension, since it actually and explicitly implies only the least predicate that can be attributed to something. It does not exclude additions; indeed, it is determined and contracted by them. Those additions, however, are not something extraneous to being; but (1) Cf. Logic. pp. 219 and ss.

they relate to it as a more express concept relates to a confused concept. XIII. — Being logically considered and being ontologically taken. In the first acceptation, being designates something most common, indeterminate, and abstracted from all modes of being; taken thus, it exists only in the mind. Being, however, ontologically considered, implies something real which is found in all and each thing, for every thing is a being or a mode of being. In this way, being is called the greatest reality, since it is the first predicate of all existing things; and it is the object of Metaphysics (1). XIV. — The distinction of being in common from the in finite properly so called. The infinite properly so called, or categorematic, is that whose perfection lacks all limit. It is, therefore,

something positive which most actually possesses all degrees of perfection. Being in common, however, does not contain any determinate perfection in act. It can indeed be called infinite precisively, insofar as it prescinds from a determinate limit and wanders outside every genus and every category; but it is by no means positively infinite. For to the positive infinite no addition can be made, even by mental consideration; but additions are made to being in common, which contract it, just as a more express concept contracts an indeterminate concept. XV. — The distinction of being from intellection and from the intelligible. Subjectivists contend that being in common is perception itself, understanding, or the idea itself. — But being in

common can become all things. Therefore our thought and idea could become all things: hence again a fall into idealistic pantheism. Moreover, to be perceived, understood, an idea, is intentional, representative being. Moreover, representative being presupposes representable being. Therefore being in common differs from the being of intellection, as representable being differs from representative being. It also differs formally from the intelligible. Indeed, every intelligible is being, but it adds to being some relation, namely actual or aptitudinal conformity to the intellect, as will be shown below, Tract. II, q. I, art IV. (1) Cf. S. Thomas, I.P . q. 4, a. 1, ad 3; P . Páovus, O.P . Comment., in b. I

ARTICLE TWO — On The Concept Of Being.

I.— What is the objective concept of being. The concept, as has been said in Logic (1), is twofold: one formal, the other objective. The formal concept is the act of the intellect perceiving the object, or even the mental word itself, not as it acts as a representative of the object, but as it is a certain subjective affection of the intellect; the objective concept, however, is that notion which corresponds to the formal concept, or is the object itself actually expressed in the mind. We are here chiefly concerned with the objective concept. The objective concept of being designates something most common which is predicable of all things which are or can be. The things of which it is predicated relate as inferiors, while being itself is some superior which is contracted in its inferiors. It is asked, however, how the concept of being relates to its inferiors and how it is predicated of them. II. — Conclusion: The concept of being is not perfectly and simply abstracted from its inferiors, but imperfectly and in a certain respect. So the Thomists, to whom some contradict. Proof of the I° part. A concept is then only perfectly abstracted from its inferior when the inferior concept can be resolved into at least two concepts: one superior, the other differential. But the inferiors of being cannot be resolved into two concepts, one of which is being, the other a differential concept extraneous to being. Therefore the concept of being is not a concept perfectly abstracted from its inferiors. The major explains what a perfectly abstract concept is, and is understood by induction. For this reason animal is a concept perfectly abstracted from man and horse, because man can be resolved into two

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concepts: one superior, namely animal, and another differential, namely rational; and likewise horse is resolved into two concepts, animal and neighing. If, however, that differential concept were lacking, animal would not be a concept simply abstracted from the concept of man or horse. The minor is clear. Every difference of any inferior

includes being itself essentially and transcendentally, otherwise it would be nothing. Therefore an inferior of this kind cannot be divided into two distinct concepts, one of which is being, the other some difference outside being. Proof of the II° part, namely that the concept of being is in a certain respect abstracted from its inferiors. Although being actually includes all the notions which are involved in its inferiors, it does not, however, express them explicitly and determinately; but only implicitly and

confusedly. Moreover, a concept which does not explicitly exhibit the notions contained in its inferiors is in some way abstracted from them, at least in a certain respect. Therefore being is a concept abstracted in a certain respect from its inferiors, just as a confused and implicit concept is abstracted from an explicit concept of the same objective notion. III. — How being is contracted in its inferiors and why it is not a genus. Some superior is contracted to inferiors in two ways: first, when some difference entirely extraneous to the concept of the superior is added, such as animal is contracted in man and horse by a difference extraneous to it; second, when some notion is added which, although not extraneous to the concept of the superior, causes the superior concept, which was previously confused, to be apprehended in a more express and determinate way. Now it is clear that being is not contracted in the first way, like a genus through a difference; for it is impossible to add any difference extraneous to being. Wherefore St. Thomas teaches that being cannot be called a genus (1). For every genus has differences which are outside the essence of the genus. But no difference could be found which would be outside being, because non-being cannot be a difference. — It remains, therefore, that being is contracted through a greater and clearer expression of the same reality. Thus it is contracted in God and creatures, substance and accident, insofar as being by essence and being by participation, the mode of being in itself and the mode of being in another, refer and exhibit expressly and explicitly something which being as such only implicitly contains. IV. — In what way being is

predicated of its inferiors. The Scotists contend that being is univocal with respect to its inferiors, by the least univocation. There is, as they say, a threefold univocation: first, when the same notion is in all in the same mode of being, the same order, the same perfection. Second and lesser, when the same notion is in diverse things in the same mode and order, but not the same perfection; third and least, when the same notion is indeed in several things, but neither the same perfection, nor the same order, nor the same mode (1). V. — First conclusion: Real being is not univocal with respect to God and creature, nor is being common to the ten predicaments univocal with respect to substance and accident. Proof. Univocal is said to be that whose notion signified by the name is simply the same in its inferiors. But the notion of being signified by the name is not simply the same in God and creatures, in substance and accident. Therefore being is not univocal with respect to God and creatures, substance and accident. Proof of the minor. 1 That is not simply the same in several things which is found in one by essence and necessarily, but in another by participation and contingently: for those notions of being differ immensely and are almost opposed, as unreceived and received. Moreover, being in God is by essence and necessarily, and as unreceived, but in creatures as received and by participation and contingently. Therefore the notion of being cannot be the same in God and creatures. 2 That is not simply the same in several things which belongs to one as properly and in itself existing, but to another as existing in another and begging its being from another: for that notion of independence and that notion of dependence and inherence differ greatly. But being is ascribed to substance as (1) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. Cont. Gent., c. 25, 1. F . q. 2, a. 5, III. Metaphys. lect. 8. (1) Cf. Scor. Sent. I, dist. 8, q. 3; FRASSEX, Metaphys., disp. I, sect. 2. q. 2.

properly and in itself existing, but to accident as existing in another and begging its being from another; wherefore accident by Aristotle and St. Thomas is said to be more of being than being. Therefore (1). VI. — Second conclusion: Being with respect to its inferiors is not equivocal, but

analogous. Equivocals are said to be those which agree only in name, but have nothing in common in reality. But, if God and creatures, substance and accident, agree only in name, but have nothing at all in common in reality, human cognition and science are ruined, which is absurd.

Therefore. Proof of the minor. « Since all our cognition of God is taken from creatures, if there is no conformity except in name only, we would know nothing of God except empty names, to which no reality would correspond. It would also follow that all demonstrations given by philosophers concerning God would be sophistical (2).» Likewise, we denominate, define, and know substances from accidents, namely actions, properties. Therefore, if accident and substance agree in no way in reality, but only in name, our cognition of substances will be empty and fallacious. It is necessary, therefore, that being be predicated analogically of God and creatures, of substance and accident. But what this analogy is, is disputed. Some think it is analogy of proportion, others analogy of proportionality, others both proportion and proportionality. Let what was said in Minor Logic, Tract. I, q. I, art. III be recalled (3). VII. — Third conclusion: The analogy between God and creatures, substance and accident, is not an analogy of several to a third, but of one to another. — Analogy of several to a third supposes something prior with respect to which those several (1) « In vain will one reply with Saguen that all beings are equal in their opposition to nothingness and that, consequently, a univocal concept suffices to embrace them all. It is not true that they are all equally the non-nothing. Does not the Necessary, the Infinite, the Perfect, the Immutable, the Eternal, really differ from the contingent, the finite, the imperfect, the changeable, and the temporal? Do substance and accident, spirit and matter, exist in the same way? » C. LABEYRIN, Dogme « Méthaphysique, p. 174. (2) S. Thomas, De Poenit., q. 7, a. 2. (3) Logic. pp. 45 and ss. are said, as healthy food and healthy medicine suppose an animal with respect to which they are called healthy. But nothing can be or be conceived prior to God and creatures, substance and accident. Therefore.

Moreover, in the analogy of being there are not three terms, but only two which are compared: creature indeed in order to God, accident in order to substance. Therefore only the analogy of one to another prevails. VIII. — Fourth conclusion: The analogy of being between God and creatures, substance and accident, is an analogy of proportionality; it is also of proportion, not formally, but virtually. Proof of the I° part. Analogy of proportionality is had when the notion signi fied by the name is found intrinsically and truly in both analogates. But the notion signified by the name being is found intrinsically in God and creatures, in substance and accident; for creatures are beings, not only denominatively, but by reality and intrinsically; not only substance, but also accident, is intrinsically being, because it is truly outside nothing, and truly has real effects, such as being quantified, being colored, being hot, etc. Therefore. From which the II° part is proved. In analogy of proportion properly so called, the analogous form is in the principal analogate intrinsically, but in the others extrinsically and by denomination. Moreover, the form of the chief analogate is placed in the definition of the others, so much so that the other analogates cannot be conceived without the form of the chief analogate: thus the health of food cannot be understood independently of the health of an animal. But 1° the notion of being is not found extrinsically and only by denomination in creatures and accident, but intrinsically, as we already know; 2° God is not placed in the de finition of creatures; substance, however, although it is included in the definition of accident as its subject, is not placed as the form denominating the accident, in the way that the health of an animal is the form denominating healthy medicine; but, on the contrary, accident has some proper form by which it is constituted and by which it is conceived, without thereby conceiving the form constituting substance. Therefore the analogy of proportion formally so called is lacking. Proof of the III° part, namely that the analogy of being includes nevertheless virtually the analogy of proportion.

Something is said to be virtually such when it has the power to induce the same effect as that

which a thing formally such produces; thus the human soul can be called a virtually corporeal form, because it can achieve what a formally corporeal form bestows. But the analogy of being has the power to produce the effect which the analogy of proportion formally so called produces. Therefore. Intrinsically secondary analogates, such as food is denominated extrinsically healthy from the health of an animal. But accident is so dependent on substance that, if per impossible it did not have entity intrinsically in itself, it could from the extrinsic denomination of the being of substance be called being; and creatures, although they are something of being and are called beings intrinsically, could nevertheless be called beings extrinsically. Therefore the analogy of being has the power to achieve what the analogy of proportion does. — With this distinction, the diverse places of the Angelic Doctor can be reconciled, who sometimes acknowledges between the created and uncreated only analogy of proportionality (1); at other times seems to admit also analogy of proportion (2). IX. — Fifth conclusion: Although the analogy between God and creatures agrees in many things with the analogy between substance and accident, it differs in some notable way. How it agrees is clear from the preceding conclusions. The difference, however, consists in this: Being is not prior to God and creatures, but is prior to substance and accident. The whole notion of being is absolutely and fully found in God. But when the whole notion of the analogate is found in one of those of which it is predicated, then there is no predicate prior to both. The reason is clear, because then the predicate does not exceed the subject nor is greater than it. But if it is not greater than the subject, it is not prior to it. Therefore being is not prior to God and creatures. But when the whole notion of the analogate is not found in either of the subjects, then the predicate is greater and more common than the subject, and therefore prior. But the whole notion of being is not fully and absolutely found in substance which is the first genus, since divine being is not

included. Therefore being is prior to substance and accident (3). (1) Q. 2, De Verit. a. 11. (2) I. P . q. 16, a. 6. (3) Cf. S. THOMAS, Opusc. 39, (al. 42) De natura Generis, c I. X. — Di fficulties are solved. 1° Those things which communicate in a form are univocal. But God and creature, substance and accident, communicate in the form of being, namely in entity. Therefore they are univocal; therefore being is predicated of them univocally. Resp. : Distinguish the major: Those things which communicate in a form which is simply of the same notion are univocal, I grant; in a form which is not simply of the same notion, I deny; contradistinguish the minor and deny the conclusion. The distinction is clear from the notion of the univocal and analogical. 2° You will object: If the same notion of being is not in God and creatures, the cognition which we draw concerning God from creatures is fallacious. But this cannot be admitted. Therefore the notion of being is the same in God and creatures. Resp. : Distinguish the major: If the same notion of being is neither simply nor proportionally, the cognition is fallacious, I grant; if it is not the same simply, but the same proportionally, the cognition is fallacious, I deny. I grant the minor, and distinguish the conclusion: Therefore the notion of being is the same in God and creatures proportionally, I grant; simply, I deny. Cognition which is founded on likeness and analogy is not fallacious, because what belongs to the similar, insofar as it is similar, also belongs to the other of which it is the likeness. Hence what belongs to creatures proportionally and in a more eminent way is attributed to God. 3° Measure and measured are of the same notion. But God and creature relate as measure and measured. Therefore they are of the same notion. Resp. : Distinguish the major: Measure properly so called, such as is used in quantity, is of the same notion as the measured, I grant; measure improperly so called and superexcelling, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence. 4° The analogate is prior to the analogates. But being is not prior to God and creatures. Therefore it is not analogical. Resp. : Distinguish the major: It is prior according to the imposition of the name, I grant; according

to reality, I subdistinguish: if the whole notion of the analogate is found in neither of the analogates, I grant; otherwise, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the conclusion. The solution is clear from what was said in number IX (1).

XI. — Whether the concept of being is the first of all both in logical order and in temporal order. The concept of being is simple and (1) Cf. S. THOMAS, De Ente et Essentia, cap. II; CAJESTAX., Comm. in

direct and is the first of all in time and logically. — That is logically first which is included in every other concept. But being is included in every other concept, since every concept is some being or some determination of being. Therefore being is what is first conceived in logical order. — In temporal order, however, what is first acquired is what is more common, as was said in Psychology (1). But the most common idea is the idea of being. Therefore the idea of being is the first which is acquired. If, however, it concerns the reflexive and scientific concept of being, as we are acquiring it here in Metaphysics, it is not first, but presupposes many prior cognitions (2). XII. — How, therefore, the concept of being is acquired. The simple and crude notion of being, which is the first of all, is suggested to us by the easiest abstraction. For by apprehending singular things, from which our cognition begins, the intellect spontaneously and without any effort abstracts from individuating notes, and immediately discerns what is most common, namely being; then it proceeds from the more universal to the more distinct. That first cognition is only confused, nor does it attain being reduplicatively as transcendent and communicable to inferiors. Then to abstraction is added a comparative act by which being is referred to its inferiors as something most universal which is apt to be in many and innumerable things (3). Afterwards many other difficult and scientific acts are added by which one penetrates to the principles and properties of being; and from all these is formed that Ontological Metaphysics which we are attempting to acquire in the present context. Nevertheless, we must beware of the error of the Hegelians,

who contend that nothing is positively and according to itself conceived. Since concepts are signs of things, just as names are signs of concepts, it is necessary that what is conceived according to itself be something according to itself. Moreover, nothing according to itself is not something, as is clear. Therefore it is not conceived according to itself. But it is conceived after the manner of another, namely after the manner of being. The mind does two things to compare conceived nothing: 1° it conceives entity; 2° it negates entity. Just as death is understood as life denied, so nothing is conceived as being negated. Nothing, therefore, in our mind is some being of reason, namely negation, which is conceived after the manner of a positive and includes two things in its concept: 1° entity, 2° lack of entity. Nothing, moreover, is divided in three ways: 1° by reason of object, it is the nothing of existence, which denies existence but not possibility, and the nothing of essence, which denies even possibility, such as a square circle. 2° By reason of extension, it is absolute and total nothing, which denies all being, and relative and partial nothing, which denies to another, but not being or some degree of being; thus death denies life but not all being. 3° By reason of subject, it is the nothing of negation, which says only the absence of some form, and the nothing of privation, which is the lack of a due form. These things being understood, the opinion of Ad. Franck is refuted, who says: « Absolute nothing is impossible to conceive, and to speak of it is to contradict oneself (1). » XIII. — On the concept of nothing. Nothing is the negation of being. Many Idealists contend that no true concept of nothing is had. But on the contrary: whatever is in the mind exhibits some concept; but nothing is in the mind, since the mind discusses and reasons about nothing and discerns it from being. Therefore nothing has some concept. (1) Tract. I. q. II, a. V. Vol. I II. p. 81. (2) This question, how being is first known, is fully and excellently treated by Cajetanus in De Ente et Essentia, in the prooemium. (3) Let what we have discussed in Logic concerning the acts by which the direct universal and the reflexive, or logical, universal are formed

be recalled, vol. I, pp. 219-221.

XIV. — WHETHER THE CONCEPT OF BEING IS AN ESSENTIAL PREDICATE OF CREATURES.

Resp. 1° Being taken properly for the existent is not an (1) FRASCEK, Diction. philos. v. Etre. — The same is asserted by ED. LE ROT: « The idea of nothing is only a pseudo-idea, nothing is unthinkable, since thinking nothing would always be thinking something or not thinking. » Revue de Métaphys. juillet 1907, pp. 479-480. — « The thought of nothing would only be a nothing of thought. » Ibid., p. 487. — Nothing cannot indeed be conceived according to itself, but after the manner of another, and by reason of being, of which it is the negation, it is most certainly conceived; a true and positive act of the mind is that by which we understand the opposition of being and non-being, which opposition the principle of contradiction expressed.

essential predicate strictly speaking of creatures. For a predicate strictly essential is that which cannot be denied while preserving the concept of the essence. But, since creatures do not exist necessarily, but contingently, existence is a contingent predicate, and therefore can be denied while preserving the concept of the essence. Therefore being taken for the existent is not a strictly and properly essential predicate of creatures. Resp. 2° Being taken for the existent can be called an essential predicate in a broad sense. That can be called a predicate essential in a broad sense which does not place a thing in another predicament, but is in the same genus as it. But being, although it can be denied while preserving the concept of the essence, since however it comes to a thing, does not place it in another predicament, but is in the same predicament with it: thus being coming to substance is substantial being, and being coming to the essence of an accident is accidental being. Resp. 3° Being taken for essence is a strictly essential predicate of creatures; for no creature can be conceived unless it is some essence or has some essence. XV. — In what way the concept of being is

the simplest of all. Being is the simplest, because it cannot be resolved by analysis into any notes; others, on the contrary, are resolved into being itself as into an ultimate term. This simplicity, however, is of imperfection and potentiality; for being is indivisible because it exhibits the least note, the least predicate that can be attributed to anything. It must therefore be carefully distinguished from the simplicity of pure act, which is the completion of all perfections, excluding all composition from genus and difference, from potency and act, substance and accident. XVI. — Errors concerning the concept of being. Pantheists wish the concept of being in common to be the concept of reality and the most general being to be the source of realities. Lamennais seems to adhere to these (1). On the other hand, Subjectivists, Nominalists, Conceptualists assert that the notion of being exhibits nothing objective, but is a figment of our mind. (1) For he calls being « the inexhaustible source of realities » and says that all particular beings are actually contained in it « not only in potency, but in reality. » Cf. Lamennais, Esquisse d'une Philosophie, I. P . liv. I. c. 5.

ART. II. — ON THE CONCEPT OF BEING.

These errors are refuted from what has been said concerning the existence of universals (1). The true doctrine is briefly resumed: 1° Being in common does not exist formally in things. Whatever really exists in nature is singular, determinate, one, discrete from all others. But the notion of being in common is most indeterminate, abstract, common to all. Therefore the notion of being in common does not exist really and formally in nature, otherwise all things would be really one. 2° The concept of being, however, is not devoid of objective value, but truly exhibits some reality independent of our intellect. That which has true objective value is that which independently of our intellect speaks of real order to existence and which is the foundation of the principle of contradiction, from which one can argue to prove the existence of the first and

most real being; which is the first predicate of all things existing in nature. But 1° being designates something that has an order to real existence independently of our concept; for it does not depend on our intellect that something is apt to exist, as is clear that the intellect does not confer on a being of reason the aptitude for existence; 2° being is the foundation of the principle of contradiction, for that principle is precisely concerned with the conflict between being and non-being; 3° since being designates something that implies an order to real existence, one can in some way argue from the notion of being to prove the existence of some being which is not abstracted from all existence, nor receives existence from another, but exists by its own power and imparts existence to others (2); and finally being is the first predicate which is ascribed to anything existing in nature. Therefore, although being in common as such does not exist on the part of reality, nevertheless to the concept of being there corresponds objective value, or some entity independent of the intellect. This entity, moreover, is not properly God and creature, nor substance and accident, reduplicatively considered as such, but the nature or essence which is common to them by the community of analogy, and which implies an order to real existence. This common essence does not exist according to the mode in which it is conceived, (1) Cf. Logie. Maj. Tract. I. (2) Cf. P . LEPID, Ontologia, sect. I, cap. III.

but has a foundation in nature with respect to what is conceived. Hence, because being is not devoid of objective reality, the Philosophy which contemplates being is not empty and vain, but enjoys objective value and is rightly called a science of reality (1).

QUESTION TWO

On potency and act (1). The notion of being becomes clearer and more express from the consideration of potency and act and their mutual relation.

ARTICLE ONE.

I. — The notion of potency. Potency is derived from the verb to be able. Among beings, some can be, although they are not; others, however, already are: that which can be is said to be in potency; that which already is is said to be in act; a little boy can be a philosopher, but is not yet, he is said to be a philosopher in potency; when he has acquired philosophical knowledge, he will be a philosopher in act. Marble can become a statue, but is not yet, it is said to be a statue in potency; from marble the representation of the Virgin was drawn out, it is said to be marble in act as a statue. A man closes his eyes, he is potentially seeing; (1) One may consult: ARISTOTELES, IX Metaphys.; S. THOMAS, com- ment. in IX Metaphys.; in II, III, VII and VIII Physic.; De Ente et Essentia ; CAIETANUS, Comm. in opusc. de Ente et Essentia ; PETRUS a BEBOOMO, Tabula aurea, v. actus, potentia ; ALMANNUS, q. 27 ; DOMET DE VORGEN, L'acte et la puissance, Annal. de philo. chri. aoult 1886 ; FAROES, Théorie fundam. de Pacte et de la puissance, du moteur et du modèle ; Card. MEN- ERN, Ontologie ; KAUPMANN, Etude de la cause finale dans Aristote, tra- duit par le P . DEISEN, O. P .; GARDELI, O. P .,Dictionn. de théologie, v. Acte ; BAUDIS, L'acte et la puissance dans Aristote, Revue Thomiste, 1899, 1900.

he has eyes open, he is actually seeing. Thus potency and act are known by mutual

comparison: potency is like a beginning, act like a completion; potency is perfectible, act is perfection. Neither can be properly defined: for potency is understood through act, but act is among the first simple things, which do not admit of a strict definition, since they do not consist of genus and difference. II. — Potency in general can be described from Aristotle as: A principle of acting or being acted upon. For potency comes from to be able: one is then said to be able when he has in himself a principle of doing or receiving something: fire can heat, because it has in itself a principle of inducing heat; water can be heated, because it has in itself a principle of receiving heat. The principle,

however, can be taken either properly as it designates some real capacity existing in a real subject, and then it is called real, or subjective, potency; or improperly, insofar as it implies a real capacity not in the thing itself, but only in an extrinsic cause, insofar as there is no repugnance to its being produced by some cause; and thus it is called logical-objective potency, or simple possibility. It is called objective, because it belongs to a thing not according to itself, but as the thing is an object of mental consideration, and also as the thing is an object of real potency in the cause from which it can be produced. Many other worlds are in objective potency, because they are an object of divine power by which they can be endowed with existence. Logical potency in itself is mere non-repugnance to existence, but it supposes real potency in the extrinsic cause on which the thing depends. Possible worlds in themselves are nothing other than mere non-repugnance to existence, but in God, who is able to produce them, they are real potency. Hence is refuted the error of those who confuse potency as such and possibility; a being in potency is also possible, but not every possible being is a being in potency: in the latter can be included some real and subjective capacity. From the Aristotelian notion of potency, that it is a principle of acting or being acted upon, it appears that a twofold subjective potency is distinguished: active, namely a principle of acting, and passive, a principle of receiving something. In iron there is a passive potency to receive heat; in fire, an active potency to induce heat.

III. — ACTIVE AND PASSIVE POTENCY ARE COMPARED. PASSIVE

potency and active potency have something in common: 1° both are some real capacity in a subject; 2° both are a principle of act, indeed in a di fferent way; active is a principle from which act emanates, but passive is a principle in which act is received; — 3° both are distinguished from their correlative act. For a principle implies a real distinction from that of which it is a principle. Therefore, since both are a principle of act, both are distinguished from their corresponding act. In God, active

potency is not precisely a principle of action, since God is His own action, but a principle of the produced effect. They differ, however, in this: 1° Passive potency is imperfect, for everything su ffers according as it is deficient and imperfect; but active potency is act and perfection. For from active potency action emanates, which is a certain perfection. But nothing gives except what it in some way contains in itself. Therefore active potency in some way contains the perfection of operation. Hence the saying of St. Thomas: Everything according as it is in act and perfect, according to this is an active principle of something (1). 2° Active potency, although it is called potency with respect to operation, which is its term and ultimate perfection, is nevertheless in itself some act, which is called first act; but passive potency, as passive, cannot in any way be called act. For as the Angelic Doctor explains (2), active potency is not divided against act, but is founded in it, for everything acts according as it is in act; but passive potency is divided against act, for everything suffers according as it is in potency. Hence this potency is excluded from God, but not the active. In short, passive potency is potency only, to which corresponds the first act informing it; but active potency is a first act to which second act, or operation emanating from it, corresponds. Passive potency is properly for being, but active for acting. IV. — Another consideration of active and passive potency. Passive potency, as has been said, is the capacity to receive something (1) I. P . q. 25, a. 1. (2) Ibid.

which it did not previously have, in which notion is included a subject which is otherwise disposed than before, since it acquires what it previously did not possess. Moreover, to be otherwise disposed than before is to be transmuted. Wherefore passive potency designates some principle which can be transmuted and moved. But a passive principle, since it does not actually have the perfection which is to be acquired by transmutation, requires another which may bestow that perfection, or which may transmute. Hence active potency implies a principle which can transmute and move. From these can be

understood the definition which Aristotle gives of active and passive potency. — Active potency is the principle of transmutation in another, insofar as it is another, that is, the principle of transmuting another insofar as it is another. These last words are skillfully added. For the active principle, or transmuting, can be found in that which suffers and is transmuted, but it is not moved and moves according to the same aspect, but according to different aspects: a man, e.g., moves himself according to the heart, is moved according to other parts. True passive potency is defined: The principle of mutation from another, insofar as it is another, that is, the principle of receiving transmutation from another insofar as it is another. Why these last words are added, we already know: something can suffer from itself, but not according to the same aspect: a man can be moved by himself, but one part is the mover, another part the moved. Hence it follows that active and passive potency are really distinguished, or are in different subjects, because nothing is according to the same aspect agent and patient (1). VI. — Conclusion: There exists in nature a state of potency, even passive. Arg. Ium. Wherever transmutation takes place, passive potency is present. But transmutations take place in nature. Therefore. The major is clear from what has been said, since passive potency is the principle of mutation from another. Proof of the minor. Mutation occurs when the same subject is otherwise disposed than before. But in the world we frequently see the same subject otherwise disposed than before, e.g., the same iron is now in a state of coldness, now becomes incandescent; the same subject which was seed becomes a plant, the plant becomes ashes; the same embryo which was an ovum becomes living, becomes sensitive, becomes man. Daily facts, therefore, invincibly demonstrate the state of potentiality. Oxygen and hydrogen before they were combined were not water, and yet water was not drawn from nothing: therefore oxygen and hydrogen were water in potency. Arg. IIum. It has been proved, in Natural Philosophy, that matter and form exist, which doctrine can be called certain with respect to living things. But the existence of matter and form implies the

existence of potency and act (1). Therefore potency exists, even substantial, at least in living things. Arg. IIIum from the absurdities of the denying opinion. Unless a state of real potency distinct from act itself is given, it follows that a man who does not actually see is blind, for he is considered blind who lacks the power of seeing; and a man who does not actually feel is insensible, for he is utterly to be called insensible who does not have a true power of feeling. V. — The existence of potency. The existence of a state of mere potency, namely passive, was denied by the ancient Eleatics, especially Parmenides, Mellesius, Zeno; by the Moderns, F . Herbart, and others, who contend that potency, especially passive, is only a figment of reason, or not distinguished from mere possibility. The reality of potency, however, is asserted by Aristotle (2) and the Scholastics, both ancient and modern (3), and generally by all who defend the objectivity of motion. (1) Passive and active potency are in different subjects, says St. Thomas repeatedly after Aristotle. Cf. Metaphys. I. I ; IV Sent. dist. 4, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 ; dist. 14, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1. (2) Cf. ARISTOT., Phys., I, IV. (3) Cf. KLEPTOEN, La Philos. seol. t. I, c. 1. a. 3 ; FARON, Théorie fendantem. de l'acte et de la puissance. VII. — The first subdivision of passive potency: into quidditative and entitative. Receptive potency can be either for first being, which is substantial form, or for ultimate being, which is existence. The first does not have determinate entity, but is a determinable subject for quiddity through substantial form, and for this reason it is called quidditative potency. The other is already a certain essence, but needs to be actuated by being, or existence; and, because it is called being from being, therefore the subject susceptible of being is fittingly called entitative

potency (2). (1) Cf. vol. II, pp. 113 and sqq. (2) Cf. Card. LOKKSZIKUL, Metaphysic. Gen. P . II, lect. IX. 2 2 M E T A P H Y S I C A O N T O L O G I C A , T R A C T . I . Q . I I . The act corresponding to quidditative potency is specific essence, but the act corresponding to entitative potency is existence. But since the act of essence and the act of existence are of different physical genera, it follows that

quidditative and entitative potency differ in physical genus. In whatever, therefore, composition of essence and existence is found, entitative potency is found, and in whatever composition of matter and form is present, quidditative potency is present. The first, therefore, belongs to all created things, the second only to corporeal things. VIII. — The second subdivision: into natural and obediential potency. Passive potency implies an order to active potency as to its complement and perfection. There is, however, a twofold active potency to which passive can be compared, namely: the potency of a natural agent, and the potency of the first agent, which can induce a higher effect. Hence a twofold passive potency is usually distinguished: natural and obediential. Natural is in order to a natural agent; the other is in order to the first agent and to an act exceeding the powers of nature. Three things must be established concerning obediential potency: whether it exists? what kind it is, passive only, or also active? and to what it extends? IX. — First conclusion: There is in every creature an obediential potency for e ffects induced by God and exceeding nature. Proof. The potency which is totally subject to some agent can be raised to all those effects which such an agent can induce. But the potency of every creature is totally subject to God, from whom it totally depends in being and preservation. Therefore it can be raised to all effects which God can induce. God, moreover, can induce effects exceeding the scope and powers of all nature. For the higher some active power is, the higher can it elevate that thing to an effect. But divine power is higher than every natural power of a creature, and consequently can induce an effect exceeding all the powers and exigencies of nature. Therefore every creature is in potency to effects surpassing the power of nature. Potency, however, to effects exceeding nature is called obediential. Therefore obediential potency exists in creatures.

X. -- SECOND CONCLUSION: OBEDIENTIAL POTENCY IS NOT ACTIVE BUT ONLY PASSIVE. IT IS AGAINST

Suarez. Arg. Ium. It is of the nature of every active potency to contain the effect in itself virtually. But a

creature can in no way contain a supernatural effect in itself, because a cause of a lower order cannot grasp nor contain an effect of a higher order. Therefore a creature cannot have active potency with respect to supernatural effects. The argument is declared. Every active potency, or every cause, must in some way contain the effect in itself: a principal cause indeed must contain the effect by reason of its form, but an instrumental cause by reason of the motion which it participates from the principal cause. Moreover, it is clear that the power which is participated in the instrument is not innate, but communicated. Therefore, since a creature cannot attain a divine effect except through a communicated power, it is manifest that a creature does not have an innate, or natural, power by which it can contain a supernatural effect in itself (1). Arg. IIum. Active obediential potency would be at once entitatively supernatural and entitatively natural. This, however, is manifestly impossible. Therefore active obediential potency is incompatible. Proof of the major. It would be supernatural. Every immediately operative power is specified by the acts it elicits (2). But immediately operative obediential potency would elicit acts entitatively supernatural, since this potency is precisely said in order to acts exceeding nature. Therefore it would be entitatively supernatural. Moreover. Every active potency must be proportioned to the effect to be produced. But the effect to be produced is of a supernatural order. Therefore this potency would be of a supernatural order.

And yet entitatively natural. For obediential potency is not distinguished from the entity of creatures, but is innate to them. But what is not distinguished from the natural entity of creatures is entitatively natural, since the supernatural is considered to be that which is distinguished from nature and is above nature. Therefore that potency would be entitatively natural.

XI. — Third conclusion: Obediential potency extends to all things which do not imply contradiction, and can never be exhausted. Obediential potency, since it is said by order to the first agent, is measured by the power of the First

Agent itself. But the power of the First Agent extends to all things which are not repugnant, nor can it ever be exhausted. Therefore obediential potency extends to all things which do not involve repugnance, and will always remain inexhaustible. The Angelic Doctor appropriately says: « Whatever God does with His creature, it still remains in potency to receive from God (1). » By obediential potency, therefore, one creature can be totally converted into another, form into form, matter into matter. For these do not involve contradiction; for both forms and both matters have the common nature of being, and that which is of entity in one can be converted by the author of being into that which is of entity in the other, with the removal of that by which it was distinguished from it (2). Hence if it is asked whether a stone can be converted into an angel and an angel into a stone, it must be answered: An angel and a stone retaining their proper difference cannot be converted into each other, which would imply contradiction; but if the difference between angel and stone is removed, both will agree in the common notion of being, and thus the author of being can convert that which is of entity in the angel into that which is of entity in the stone. XII. — How obediential potency is actuated. In two ways: through transient motion and through permanent habit. In the first way, a creature is elevated by God, as every instrument is elevated through virtuous motion communicatively given in a transient way by the principal agent; in this way the sacraments concur in the production of supernatural grace. In the second way, faculties are elevated to attain something which is contained within their adequate object, which nevertheless they cannot naturally perceive. Thus through the light of glory, which is a permanent habit, our intellect is made apt to see the divine essence, which is contained within the adequate object of the intellect, namely being and truth. It is wisely said: within the adequate (1) S. THOMAS, De Perit. q. 29, a. 3, ad 3. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, III. P . q. 75, a. 4. ad 3. object, for obediential potency is not borne to those things which change essence and imply contradiction. Moreover, if faculties were borne outside their adequate object, e.g., the

eye to understanding, the ear to seeing, the essence would be destroyed, and contradiction would be introduced. XIII. — On logical potency, or the possible. We have distinguished potency as such from the possible. Real potency is a true capacity, really existing in a real subject. The possible, however, is said to be that to which being is not repugnant, or which is apt to exist. It has, therefore, some real-ideal being, and a positive concept by reason of which it is distinguished from nothing, which cannot be conceived positively. The aptitude for existence, however, can arise both from the mutual convenience of terms, which present no repugnance, and from an extrinsic cause which can bring the thing to being. Hence a twofold possibility: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic is the aptitude for existence arising from the non-repugnance of terms to each other. Extrinsic is the aptitude for existence in relation to an active cause which can endow the thing with existence. Intrinsic is called absolute, because it is had independently of any hypothesis; metaphysical, because it lies in the very essence of the thing; primary, because it is presupposed to extrinsic potency. The latter, however, is called relative and secondary. With respect to God, relative possibility is as open as absolute possibility: for whatever is intrinsically possible can be brought into being by God. With respect to creatures, however, it is less open. Some things, indeed, cannot be effected by a created cause, such as spiritual substance; some, however, can be produced considering the laws of nature, but not

considering the laws by which human morals are regulated; some, finally, can be produced considering both the laws of nature and morals. In the first case, there is physical possibility; in the other, physical and moral simultaneously. The opposite of possible is impossible: hence intrinsic impossibility is the repugnance to existence arising from the repugnance of terms to each other; extrinsic impossibility is the repugnance arising only from the defect of active power in some created cause. It is subdivided into moral and physical, like possibility itself.

XIV. — Some sayings concerning the possible and impossible. First: The possible adequately taken is intrinsically and extrinsically possible; for it must be possible in every respect, both in itself and in order to its cause. Second: The possible extrinsically is also intrinsically possible, but not conversely. For the secondary supposes the primary, but not conversely. Third: The intrinsically impossible is relatively impossible; but the relatively impossible can be intrinsically possible and with respect to God; of which kind is a golden mountain; for it is impossible with respect to us, but can be endowed with existence by God. Fourth: To know what is possible or impossible intrinsically, it suffices to consider the relation of terms to each other; but for extrinsic possibility to be known, it must be compared in order to the cause from which the thing is producible. Fifth: Given the possible, it does not follow that there is absurdity; given the impossible, it follows that there is absurdity. Sixth: From act to potency, from not able to not being, the consequence holds; from potency to act, from not being to not able, the consequence does not hold. The saying is clear from the terms themselves. Seventh: Possibles derive their extrinsic possibility from divine omnipotence, which can actuate by existence whatever does not imply contradiction; but their intrinsic possibility they have in themselves, or in their constituent notes. This is dealt with below, concerning the foundation of essences.
XV. — Whether the notion of the possible is posterior to the notion of the existent. The possible is a certain abstract notion. But the order of our cognition is that we are led from concretes to abstracts. Therefore the existent is conceived first; then the intellect, by abstracting from the state of reality and existence, forms the concept of the possible. Thus, our mind proceeds as follows: first, it forms the most common notion of being; then it conceives existence, by conceiving whether a thing is; thirdly, essence, by conceiving what a thing is; fourthly, the attributes of a thing, by conceiving how a thing is. Among the attributes of essence, however, is possibility, hence fifthly it conceives possibility, by conceiving whether a thing can be. Extrinsic

possibility is indeed manifestly posterior; intrinsic possibility is really the same as essential predicates, but is conceived as a mode of essence, and therefore is posterior to essence. Therefore possibility is inferred from the existence of a thing (1). However, XVI. — The intrinsic possibility of things does not arise from their existence. That which prescinds from actual existence does not originate from it. Moreover, the possible prescinds from actual existence, since it is indifferent to being and not being. Moreover, if possibility arose from actual existence, things, before they existed, would not be possible; and on the other hand, every possible would be endowed with existence, which is to introduce blind necessity and fatalism. (1) Cf. BALMES, Philosophie fondament. liv. V. c. IV. ¡¢£€¥ ¦§¨©ª«¬ ®¯°±²³ ´µ¶·¸ ¹º» ¼½¾¿ÀÁÂÃÄ ÅÆÇÈÉÊËÌÍÎÏ ÐÑÒÓÔÕÖ ×ØÙÚÛÜ ÝÞßàáâãäåæçèéêëìíîï ðñòóôõö÷øùúûü ý þÿ

ARTICLE TWO

ON ACT AND ITS RELATION TO POTENCY .

1. — A threefold acceptation of act. The notion of act we have already gathered from the notion of potency: Act relates to potency as the builder to the buildable, as the active to the potential, and as the one who sees to the one who has his eyes closed. Act, therefore, is the complement, the perfection, just as potency is the beginning and imperfection. Since, therefore, potency and act are opposed, Aristotle thought that act could be sufficiently defined in this way: Act is the existence of a thing not as we say it is in potency. Act comes from the verb to act, just as potency comes from the verb to be able. Hence from the common understanding of men, the name act was first attributed to operation; for thus almost all understand act. Secondly, however, it was thence transferred to form, insofar as form is the principle and end of operation. But, because every operation supposes being, or existence, in the third acceptation act designates the being of a thing. Hence a threefold acceptation of act: act of essence, act of existence, act of operation (1). The act of essence is that by which

essence is determined to a certain species. That by which a thing is placed in a certain species, however, is form. Hence that act is properly called formal act. The act of existence, however, is also called the act of being by which a thing is placed outside the state of mere possibility. Hence it is clear how far from the truth those are who confuse act with action. Action is indeed act, but not every act is action: action properly designates the exercise of an active power, but act the actual perfection, substantial or accidental, of a being. Aristotle calls act energeia or entelecheia: energeia more properly expresses action, entelecheia however perfection. (1) S. THOMAS. Qq. Dipp. De Potent. Dei, q. 1, a. 1. Nevertheless, the two words are not infrequently used promiscuously (1). II. — There is, however, a certain order among those three acts. For operation supposes form and completes it, and existence supposes essence, which it actuates. Hence a division into first and second act. First act is said to be that which does not suppose another, but is ordered to another; second act, which implies another and tends to another. Thus, if form is compared to operation, essence and existence, form is first act, operation second act; essence first act, existence second act. III. — With respect to potency, received act and unreceived act and pure act are distinguished. Received act is that which informs potency and is received in potency; unreceived, however, is that which is received in no potency. If, moreover, some act is neither received in potency nor can receive a further act, then it will be unreceived and non-receptive. Moreover, such an act is necessarily most perfect and infinite. For since act according to itself implies perfection, if some act is not pure perfection, it is clear that it is not pure act, but mixed with potency. Now act can be mixed with potency in two ways: either because it is itself the act of a potency, or because it is in potency to a further act. Moreover, unreceived act is not the act of a potency; but non-receptive act is not potency to an act. Wherefore unreceived and non- receptive act is purely act, pure perfection, hence it is called pure act. But what is pure perfection is without limit, since every limit denotes

imperfection. Therefore unreceived and non-receptive act is properly and simply infinite act. But act which is not received in some subject, but receives a further act, can be called infinite in a certain respect, not however absolutely. Thus angelic form is not received in any matter; from which aspect it has nothing that restricts and limits it. (1) On the Aristotelian acceptation of act, consult P GARDERI, O. P . Revue Thomiste, 1893, n. 6 ; KAUFFMANN, Etude sur la cause finale,tra- doct. DUBER ; BACDIS, L'Acte et la puissance dans Aristote, Revue Tho- miste, 1899.

It gathers in itself the whole breadth of perfection which is in the order of essence and the

whole fullness of that species. Nevertheless, it is not its ultimate actuality, since it is receptive of its ultimate act, namely existence; from which aspect it becomes potency, and therefore imperfect and finite. Beings of this kind, therefore, are composed of something which receives, namely essence, and of something which is received, namely being. Since, therefore, the act of being is received and a being is called being rather from the act of being, it follows that those things are not properly called unreceived beings, but rather received. By the very fact, however, that something is received in another, it is manifest that it is dependent. But what depends cannot exist by its own power, but borrows existence from another. Hence received act can be called received in two ways: 1° because it is in another; 2° because it is from another. Unreceived and non-receptive act, however, exists by its own power, is a being from itself, or is God Himself. IV. — By reason of the mode of being, act is divided into subsistent and non-subsistent. Subsistent is called that which can exist in itself, independently of matter, and, if it subsists in itself as a complete nature, like an angel, it is perfectly subsistent act; if it needs to be united to matter to form a complete species, it is incompletely subsistent act, like the human soul. Non- subsistent is that which needs matter to exist. V. — Informing act and terminating act. Informing act is that which actuates its potency in the way that form actuates matter; terminating, which perfects and completes some

potency, without however being its form, just as a point constitutes a line, yet is not its form, but only its term. Subsistence, existence are terminating acts; whiteness is an informing act. VI. — Substantial act and accidental act. The first gives being simply, as the soul to the body. The other, however, gives being in a certain respect and supposes being simply: thus is knowledge with respect to man, heat with respect to fire. Having explained the concept of potency and act, the relation between the two is seen. This relation is expressed by the following Scholastic sayings:

VII. — The first saying is: Every mutable being is composed of potency and act. A mutable being is said to be that which can be otherwise disposed than before, and therefore implies that it can acquire something and lose something. But by the very fact that it can receive something and lose something, it is not pure act, but supposes an act mixed with potency. Therefore a mutable being supposes an act mixed with potency, or is composed of potency and act. Proof of the minor. Pure act, since it is non-receptive, can acquire nothing, and consequently can lose nothing, because something is lost so that another may be received. But something is said to be lost when it is separated from the subject in which it was received. But pure act has nothing received. Therefore it can lose nothing. Therefore every mutable being supposes some act which is acquired or lost, and some potency in which the lost act was received and in which the act to be acquired will be received; which is composition of potency and act. Every immutable being, therefore, is pure act. But since pure act is God alone, it is clear that every created being is mutable, composed of potency and act. VIII. — The second saying: Act and potency divide being and every genus of being. It coincides with the preceding saying. The meaning is: Created being in common is divided into potency and act in such a way that potency is as it were the genus, act as it were the difference. Indeed, potency is, like a genus, a determinable principle; act is, like a difference, a determining principle. For when we wish to know the nature of something, we inquire what is its genus and what its

difference; so we perceive the nature of being from potency as from a genus, from act as from a difference. It is added: And every genus of being, so that the composition of act and potency may be known to be common to all categories. There is, moreover, a twofold genus of being: substantial being and accidental being; substantial being indeed consists of substantial potency and substantial act; accidental being, however, of accidental potency and accidental act. This is more fully demonstrated from what follows.

IX. — The third saying: Act and potency are in the same genus. It is understood of potency which is essentially ordered to act as to its proper end and complement. Moreover, we do not intend that act and potency are in the same predicament genus, as if act should be quality if potency is quality; for it often happens that potency is placed in the genus of quality and act in the genus of action. But the meaning is: If potency is in the genus of substance, act will be in the genus of substance; and if potency is in the genus of accident, act also will be in the line of accident. Proof. Act and potency relate in such a way that act is the essential complement and essential perfection of potency. But an accident cannot essentially complete and perfect a substance. Therefore, if potency is substance, act cannot be an accident, but must be substance. Proof of the minor. To perfect a substance essentially is to give it some substantial being, as is clear. Moreover, it is incompatible that an accident give substantial being. Therefore it is incompatible that an accident essentially complete a potency. Again, what constitutes and essentially perfects an accident must be of the same essence with it. But for substance to be of the same essence with accident is impossible. Therefore substance is not the essential perfective of an accident, otherwise potency by receiving act would cease to be accident, and would become substance, contrary to the hypothesis. X. — The fourth saying: Potency derives its species from act. Everything is speci fied by that by which it is defined, for species and definition are convertible. But potency is defined by act. Therefore it is specified by it. —

Proof of the minor. A thing is intelligible and de finable insofar as it is being, for intelligibility is founded in being. Moreover, being is said properly and primarily of a thing which is in act; but of a thing which is in potency secondarily and by order to act; for the possible is considered to be being insofar as it has an aptitude for acting or being in act, just as a builder is said to be one who can build, and a speculator one who can speculate, and the visible that which can be seen. Therefore act is properly and primarily intelligible and definable, but potency secondarily and by order to act.

XI. — The fifth saying: Nothing is reduced from potency to act except by some being in act. A being in potency lacks perfection, but act is perfection. But lacking perfection cannot give itself perfection. Therefore it cannot give itself act, or reduce itself from potency to act. It demands, therefore, another which can bestow perfection. But again that cannot bestow perfection unless it itself possesses perfection, or act in itself. Therefore a being in potency must be reduced to act by some being in act. XII. — The sixth saying: Although that which is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act is prior in potency than in act in the order of generation; nevertheless, simply speaking, act is prior to potency in reason, nature, and perfection. Proof of the I° part. Since generation proceeds from imperfect to perfect, it is necessary in the order of generation that the imperfect be prior to the perfect, as a boy is prior to a man. Moreover, the imperfect corresponds to potency, the perfect to act. Therefore in the same subject which passes from potency to act, potency is prior to act. Proof of the II° part. 1° Act is prior in reason. That by which another is de fined is prior to it in reason, just as animal is prior to man, subject prior to accident. But potency cannot be defined except through act. Therefore act is prior to potency in reason. 2° It is prior in nature. That is said to be prior in nature, prior to another, when another depends on it in being. But potency depends on act in being, because potency does not stir itself to act, but requires another which is already in act (1). Therefore act is prior in nature. Hence unless some

prior act existed, all things would have remained in potency and would remain forever (2). 3° It is prior in perfection. The end is more perfect than those things which are for the end. But act is the end of potency; for active potency is for the sake of the act of operation, and passive potency for the sake of the act of form, from which it receives its complement. Therefore act is prior to potency in the order of perfection. (1) Cf vol II, p 28, 30

(2) The primacy of act is denied by Ed. Le Rov, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, mars 1907; whose doctrines are refuted by P . GARRIOOU-LAOBAIROK, O. P ., Revue Thomiste, juillet-août 1907, pp 317, ss.

XIII. — The seventh saying: Potency cannot exist without any act, but act, as such, can exist without potency. For it depends on act and cannot exist without it. Therefore, since potency is posterior to act in reason and nature, it cannot exist without any act. But indeed the prior does not originate from the posterior. Therefore, since act is simply prior to potency, it can exist without it. If, therefore, some act needs potency to exist, this does not arise from the fact that it is act, or perfection, but from the fact that such an act is under another respect potency and imperfection. XIV. — The eighth saying: The same thing with respect to the same thing cannot be simultaneously in act and in potency. To be in potency is to lack perfection; to be in act is to possess perfection. But it is impossible for the same thing to lack and enjoy the same perfection simultaneously. Therefore it is incompatible for the same thing with respect to the same thing to be in act and in potency simultaneously. XV. — The ninth saying: Act is limited only by subjective potency in that order in which it is act. Act which implies only perfection cannot of itself be limited in that order in which it is perfection, otherwise it would have and not have the perfection of that order simultaneously. If, therefore, it is in fact limited, this must be derived from something else. That other, moreover, cannot be another act, but only potency. Therefore act is limited only by potency. Proof of the minor. Another act would be either of the same order or of a different order. Moreover, given two

acts of the same order to be possible, there is only addition of perfection in the same order, by no means limitation. If, however, it is of a different order, it is either of a superior order, or of an inferior and subordinated order. But an act of a superior order is not limiting, because it is of a superior order to perfect, not to limit or make imperfect. — If it is of an inferior order, it is something potential with respect to the superior. Hence it remains that act is limited only by potency. XVI. — The tenth saying: Act is multiplied only by potency. It follows from what has been said. Act, as perfection, cannot be multiplied unless perfection is multiplied in several distinct subsistents. But this distinction cannot be made except through potency. Therefore. Proof of the minor. Distinction cannot arise from some principle which is intrinsic to the perfection of one and not to the perfection of another, because an intrinsic difference changes the species. Therefore it must be made through extrinsic receptives or subjects, just as whiteness is multiplied because it is received in several subjects. But the subject and receptive is potency. Therefore multiplication takes place through potency. Hence a corollary: Act mixed with no potency, or unreceived and non-receptive act, is unique. XVII. — The eleventh saying: Act and potency are primarily opposed. Those things are primarily opposed whose notions exclude each other. But the notion of potency and the notion of act mutually exclude each other, for potency is determinable, perfectible, beginning; act is determining, perfecting, completion. Therefore. XVIII. — The twelfth saying: There is no middle state between potency and act. Against Leibniz and some dynamists who agree with him. By such a state a being either begins to act in some way or not at all. If it does not begin to act at all, it remains in the state of mere potency. If, however, it begins to act, there is already the beginning of act. But what is the beginning of act if not some act, at least imperfect? For the transition from potency to act, or motion, is a true act, for it is defined: the act of the existent in potency insofar as it is such, that is, the wayfaring act to a term (1). Therefore there is no middle state between potency and act, although

between potency and perfect act there is an intermediate state, which is motion. XIX. — The thirteenth saying: From two beings in act one thing simply cannot be made. For since one and being are convertible, each thing is denominated one by that by which it is denominated being. But it is called being (1) Cf.vol II.0.261

ARTICLE ONE — On The Notion And Properties Of Essences.

I. — Di fferent denominations of essence. Essence is called by Aristotle ousia, what it is, species, nature, the reason of a thing, etc. Since it is something common to all genera, it cannot be properly defined; however, it is described in various ways according to the different respects considered in it. In itself considered, it is called: That by which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species; in order to the intellect, it is that by which a thing is first conceived by the intellect, that which is first conceived in a thing; with respect to attributes which (1) Cf. ARISTOT. Categor. and VII. Metaphys ; BORN., De Persona and duabus Naturis ; S. THOMAS, in VII. Metaphys. lect. 3, De Ente et Essentia, ec.I and II;PETRUS A BERGAMO, Tabula aurea ; CAJET, in op. De Ente et Essentia ; SUAREZ, Disput. Metaphys. disp. 31 ; LEIPZID, Ontol. lib II, sect I, c V ; MERCER, Ontol. , n° 16 and ss.; LOBENHELLI, Metaphys., lect. III and IV; RENNE, Q. I, § 3 ; DELLMAS, Metaphys. ; DOMET DE VOA- GES, Abrégé de Metaphysique, c. XXIV II. — However, in composite substances, essence does not imply only form, but the composite of form and matter. The reason is that essence includes whatever is expressed in the definition. But in the definition of a composite substance, not only form but also matter is placed. Therefore the essence of a composite also implies matter itself. On the other hand, essence is not a relation between matter and form or something coming to them. For essence is first and fundamental being; but relation or something else coming to matter and form is being in a certain respect and extraneous. Wherefore essence cannot designate a relation between essence and form or something added to them. It remains, therefore, that it designates the composite of matter and form. And indeed, essence is that which has being, or that of which being is. But being is not of form alone or matter alone, but of the whole composite, as is clear from Natural Philosophy (2). Therefore in composite substances essence designates the composite of matter and form. In spiritual substances, however, which are devoid of

any matter, essence is only form. III. — Essence is also called nature. It should be known, however, that this name nature is used in a fourfold sense by Boethius (3). First, it is called nature which relates commonly to all beings, as nature is defined: Everything that can be grasped by the intellect in any way. Secondly, as it belongs to substances only, and thus nature is said to be: What can act or be acted upon. Thirdly, nature is said to be the principle of motion or rest. Fourthly, each thing informing a specific difference is called nature. Taken in the first and fourth senses, nature is convertible with essence, and signifies the essence of a thing, according as it has an order or ordination to the proper operation of the thing, since no thing is deprived of its proper operation (3). (1) On the meaning of that: what it was to be cf. Card. MENCKEN, n. 19, not.; MATTHIAS KAPPES, Aristot. lexik., p. 25.

(2) I. P . Tract. II, q. 1, II, n. IV, vol. II, p. 149. (3) Cf. BONTIUS, De Persona and duabus Naturis, c. 1. P . L., LXIV, 1841-1342.

IV. — The name essence implies something which is found in all predicaments, but not in the same way. Every being has that by which it is and that which it is: that by which it is implies existence, that which it is implies essence. Because essence is known by definition, it is necessary that beings have essence in the way they have definition. Accidents, however, have an incomplete definition, since they cannot be defined unless an extraneous subject is placed in their definition. Hence, although they have essence, they have it only incompletely. Parts of the substantial composite, however, have the nature of essence, but of partial essence. V. — In what way essences can be called participated likenesses of the divine essence. This consideration is not primary in logical and analytic order; for it is not the divine essence that first leads us to the knowledge of created essences; but in synthetic order, and supposing that the concept of essences has already been acquired by the natural process of human cognition, that respect is profitably and beautifully considered. God knows His essence as participable and

imitable, according to some mode of likeness, by creatures. The divine essence, moreover, known as thus imitable by such a creature, is the exemplar or idea of this creature. Hence divine ideas are the essence of God known as imitable in and by creatures in such or such a way; but the objective imitations and participations (1) S. THOMAS, De Ente et Essentia, c. I. — On nature, however, as the object of Cosmology cf. vol. II, p. 254, ss. corresponding to the divine ideas are the essences of things. These participations, however, are not by emanation, but by likeness and analogy, as has been said concerning the analogy of being (1). VI. — In what way essences are said to be eternal, necessary, immutable, indivisible. If they are considered as they are in God, they do not differ from the divine ideas; and thus they are absolutely and positively eternal, necessary, as the divine essence (2). If, however, they are considered as they exist in singular things, they participate in the conditions of those singulars, and hence it is clear that they are not eternal and necessary. If, however, it concerns spiritual creatures, even singular essences are eternal a parte post: supposing, namely, that they exist, they cannot be deprived of existence except by the absolute power of God. They are also called necessary, because, since they have in themselves no principle of corruption, they necessarily remain in being. Considered in themselves, all essences are negatively eternal, insofar as their truth prescinds from all time, and is independent of all time: it has always been true, and always will be true, that man is a rational animal. However, positive eternity, which makes an essence really exist, does not belong to them, since no created essence is due to exist from eternity. Hence they differ fundamentally from the divine essence, which is positively eternal. They are necessary in this sense, that the constitutive notes of essences cannot be otherwise than they are: for any essence necessarily requires these essential predicates and no others, so that, given these principles, the essence is necessarily had; with them removed, it is necessarily destroyed. Thus the essence of a triangle is necessary, because a triangle cannot be

conceived otherwise than as having three angles. In the same way, they are immutable, because their constitutive predicates cannot be varied unless the very notion of the essence is destroyed. (1) Supra, q. I, a. II, n. V and ss. pp. 257, ss. (2) On these St. Augustine beautifully discusses: « Therefore each thing is created by its proper reasons. But where are these reasons to be thought to exist except in the mind of the Creator?... They are not only ideas; but they themselves are true, because they are eternal, and remain such, and are unchangeable; by participation in which it happens that whatever is, is in whatever way it is. » Lib. 83 Quaest. q. 46, P . L. XL,30. 2 0 2 M E T A P H Y S I C A O N T O L O G I C A , T R A C T . I . Q . I I I . Although all created essences are composite, they are nevertheless indivisible. They are composite. Every created essence consists of genus and difference; genus indeed is

derived from what is more material and potential in the thing, difference from what is more formal and actual (1). Genus and difference, however, imply a plurality of elements, and therefore a certain logical composition. Therefore in every created essence there is a certain composition. Nevertheless, they are indivisible, because nothing can be added to them or subtracted from them. For essence is like a definition. But, with the smallest addition or subtraction, there is a different definition and a different nature of the species, as the Angelic Doctor observes (2). Thus sentient animate substance is only the definition of an animal; if you add rational, you constitute the species of man; if you subtract sentient, you constitute the species of a plant. By the same right, nothing can be added to essences, nothing can be subtracted from essence. Hence the saying: Species, or essences, are like numbers. If something is added or subtracted from any number, even the least, it will not be the same number in species. The least in numbers is unity: if it is added to the ternary, a quaternary arises, which is another species of number; if it is subtracted from the same, a binary remains, which is also another species of number. And similarly in definitions and in essence. The last property of essences is knowability. VII. — On the

knowability of essences. We de fine the essences of things to some extent; but whether those definitions have some objective value; whether it is possible to know essences by a proper concept? This question is connected with the most celebrated dispute concerning the existence of universals (3). For universals are the natures or essences of things; if, therefore, universals lack objective value, it is clear that definitions of essences are devoid of all force and that our knowledge of essences is purely nominal. This consequence was embraced by the Nominalists, Locke, Hume, and in our days by Materialists and Positivists. (1) Cf. Logie., p. 61. (2) S. Thomas, VIII Metaphys., lect. 3 (3) Cf. Logie. Maj., Tract. I. VIII. — First conclusion: The essences of things are in themselves most knowable. A thing is knowable insofar as it has the notion of positive being, and ceases to be knowable insofar as it is negation and non-being. Moreover, the essences of things have the notion of positive being, since they are the intrinsic and positive principles by which being is constituted in a determinate degree. Therefore the essences of things are in themselves and ontologically most knowable. But they are not apprehended by us as they are in themselves. IX. — Second conclusion: The cognition of essences which we have in the present state is not intuitive, but deduced and imperfect. For intuitive cognition it is required that the thing be present to the intellect either through itself or through a species immediately emitted by the thing itself. But the essences of things are not present to the intellect through themselves, nor through a species immediately emitted by themselves, but only through species received from others. Therefore the cognition we have of essences is not intuitive, but deduced. Proof of the minor. That essences of things are not present in the intellect through themselves is too clear; but that they are made present through species, not emitted by themselves, but received from others, is briefly declared. In the present state, universals and invisibles are known through sensibles and visibles. Moreover, properties and actions are more sensible and visible than the essences themselves. Therefore we know essences only through properties and

actions, or through species deduced from those properties. What we first attain is operation and property; from those species we form others in which we understand the essence itself. Moreover, the species itself by which we understand operation and property is not intuitive, but abstractive; in the present life, indeed, we have no intuitive cognition, except the cognition of the senses (1). Hence, if species deduced from properties are representative of the essence, they are abstractive, a fortiori the intuitive concepts which we form in the present concerning essences cannot in any way exist. From which it follows that this cognition is imperfect. For when

something is not seen intuitively, necessarily many things in it will escape our knowledge. X. — Third conclusion: Nevertheless, by experience and reasoning we gather true and scienti fic

easily perceives contingency in existing things, it soon concludes that there exists a First Being from which contingents derive their existence; by reasoning again it finds that that Being is the first Ideal source of all truth, of all intelligibility and possibility, and therefore the first foundation of essences. Because here, in Ontology, we attend not only to the analytic order, but generally to first principles and the highest causes, it is useful, indeed necessary, to ascend to God as the foundation of essences (1). Wherefore the Scholastic theory is by no means to be abandoned, but to be explained by a better method and vindicated. III. — Second conclusion: Simply speaking, the truth of essences or the intrinsic possibility of things cannot be entirely independent of God. We do not dwell here on the opinion of the Kantians, which is refuted elsewhere (2). If essences depend solely on our intellect, our mind will be the measure of the truth of things. Moreover, the truth of our cognition is measured by things, for cognition is then only true when it is conformed to the object. Therefore it is impossible that the essence and possibility of things depend solely on the human intellect. Moreover, things were already possible when the human intellect did not yet exist, and they would still remain possible and true even if the

human intellect were removed. « Even if the human intellect did not exist, says the Angelic Doctor, things would still be called true (3). »

The opinion of Plato is refuted from what has been discussed concerning universals (4). The opinion of the Wolffians is therefore attacked. Arg. Ium. Just as all real being depends on the first efficient (1) « Although the essences of things of experience, considered under their abstract form, are the explanatory, sufficient, and necessary reason of possibles and their properties, nevertheless, in a synthetic study, which the Scholastics called regressive, it is legitimate and indispensable to connect the results of analysis to the divine essence and its necessary imitability. » CAND. MERCER, n. 27. (2) Cf. vol. III. pp. 52, 88. (3) S. THOMAS, De Verit., q. 1, a. 2. (4) Logie, p. 232. cause, so in the synthetic order all ideal being depends on the first ideal cause. But God is not only the first efficient cause, but also the first ideal cause. Therefore not only the real being of creatures, but also their ideal being depends on God. Moreover, ideal being designates essence, which is what is first conceived and understood in a thing. Therefore the essence of creatures also depends on God. The major is clear in itself. If there is some real being independent of God, God is not the first efficient cause. Therefore, by parity, if there is some ideal being independent of God, God is not the first ideal cause. Arg. IIum. If essence does not depend on God, God depends on it in knowing. But God is entirely independent both in being and in knowing. Therefore. Proof of the major. God is dependent in knowing if He perceives some truth which is outside Himself. Now, in the aforesaid hypothesis, the essences of things would be some truths outside God. Therefore God would be dependent in knowing. — Moreover, the will is proportioned to the intellect: when the intellect depends on something in knowing, the will is subjected to the same in effecting. Therefore the divine will also would depend on things in effecting. Arg. IIIum. Truth is said by order to the intellect. But in the hypothesis of God not existing there would be no intellect: not uncreated, as is supposed; not created,

because the created presupposes the uncreated. Therefore there would be no truth, nor any essence. To the point, St. Thomas: « Even if the human intellect did not exist, things would still be called true in order to the divine intellect. But, if both intellects, which is impossible, were understood to be removed, in no way would the notion of truth remain (1).»

IV. — THIRD CONCLUSION: ESSENCE, OR THE INTRINSIC POSSIBILITY OF THINGS, DOES NOT DEPEND ON

divine power. Granting that divine power is the principle of extrinsic possibility, or producibility of creatures, we deny that it is the principle of intrinsic possibility. Proof. If essence depended solely on divine power, namely,

if something is said to be possible because God can do it, and impossible because God cannot do it, it would follow that incapacity to do something originates not from the part of the feasible object, but from the part of the doing subject. But incapacity on the part of the doing subject is true impotence. Therefore in this opinion true and properly so called impotence is ascribed to God. Moreover, if things are only possible because God can do them, it follows that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things which are possible to Him, or because He can do all things which He can. This, however, is an inept quibble; and in this way creatures could also be called omnipotent, because they can certainly do all things which they can. V. — Fourth conclusion: The essence of things does not depend on the free will of God (1). If the free will of God were the foundation of essences, God could will that a triangle not have three angles; that man not be a rational animal, that two and two not be four, and innumerable similar things. But to posit this is to derogate from divine perfection; to introduce scepticism; to

overturn all metaphysics. Therefore. Proof of the minor in parts. 1° It derogates from divine perfection to assert that God can will absurd and contradictory things. But in that opinion God could will absurd and contradictory things. For

to will the same thing to be and not to be is absurd and contradictory. But God could will the same thing to be and not to be: man to be a rational animal, because such is supposed to be the essence of man, and on the other hand man not to be a rational animal, because, if God willed, the nature of man would be otherwise. Therefore God could will contradictory and absurd things. 2° If God can change all essences, the essence of the principle of contradiction can also be changed. But once the principle (1) Cartesianus thus summarizes his opinion: « Thus, therefore, one must not think that eternal truths depend on the human understanding or on the existence of things, but only on the will of God, who, as a sovereign legislator, has ordered and established them from all eternity. » (Eaures de DtssaTtT, édit. Coess, t. II, p. 353. — To this opinion adhered in Switzerland, CaRoLus SeoCTaT. « God is absolute liberty. Everything is possible, even contraries, to absolute liberty. » Cf. SeCTaT, La philosophie de la liberté : L'idée, leçon XVII. ART. II. — ON THE FOUNDATION OF ESSENCES. 301 of contradiction is changed, universal scepticism is introduced, and all Metaphysics collapses, for the principle of contradiction is the first foundation, which being removed, it is necessary that all other things collapse (1). 3° The certainty of Metaphysics, and generally of all science, arises from the firmness of the object. But the object of our intellect is the essences of things. Therefore the certainty of Metaphysics and all science depends on the firmness and immutability of essences; therefore, if essences are mutable at the nod of the divine will, the certainty of Metaphysics and sciences wavers. Descartes objects: In God, to will and to know are the same. Therefore from the very fact that God wills something, He knows it, and therefore only such a thing is true. Resp. : Although in God all attributes are one, nevertheless the notion of willing is not the notion of understanding, and the notion of the willed is not the notion of the known, just as, in created things, although good and truth are convertible, the will which has good as its object and the intellect which has truth as its object really differ. Therefore it by no means follows that what depends on the

divine intellect also depends on the divine will. Secretan replies: God is what He wills, and things are what He wills. For the Absolute is the cause of its own existence, the cause of its own law, and determines according to its will the mode in which it produces itself. — All these involve contradiction in their terms. Cause is prior to caused, producer prior to product: hence, if the Absolute produced itself, it would be posterior to itself (2). VI. — Fifth conclusion: Properly speaking, the essences of things ... depend formally and immediately on the divine intellect; remotely and ultimately on the divine essence. Proof of the I° part, which is the sequel of the preceding conclusions. The being which essences and possibles have is ideal being; and, because all ideal being originates from the first ideal cause, essences (1) Cf. Legie. pp. 335, ss. (2) « To be the cause of one's own existence! To produce oneself! But to be cause, one must exist. The being who would be the cause of his existence would have to exist to produce his existence! The being supposed to produce himself does not exist, since he is capable of exerting a productive action. The contradiction is flagrant. » CaTd. Mxctca, n 92.

of this kind must depend formally on the first ideal cause. But the first ideal cause is the divine intellect. Therefore essences depend formally on the divine intellect. The major is clear from what has been said; the minor is understood from the terms. The ideal is said by order to the intellect. Therefore the first ideal, or the first ideal cause, must be the first intellect, that is, the divine intellect. It is confirmed. An artificer of infinite wisdom and perfection must have in his intellect ideas of all things which are made or can be made by him. But essences designate the ideas of things which are made or can be made by God. Therefore God has essences in His intellect, and hence essences depend on the divine intellect.

Proof of the II° part. Essences do not have the notion of knowability unless they bear the notion of entity. But the source and fullness of all entity is the divine essence. Therefore the essences of things do not have the notion of knowability unless they participate in something of the

divine essence, and consequently the divine intellect cannot know them unless it first knows the divine essence as the principle of entity and knowability of them. But if the essences of things are known in essence and through essence, they depend radically on it. Therefore. The matter is to be conceived thus: God perfectly intuits His essence; hence He knows it according to every mode in which it is knowable. But the divine essence is knowable not only according as it is in itself, but also according to all modes in which it can be participated by creatures. Therefore from the knowledge of His essence, God knows all imitations and participations by creatures. Moreover, imitations and participations of this kind are the essences of creatures. Therefore from the knowledge of His essence, God knows all essences (1).

VII. — IT IS MORE FULLY EXPLAINED IN WHAT WAY THE DIVINE ESSENCE IS THE IDEA OF CREATURES. THE

divine essence is the principle (1) « The foundation of possibles is therefore not the existence of creatures; it is not found either in our intelligence; our spirit is posterior to them, and it would be extinguished without in any way dragging them into its night. It is in God: only the being of God explains their character; it is the divine essence; they are conceivable, intelligible, constituted by harmonious notes only insofar as they reflect and imitate the very essence of God. If it is the divine essence, as essence, that founds them, it is the divine Intelligence that circumscribes, determines, and defines them. » C. LARREYNE, Dogme et Métaphysique, p. 177. formally for the divine intellect to know creatures, and also the principle of operating or producing creatures by way of exemplar. Under a twofold respect, therefore, it is the idea of creatures. It is properly called idea, not precisely as it is an intelligible species, nor as it is the cognition of creatures, nor even as it is knowledge or art; but as it is a form set before the divine intellect and known by it as imitable by creatures. For this is the sense in which idea is used: a form existing in the intellect beyond the thing within the intellect, or: a form according to whose imitation the artificer works (1). The

divine essence is the idea of creatures first indeed with respect to perfections which in their concept involve no imperfection and are found in God and creatures, such as being, living. This is clear, for the divine essence is the most express likeness and living exemplar of all those perfections. Indeed, it is also the idea of perfections which belong only to creatures, such as finite essences; for they imitate the divine essence and are contained in it in a more eminent mode. The essence of things, as they are in the divine idea, are infinite in number, because the divine essence is infinitely participable and imitable: hence whatever degree of perfection and imitation is assigned, another and greater can be had, and so on to infinity (2). VIII. — Why the divine essence, the intellect being set aside, is not the proximate foundation of essences. The divine essence is the foundation of essences and the idea of creatures only because it is a form set before the divine intellect and known by it as imitable by creatures. For this is the proper acceptation of idea, as has just been declared. Therefore, the intellect being set aside, the divine essence contains creatures eminently indeed, but is not their idea. Moreover, for the divine essence to be the proximate foundation and idea of creatures, it must delineate and define them in their proper degree and in their proper measure. But the divine essence, according to itself, does not define creatures in their proper degree, since it exceeds (1) Boethius beautifully sang: « Thou, all things from the supreme example, thyself most beautiful, bearing the world in mind, and forming it from a like image, commanding the perfect to complete the perfect parts. » De Concil. philo., lib. III. metr. 9, P . L. LXIII, 258-259. (2) Cf. 2. Thomas, I. P . q. 15.

them all in the same way. Cognition is therefore required which represents and expresses things according to their proper degree and mode. Therefore the divine essence, the intellect being set aside, is not the idea of creatures.

ARTICLE THREE.

Let us conclude the question of the foundation of essences with those words of St. Augustine: « For ideas are certain principal forms, or reasons of things, stable and unchangeable, because they themselves are not formed, and therefore are eternal, and always remaining in the same way, which are contained in the divine intelligence. And, since they themselves neither arise nor perish, according to them all that can arise and perish is said to be formed, and all that arises and perishes (1). » (1) S. A v o v s t i s v a , L i b . 8 3 Q q . q . 4 6 , P . L . X L . 3 0 C f . what we have discussed about the divine in our book on God One.

On The Distinction Between Essence And Existence.

I. — De finition of existence. What existence is, we have already found: the act of essence, the ultimate actuality of every form. It is called: ultimate actuality. Essence is indeed an act, but with respect to being it has the nature of potency: thus humanity implies a certain act, but this act does not attain its complete actuality unless it is said: Humanity exists. Existence, however, is an act which cannot be ordered to a further order; for above existence no new perfection can be added which is not some existence; nor can any actual being be conceived which is not the being of existence. Nothing, therefore, is more actual than existence, and it is rightly said that existence is the ultimate actuality of every form. II. — The question to be solved. Since existence is the act of essence, essence and existence relate to each other as potency and act. Moreover, every potency is really distinguished from its correlative act. Hence a real distinction between essence and existence seems to be implied. Not a few authors, however, think that the question cannot be solved so easily. Hence a notable controversy. All concede: 1° that there is no real distinction in God between essence and existence; — 2° that in creatures ideal and abstractly considered essence is really distinguished from existence; 3° that actual essence at least in reason di ffers from existence. The whole difficulty, therefore, is: whether real and actual essence is really distinguished from existence; or, in other words, whether real essence is placed completely outside causes by its own power; whether it is itself the act of existing, or whether it is placed ultimately outside causes through some act really distinct from itself, which will be existence.

This question is of such great importance that the center of Metaphysics, as it were, is placed in it; the distinction between God and creatures depends on it (1). Those who advocate a real distinction do not conceive essence and existence as two discrete and separable entities, or separately produced by God and afterwards united; but they only wish that essence and existence, although inseparable, be distinguished from each other really, as real potency

from real act. If, therefore, it is certain that there is a true and real potency which is not the act itself, it must also be held that true and real essence really differs from existence. Hence those who deny the distinction seem to admit no difference between real potency and real act. III. — The opinion for a real distinction is cited by some from Aristotle (2 Post. Analyt. text. 7):

Being, however, is the substance of nothing, as is clear. The meaning is: existence is convertible with the substance, or essence, of no creature. These words, however, can be understood of some logical distinction. The doctrine of real distinction, however, is not clearly manifested except among Christians, almost as a consequence of the dogma of creation (2). Boethius is cited, whose opinion St. Thomas explains (3). B. Albert, the Angelic Doctor, Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Cajetan, Bannez, and commonly the Thomists advocate a real distinction. Among the Jesuit philosophers, the following adhere to this opinion: Fonseca, Conimbricenses, Pallavicini, Sylvester Maurus, and in our time, among others, Liberatore, Cornoldi, Schiffini, De Maria, Ludovicus de San, Remer, Billot. (1) « This question of the real distinction of existence and essence is of the highest importance; in a certain sense, all metaphysics depends on it... It is like the central point of all metaphysics, I would almost say the stamp of its orthodoxy and the only means of exactly solving all the problems raised, when, without being satisfied, as is too often done nowadays, with examining facts at the surface, one wants to penetrate into their depth. » DOMIN DE VONNES, Abrégé de Métaphysique, t. II, p. 2, 4. (2) « The thesis which occupies us is certainly of Christian origin; it is a philosophical application of the dogma of creation. » IDEM, p.5. (3) Cf. De l’hebdomad., lect. 2 : Boethius's words are these: « It is different that which is from being. » Hebdom. I. The school of St. Thomas is well served in this point as in others by Sanseverino, Card. Pecci, Farges, Card. Mercier, Card. Lorenzelli, Domet de Vorges, Gredt, etc. The negative opinion is embraced by Alexander Halensis, Aureolus, Henry of Ghent, Durandus, Gabriel Biel, Suarez, Vasquez,

Hurtadus, Arriaga, Oviedo, Tongiorgi, Franzelin, Pesch, Delmas, Kuntz, Palmieri. To these many moderns, generally all Cartesians, adhere. The third opinion is that of Scotus, who invented a distinction between essence and existence intermediate between strict real distinction and mere rational distinction, which he calls formal actual from the nature of the thing. IV. — The mind of the Angelic Doctor is most certain. Some have wished to doubt the mind of the Angelic Doctor. But this distinction is so fundamental in the teaching of Aquinas that he places in it the very distinction between God and creatures. Of God he says: « Since in God there is nothing potential, it follows that in Him essence is not other than His being. His essence, therefore, is His being (1). » Of creatures, however: « But because created form thus subsisting has being and is not its own being, it is necessary that its being be received and contracted to a determinate nature (2). » But if the Angelic Doctor intended a mere rational distinction, the argument would be of no force, since even in God a rational distinction between essence and existence is placed. But, omitting other citations (3), it suffices to adduce two testimonies which make the matter entirely clear. — Comm. on the book of Boethius (4) on the Hebdomads: « It must be considered, therefore, that, as being and that which is differ in simple things according to intention, so in composite things they differ really (5). » — And what is to be understood by the name of simple being, he explains, adding: « This (1) I. P . q. 3, a. 4. (2) I. P . q. 7, a. 2. (3) Cf. I Sent., dist. 19, q. 2, a. 2 ; II Cont. Geni., c. 52 ; De Ente and Etencias, c. 5, q. 7. De Poten. a. 4. (4) Lect. 2. (5) Even in places where the word really is not written, P . TERNEREN, S. J., observes many things by which this distinction is more clearly signified than by the name itself. Cf. P . TERNEREN, De Unione hypostatica, p. 31.

simple one and sublime is God Himself. » — What is clearer? In God, who alone is simple being, essence and being differ according to intention; in all created things, however, which are composite beings, they differ really. He uses the same words elsewhere: « Everything which is

in the genus of substance is composed with REAL composition, because that which is in the predication of substance is subsisting in its being, and it is necessary that its being be other than itself, otherwise it could not differ in being from those with which it agrees in the notion of its quiddity; which is required in all things which are directly in predication (1). » When the Angelic Doctor says: « It is necessary that its being be other than itself », he manifestly speaks of a real distinction, as is clear from the preceding words: it is composed with REAL composition. Hence Tiphanus, S. J., speaking of the Angelic Doctor, not undeservedly said: « To deny or call into doubt that he really distinguishes existence from essence in creatures is the mark of an impudent man or a stranger to his doctrine (2). » V. — Conclusion: In created things existence is really distinguished from essence. This assertion is nothing other than a corollary of the doctrine of potency and act. Between nothing and act there is some state which is not mere possibility, but real potency. For act, although it actuates potency, does not make real potency, but supposes it. Essence, moreover, is real potency itself; existence is act (3). Therefore essence is some reality distinct from the act of existence, although it does not exist except through existence (4). (1) Qq. Dipp. De Verit. q. 27, a. 1, ad 8. — Cf. CAPR0L0S, dist. 8, q. 1, nov. Edit, PABAN and PEOUES, t. I, pp. 301, ss. (2) TIPHANUS, De Hypostasi, c. VII. (3) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 3, a. 4 ; q. 4, a. 1, ad 3 ; q. 54, a. 3. (4) On the true point of difficulty, one may read P . A. de POURIQUER, O. P . Revue Néo- scolastique, 1906, pp. 32-48. The author concludes: « Is there a middle between nothing and the actually existing? The question is not elsewhere. The affirmation or negation of the real distinction between essence and existence is therefore, in final analysis, a thesis absolutely and solely dependent on the affirmation or negation of the reality of potency, and of its reality distinct from act, irreducible to act, permanent under act. » — C. LABBENIN, Dogme et Métaphysique, pp. 178- 179, rightly observes: « All the deniers of the real distinction between essence and existence begin by positing

as an indisputable principle that the real essence of a being is real only through its existence. Evidently one must conclude to the identity of existence and essence. But, instead of starting from this assertion as from an indubitable axiom, they should prove it; and they do not think of it; all their arguments are therefore reduced to a vast petition of principle. »

There are various arguments which demonstrate the thesis. Arg. Ium. The fundamental reason which embraces the others and to which the others can be reduced consists in this: No created existence is pure act. But, if existence is not distinguished from actual essence, it will be pure act. Therefore every created existence is distinguished from actual essence. Proof of the minor: Unreceived and non-receptive act is pure act. But, if existence is indistinct from actual essence, it will be unreceived and non-receptive act. Therefore it will be pure act. The major is clear from what has been said earlier concerning potency and act. Pure act is said to be that which is neither the act of a potency, nor potency to an act. Moreover, unreceived act is not the act of a potency; non-receptive act is not potency to an act. Therefore unreceived and non-receptive act is pure act. Proof of the minor: 1° existence would be unreceived act. Since in a thing only two things are found, namely essence and existence, no other receptive of existence can be assigned besides essence. But existence cannot be received in essence unless it really differs from it — for nothing is properly received in itself; nor does a rational distinction suffice, otherwise God would be called received act, which no one concedes. Therefore existence would be received in nothing and would be unreceived act. 2° It would be non-receptive act. Non-receptive act is said to be that which is ordered to no further act. But existence is not ordered nor can it be ordered to a further act, since it is said and is the ultimate act, the ultimate actuality of every form. Therefore existence would be non- receptive act. It cannot be replied that created existence, although it is not an act received in another, is nevertheless an act received from another, and therefore is not pure act. For some act cannot

be received from another unless in its concept it implies limitation and imperfection; but an act is limited either because it is received in another or because it receives another. Wherefore an act which is neither received between essence and existence begin by positing as an indisputable principle that the real essence of a being is real only through its existence. Evidently one must conclude to the identity of existence and essence. But, instead of starting from this assertion as from an indubitable axiom, they should prove it; and they do not think of it; all their arguments are therefore reduced to a vast petition of principle. »

in potency nor receives another act is without limit and imperfection, and therefore cannot be received from another. Therefore, since existence is neither received in potency nor receives another act, it cannot be said to be an act received from another, but remains pure act. Arg. II™. The Thomistic opinion manifests that wonderful order which prevails among the diverse degrees of beings. For at the supreme summit stands God, in whom no real composition at all is conceived; in the proximate degree, after God, are spiritual substances, in which real composition of essence and being is found. In the lowest degree, finally, are seen corporeal substances, in which, besides real composition of essence and being, there is real composition of matter and form. Hence the principle of causality is excellently vindicated: everything in which being is other than essence requires a cause from which it receives being. In the opposite opinion, however, this harmony is destroyed. For if real composition of essence and being is denied, angels do not hold a middle place between God and material substances, but are assimilated to God Himself, nor does the principle of causality seem to be saved (1). Arg. III™. Act is limited and multiplied only by potency, as is already clear (on potency and act, q. II, art. II). But existence not distinct from essence does not have potency, since it is unreceived and non-receptive act, as has just been shown. Therefore existence not distinct from essence is unlimited and unmultiplied, or infinite and unique (2). Arg. IV™. In

whatever accidental being is joined to substantial being, it is necessary that being be really distinguished from essence. But in every created being accidental being is joined to substantial being: thus in man the being of white, the being of wise, etc., is joined to the substantial being of man. Therefore in every created being it is necessary that being be distinguished from essence. Proof of the major. Accidental being cannot be joined to substantial being by identity. Because they differ in genus from each other, as being simply and being in a certain respect; nor can it be joined to substantial being as received in it, just as (1) « The principle of causality: 'being whose essence is not identical to existence necessarily depends on a cause', finds in the real distinction of essence and existence its rigorous meaning and justification. » Card. MERCER, n. 48. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, Quodlib. 3, q. 8, a. 20. ART. III. — ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE. 311 act in potency; for substantial existence is the ultimate actuality, by no means potency. Moreover, substantial being and accidental being are two actualities in different genera. Moreover, two actualities in different genera do not relate to each other as potency and act. In order, therefore, that conjunction of accidental being with substantial being take place, no other hypothesis remains except that both be received in some subject, which will be essence. But the aforesaid subject must be distinct from both, otherwise the preceding difficulty would return. Therefore in whatever accidental being is joined to substantial being, it is necessary that essence be really distinguished from existence (1). Arg. V™. « No essence can be understood without those things which are parts of essence. But every essence or quiddity can be understood without understanding anything of its actual being; for I can understand what a man or phoenix is, and yet be ignorant whether it has being in the nature of things. Therefore it is clear that being is other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is some thing whose quiddity is its being, and this thing can only be one and first (2). » Many indirect arguments could be adduced. Thus in the natural composite,

essentially diverse parts, namely matter and form, are actuated by a single existence; in the human

composite, entirely distinct parts, soul and body, have a single existence; many faculties coexist in the same soul. If, therefore, essence is multiple, or many parts of essence, and yet existence is simple and unique, a real distinction between essence and existence must intervene. Many other conclusions, whether philosophical or theological, rest so much on this principle that it can be called the fundamental truth of Christian philosophy (4). VI. — Di fficulties are solved. 1° Actual essence is not a mere possible being but an actual being. But actual being exists. (1) Cf. S. THOMAS, II. Cont. Gent., c. 52 ; Card. LORENZELL, pp. 268- 169. (2) S. THOMAS, De Ente Eesentia, c. 5. (3) On these indirect arguments one may consult Card. MERCER, n. 49. (4) Cf. P . DEI. PRADO, O. P ., De Veritate fundamentalii philosophiae christianae, Placentia, 1899.

Therefore actual essence exists. Resp. : Distinguish the minor. Actual being exists either by its own power or by the power of another, I grant; by its own power necessarily, I deny. — Distinguish the consequence: Therefore essence exists either by its own power or by the power of an act distinct from itself, I grant; by its own power alone, I deny. — We by no means deny that actual essence exists; but the question is whether it exists by its own power; whether it is itself its own act of existing; or whether the act by which essence exists is distinct from it. Let it be noted again that the error of those who deny a middle state between the possible and act lies hidden here: Essence is not mere possible, therefore it is the act of existence. The consequence is denied; for it is a real potency which real act supposes and actuates. 2° Inst.: Actual essence exists by its own power. What according to itself is a certain actuality in the nature of things exists according to itself. But actual essence according to itself is a certain actuality in the nature of things. Therefore it exists according to itself, or by its own power. Resp. : Distinguish the major: what is a certain actuality designating the real act itself exists according to itself, I grant; what is a certain actuality

designating only the potency informed by real act exists according to itself, I deny. — Contradistinguish the minor: actual essence is a certain actuality designating the potency informed by real act, I grant; it is a certain actuality designating the real act itself, I deny; and I deny the consequence. Something can be called actual in two ways: either because it is the real act itself, or because it is informed by real act. Thus prime matter is said to be real and actual, not as if it were the act itself, but because it is informed by real act. Moreover, if the thing which is called actual is the act itself, it manifestly exists through itself; but, if it is only potency informed by act, it is clear that a thing of this kind does not exist through itself, but only through the act by which it is called actual. — Now, the whole controversy is whether actual essence is the real act, or only potency informed by real act. The fundamental reason we have adduced proves that it is potency, not the very act of existing; otherwise existence would be unreceived and non- receptive act. 3° You will object: But actual essence is not only potency informed by act, but is itself act. Actual essence is a being actually produced by God. But a being actually produced by God is a certain act. Therefore actual essence is the act itself, namely existence.

Resp. : the argument proves too much. By parity, it can be argued: Prime matter is a being actually produced by God. But a being actually produced by God is an act. Therefore prime matter is act. The latter argument is invalid, therefore neither is the former. In form: Distinguish the major: Actual essence is a being actually produced by God, in this sense that it itself together with existence is the term of divine production, I grant; in this sense that it alone, taken separately, is the term of production, and on the other hand existence is another term, I deny. — Distinguish the minor: A being actually produced by God is a certain

act or includes an act, I grant; it is always an act only, I deny; and I deny the consequence. Although actual essence is something produced by God, we deny that essence is according to itself the term of divine production. God does not make essence separately and existence separately, and

afterwards join both; but the term of the effect is the composite of essence and being, just as in the first creation God did not create matter separately and form separately, but the sole term of creation was the composite of matter and form. As soon as matter is produced, it has act and form, nor does it nevertheless follow that matter is form and act; so as soon as essence is produced, it has existence, yet it is not therefore right to conclude that essence is existence. 4° Things which are distinct are separable. But essence and existence are not separable. Therefore they are not distinct. Resp. : The major can be denied. For although separable things are distinct, it does not follow that distinct things are separable. Thus figure and extension are distinguished, yet figure cannot exist without extension, nor extension without figure. Moreover, it is not improbable that created essence, even actual, can be separated from existence. It could not indeed be without any existence, but it could remain intact while being separated from this existence and receive another in its place: if the essence of some already existing man were assumed by a divine Person, such essence would be separated from its own existence and, remaining the same, would exist by divine existence. 5° Existence is a certain essence. But existence is not distinguished from itself. Therefore at least some essence is not distinguished from existence. Resp. : Distinguish the major: Existence is a certain essence designating

only that by which it is, I grant; it is essence properly so called, designating that which it is, I deny. — Distinguish the consequence: Therefore some essence properly so called designating that which it is is not distinguished from existence, I deny; some essence designating only that by which it is is not distinguished from essence, I grant. And I deny the ultimate intention. Existence, like any thing, is something which is conceived by the mind, under which respect it can be called a certain essence; but the whole notion of it designates only that by which a thing is, while essence properly so called signifies that which it is. The question therefore persists whether that which it is and that

by which it is are really distinguished. Although we concede that the essence of existence is not distinguished from existence itself, nothing is thereby concluded against us, for we contend this one thing, that essence designating what it is is distinguished from existence, or, if you like, from essence designating that by which it is. Other objections are urged by P . Kuntz, Revue Néo-Scolastique 1903 (1). They finally reduce to this: Nothing is real except the existent itself. But nothing is existent except through existence. Therefore nothing is real except through existence, and therefore real essence is nothing but existence itself. But it must be denied that all real is the existent itself. Just as potency is some reality which act does not constitute, but supposes, so essence is a certain reality, which existence makes to be in act. « The existence of an essence is the sine qua non condition for the positing of the problem concerning the real or non-real distinction between this essence and its existence. But when this condition is realized, when an essence exists, the essence has its reality as essence, and this reality is distinct from the act by which it exists, it is a subjective, real potency, actualized by existence (2). » — To avoid going over the act again, we refer the reader to Card. Mercier (3) and P . A. De Poulpiquet, Q. P . (4).

ARTICLE FOUR

CERTAIN THINGS CONCERNING ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE ARE EXPLAINED.

I. — Composition of essence and being is real composition of potency and act. Potency and act relate to each other as beginning and completion. Essence, moreover, relates to existence as beginning, existence relates to essence as completion; for a being is properly completed when it is placed ultimately outside causes and in a state of reality, which

takes place through existence. Therefore composition of essence and being is composition of potency and act (1). But those things which relate to each other as potency and act not infrequently are united to form some third thing one per

se, as from matter and form a third thing one per se is formed. Does the same happen in composition of essence and being? II. — Essence and existence are indeed joined per se, but not to form some third thing one per se. The I° part is declared. — Those things are joined per se which are per se, or by their nature, ordered to each other. Essence and existence, however, by reason of themselves tend to each other, just as beginning by reason of itself is ordered to completion, and as completion demands beginning: essence wishes to be perfected by existence, and existence does not consist without essence (2). (1) Pp. 185-191. (2) Card. MENSCHER, Revue Néo-escolastique, 1903, p. 195. (3) Ibid. pp. 192-195. (4) Revue Néo-escolastique, 1906, pp. 38-45. (1) The Angelic Doctor affirms this many times, e.g. I. P . q. 3, a. 4 ; q. 4, a. 1, ad 3 ; q. 54, a. 3. (2) « Essence and existence are the two real and physical principles which constitute by their intimate union all contingent beings. Although really distinct, they are not separable: essence does not exist without existence which makes it exist, and existence, what would it be without essence? » C. LARBEYRI, op. cit., p. 179.

The II° part is shown. From two things a third thing one per se results, when each relates as a constitutive part of the essence of this third thing. But existence cannot be a constitutive part of any essence. Therefore. — For a constitutive part of a thing must be placed in its de finition. But being is placed in the definition of no created essence. Therefore. — Moreover, since being is distinguished from every created essence, it cannot be its constitutive part, but comes to essence already constituted. Thus essence and being « are composed not to make some third thing, but to place outside causes that same thing which is essence, or the thing to which being belongs. — Thus the essence of man composes with being, not to make some third thing substantially different from this man, nor different from it accidentally, but to place outside causes that very thing which is this man (1). » III. — Whether existence is an accident. If existence comes to constituted substance, it seems to be an accident of substance. The Angelic Doctor

replies: « Being is not called an accident which is in the genus of accident, if we speak of the being of substance; for it is the act of essence, but by a certain likeness, because it is not a part of essence, just as neither is an accident (2). » For a fuller understanding of this, let the following be IV. — Conclusion: Properly speaking, existence is neither in the predicament of substance nor in the predicament of accident. For a thing placed in a predicament is predicated univocally of its inferiors. Being, however, is some transcendent, which is predicated only analogically. Therefore. Because, however, the complement of a thing is reduced to the predicament of the thing itself, existence in some way reductively pertains to the predicament of the essence which it perfects: existence indeed perfecting substantial essence is referred to the genus of substance; existence perfecting accidental essence is in some way reduced to the genus of accident. Nevertheless, the existence of substance is not properly an accident, either predicamental or predicable. Proof. Existence is the ultimate complement, the ultimate 1) Dn M a n A . C n e l . T r a c t . I I . q . I I . a . I I . (2) Qq Disp - E Potent. q. 5. a. 4. ad. 3. ART. IV. — CERTAIN THINGS CONCERNING ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE ARE EXPLAINED. 317 actuality of substance, or of the being to which being in itself belongs. But the ultimate actuality of a being in itself cannot be a predicamental accident, or a being in another. Therefore the existence of substance cannot be a predicamental accident.

Accident, whether predicamental or predicable, perfects substance with a perfection extraneous to its nature: thus clothing, knowledge, perfect a man in something extraneous to the nature of man. But existence perfects a thing, not in some extraneous genus, but in its own nature, in the very genus of substance. Therefore the existence of substance is neither a predicamental nor a predicable accident properly speaking (1). In a broad sense, however, and by a certain likeness, it can be called a predicable accident. Whatever is not a part of essence can be called an accident. Existence is not a part of essence. Therefore it can be called an accident:

not indeed a predicamental one, since it is itself a substantial act, but a predicable one in a broad sense. More correctly speaking, however, existence could be called a quasi-property. For a property is that which, although distinct from essence, is constituted by the principles of essence. But existence, although distinct from essence, is quasi-constituted by the principles of essence; for from the principles of essence it arises that existence is a substantial or accidental act. Therefore existence is a quasi-property. In short: since potency and act are in the same genus, the existence of substance is a substantial act, just as substance itself is substantial potency; the existence of accident, however, is an accidental act, just as the essence of accident itself is accidental potency; nevertheless, existence itself is not directly in the predicament of substance or accident. Being is not properly said to be reduced to a predicament, as Bannez acutely observes, but rather to be participated in and limited by every predicament and every genus and predicamental difference, just as being is not reduced to a predicament, but is divided into ten predicaments through the diverse modes in which it is participated and limited (2). (1) « Some authors of our opinion have wanted to conclude that being must be considered as a simple accident. All the great scholastics reject this consequence. » DOMET DE VORONS, Abrégé de Métaphysique, t. II, p. 20. (2) Cf. BANNER, Comm. in I. P . q. 3, a. 4.

V. — Whether existence is something intrinsic to the existing thing. It is not intrinsic in such a way as to be a part of the thing, or essence, or something essential, as is clear from the preceding; but in this sense that the existing thing is said to exist not by extrinsic denomination, but by some reality which it has intrinsically in itself. For existence is the first actuality by which a thing is drawn out of nothing. Therefore it must be intrinsic to the thing, otherwise it is unintelligible how a thing is outside nothing through some notion which is outside the thing. So Bannez (1). VI. — Whether existence is more a terminating act than a received act. Existence according to its primary formal notion does not require that it be received as in a subject, otherwise it

would not belong formally to God. In this it essentially and principally consists, that it is a term completing substance and making it to be outside nothing. Thus in Christ the Lord, substance does not have created existence, but exists outside nothing through the existence of the divine Word terminating and completing the dependence of the humanity, so that it is outside nothing. Moreover, if it were of the formal notion of existence that it be received in a subject, it could not be supplied by divine existence. Therefore that being is received does not pertain to the formal notion, but only to the material and imperfect notion of existence. Thus the author is praised. VII. — Whether existence is more perfect than the essence it actuates. Existence is simply more perfect than essence. That is simply more perfect by which a thing is said to be simply a being. But a thing is said to be simply a being by existence: for essence without being is only a being in potency, but when it has being it is a being simply. Therefore existence is simply more perfect than essence. Moreover, being is the ultimate actuality of all perfections and of all forms; being is not perfected by its conjunction with essence, but rather perfects essence. Hence it relates to essence as perfective to perfectible. In being itself all perfections are understood. Thus what is most powerful in God is not understood as life, wisdom, etc., but that He is subsisting being itself, in which other perfections are comprehended. Therefore being is simply more perfect. — Hence it is that all things most desire being as the

best of all. In a certain respect, however, essence is more perfect than being, because it limits and contracts being; hence existence relates to essence as limitable and determinable to limiting and determining. Moreover, the determining is more perfect than the determinable. Moreover, although being is not perfected simply by essence, but perfects it, supposing however that it is received in essence, it is perfected in a certain respect, insofar as it is received in a nobler essence: thus it is more perfect in a living thing than in a mineral, in an angel than in a man (1).

VIII. — IN WHAT WAY BEING IS THE E FFECT OF GOD.

Resp. : 1° It is certain that being is in some way produced by creatures. For created causes give being to their effects, by reducing what was in potency to the act of being, by causing a new form, or by causing being to be joined to form and essence. Creatures also effectively cause the determination of existence. For being according to itself is unlimited and indeterminate, and yet is limited in each creature. An efficient cause of this limitation must therefore be assigned. But this is not essence, which is the receptive cause of limitation, but not the effective; nor is it God alone; for God, although He bestows being, does not limit it according to itself, but rather gives what is of perfection in the thing. Therefore the cause of limitation is the created agent which produces the suppositum. For the suppositum is the receptive and determinative of existence: wherefore the cause producing the suppositum simultaneously effectively causes the determination of existence. 2° Matter, form, suppositum, can be called the material cause of existence, because they are compared to it as a receptive subject. No form, however, can be called the efficient cause of existence; for the efficient cause must have in itself the being it causes. Moreover, no form according to itself has existence. Therefore no form can be the effective cause of existence. (1) Cf. BAXNER, loc. cit.

Nor is it the formal cause of existence, because form is compared to existence as potency to act, receiver to received, and therefore as material cause. Finally, form is not the final cause of existence, for existence is the ultimate perfection and term of form, but not conversely. 3° No creature can cause existence absolutely and simply. Just as to cause such being is to produce it from non-being such, e.g., to cause white is to draw it from non-white; so to produce being simply is to cause it from non-being simply. Wherefore, for creatures to be said to cause existence absolutely and simply, they must produce existence from non-existence. But it is incompatible for creatures to produce existence from non-existence. Therefore it is incompatible for creatures to be causes of existence

absolutely and simply. It can be proposed in another way: The causative power of existence supposes that the agent cause has being from its nature. But no creature has being from itself and its nature; but the being of every creature is communicated and preserved by God. Therefore no creature is per se causative of existence. — The minor is clear; the major is shown. Something is first such in itself before it is productive of its like, just as fire is first hot in itself before it is heating. Therefore something must first be in itself before it is productive of being in another. Moreover, each thing is said to be of such a nature from its proper form which belongs to it per se. Hence, for something to be per se causative of its like, it must have that from its proper form, or nature; and, consequently, for something to be per se causative of existence, it must have existence from itself and from its proper nature. Since, therefore, God alone is His being by essence, He alone is the one who produces being. Thus, being is the proper effect of God, which can indeed be taken in a threefold sense: 1° that being is the per se first effect depending on God alone; 2° that being is the formal and adequate object of God alone, for God alone is the cause of every being participating in being or pertaining to the being of a thing; 3° that God alone produces being insofar as it is being and being without any limitation (1).

(1) Cf. BANKEK, loc cit.

IX. — THE UNION OF ESSENCE AND BEING COMPARED WITH THE UNION OF MATTER AND FORM.

We have not infrequently compared composition of essence and being with the union of matter and form. The comparison can be briefly explained from St. Thomas and Cajetan (1). Analogy. 1° Both compositions consist of potency and act; matter indeed is potency with respect to form; essence is potency with respect to being. — 2° In both compositions the extremes are in the same genus: matter is potency in the genus of substance, form act in the genus of substance; essence is substantial potency, existence substantial act. — 3° Matter is not in act without form; yet it is really distinguished from it; similarly essence is not in act

without existence and yet really differs from it. Differences. 1° Matter and form are substantial parts from whose union a third thing results, namely complete substance; essence and being, however, are not parts of substance, but essence is complete substance itself, existence comes to substance already constituted. — 2° Prime matter is pure potency, not at all act; essence, however, is real potency which is first act, formal act. — 3° Form is the actuality of matter, but not the ultimate actuality of the thing, for it is ordered to a further act; existence, on the contrary, is the ultimate actuality of every form. 4° Composition of matter and form is ascribed only to material beings, because matter and form divide only material substance; composition of potency and act, however, belongs to all created beings, because potency and act divide all being and every genus of being. X. — Whether existence is a mode or a thing. Existence is more appropriately called a mode than a thing. For it relates as a term. Moreover, the term of a thing is properly its mode, just as a point is the ultimate mode of a line. Therefore existence is a mode of a thing, or essence. Moreover, « the notion of mode consists in this, that it is the actual exercise of a thing, just as sitting and union are the actual exercise of sitting or uniting. But existence is the actual exercise of constituting a thing outside causes. Therefore it is more appropriately called a mode of a thing than (1) S.THOMAS,II Cont.Gent.C.54;CAJET.De Ente et Essentia,c.5.q.9. HUDSON

the thing itself. Let us be allowed to conclude the whole question of essence and existence with these words of the illustrious Domet de Vorges: « They are two

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the intellect; the other, existence, referring to the divine will; two streams emanating from the same ON THE PROPERTIES OF BEING. source, but by different paths, and which meet to constitute a new center, like a mirror, by concentrating diverse rays of light, reproduces a reduced image of the sun. (1). » The properties of being are some transcendental, which are convertible with being itself; others general, which, although they do not (1) Abrégé de Metaphysique, t. II, p. 1) The Thomistic doctrine is summarized in thesis III approved by the S. Cong. of Studies: « Therefore in the absolute belong to every being, nevertheless according to themselves do not place a thing in a determinate predicament; of which kind are necessity, contingency, infinity, etc., which are the primary divisions of being. Hence a twofold question is to be dealt with: one on the transcendental properties, the other on general properties. The properties of being are some transcendental, which are convertible with being itself; others general, which, although they do not belong to every being, nevertheless according to themselves do not place a thing in a determinate predicament; of which kind are necessity, contingency, infinity, etc., which are the primary divisions of being. Hence a twofold question to

be dealt with: one on the transcendental properties, the other on general properties.

QUESTION ONE.

On the transcendental properties of being (1) It must first be asked whether being really has transcendental properties; and, this having been explored, each must be discussed in particular, as well as those which are opposed to them; and finally concerning the beautiful, which closely follows the transcendentals. (1) Cf. ARISTOV. IV. Metaphys. text. 5.,; III, c. 2 ; 8. THOMAS, in h. 1. and q. 1. De Verit. a. 1.; SOTO, Categor., c. 4, q. 1. ; SUARKX, Diop. Meta- phys. disp. 3 ; ALAMANKUS, quarta p. Metaphys. q. 11 ; LEPIDI, Ontol.; Card. MERCER, Ontol., II partit: Aperçu preliminaire ; DORM DR VOR- om, Abrdgé de Metaphysique, tom. - c. 3; DUSMAS, Ontol.; and commonly the Scholastics. ¡¢£€¥ ¦§¨©ª«¬ ®¯°±²³ ´µ¶·¸ ¹º» ¼½¾¿ÀÁÂÃÄ ÅÆÇÈÉÊËÌÍÎÏ ÐÑÒÓÔÕÖ ×ØÙÚÛÜ ÝÞßàáâãäåæçèéêëìíîï ðñòóôõö÷øùúûü ý þÿ

WHETHER BEING HAS TRANSCENDENTAL PROPERTIES.

I. — How many transcendentals there are. By the name transcendentals is understood, among the Scholastics, that which agrees in some respect with all and each thing which is or can be (1). Six are numbered by the Ancients: Thing, being, truth, good, something, one. The reason for this assertion is assigned by the Angelic Doctor (2): The most common notion, or mode generally following all being, can be taken according as it follows every being in itself, or according as it follows every being in order to another. If in the first way, namely in order to being itself, it expresses either something affirmative or negative. No affirmative thing, however, is found said absolutely which can be taken in every being except its essence, and thus the name thing is imposed. This is the only difference between being and thing, that being is taken from the act of being, but thing expresses the quiddity which has being. Being, therefore, expresses more than thing with respect to comprehension, since it says the whole informed by the act of being, while thing says only essence; but with respect to extension, thing extends more broadly in some sense, for many things are

called things which are not properly called beings (3). The negation, however, which follows every being absolutely is indivision, and this is expressed by the name one; for nothing else is one than undivided being. Therefore under this first respect there are three transcendentals: thing, being, one. (1) On the distinction between transcendentals and universals cf. Logic., pp 52-53. (2) Q. 1 De Verit., a. 1. (3) « This way of seeing has passed into the French language. When we say a being, we always speak of a distinct individual; we do not say that a color is a being, although it is nevertheless something different from the colored object. » Domme de Vorons, op. cit., t. I, p. 3%. If, however, the mode of being is taken in the other way, namely according to the order of one to another, this can be in two ways: one according to the division of one from another, and this is expressed by the name something, as if another what. One and something differ in this, that one says undivided being in itself, something says being divided from others. The other way according to the agreement of one being with another, and this indeed cannot be unless something is taken which is apt to agree with every being. This, however, is the soul, which in a certain way becomes all things, as the Philosopher says. In the soul, however, are cognitive and appetitive powers. The agreement of being to appetite is expressed by the name good; for good is what all things desire. The agreement of being to intellect, however, is expressed by the name truth. Under this respect there are also three transcendentals: something, truth, good. Concerning thing and being, enough has been said in the preceding Treatise (1). Since, however, something is reduced to one, it remains to speak of one, truth, and good. Although there are six words, in practice only four transcendentals are enumerated; for thing and being, one and something are used promiscuously.

Being is exhibited as some subject of which the others are predicated; hence it is asked whether the other three, namely one, truth, good, are properties of being. 11. — First conclusion: One, truth, good are transcendental properties of being. Proof. That is called a property of something which

emanates from it and is predicated of it in what kind necessarily (2). But one, truth, good emanate from being and are predicated of it in what kind necessarily. Therefore they are properties of being. The major is the notion of property; proof of the minor. 1« One, truth, good emanate from being. Something is said to emanate from some essence insofar as it supposes this essence previously constituted; thus visibility emanates from man because the essence of man is presupposed to the concept of visibility and is pre-understood as already constituted. But the notion of being virtually and, in our mode of understanding, is presupposed to the objective concept of one, truth,

good; for we would not understand one, truth, good unless they exhibited the notion of being already constituted, because apart from being is nothing, and nothing cannot be conceived by the mind at all. Therefore unity, truth, goodness are considered to emanate from being as from an essence. 2° They are predicated in what kind. What does not say the essence itself, but emanates from essence already constituted, is not predicated directly in what, but rather in what kind. But one, truth, good, according to our mode of understanding, emanate from essence already constituted, as we have just said. Therefore, according to our mode of understanding, they are not predicated directly and immediately in what, but rather in what kind. 3° In what kind necessarily, for unity, truth, goodness are inseparable from being, since they are materially convertible with being, as we will show in the following. rather than some reality superadded to the essence itself, such as intellect, will, etc. But the properties of being flow from it not by physical emanation, but according to our mode of understanding; nor are they some reality superadded to being itself, since it is impossible to add anything to being which is not being itself. Therefore those properties are not properties of a thing, or physical. They are, however, demonstrable properties. The subject of every science has demonstrable passions, or properties, for what every science especially intends is to demonstrate properties of the subject, through the definition of the

subject or property or passion (1). But the subject of metaphysical science is being, whose properties are one, truth, good. Therefore one, truth, good are demonstrable properties of being. III. — Objections: It is of the nature of a property that it be really distinguished from its subject. But one, truth, good are not really distinguished from being. Therefore they are not properties of being. Resp. : Distinguish the major: It is of the nature of a predicamental property to be really distinguished from the subject, I grant; of the nature of a property most commonly taken, as it abstracts from predicamental and transcendental, I deny. Distinguish the consequence: They are not predicamental properties, I grant; transcendent, I deny. A predicamental property is indeed an accident really distinct from substance; but in the concept of a property most commonly taken is included only that it emanates from essence and is predicated of it in what kind necessarily, according to our mode of understanding. That this belongs to one, truth, good, we have shown. They are therefore properties of being, not predicamental, but transcendental. This will be more clear from the following conclusion. IV. — Second conclusion: The properties of being are not properties of a thing, or physical, but demonstrable properties. Proof. Properties of a thing, or physical, are those which flow from essence by real and physical emanation as V. — Transcendent properties add something to being, which is not really distinguished from it, but as explicit from implicit. So the Thomists commonly, against many Scotists, who thought that one, truth, good add a positive entity. Proof of the conclusion. What is not a mere synonym of something adds something to it. But those three properties of being are not a mere synonym of it; for when it is said: Being is one, is true, is good, it is not intended: Being is being, which would be a nugatory statement, but

some true predicate belonging to it and somewhat distinct from it is signified. Therefore the properties add something to being. Not, however, a real entity really discrete from it; for who can conceive a positive entity which is something (1) Cf. Logic., De praecognitionibus et

praecognitis, pp. 388, ss. — The ancient scholastics use the word passion rather than property; a passion implies a subject prior to itself from which it arises and which it always accompanies. In this way, the passions of being presuppose being constituted, emanate from it and necessarily accompany it. Attributes are not infrequently used in this signification. However, attribute and property are not entirely convertible; attribute has rather a logical respect and is taken for a predicate attributed to a subject; moreover, an attribute is said to be, even if it adds nothing, but a physical property adds something to a subject; hence divine attributes are called, not divine properties.

really extraneous to being? But only something distinguished in reason, as explicit from implicit. For being says only that which has being; one, however, that which is undivided in itself; truth, that which has an order to intellect; good, that which has an order to appetite. Hence those words are not mere tautology, but truly help science, insofar as they are ordered to making concepts clearer, fuller, more explicit. VI. — What is the order among the six transcendentals. The transcendentals are ordered among themselves according to their proper formal notions. Being, therefore, holds the first place, for it precedes the others as subject its properties, or passions. The second place is held by one, for it follows being absolutely; the third place, however, claims something, for one, or being undivided in itself, being apprehended, being divided from any other is immediately apprehended; the fourth place is held by thing; for thing is said from its proper quiddity, or essence; moreover, every essence becomes proper from the fact that it is undivided in itself and divided from any other. Thing, therefore, immediately follows one and something. Finally, truth is prior to good. For since being simply is prior to being perfect, that which follows being simply is prior to that which follows being perfect. But truth follows being simply, good, however, follows being perfect. Therefore truth is prior to good. The reason for the minor is that something, by the very fact that it has being simply, is apt to be understood, or is intelligible and true; but in order to be

appetible and good, it must be conceived as endowed with a certain perfection by which it can allure, draw, move appetite. VII. — Whether the word « fact » should be numbered among the transcendentals. With respect to the imposition of origin, fact implies act and effect; but from usage it signifies not only actions of man but also actions of nature; hence historical facts, physical facts, chemical facts, etc., are called facts. Because, therefore, fact implies activity, and activity is ordered to producing something, the name « fact » has been transferred to express what is, especially what is most real and positive.

ART. VIII. — ON THE BEAUTIFUL.

« If one wants to a ffirm that a thing exists, one says: it is a fact. The existence of the Church is a fact, we ourselves have said above: the fact of existence. It is the fashionable term for indicating something real and positive (1). » In some way, therefore, it approaches the transcendentals; however, it is not properly one of the transcendentals. For fact implies that which has a cause; transcendentals, however, prescind from cause and effect. Moreover, fact is not properly said except of things which are manifested sufficiently directly by sensible experience; hence the existence of God is not called a fact; transcendentals, on the contrary, are predicated of every thing, even entirely immaterial or abstract (2). (1) DOMER DE VOSQUS, op. cit., p. 36. (2) « One will not regularly say that the existence of God is a fact. This word therefore has a psychological rather than metaphysical value. It is relative to the manner in which the thing is known to us. The same applies to the word phenomenon brought into fashion by the Scottish

school, which indicates actions and qualities by which substances manifest themselves to us. » Ibid. 1. — The notion of unity. Unity in the abstract is the notion by which a thing is constituted undivided in itself and divided from any other, or is the indivision of a thing in itself and division from any other. One in the concrete is said to be that which is undivided in itself and divided from any other. Two things are primarily in the concept of one: being and the negation

of division. One does not signify only negation. For one is a transcendental property of being. But a property of being must imply in the direct notion something positive like being itself. On the other hand, it does not exhibit being only, otherwise it would not differ at all from it, and hence mere synonymy and tautology would be introduced. It adds, therefore, something; not something real, which is impossible, but something of reason. Moreover, a being of reason is relation or negation (2). Now one does not imply relation, but follows being absolutely in itself. It remains, therefore, that one adds above being a certain negation, that is, the negation of division. Wherefore one signifies principally, and directly, being; less principally and indirectly, the negation of division; for a quality of being must exhibit principally something positive like that of which it is a property. Moreover, one implies division from another. By the very fact that being is itself, it necessarily follows that it is not another, but is discrete from another. Hence, even before the creation of the world, God was divided from other beings, not indeed as actually existing, but as future or possible. The divine I. — The notion of unity. Unity in the abstract is the notion by which a thing is constituted undivided in itself and divided from any other, or is the indivision of a thing in itself and division from any other. One in the concrete is said to be that which is undivided in itself and divided from any other. Two things are primarily in the concept of one: being and the negation of division. One does not signify only negation. For one is a transcendental property of being. But a property of being must imply in the direct notion something positive like being itself. On the other hand, it does not exhibit being only, otherwise it would not differ at all from it, and hence mere synonymy and tautology would be introduced. It adds, therefore, something; not something real, which is impossible, but something of reason. Being of reason, however, is relation or negation (2). Now one does not imply relation, but follows being absolutely in itself. It remains, therefore, that one adds above being a certain negation, that is, the negation of division. Wherefore one signifies

principally, and directly, being; less principally and indirectly, the negation of division; for a quality of being must exhibit principally something positive like that of which it is a property. Moreover, one implies division from another. By the very fact that being is itself, it necessarily follows that it is not another, but is discrete from another. Hence, even before the creation of the world, God was divided from other beings, not indeed as actually existing, but as future or possible. The divine (1) Cf. AARSTOR. V. Metaphys. text. 7-12.; S. THOMAS, 1. 7 and 8 in V. Me-apphys. and 1. 4, in X Metaphys. / 1. P ., q. 11 i. Sent., dist. 24 ; Cont. Gent., c. 53 ; De Verit. q. 8 ; SCOTUS, 11. Sent.; CAJETANUS, BANNES, PBOUNS, in I. P . q. 11 ; SUAREN, disp. 4 ; and authors already a. 1. cited. (2) Cf. Tract. I. q. I, a. I, n. IX. Above, p. 251. essence was certainly discrete from the essence of man and the essence of an angel, although neither angel nor man yet existed. Three things, therefore, are included in the notion of perfect one: being, the negation of division from itself, division from any other. However, being reduplicatively as divided from others is strictly called something, as we have already noted. II. — On the formal notion of one. Suarez seems to think that one adds nothing positive to being, either in reality or different in reason; the Scotists contend that it adds a positively distinct formality; or a relation of identity. The Thomists, however, more commonly teach that the transcendental one by its proper addition adds to being only the negation of division; but by improper addition and as to the explicit it adds something positive, namely being itself, not materially taken, but insofar as it grounds the negation of division in itself. Against the Scotistic opinion, it suffices to note this: If one added a positive perfection to

being, this would also be being, and therefore would imply a new positive perfection, and hence an infinite process (1). Moreover, if one were a formality distinct from being as excluding from excluded, it would not be formally being, since it would formally exclude it. One also does not consist formally in the relation of identity, because identity is posterior to unity and supposes it: for the same things are

those whose substance is one. But one by its proper addition adds real negation. For unity is indivision. But indivision is real negation, or privation of division. Therefore it adds real negation of division. By improper addition, however, it adds something positive, namely being itself as undivided. « One, says the Angelic Doctor, does not signify pure negation but being itself undivided, and therefore one and being are convertible (2). » — « One according to itself relates more to position (1) « The unity of this superadded being would in turn imply a new positive perfection, therefore a new being, grafting itself onto the previous one, and we would thus proceed to infinity, accumulating perfection upon perfection to explain the unity of a first subject. » Card. MENCKRS, n. 63. (2) L. 4. in X Metaphys.

than multitude, in which real negation is implied according to which a thing is distinguished from another (1). » The reason for this is that one is a positive name which refers to positive reality. It is disputed, however, whether one implies entitatively matter, formal negation of division, or formally the entity itself as grounding the negation of division, indirectly and as connoting the negation of division. The first is held by Capreolus, Cajetan and others; the second by Bannez, Joan. a S. Thoma, Mailhat, and many others. This latter seems truer. One is a property of being which is convertible with it. But if it formally signified negation of division, it would not be a property convertible with being, for a negative cannot be a property of a positive and convertible with it. Therefore it is not formally negation. — It is con firmed. Since negation is non-being, if one signified negation principally, it would exhibit principally non-being. Moreover, it is impossible for a property of being to say principally non-being. The true opinion, therefore, is the other, namely that one indirectly and as a connotation signifies negation, directly and principally being itself, not being absolutely taken, but being as grounding indivision; which distinction suffices so that being can be predicated of being without nugation and tautology. For thus the predication is explained: Being is one, namely being is undivided being, or: it is being as

grounding indivision. Hence it follows that the idea of one is positive-negative, since it implies positive being and negation. III. — On the negation which one implies. One properly negates actual division, but not necessarily divisibility: for a being remains one, even if it is divisible. Hence unity of simplicity and unity of composition are distinguished, as will be explained shortly, n. IX. The negation which pertains to the essence of one is the negation of division in itself, namely that which does not admit another suppositum. Although this is not principally signified, it nonetheless necessarily enters into the concept of one, which is defined: Undivided being in itself. But the negation of component parts does not pertain to one, otherwise composite beings would lack transcendental unity. The negation of division into several selves does not pertain to one, for a man would be one transcendentally, even if he were divided into several selves. Nor does the negation of division into essential parts pertain to one, for if a composite is divided into essential parts, each retains transcendental unity. Therefore one can admit in itself many distinct things, whether they are physical parts, such as matter and form, and thus we have proved in Natural Philosophy that a composite is one, although it coalesces from really distinct matter and form; or metaphysical parts, such as essence and existence, and thus above we have shown that being is one, although essence and existence are distinguished; or accidental parts, and thus in Psychology we have proved that the soul is one, although faculties are distinguished from it (1). But what one cannot admit in itself is another suppositum, because another and another suppositum make another and

another individual. The negation of identity with another, or division from another, necessarily accompanies one; for, if being is itself, it is necessarily not another. However, this negation does not properly say one, but implies something pertaining to multitude; for, the division of one from another being understood, multitude is immediately implied. IV. — The negation of division which one implies is not a negation simply, nor a privation simply, but has the mode of

privation. The Angelic Doctor explains the matter thus: « This privation is intermediate between true privation and simple negation, having something common with both: with true privation indeed in this, that it is a privation in some subject, hence it does not belong (1) On this matter one may consult Card. Mencken, who establishes and proves three theses: « First thesis: the metaphysical composition of a being is reconciled with its essential unity... Second thesis: the physical composition of beings is not incompatible with their substantial unity... Third thesis: the accidental composition of several substances does not follow their respective unity. » Ontol., nn. 79, ss. — Cf. what we will discuss below a. III, On the things opposed to one, and q. II, a. V. On simple and composite being.

to simple non-being; with simple negation, however, in this, that it does not require aptitude in the subject (1). » « The negation included in one di ffers from negation simply, and tends more towards the negation of division (2). » V. — Transcendental one is not to be confused with what is called unique. Transcendental one says only undivided in itself and divided from another; unique, however, adds something to this concept, namely that it excludes the association of another which is assimilated to it in that in which it is said to be unique. God, e.g., is undivided in himself and divided from any other, and so is said to be one; but moreover he excludes the association of another God; and so he is said to be unique, because there are not nor can there be many gods. Peter is undivided in himself and divided from any other, hence he is one man; but he does not exclude the association of another assimilated to him, hence he is not a unique man. VI. — Numerical unity is also to be carefully distinguished from transcendental unity. 1° Numerical unity is that which is said to be the principle of number; thus when we count ten, we begin from one. Transcendental unity adds nothing to being except the negation of division; but numerical unity adds something to being; not indeed a difference which is outside the essence of being, but a determinate mode of being, in the way that predicaments add something to being, by determining and contracting it.

2° Numerical unity relates to number as measure to measured, for number is de fined: multitude measured by one. Therefore it adds to being the relation of measure and part. 3° Numerical unity pertains reductively to the predicament of quantity. What is properly placed in the predicament is quantity. Because numerical unity is not quantity, but the principle of some quantity, namely number, it is not properly in the predicament. However, principles and parts of a thing are placed reductively in the predicament of the whole thing. Therefore, since unity is the principle of quantity, it is placed reductively in the predicament of quantity. Transcendental unity, however, cannot be placed even reductively in a predicament, since it exceeds all categories. 4° Transcendental unity belongs to all things; numerical unity belongs only to quantitative things, in which number can be; in others, however, there is multitude, not number, as will be explained a. III, n. I (1). VII. — Transcendental one is convertible with being, or, in other words, any thing is one by its entity. Proof. Any thing by its entity is either simple or composite. — If it is simple, it is without division both in act and potency. But lack of division is unity. Therefore it is one by its entity. If it is composite, it includes a multitude of parts. But the multitude of parts is nothing other than several unities joined together and constituting some whole; for a composite does not have being unless its parts are divided, but after they constitute and compose the composite itself. Therefore any being, whether simple or composite, is one by its entity. Moreover, if a thing were not one by its entity, but by something else, this again would have

to be one by something else, and hence there would be an infinite process, which is impossible. Therefore it is incompatible for a being not to be one by its entity. Moreover, its entity is through being itself, as is clear. Therefore it is one through itself, and hence one and being are convertible. There is therefore an adequation and conversion between being and one, and « hence it is that each thing, as it preserves its being, so it preserves its unity (2). » VIII. — Division of unity. Because one is convertible

with being, according as being is said in different ways, one is said in different ways. Moreover, being is sometimes per se, sometimes per accidens, (1) This distinction was not understood by Balmbs, who incautiously writes: « One cannot conclude, however, that unity identified with being is distinguished from unity which engenders number. All beings, one in themselves, but distinct from each other, whatever they are, can be conceived under the idea of number. » Philos. fondam. liv.VI, c. 2. — Which opinion had already been excellently refuted by S. Thomas, IV Metaphys., lect. 2. (2) S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 11. a. 1.

hence in a similar way one is sometimes per se, sometimes per accidens. One per se is that by which a thing is constituted undivided in its own nature; one per accidens is that by which a thing is constituted undivided, not in the essence itself, but in something beyond essence, such as a white man. One per se is again divided in many ways just as being itself per se. If being per se does not coalesce from integral or essential parts, there is unity of simplicity, or indivisibility, because the essence is undivided in act and potency. If, however, being consists of essential parts, such as matter and form, it is unity of composition, in which case being is undivided according to act, divisible according to potency (1). It can be one per se either in the notion of nature, when it is simple, or when diverse parts are ordered to form a single essence. Or in the notion of suppositum, when it is simple and completely subsistent, or when diverse parts subsist in a single suppositum or single person. If, however, there are several supposita, it will be another and another, and being will no longer be said to be per se one by reason of suppositum. Under another respect, one per se is said in three ways: either as indivisible, or as continuous, or as one in reason (2). One indivisible is a simple essence. Some things, however, are called one continuous, when they are continuous in quantity, as neck and head; some, finally, are called one in reason, from which results one notion of essence which is expressed by a single definition. Thus, matter and form are one in reason, because from them results one essence which is to be

expressed by a single definition. According to logical intentions, one can be said in four ways: one in number, one in species, one in genus, one in analogy. One in number are those whose matter is one, for the principle of individuation is signate matter, as has been proved elsewhere (3) and this unity is properly called individual. One in species are those whose definition is one; for nothing is (1) That unity of composition is fivefold: essential, entitative, integral, accidental, and numerical. Cf. vol. II, p. 13. Entitative composition, however, belongs to every created being, even the simple, such as an angel. (2) S. Thomas, II Cont. Gent., c. 56. (3) Cf. vol. II, pp. 236, 58. properly defined except the species, since every definition consists of genus and difference (1). One in genus are those which have one mode of predication, that is, agree in some one thing apt to be predicated of many in what incompletely. One in analogy, however, are those whose notion is neither simply the same nor simply diverse, but to such an extent that a certain proportion and relation exists between them, as has been said concerning analogy of proportion and proportionality (2). Hence Socrates is in himself one in number; Socrates and Plato are one in species; man and animal are one in genus; the health of food and the health of an animal are one in analogy. Unity of species is formal unity insofar as it implies indivision of essence, to which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be subtracted; individual unity is material unity. Formal unity and multiplication arise from form; the first principle of material unity and multiplication,

however, is signate matter. One per accidens can be considered in operating and in being. Unity of several in operating is called dynamic; and if indeed it exists among several natural agents, it is called physical dynamic; if it exists among several free agents, as among several citizens, it is called moral dynamic. One per accidens in being is distinguished in four ways: natural, artificial, moral, of aggregation. Natural, when things of different genera, e.g., man and whiteness, are joined by nature under one undivided being. Hence a white man is a natural per accidens unity. Artificial, when diverse things are joined by

the operation of art into one being; thus is a house. Moral, when several are joined by reason of a common end, such as a family, a state. Of aggregation, when several things are joined by chance into some accidental being, such as a pile of stones. Another way of distinguishing one per se and one per accidens is proposed by the illustrious Domet de Vorges. With formal unity, one per se is a being in itself comprising all the necessary elements of its essence, and one per accidens will be a nature conceived with

accessory elements and adjuncts of essence. With individual unity, however, one per se is that which has one and the same existence; one per accidens, however, are those which, although joined by a physical bond, have their own distinct existence. Hence he concludes: If we wish to speak of definitive and actual unity, there is no unity per se except that which is characterized by the actual indivisibility of existence (1). IX. — Whether all those species enjoy objective reality. Every one, under the respect in which it is one, is also being, as is clear from what has been said. Moreover, being which really exists outside the mind is singular being; for nothing exists unless it has a determinate essence and existence. Therefore that which is endowed with existence is individual one; hence singular one and real one are convertible (2). Universal one, however, even if it does not exist under the form of universality, is not entirely devoid of objectivity, because it exists with respect to the thing conceived and has a real foundation in nature. For, as has been said in the Treatise on Universals, there is on the part of reality a true similarity among the essential predicates. The intellect can, moreover, consider only the similarity and conformity among several things without considering their distinction, and hence the concept of universal unity is formed, namely the concept of a uniform nature common to several and several things (3). X. — Certain notions which have a relation to the notion of one, namely same, similar, equal. By the very fact that something is undivided in itself, it is clear that it agrees with itself. This agreement of a being with itself is called identity. Identity, therefore, is a certain unity of being; and

accordingly as many species of identity can be assigned as there are species of unity. Identity properly so called is threefold: metaphysical, physical, and moral. Metaphysical is that which belongs to an entirely immutable being, such as God; physical is had when the physical reality of a being, such as essence, remains without any change, of which kind are angels, the human soul; moral, when physical reality, although it changes in itself, nevertheless persists the same in common estimation, because the change takes place gradually and imperceptibly. Of this kind is the identity of our body throughout the course of life. In the strict sense, identity implies individual unity, or says something one in number; in a broader sense, however, it is the union of several agreeing in the nature of genus or species. In this way, the nature of Peter and Paul is said to be the same. The same are said to be those which agree in substance; similar those which agree in quality; equal those which agree in quantity; or, as the Angelic Doctor says, the same is one in substance, equal one in quantity, similar one in quality (1). These words, however, are not used so strictly in practice. In a less strict sense, similar are said to be those which agree either in nature or in quality; hence an agent is said to act similarly to itself whether it produces an accident or a substance. Wherefore similarity commonly taken is considered according to agreement, or communication in form (2). There is, however, a threefold communication in form and therefore a threefold similarity. 1° Some communicate in form according to the same notion and according to the same mode;

thus two equally white things agree in the form of whiteness by the same notion and the same mode; this is the most perfect similarity, hence these are not only called similar, but equal in their similarity. 2° Some communicate in the same form according to the same notion, but not according to the same mode, as two unequally white things; but this is not had except in accidental forms, for substantial forms do not admit of more and less. 3° Some communicate in the same form but not according to the same notion, as happens in non-univocal agents with respect to their proper

effects. Thus the form of a house agrees with the form which is in the mind of the artificer, but in such a way that the form of the house is not of the same notion as the form which is in the mind of the artificer. In this way all creatures are said to be similar to God. 1) Cf. Abrégé de Metaphysique, I, pp. 51-52. (2) « This is the true practical unity. » Ibidem. (3) Logic., pp. 239 and ss. (1) IV Metaphys., lect. 2. (2) Cf. S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 4, a. 2.

XI. — WHETHER TWO ENTIRELY SIMILAR THINGS CAN EXIST.

The matter was sharply disputed between Leibniz, who denied it, and Wolf and many philosophers adhered to him, and Clark, who asserted it (1). The difficulty, however, disappears with a distinction. Either it concerns only similarity, so that all predicates of one individual are perfectly similar to all predicates of the other. In this sense the question is answered affirmatively. For in those entirely similar notes no contradiction is implied, but there are simply distinct entities, which can be produced by the omnipotence of God. Or it also concerns identity, so that the predicates are not only entirely similar, but also entirely identical. In which sense, a manifest repugnance is introduced: there would be two, as is supposed, and simultaneously one, for both would be simply the same. It is of the nature of one individual to have individuating principles whose collection belongs only to itself. Therefore it is impossible to find another individual which can claim all the same individuating principles. Form, figure, place, stock, time, country, name: These are the seven things which one has and another does not. Hence it happens that an individual is entirely incommunicated and incommunicable. (1) Cf. Letres entre LEMINITES and CLARKS, among the Opera LEMINITUM.

ARTICLE THREE — On The Things Opposed To One.

I. — The notion of multitude. Because a thing is better known from its opposites, after having spoken of one, we must speak of those things which are opposed to one, namely multitude and distinction. Multitude is defined from St. Thomas: That which is made of ones, of which one is not the other (1). — It is made of ones, namely a collection of beings, each of which is one in itself. Of which one is not the other; multitude, namely, implies division, just as unity implies negation of division. Moreover, division requires that one be not the other: for being divided from another sounds the same as other, or diverse. Hence otherness, or diversity, is necessarily included in the notion of multitude. 11. — The notion of number. Number is some species of multitude, namely multitude measured by one. One is called the measure of number, because this unity, taken a number of times, makes the number itself; hence, if we wish to know some number, we must know how many times unity has been taken. And this is the most certain measure. For a certain measure is said to be that from which nothing can be taken away or added. Moreover, one, which is the

principle of number, is entirely indivisible, and remaining one, it undergoes no addition or subtraction. Hence it is the most certain measure. There is, therefore, a great difference between multitude in general and number. For the concept of multitude two things suffice: 1° the notion of ones, or undivided beings, 2° the notion of the division of each from others. For the concept of number, however, a third notion is required, namely the notion of measure. Measure, however, properly

designates that by which the quantity of a thing is known (1); hence number properly belongs only to those things which have quantity, and consequently matter, since matter is the root of quantity, and therefore is something predicamental; multitude, on the contrary, also belongs to spiritual things, or to every being. Beings which form a multitude can be entirely discrete without any relation to each other; but beings which form a number must have a

relation, since they are measured together and derive species from the ultimate unity (2). Number, therefore, arises from predicamental unity and is measured by it. Predicamental unity, moreover, corresponds to quantity, which is threefold: length in extension, mass in weight, time in discrete quantity. Hence a threefold unit of measure: centimeter, in length; gram, in mass and weight; second, in time. The notion of number, therefore, is more fully formed from the consideration of quantity, the continuum, time, concerning which we have spoken in I. P . Natural Philosophy, and which do not have a proper metaphysical respect. III. — Multitude is opposed to transcendental one contrarily; but number is opposed to numerical, or predicamental, one relatively. The I° part is proved. Those things whose notions are opposed are themselves opposed. But the notion of transcendental one and the notion of multitude are opposed (4). Therefore. The minor is declared. The notion of transcendental one is indivision; the notion of multitude is division. But division and indivision are opposed, as is clear. Therefore the notion of transcendental one and the notion of multitude are opposed. What kind of opposition, however, is this? At first glance, it seems to be privative, for indivision is privation of division. More truly, however, one and many are said to be opposed (1) « Measure is nothing other than that by which the quantity of a thing is known: the quantity of a thing, however, is known by one and number. By one indeed, as when we say one stadium or one foot; by number, however, as when we say three stadia or three feet. Further, every number is known by one, because unity taken a number of times gives the number. » S. Thomas, X Metaphys., lect. 2. (2) « The ultimate unity gives species to number. » S. Thomas, VIII, Met. 1. 3. (3) Those who seek a longer exposition may consult Card. Mercier, nn. 83 (4) Cf. S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 11, a. 2. contrarily. Contrary opposition, indeed, is between two things which imply something positive. But one and many imply something positive; for one does not signify pure privation, but something positive, namely being itself undivided. Therefore one and many, although they are

opposed by way of privation, are not however opposed according to pure privation and habit, but as contraries (X Metaph. lect. 4°). The II° part is declared. Predicamental one, which is the principle of number, is opposed to number as measure to measured, since number is defined: Multitude measured by one. But measure and measured are opposed relatively. Therefore predicamental one and number are opposed relatively. V. — One is not directly opposed to multitude itself, but rather to the division which is found in it. « One, says the Angelic Doctor, is not the remover of multitude, but of division, which is prior in reason than one or multitude (1). « That which is directly opposed to unity is that by reason of which unity is dissolved. But that by reason of which unity is dissolved is division, not multitude. Therefore what is directly opposed to one is not properly multitude, but division, which is found in multitude. Proof of the minor. Given division, unity, which is indivision itself, is immediately dissolved; given multitude, however, unity is not dissolved unless division is also introduced: for given many palms in the same continuous thing, one continuum remains, unless they are divided.

V. — One taken materially is not opposed to multitude. One taken materially designates positive entity itself. This entity, however, constitutes multitude. Moreover, nothing is constituted from its contrary. Therefore one taken materially, by reason of its positive entity, is not opposed to multitude. Therefore opposition between unity and multitude is considered only with respect to essence, or the formal notion of unity, and division, which is in multitude. VI. — Multitude is founded in unity and is itself posterior, both in knowing and in being. Proof of the I° part. (1) I. P ., q. 30, a. 3, a d 3.

Every privation is founded in some subject; for it is itself the negation of some form in a subject. Moreover, every subject is some being. Therefore every privation of being is founded in being itself. Since, however, one and being are convertible, it is necessary that every removal, or privation, of unity, be founded in some one. Therefore multitude, which is the removal of unity, is founded in some one and is

some one. Proof of the II° part. That is said to be prior to another in the order of cognition which is placed in the definition of the other. But one is placed in the definition of multitude; for multitude is said to be: That which is made of ones, of which one is not the other; but multitude is not placed in the definition of one. Therefore one is prior in the order of cognition. Moreover, one says negation of division. « But division falls into the intellect from the negation of being itself: so that what first falls into the intellect is being; second, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division; third, one; fourth, multitude (1). » Therefore one is prior to multitude in the order of cognition. Proof of the III° part. Multitude in the order of reality is a certain composite of ones. But the composite is posterior to its components in the order of reality. Therefore in the order of reality, multitude is posterior to one. It depends, therefore, on one in its being, nor would it be contained under being unless it were in some way contained under one. For Dionysius says that there is no multitude not participating in one. But those which are many in parts are one in the whole, and those which are many in accidents are one in subject, and those which are many in number are one in species, and those which are many in species are one in genus, and those which are many in processes are one in principle (2).» VII. — The notion of distinction. Just as multitude is opposed to unity, so distinction is opposed to identity, which is defined as: Lack of identity among several. Since, however, identity is a certain unity of being, distinction implies in creatures a certain plurality and multiplicity of being. This plurality, however, is designated by different names: diversity, dissimilitude, inequality, difference. Those which are not one in substance are called diverse, just as those which are one in substance are called the same; those which are not one in quality are called dissimilar; those which are not one in quantity are called unequal. Diverse extends more broadly than different. For difference, besides the fact that they differ, must have something the same in which they agree. Hence difference implies two things: 1° that those which differ agree in some

univocal predicate; 2° that they are separated from each other by formal differences. Thus man and brute agree in some univocal predicate and are separated by rationality and irrationality; and therefore they are truly different. Plant and animal agree in some univocal thing and on the other hand are separated by sensibility and insensibility, hence they are called different. Those, however, which agree in no univocal predicate are simply diverse: thus God and creature do not properly differ, but are diverse; likewise substance and accident. Distinction is sometimes taken in a stricter sense, for lack of identity between two individuals, and thus there is a threefold degree: Those which are not one in genus are called diverse; those which are not one in species are called different; those which are not one in number are distinct. In the present context, however, distinction is taken in a general sense, and whatever are not the same are called distinct, whether they are diverse or different. VIII. — Real and logical distinction. Distinction, as has been said, implies a certain plurality. If

this plurality is in things independently of the mind's concept, a real distinction is introduced; if, however, it is had only in our concepts, it is a distinction of reason, or logical. Real distinction supposes real composition in a being; logical distinction, however, can be conceived in the simplest being. Indeed, the simpler and more perfect something is, the more foundations for logical distinctions it provides. For a being of this kind, remaining in itself most simple, is equivalent to innumerable really distinct beings; and hence it provides a foundation for innumerable distinctions. Real distinction is twofold: greater, or entitative, which exists between thing and thing, as between man and garment; lesser, or modal, which is between a thing and a mode, as between a curved line and the curvature of the line. For it is divided into adequate and inadequate, according as the extremes do not include each other at all, as

man and horse, or include each other, as body and heart. Real distinction is called physical or metaphysical according as things are distinguished in existence or in essence. Signs

of real distinction are: 1° The origin of one from another, insofar as one is a principle, the other a term: for these are relatively opposed, and therefore necessarily distinct. 2° Actual separation, as between stone and tree. 3° Real separability, as between water and heat, body and health. 4° Real composition, for the composite argues parts, and a real composite real parts. 5° Real opposition, for really opposed things imply really another and another. Logical distinction is called a distinction of reasoning reason, if there is nothing reasoned, that is, if there is no foundation for distinguishing; it is of reasoned reason, if something is truly reasoned, that is, if there is in reality a true foundation for distinguishing. Distinction of reasoned reason is twofold: greater, or strictly precisive; lesser, or broadly precisive. The first is between two formalities of which one does not include the other in its concept, e.g., between animality and rationality; the second is between two formalities whose concepts, although diverse, include each other. Thus, the concept of one is not merely the concept of being; however, it includes it, nor can one be conceived without being. Divine attributes are distinguished in this way; for one includes the other in its concept, although it is distinguished from it under another respect. Those things are distinguished virtually which, although really the same, are equivalent to several really distinct things, as the human soul is equivalent to vegetative and sensitive (1)). It is divided, however, into (1) « There is, for example, a complete virtual distinction between the concepts of vegetative soul and intellective soul, by means of which we can represent the human soul. Not only, indeed, is the formal term of these two concepts composed of expressly different notes, which is the minimum required for a virtual distinction, but, in addition, each of them can exist separately in nature. Vegetative life is realizable in beings which do not have intelligence, and existence can exist outside organized subjects. » Card. Mira- cien, n. 77. virtual intrinsic and virtual extrinsic. It is called intrinsic virtual, when the diverse formalities of a thing, even if not really prescinded, achieve the same as formalities really

prescinded; because they are equivalent to them. It is called extrinsic virtual, when the distinction does not affect the thing itself intrinsically, but only dominatively and in concept. IX. — A distinction of reason su ffices to remove contradiction. Contradiction is introduced through simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same thing. Affirmation and negation, however, exist only in the intellect, for they are divisive differences of propositions, which are not in things, but are produced by the intellect. Therefore, to verify affirmation and negation simultaneously of something, plurality in the intellect suffices. Moreover, where there is a distinction of reason, there is plurality in the intellect. Therefore a distinction of reason suffices to remove contradiction, so that affirmation and negation of the same thing can be verified without contradiction. X. — Whether a distinction of reason supposes a real distinction. Distinction can be considered on the part of the object and on the part of the subject, or intellect. Hence it must be answered:

1° Sometimes a distinction of reason supposes a real distinction on the part of the object. The distinction of white Peter from himself as black is a distinction of reason; but this implies a real distinction, namely the distinction of accident from substance, or whiteness from Peter. This example shows that a logical distinction sometimes supposes a real distinction also on the part of the object. 2° A distinction of reason always supposes a real distinction on the part of the subject. Concepts of reason, indeed, can be considered in three ways: 1° as signifying the same object, as when it is said: man is man; 2° as one adds something to another, as man and animal; 3° as they are of simply diverse notions, as animal and rational. Moreover, in this threefold case, concepts are subjectively diverse: for the concept of rational in my intellect is numerically distinct from the concept of animal; indeed, even in the first case: man is man, there are two concepts, one of which is the subject, the other the predicate. Therefore they are numerically distinct, and consequently are really distinguished on the part of the subject,

insofar as they are two ideas, or two numerically distinct accidents. 3° The greater distinction of reason, although it does not always suppose a real distinction on the part of the object, nevertheless implies in the object a real foundation for distinction. Proof. There is in the object a real foundation for distinction when the object is equivalent to several really distinct things. But the object in the greater distinction is equivalent to several really distinct things: thus man is equivalent to animal and rational; and, although these are one physically, there is a true foundation for conceiving them as distinct, so that one is understood without the other. Therefore the greater distinction supposes in the object a real foundation for distinction. XII. — Whether falsehood can underlie a logical distinction. The act of distinction, or precision or abstraction, is reduced to simple apprehension. But falsehood cannot underlie simple apprehension. Therefore. — The major is declared. By precision, or distinction of reasoned reason, one and the same thing is considered separately from another, but the mind abstains from all judgment; it neither affirms nor denies the note which it considers separately to be in fact separate. Therefore falsity or truth does not underlie logical distinction, unless perhaps per accidens, as has been said in Logic, concerning simple apprehension (1). From these is understood the saying: There is no falsehood in prescinding or abstracting, that is, error cannot underlie precision or abstraction, because they are acts of simple apprehension (2). XI. — What are the foundations of logical distinctions. These foundations are considered on the part of the intellect and on the part of the object. On the part of the intellect is its imperfection. For since our mind does not apprehend things intuitively, but through diverse motions, namely composing, dividing, reasoning, it needs several and distinct concepts to know what is truly one and undivided. However, the more perfect the intellect, the fewer concepts it needs, because it comprehends more in one (1). On the part of the object, sometimes its imperfection, because the thing exhibits two things which relate to each other as imperfect to perfect, potency to act, as in man animality to rationality.

Hence the necessity of distinguishing genus and difference. But more commonly, the foundation of distinction is the perfection of the object, insofar as either one essence is equivalent to many really distinct things, as the human soul is equivalent to vegetative and sensitive forms; or one cause produces effects which proceed from distinct causes, etc. (1) This also holds for angels: « The higher the angel, the fewer species it will need to apprehend the universality of intelligibles; and therefore its forms must be more universal, as if each extends to more things. » S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 55, a. 3. XIII. — The Scotistic distinction (3). The Scotists thought there is a distinction intermediate between real and rational distinction, namely a formal actual distinction from the nature of the thing. This is said to exist, not between two things, but between two formalities, e.g., between animality and rationality. It is from the nature of the thing, because actually and independently of our concept animality is not rationality, and before the operation of the mind the predication is true: The animality of Socrates is not his rationality. On the one hand it approaches real

distinction, because it exists actually from the nature of the thing; on the other hand it approaches rational distinction, because animality and rationality, although they are two formalities distinct by their own nature, are not however two things in Socrates, but one thing. It is rightly said, therefore, to be intermediate between real distinction and rational distinction. The Scotists place this distinction between divine attributes (4) and between metaphysical degrees. Metaphysical degrees, however, are the series of essential predicates in one individual which are ordered by way of a ladder (1) Cf. Logic, pp. 264, ss. (2) « In this operation there can be no error, because neither one denies nor affirms: so that there is nothing clearer than this axiom of the School: He who makes a precision does not make a lie: abstinentium non est mendacium. » Bossuert, Logique, I. I. c. XXIII. (3) Many think that this distinction is not from Scotus himself, but was introduced by his disciples; for Scotus places between divine attributes the same

distinction which St. Bonaventure calls of reason. Cf. Scoren, III Sent., dist. 2., q. 7, nn. 43 and 44. (4) Cf. Cajet. Comm. de ente et essentia, c. VI, q. XII.

descending from the supreme genus to the individual, or ascending from the individual to the supreme genus. Thus in Socrates there is being, substance, body, living, animal, man, individual. XIV. — First conclusion: Formal actual distinction is impossible. Every distinction which denies real identity is real distinction. But the distinction which the Scotists posit denies real identity. Therefore it is real distinction, not intermediate. The major is clear; distinction is lack of identity; therefore real distinction is lack of real identity. Proof of the minor. Real identity is denied when independently of the mind's concept it is true that one is not the other. But, according to the Scotists, before the concept of the mind one formality is not the other. Therefore a distinction of this kind is a negation of real identity. Moreover, the formalities of the Scotists are either something real, or something of reason, either with or without a foundation in reality. If they are something real, the distinction between them is real; if they are something of reason without a foundation in reality, it is a distinction of reasoning reason; if it is something of reason with a foundation in reality, it is a distinction of reasoned or virtual reason. Therefore no medium exists. Hence many recent Scotists do not dare to call it intermediate, but reduce it to virtual distinction and call it real analogically, insofar as it has a real foundation in nature. — If the Scotists intended nothing else, why did they pronounce insufficient the division admitted by other Scholastics? XV. — Second conclusion: The distinction which exists between metaphysical degrees is not real and independent of the operation of the mind, but only virtual. Metaphysical degrees are proportioned to the form from which they arise and of which they are formalities, and therefore are in the being itself as they are in the form from which they proceed. But in the form from which they proceed they are not really distinguished. The minor is clear from what has been said in II. P . Natural Philosophy, where it was shown that there is

in man a single soul, and a single form, namely the rational soul, by reason of which man is not only a man, but also animal, living, body, substance, and being (1). Therefore, if metaphysical degrees: man, animal, living, body, substance, being are really one in form, they must be really one in man himself. They are distinguished, however, virtually. For, just as a hexagon contains a pentagon and a tetragon and exceeds them, so one intellective soul contains and exceeds the sensitive and vegetative; and thus it provides a foundation for distinguishing in man the intellective, sensitive, and vegetative, in such a way that one can be conceived without the other being understood. By the very fact that one thing is equivalent to several, it can be understood according as it is equivalent to one, without considering the other, and then according as it agrees with the other, without considering the first. XVI. — Objection: Contradictories are veri fied of metaphysical degrees. But, for contradictories to be verified, a real distinction is required. Therefore there is a real distinction between metaphysical degrees.

Resp. 1°: With the major granted, I deny the minor; for, as was said above, a distinction of reason suffices to remove contradiction, n. IX. Resp. 2°: Distinguish the major: Contradictories are veri fied of metaphysical degrees dependently on the operation of the mind, I grant; independently of the operation of the mind, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: For contradictories to be verified independently of the operation of the mind, a real distinction is required, I grant; otherwise, I deny. And I deny the consequence (2). (1) Cf. vol. II, pp. 486, ss.; pp. 422, ss. — On that Scotistic doctrine, one may read A. VACANT, Etudes comparées sur la philosophie de S. Thomas d' Aquin et sur celle de Duns Scot, pp. 20, ss. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 13, a.4, ad 2, q. 76, a. 3 ; GOUIN, Meto pAgo., q. 2, a. 2. § 1 ; Card. MERCER, n. 79; DOMET DE VORGES, c. VIII 1. — On the threefold truth. In Logic we distinguished a threefold truth: formal, which is the conformity of the intellect with the object; transcendental, which is the truth of being itself; moral, which is the conformity of signs or

words with the mind's sentiment. Concerning logical truth we have treated sufficiently elsewhere; the discussion, therefore, is about metaphysical truth. What does it imply and in what does it consist? II. — The truth of being implies formally an order or conformity to the intellect. When something is per se first such, others are not such except by order to it. But the intellect is per se first true. Therefore all other things are called true by order to the intellect. The major is an axiom, which is clear enough. For when something is per se first such, it is as it were the chief analogate in that genus; therefore other things cannot be called such except by order to that chief. Thus, because health is per se first in an animal, other things are denominated healthy by order to the animal. Proof of the minor, namely that the intellect is per se first true, or (1) One may consult Aristotle II Metaphys. c. 1, and VI Metaphys. c. 3. In these, however, he treats rather of the truth of cognition. Hence Domet De Vorges (op. cit.) holds that the notion of transcendental truth is of Christian origin « The notion of transcendent truth seems to us to have a Christian and Platonic origin. » — Consult S. Au- gustius, Solilog., I. II, c. 5, De vera Religione, c. 36; S. Axelimus, cc. 7- 11, Monolog., c. 31-36, Brevisio. i. f., c. 6; S. Thomas, I. Senz. dist. 17, and dist. 39, I. p. q. 16 Qo. De Peru. S. Bonaventur and Scotus in Senz.; Carneolus, dist. 19, q. 3, nov. Edit., t. II, pp. 157, ss.; Cajetanus, Banne, in I. P . q. 16; Suarez, disp. 8; Alamannus, IV P . Meta- phys., q. 17; and more recent Scholastics: Sanservirino, Ziolara, Lepid, Mercier, Domet De Voros, and Pioeus, Comment. Semine Theolo- gique, e°c.

that truth is found per se first in the intellect. Just as good names that towards which appetite tends, so truth names that towards which cognition tends. Therefore the true is properly and first had where cognition terminates. But the term of cognition is in the intellect: for while appetite is drawn to the appetible, the knowable, on the contrary, is drawn to the knower, and all cognition takes place insofar as the known is in the knower. Therefore truth is had primarily and properly in the intellect. It is necessary,

therefore, that « the notion of truth be derived from the intellect to the thing understood, so that the thing understood may also be called true according as it has some order to the intellect (1). » It is confirmed. From common usage, things are said to have the truth of being, or to be truly, when they are conformed to their type, or notion which all have of them. Thus, wine is said to be true insofar as it is conformed to the idea which all form of wine (2). Conformity, moreover, with the type, idea, notion, also implies conformity with the intellect, which produces the type, notion, idea. Therefore the truth of things, or transcendental truth, implies an order to the intellect. Finally, if truth did not imply that conformity, it would add nothing to being; hence entity and truth would exhibit only mere synonymy and tautology. On the contrary, truth is entity as knowable and intelligible. Hence truth and knowability, or intelligibility, are used promiscuously. But intelligibility necessarily implies an order to the intellect. Therefore truth also. III. — On the formal constitutive of transcendental truth. It is clear, therefore, that some relation

uncreated intellect. The truth of things, therefore, in the order of cognition does not originate from the truth of the divine intellect. There is, therefore, another proximate and immediate norm, in comparison with which the truth of things is estimated; and this is something abstracted from sensible experience, necessary and immutable. For the intellect, by abstracting properties and quiddity from sensible things, forms for itself a certain specific type, which exhibits necessary, immutable predicates, unshaken among all peoples. Thus, all agree on a certain immutable norm according to which a true straight line is judged, and on a certain fixed norm according to which true wine is judged: hence they are called a true straight line, and true wine, insofar as each corresponds to the immutable conception which all have of each; and so on for others (1). The proximate norm, therefore, is that specific type formed by abstraction, immutable and necessary; hence the truth of a thing is had proximately and immediately through relation

to that type, or is the conformity itself with that norm, or with the intellectual and necessary representation of that nature. The metaphysician, however, does not stop here; since he investigates the highest causes, not only in knowing, but especially in being, he proceeds further, ascends from the analytic order to the synthetic and ontological order, and points out the first and ultimate root of being and the norm of truth; and finally concludes that the divine intellect is the highest norm and cause of truth. The teaching of the Scholastics, therefore, is most beautiful and true, which simultaneously defends both, that our cognition begins from sensibles, and that God is the proper norm of truth (2). (1) « For the man of the North as for the man of the South, there is a set of properties which serve to define the specific nature of wine; for the Euclidean geometer, as for the partisan of non-Euclidean geometries, there is an abstract type characteristic of a straight line. Now, as soon as an abstract type, whatever it is, is subjected to analysis, there appear between its constitutive traits necessary, immutable relations... The judgments that men pronounce on the matter of beings are not in all points divergent and variable; there is in their object a part on which the agreement of intelligences is universal and constant. » Card. MERCKER, p. 98. (2) Cf. what has been said concerning the foundation of essences, above, Tract. I. q. 111, a. II. These things being explained and the danger of Ontologism and exaggerated Exemplarism being removed, it can safely and rightly be stated VI. — Conclusion: Simply and properly speaking, all things are called true by order to the divine intellect; not however by order to the human intellect except secondarily. — The truth of being is the conformity of a thing to the true intellect and to its norm; therefore it primarily consists in conformity to the supremely true and infallible intellect and to the first norm. The supremely true and infallible intellect and the first norm, however, is the divine intellect. Therefore the truth of being is said primarily by order to the divine intellect. Moreover, since truth is an order to intellect, a thing ought to be called primarily true with respect to the intellect to

which it has a per se order, but secondarily with respect to that intellect to which it has a per accidens order. For the judgment of a thing is not taken according to what belongs to it per accidens, but according to what belongs to it per se. But, in the ontological order, natural things have a per se order to the divine intellect, but per accidens to the human intellect. Therefore they are called primarily true with respect to the divine intellect, secondarily with respect to the created intellect.

The minor is declared. A thing has a per se order to the intellect on which it depends according to its being. But all things depend on the divine intellect according to their being, for the divine intellect is the first cause in which all created things are, just as all artifacts are in the mind of the artificer. Therefore natural things have a per se order to the divine intellect. A thing, on the contrary, has a per accidens order to the intellect by which it is known, but not made. Natural things, however, are indeed known by the created intellect, but are not made. Therefore they have a per accidens order to the created intellect. On the contrary, the cognition of the intellect depends on things and is measured by things: for cognition is said to be true only insofar as it is conformed to the thing. Hence the axiom: The truth of natural things is posterior to the divine intellect, posterior to the created intellect. — Arti ficial things, however, have a per se order to the intellect of the artificer; for they

depend on him in their being, since the idea of the artificer is the measure of the artifact. Hence things, as artificial, are called true by order to our intellect. Thus a house is true insofar as it is conformed to the idea of its artificer. We said: as artificial, for things of this kind already have their natural being, since all art is founded in nature; and according to this they do not depend essentially on our intellect, but are called true primarily with respect to the divine intellect; secondarily with respect to our intellect, as was said of natural things (1). VII. — Truth and being are convertible. Proof. Arg. Ium. Truth signi fies the knowable and intelligible. But everything insofar as it has being, is knowable. Therefore insofar as it is being, it is true, and

hence being and truth are convertible. The reason for the minor is that cognition is the assimilation of being itself and the intellect. Therefore the knowable is being itself as assimilable to the intellect. Therefore something is knowable insofar as it is being. Hence it follows that truth is being. On the other hand, every being is true insofar as it is being, because every being is conformed to intellect, actually or in aptitude, as the following argument shows. Arg. IIum. A thing is ultimately true by transcendental truth from the fact that it is conformed to the divine intellect, or archetype existing in the divine mind; and proximately true because it is conformed to the conception which ought to be had of it. But every thing is necessarily conformed to the divine archetype; for God, as supreme wisdom and supreme power, could not produce things except conformed to His archetype; every thing is also intelligible to our intellect (2), which can become all things and by abstraction fashion a necessary type which is the norm for the thing, to which each thing can be conformed. Arg. IIIum. Everything, by the very fact that it is, is truly that (1) CI. S. Thomas, I. P . q. 16, a. 1. (2) « Being is only worth existing on condition of being intelligent or at least intelligible. » Domnrt Dr. Vonons, t. I, p. 109. which it is. But it is what it is by its entity. Therefore it is true by its entity (1). Thus, truth adds nothing above the entity of a thing except an order to intellect. Transcendental truth is indeed convertible with being in substance; formal truth, however, is convertible with being as manifestative with manifested (2). The whole notion of truth, therefore, implies two things: real entity and the aptitude for conformity to intellect or some norm. Hence truth is distinguished from being by a lesser distinction of reasoned reason, insofar as the concept of being does not explicitly and expressly say this conformity, but the concept of truth expressly imports it. And this distinction of reason suffices so that being is said to be properly in things, but truth properly in the intellect. VIII. — The aforesaid conformity to intellect or norm can be in act or in aptitude. Transcendental truth abstracts from actual or potential cognition, and only implies being as intelligible and

assimilable and conformable to intellect. A thing, namely, is said to be true « insofar as it is apt to produce a true estimation of itself, and insofar as it imitates its proper notion, which is in the divine mind (3). » With respect to the divine intellect, things are actually adequate and actually conformed; with respect to the human intellect, however, things are apt to be adequate and conformed, that is, they are adequate and conformable.

The relation which truth implies, therefore, is actual or aptitudinal assimilation, conformity or conformability to intellect. IX. — In what way truth is in things. In order to the created intellect, truth is in things not formally and according to essence, but only causally. For things with respect to the created intellect are said to be true insofar as they are apt (1) Hence Bossuet writes: The true is what is; the false is what is not. « Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même, c. I, n. XVI. (2) To this belong the definitions of truth given by S. Augustine: Truth is that by which what is is shown (De vera Relig., c. 36), and by S. Hilary: Truth as declarative or manifestative of being (De Trinit., lib. 5, ante med.). (3) 8. Thomas, I. Cont. Gent., c. 60.

to produce a true apprehension of themselves. But this is nothing other than being the cause of truth existing in the intellect. — Things, therefore, relate to our intellect in the notion of truth, as medicine relates to an animal in the notion of health, namely causally and by order to the primary analogate. Truth, however, which is in things in order to the divine intellect is found in them properly and according to essence. For the aforesaid truth in the ontological order is the adequation of things with the eternal exemplars. But the adequation with the eternal exemplars is essentially in things; for things cannot subsist except through the divine intellect producing them in being. Therefore transcendental truth in order to the divine intellect is essentially in things. X. — Whether things are true by a single truth or by a multiple truth. To answer the question fully, truth can be considered in three ways: 1° properly and principally, namely by comparison to the divine intellect; 2° properly, but secondarily, that is by

comparison to the human intellect; 3° improperly, or fundamentally, as truth is said to be in things. In the first acceptation, all things are true by a single truth, because God knows all things by a single cognition. The divine cognition is said to be single, because it takes place through a single species, namely His essence, by a single act, in one and the same way. There is no variability of cognition in God, for that action does not regard some time, but is measured by eternity itself (1). In the second acceptation, there is a multiple truth: for truth (1) In this sense can be understood what Fenelon beautifully and eloquently recounts: « O truth more precious alone than all others together that I can discover! Truth which serves me in place of all others! No, I am ignorant of nothing, since I know what is all, and all that is not it is nothing. O universal, infinite, immutable Truth, it is therefore you that I know!... Nothing can have any degree of truth except through you, O first Truth! From you all beings issue as from their source; in you I find the immediate cause of all: your power, which is boundless, leaves no bounds to my contemplation... Your infinite astonishes and overwhelms me, it is my consolation: I am ravished that you are so great, that I cannot see you entirely; it is by this infinite that I recognize you as the Being who drew me from nothing. My spirit succumbs under so much majesty, happy to lower its eyes, unable to bear the brilliance of your glory. » Traité de l’existence de Dieu, II partie, c. II.

is received in many created intellects, and thus according to the multitude of intellects it is multiplied. Indeed, in the same intellect there are many truths. « In one way because of the diversity of known things of which it has diverse conceptions, which diverse truths follow in the soul. In another way from the diverse mode of understanding. For the course of Socrates is one thing, but the soul, which understands time by composing and dividing, understands the course of Socrates in diverse ways as present, past, and future, and according to this it forms diverse conceptions, in which diverse truths are found (1). » In the third acceptation, there are many truths for many things, but for

one thing there is only one truth. For truth thus taken is entity itself. But one thing has one entity; many things have many entities. Therefore one thing has one truth, many things have a multiple truth.

This multiple truth of things, however, is said by order to one truth, which is the truth of the divine intellect. For in all analogates there is one principal and supreme with respect to which others are said. Therefore, although created things are true by their own proper and intrinsic truth, they are all called true by relation to one supreme and unique truth (2).

XI. — WHETHER THE TRUTH OF THINGS IS ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE (3).

1° All things are true from eternity according to the truth of the divine mind. For truth is the adequation of intellect and thing. But from eternity the divine intellect and things are adequate. For although things do not yet exist, there is nevertheless an adequation; for in the commensuration of intellect and thing it is not required that both extremes actually exist. Thus our intellect is adequate to future things, which however are not yet in act, as when we say: Antichrist will be born. Hence this is denominated true by the truth which is in the intellect only, even when the thing itself does not exist. Similarly, the divine intellect could have been adequate from eternity to those things which were not from eternity, but were made in time, and thus those things which are in time can be denominated true from eternity by eternal truth. (1) S. Thomas, q. 1, De Veri., a. 5. (2) Cf. I. P . q. 16, a. 6. (3) Ibid., aa. 7 and 8. 2e Truth is immutable with respect to the divine intellect. For since truth is the adequation of intellect and thing, it can be varied either on the part of the intellect, from the fact that someone takes a different opinion about a thing remaining in the same state, or on the part of the thing, if the opinion remaining the same, the thing is changed. If, therefore, there is some intellect in which there cannot be an alternation of opinions or whose acceptation no thing, no change of a thing, escapes, in it there is immutable truth. But the divine intellect is of this kind. Therefore its truth is

immutable. Created truth, however, which we find in things and in the created intellect, is not properly eternal, since the thing or intellect in which it inheres is not from eternity. It can, however, be said to be eternal in another respect, because the truth of essences prescinds from all time; likewise it is said to be immutable, insofar as there is an invariable and necessary connection between essential predicates (1). XII. — In what way the truth of things is measure and measured. The Angelic Doctor excellently and elegantly explains the matter (2): « Natural things, from which our intellect receives knowledge, measure our intellect, as is said in X. Metaphys., but they are measured by the divine intellect, in which all created things are, just as all artifacts are in the intellect of the artificer. Thus, therefore, the divine intellect is measuring, not measured; but a natural thing is measuring and measured; but our intellect is measured, not measuring natural things indeed, but only artificial ones. » A natural thing, therefore, placed between two intellects, is called true according to adequation to both. For according to adequation to the divine intellect, it is called true, insofar as it fulfills that to which it is ordered by the divine intellect. According to adequation to the human intellect, however, a thing is called true because it is apt to form a true estimation of itself. » The first notion of truth, however, is inherent in a thing before the second, (1) To this pertains proposition 58 condemned by the S. R. and U. Inquisition by the decree « Lamentabili sane exitu » 3 July 1907: « Truth is no more immutable than man, since it evolves with him, in him, and through him. » (2) Q. 1. De Veri. a. 2. because the comparison to the divine intellect is prior to the human. Hence, even if the human intellect did not exist, things would still be called true in order to the divine intellect; but, if both intellects, which is impossible, were understood to be removed, in no way would the notion of truth remain.»

ARTICLE FIVE.

I. — The notion of falsity. Since falsity is opposed to truth, it is de fined from the opposite. Hence logical falsity, or in knowing, is the non-adequation of intellect and thing, insofar as the intellect knows a thing otherwise than it is; metaphysical falsity, or in being, would be the difformity of a thing with its norm or with the intellect to which it is said to be ordered; falsity in signifying is the difformity of the signification of words or writing with the thing signified; moral falsity, or falsity of sin, is the difformity of a human act with the rule of morals, or the difformity of the will with divine reason. II. — False is opposed to true not contradictorily, nor privatively, but contrarily. Contradiction is pure negation without a subject, namely it posits nothing nor determines a subject for itself, and for this reason it can be said both of being and of non-being, such as non-seeing and non- sitting. Privation is negation in a subject: it posits nothing real, but determines a subject for itself, namely the subject to which such a perfection is due. A contrary, however, since it is between two positive extremes, both posits something and determines a subject. But the false determines a subject and posits something in the subject: for, just as truth posits an adequate acceptation of the thing, so falsity posits a non-adequate or difform acceptation of the thing. Therefore falsity is opposed to truth not contradictorily, not privatively, but contrarily. III. — Falsity simply is not found in things depending on God, except in voluntary things, in which moral falsity can exist: but falsity in a certain respect can be in things by order to our intellect. (1) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 17, and his interpreters already cited.

It is briefly explained what falsity simply and in a certain respect is. Since truth and falsity are opposed, falsity simply occurs where truth is first and simply had. But the truth of a thing is said simply with respect to the intellect to which it has a per se order, or on which it depends in its being; in a certain respect, however, it is said with respect to the intellect to which it has a per accidens order, or on which it does not depend. Therefore falsity simply of a thing is

difformity with the intellect to which it has a per se order, or on which it depends in being: falsity in a certain respect is difformity of a thing with the intellect to which it has a per accidens order, or on which it does not depend in being. Now the I° part is proved. Falsity of a thing simply, in the ontological order, would be difformity of a thing with the divine intellect. But it is incompatible that a thing have difformity with the divine intellect. Therefore it is incompatible that there be falsity simply in things. The major is clear from the notion just given, and is again urged in this way: Natural things depend on the divine intellect, just as artificial things depend on our intellect. But artificial things are said to be false simply, because they fail to conform to the form of art. Therefore natural things are said to be false simply, because they fail to conform to the form which is in the divine mind, or because they are difform to the divine intellect. The minor is certain. Whatever happens in things proceeds from the ordination of the divine intellect. Therefore nothing in things can be difform to the divine intellect, otherwise God would be an impotent artificer, who is unable to produce things in being as He conceives them in His mind. The II° part is shown. Voluntary things can be compared to God as known to knower, and in this way they are always conformed to the divine mind, because they are always known as they are. In another way, as regulated to its rule, and in this way difformity, or moral falsity, can occur. For divine reason is the norm to which a human act ought to be conformed. But the free will, from the power of sinning which it has, can not conform its act to the eternal reason. Therefore in free agents a certain moral falsity can occur with respect to the eternal reason. The III° part is shown. 1° There is no falsity simply in things with respect to our intellect. What is per se and essentially being is per se and essentially true;

for being and truth are convertible. But every thing is per se and essentially being. Therefore it is per se and essentially true. 2° In a certain respect, however, it can be called false with respect to our intellect, and this in two ways. In one way, according to the notion of the signified, so

that that is said to be false in things which is signified or represented by false speech or intellect, according to which mode any thing can be called false with respect to what it is not, true with respect to what it is. Thus a true tragedian is a false Hector, as Augustine says (1). The tragedian truly has the being of a tragedian; according to this he is, therefore he can be called true; but he does not have the very being of Hector; according to this he is not, therefore he is called false. — In another way, a thing is said to be false by way of cause, insofar as it is apt to produce a false opinion of itself; which can happen thus: Since our cognition arises from sense, which concerns accidents, we judge things from external accidents. Therefore, when some things in external accidents have a likeness to other things, they are said to be false according to those things. Thus tin has external accidents similar to the external accidents of silver: hence it can sometimes produce in us a false opinion that it is silver, and so tin is said to be false silver. In this example the axiom is also verified: A thing according to what it is is said to be true, according to what it is not is said to be false. Tin truly has the being of tin: according to this it is, and is called true; it does not have the being of silver: according to this it is not, and is called false. Therefore true tin is false silver, just as a true tragedian is a false Hector. IV. — On logical falsity. This is the non-adequation of the intellect with the thing. It is properly had in judgment. Per se it never underlies apprehension; per accidens, however, it can underlie complex apprehension (2). Falsity, or error, however, is never present in cognition except under the influence of the will. For the intellect is determined to assent either by an evident object or by the will. But false cannot be an evident object which draws the intellect to assent. Other things which concern the truth and falsity of cognition are required in Log. Maj. Tract. II. (1) On the causes of error cf. Logic, pp. 253-254. 1. — The de finition of good. The definition of good given by the Philosopher is celebrated: Good is what all things desire. Good is described from its effect, which is to move appetite, just as motive power is usually manifested by

motion. All things. The meaning is not: nothing is good unless it is desired by all, as if all beings desired all good; on the contrary, it is certain that each thing desires a good proportioned to itself; but it is intended: all things desire some good and nothing is desired except because it is good and under the aspect in which it is good. Nor is the objection valid concerning some who desire evil; because they do not desire evil except under the aspect of good, insofar as they consider it good, and their intention is per se directed to good, but per accidens falls upon evil (2). Desire. A threefold appetite is distinguished: innate, which is the inclination of each thing to its own perfection; sensitive, following sensitive cognition; intellective, following the cognition of the intellect. When it is said: what all things desire, it is to be understood of every appetite, whether natural, sensitive, or intellectual. Natural things tend by natural appetite to good, not that they know good, but because they are moved to good by some knower, namely by the ordination of the divine intellect, in the way an arrow tends to the target from the direction of the archer. 1. — The de finition of good. The definition of good given by the Philosopher is celebrated: Good is what all things desire. Good is described from its effect, which is to move appetite, just as motive power is usually manifested by motion. All things. The meaning is not: nothing is good unless it is desired by all, as if all beings desired all good; on the contrary, it is certain that each thing desires a good proportioned to itself; but it is intended: all things desire some good and nothing is desired except because it is good and under the aspect in which it is good. Nor is the objection valid concerning some who desire evil; because they do not desire evil except under the aspect of good, insofar as they consider it good, and their intention is per se directed to good, but per accidens falls upon evil (2). Desire. A threefold appetite is distinguished: innate, which is the inclination of each thing to its own perfection; sensitive, following sensitive cognition; intellective, following the cognition of

the intellect. When it is said: what all things desire, it is to be understood of every appetite, whether natural, sensitive, or intellectual. Natural things tend by natural appetite to good, not that they know good, but because they are moved to good by some knower, namely by the ordination of the divine intellect, in the way an arrow tends to the target from the direction of the archer. (1) Cf. ARNSTOT. I. Ethic. and V. Metaphys. : S. AQUINISTUS. De Doctri- na christiania, lib. I, c. 32, P . L. XXXIV, 32, and De Trinit. lib. VIII, c. 3, P . L. XLII, 949 ; BONTIUS. De Hebdomad., circa med., P . L., LXIV, 1312, ss.; DIONYSIUS. De divin. nomin. c. 3, P . G., III, 679, c. 5, 815 ; 8. THOMAS, q. 21. De Veritat., and I. P . q. 5 ; CAJETANUS, BANKER, PÉQUES, in h. L. SUAREZ, disp. 10 ; ALAMANUS, q. 19 ; and more recent Scholastics cited above; COUSIN. Du Vrai, du Beau, du Bien. (2) S. THOMAS, I. Ethic., lect. 6. A di fficulty could be raised against the aforesaid definition. For just as good implies an order to appetite, so truth implies an order to intellect and cognition. But truth is not defined as: What all things know. Therefore good should not be defined as: What all things desire. Resp. : There is a great disparity. Truth cannot imply an order to all things, but only to those which can receive beings in an intentional mode and attract them to themselves: for cognition is perfected through an intentional species by virtue of which the known is drawn to the knower. Good, on the contrary, can imply an order to all things, because appetite is drawn to the thing itself, and the appetition is terminated in the thing according to its real being. Moreover, all beings can receive some being, namely some natural perfection. Wherefore good, which perfects appetite, can be said of all things in some way. Hence good is rightly defined as what all things desire, although truth cannot be defined as what all things know. II. — The notion of transcendental good consists in the perfection of a thing itself insofar as this perfection implies an order to appetite. Since good is what all things desire, the goodness of a thing consists in its appetibility. But the appetibility of a thing is nothing other than the perfection of the thing itself implying an order to appetite. Therefore transcendental goodness

consists in the perfection of a thing itself, insofar as it implies an order to appetite. The minor is declared. Nothing is appetible unless it suits appetite. Moreover, nothing truly suits appetite unless it in some way perfects it, just as, conversely, something is said to be unsuitable to a thing because it places some imperfection in it. Therefore appetibility is the perfection of a thing itself implying an order to appetite. Moreover, nothing is perfective of another unless it is perfect in itself; for nothing gives what it in no way has in itself. Hence good signifies being as perfect in itself and perfective of another. Being perfect in itself relates to good presuppositively; but what is properly constitutive of good, or formal, is being perfective of another, namely appetite. Cajetan (and, after him, Suarez, Card. Zigliara) distinguishes a twofold appetibility: fundamental and formal. Fundamental appetibility is the very notion by which being becomes appetible.

Being, however, becomes appetible because it perfects the appetent. Therefore fundamental appetibility is the perfection of the thing itself. Formal appetibility is the relation itself to appetite. Fundamental appetibility is of the essence of good, since it is the perfection of the thing itself, in which the notion of good consists, as has just been proved. Formal appetibility, however, is not of the essence of good, but its property. It is not of the essence, because a relation to appetite supposes that the thing is already perfective of appetite; it is, however, a property of good, or a necessary consequent, for from the fact that a thing is perfective of appetite, a necessary order to appetite immediately arises. good, considered as the object of other powers. But the objects of other faculties signify principally an absolute thing, and secondarily a relation to the faculty: thus flavor, the object of taste, denotes an absolute quality, with a relation to taste; odor, a positive quality with an order to smell. Therefore good implies primarily an absolute thing, secondarily a relation to appetite. This relation is not real, but of reason. For the order of good to appetite is the relation of measure to measured, for good specifies, and therefore measures, appetite. But the relation of measure to

measured is not real, because the measure does not really depend on the

measured. Therefore the relation of good to appetite is not real, but only of reason. III. — Opinions concerning the primary and constitutive notion of good. From the preceding argumentation it follows that two things are found in the notion of good: something absolute, namely the perfection of a thing, and something relative, namely suitability, or order to appetite. Hence diverse opinions have arisen concerning the formal constitutive of good. The first places it in the absolute: so Herveus, Molina. The second, attributed to Durandus, Capreolus, places it in some relation, or connotation. The third, which is that of Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Bannez, and many Thomists, teaches that goodness consists primarily and per se in some absolute nature, or perfection; secondarily, however, and consequently but necessarily, in a relation to appetite. We choose the last. Against the first, it is argued: Good cannot be placed in a purely absolute nature, for it relates to appetite as the visible to sight, the intelligible to the intellect. Moreover, the visible and the intelligible do not signify something purely absolute, but imply a relation to sight and intellect. Therefore neither can good be something merely absolute, but necessarily implies some relation. Against the second: Good necessarily, primarily, and principally implies the perfection by virtue of which it becomes appetible, or suitable to appetite. But a relation according to itself does not express perfection, but only a mere respect. Therefore the formal constitutive of good is not a relation. The last opinion remains. Good, as the object of appetite,

IV. — GOOD IMPLIES THE RELATION OF A FINAL CAUSE (1).

Good has the notion of appetible only because it is suitable. Now, something is considered suitable because it agrees and is adapted to its end. Hence, from common usage, a thing or person is esteemed good by co-aptation to its end. « In general, the goodness of a thing or person

consists in the adaptation of what it is, or what it does, to its purpose... The notion of goodness, one sees, is correlative to that of purpose or end. Suppress the end, there is no longer good; suppress finality, goodness vanishes (2). » These, therefore, are necessarily connected in the notion of end: appetibility, suitability, co- aptation to the end. In logical order and in knowing, appetibility is prior. « First things cannot be known through prior things, but are known through posterior ones, just as causes through their proper effects. But since good is properly a motive of appetite, it is described by the motion of appetite, just as motive power is usually manifested by motion (3). » — But in the ontological order and in being, suitability is prior: for a thing is considered and is appetible because it is suitable and co-adapted to its end. (1) « But good, since it has the notion of appetible, implies the relation of a final cause. » S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 5, a. 2, ad 1. — Cl. a. 4. (2) Card. MERCER, n. 113. (3) S. THOMAS, in I. EBIIC. Nic. lect. 1.

V. — Good and being are convertible in reality, but di ffer in reason, such that being is prior to good. The notion of good consists in this, that something is perfect and perfective. But nothing is perfect and perfective except insofar as it is being. Therefore nothing is good except insofar as it is being; and therefore every good is some being. Proof of the minor. Every perfection is a certain actuality. But every actuality is being itself, which is said to be the ultimate actuality of every form. Therefore nothing is perfect or perfective unless it is in act through being. On the other hand, every being is good. For good, as we have explained, is said to be that which is suitable and co-adapted to its end. But every being, since it is from God, the highest Wisdom and Power, cannot fail to be co-adapted to its end; moreover, experience and induction show that each being, whether in minerals, vegetables, animals, or intellects, agrees with its end (1). Moreover, whatever has the notion of perfect has the notion of good. But every being, insofar as it is being, is in act and in some way perfect, because every act is a certain perfection.

Therefore every being, insofar as it is such, is good (2). Good and being, therefore, are the same in suppositum; they are distinguished in reason, insofar as good adds to being the transcendental relation of suitability to appetite. Hence, because good adds to being, being is presupposed to good. First, therefore, in the conception of the intellect, being falls, then good; and so, according to reason, being is prior to good (3). VI. — On being simply and good simply. This distinction of reason su ffices so that being simply and good simply are taken in entirely different significations. Since being implies that something is properly in act, and act properly implies an order to potency, by this something is said to be being simply by which it is first discerned from what is only in potency. But something is first discerned from a being in potency through substantial being: (1) On this matter, consult Card. MEBCHEN, n. 122. — Let what has been said elsewhere concerning the twofold order, dynamic and teleological, which prevails in the world, be recalled. Vol. II, pp. 37-38. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 5, a. 3. (3) Ibid. a. 2. for each thing is properly placed in act through its substantial being. Therefore through its substantial being each thing is said to be being simply; but through superadded acts it is said to be being in a certain respect. Thus, being quantified, being white, comes to an already existing thing, but does not remove the thing from a state of potency simply so called. Therefore it cannot be called being simply, but only being in a certain respect. Being simply, therefore, has the notion of first being. But good implies the notion of perfect, which is appetible. Perfect, however, which according to etymology is the same as totally in act, designates that to which nothing is lacking according to the proper act of its nature; consequently it implies the notion of the ultimate. Hence that which is ultimately perfect is said to be good simply; but what does not have the ultimate perfection which it ought to have, although it has some perfection insofar as it is in act, is not called perfect simply nor good simply, but in a certain respect. Thus, therefore, according to first being, which is substantial, something is said to be being simply, and good

in a certain respect, that is insofar as it is being; but according to ultimate act, something is said to be being in a certain respect, and good simply (1). Now, the ultimate perfection is the ultimate end; then only will a creature be simply good when it attains its ultimate end and enjoys it. This end, however, cannot be obtained in the present life. Therefore no mortal can be called good and perfect simply. The Blessed, on the contrary, are simply perfect, since they are immovably established in the end. In another sense, being simply can designate what is absolutely, a being from itself; and good simply what is absolutely good and without limit. In which sense, good simply is good by essence, and in this acceptation no one is good except God alone; but good in a certain respect designates good by participation and emanating from another. (1) Ibid., a. 1, ad. 1. — « It is therefore true, as Boethius wished, that things are not said to be and to be good in the same way or according to the same reality, if it concerns being and being good, in the pure and simple sense: being, indeed, concerns substantial being, while being good concerns the completion of being by the presence of all that, even accidentally, contributes to its perfection. » P . Pécuves, O.P . Comm. Som- me Théol., t. I, 1 175.

VII. — A thing, to be good, must be existing or imply an order to existence. Proof. Good has the notion of appetible. But nothing is properly appetible unless it is existing or has an order to existence. Therefore. Proof of the minor. While cognition takes place insofar as the knowable is drawn to the knower, appetition takes place insofar as appetite is drawn to the appetible itself. But appetite cannot be really drawn except by something real, which is in act or at least in hope. Therefore the appetible must be real in act or in hope, that is, existing, or having an order to existing. Hence an actually existing being is properly called good; a being existing in hope, however, is called

good insofar as it has an order to actual existence. VIII. — Why mathematics are said not to be good. Hence those things which cannot actually exist do not have the notion of good. Wherefore Aristotle teaches that Mathematics are not

good (1). These words seem to imply something excessive; however, they can be taken in some hidden sense, as St. Thomas (2) and Cajetan (3) interpret. Mathematics can be considered in two ways: one absolutely, e.g., if quantity is inspected absolutely in itself, and then the judgment concerning mathematics is the same as concerning natural things: they are beings and good. Secondly, reduplicatively as mathematics, e.g., quantity abstracted from singular and sensible matter, and thus the saying of the Philosopher is taken. For beings are placed in three degrees, namely physical, mathematical, and metaphysical beings. These three exhibit something common, that they cannot exist in a state of universality; but the mode in which they subsist in their own degree of abstraction is entirely different. Metaphysics taken according to its abstraction, that is, according to abstraction from sensible and intelligible matter, subsist, because they have individuals abstracting from all sensible and intelligible matter: such are spirits, separate intelligences. Mathematics taken according to their proper abstraction, that is, abstraction from individual and sensible matter, do not subsist either in the universal or in the particular; because they have no individual in the nature of things, abstracting simultaneously from individual and singular matter: thus no abstract quantity exists. Physical beings, however, or natural beings, since they have no proper abstraction of their own, but only that which is common to all knowable things, namely by which the universal prescinds from the singular, subsist in the nature of things, insofar as they have individuals existing in sensible matter, with the other conditions which are explained in the treatise on universals. Thus it appears how Mathematics are said not to be good for some special reason, while Metaphysics and Physics are considered good without restriction. Metaphysics in its proper degree can have individuals; Physics also exists in the singular, although not in the universal; Mathematics, however, as such, exists neither in the universal nor in the singular (1). If, finally, Mathematics are taken subjectively, as science or habit of the intellect, they are without restriction good, like

other intellectual virtues. IX. — The notion of created good consists in mode, species, and order. Good implies perfect, or that to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its perfection. Now, for nothing to be lacking to a being, it must have form, for each thing is what it is through its form; however, certain things are pre-required for form, and certain things follow from form. Therefore, for something to be perfect, it must have both form, and those things which are presupposed to form, and those which follow from it. Moreover, that which is presupposed to form is the commensuration of principles, whether material or efficient; for form cannot be received except in a subject commensurate and proportioned to it. But what follows from form is an inclination to the end, or to action, or something of this kind, because each thing insofar as it is in act acts and tends to what suits it according to its form. Three things, therefore, are required: the commensuration of the subject to the form, the form itself, and the inclination of the form. (1) III Metaphys., c. 2. (2) I. P . q. 5, a. 3, ad 4. (3) Comm. in I. P . q. 5, a. 3.

The commensuration of the subject to the form is called mode; by the very fact that something is measured, it acquires a certain mode, hence it is said that measure prescribes mode. Form, however, is signified by species, because through form each thing is constituted in species; the inclination, finally, is order to something, hence it is signified by order. Therefore created good consists in mode, species, and order (1). These three are reduced to measure, number, and weight, concerning which the Wise man says (2): You have arranged all things in number, weight, and measure. — Measure corresponds to mode, because, as Augustine says, measure prescribes the mode for every thing. Number, however, corresponds to species, for species are like numbers, nothing can be added to them, nothing subtracted. Weight, finally, corresponds to order, for inclination and love is a certain weight: My love, my weight (3).

In these three is represented some vestige of the Holy Trinity. Measure and mode imply substance limited by its

principles, which is the principle of all things which are in the thing; and so it signifies the Father, who is the Principle not from a principle. Species, or form, implies the species, or idea which is in the mind of the artificer, and so it signifies the Son, who is the Word and idea of the Father; weight and order designate love, and so they signify the Holy Spirit, who is the Love of the Father and the Son (4). X. — The division of good into true and apparent. Good is the perfection of the appetent. Either, therefore, it truly perfects the appetent or only apparently. In the first case, it is true good; in the other, apparent good, or false good. Moreover, just as it is incompatible that something totally false be known, so it is incompatible that something totally evil be desired. Therefore false good must be, in some respect, true good. This happens thus: In the created appetent, several appetitions are distinguished: one superior and principal, others inferior; each tends to some good proportioned and different. (1) Cf. S. A u g u s t i n . De N a t u r a B o n i , c. 3, P . L. X L V I I . 5 3 5 ; S. T h o - m a s , I. P . q. 5, a. 5 ; P . P r o v e s , i n h. 1. (2) Sap. XI. 21. (3) Cf. S. A u g u s t i n . De G e n e s . a d l i t e r . , l i b . I V , c. 3, P . L. X X X I V , 2 9 9 . (4) Cf. S. T h o m a s , I. P . q. 4 5 , a. 7 . — C f . also our work: La

It can happen, however, that what suits the inferior appetition is repugnant to the superior; and hence it will be something truly good with respect to the inferior tendency, but false good with respect to the superior. Moreover, the proper perfection of the subject is considered not according to the inferior appetite, but according to the principal one. Wherefore that alone is true good, and true perfection of the appetent, which agrees with the superior tendency. Consequently, that which obstructs such a tendency, although it is a true good with respect to the inferior tendency, is simply false good with respect to the appetent subject. Thus, carnal pleasure against the dictate of reason is a true good of sense; but because it is repugnant to the principal appetite according to which the proper perfection of man is estimated, it simply does not suit man; indeed, it makes him worse, hence it is called false, or apparent, good.

Virtue, on the contrary, perfects the subject according to the superior tendency, and therefore is the true good of man. Therefore true good is false under no respect: apparent good, however, is true under some respect, namely considering the inferior tendency, but under the principal respect, namely considering the superior tendency, it is false. XI. — Another division into honest, useful, and delightful good (1). This division is properly of human good. Honest is said to be that which is fitting by its own nature, and which is desired for its own sake; useful, that which is ordered as a means to another; delightful, that which is desired for the sake of the rest, or delight attached to it. If, however, we consider the notion of good more deeply and commonly, this division is found to belong properly to good insofar as it is good. For good is something insofar as it is appetible and the term of the motion of appetite. But the term of motion is threefold. Therefore good is divided in three ways. Proof of the minor. There is a term simply, or ultimate, which does not tend to another; and a term in a certain respect, that is an intermediate term, which terminates some part of the motion, but again is ordered to another. Moreover, the ultimate term of motion can be taken in two ways: either the thing itself to (1) Cf. S. T h o m a s , I. P . q. 5, a. 6 ; C a j e t a x u s , P b o v e s , i n h. I.

which one tends, hence there is the term, or the end which; or rest in that thing, the term, or end by which. Therefore there will be a threefold good according to this threefold term: Good terminating the motion of appetite in a certain respect, as a means through which one tends to another, is called useful. That which ultimately and totally terminates appetite, as the thing

towards which appetite per se tends, is called honest, because honest is said to be that which is desired for itself. That, finally, which terminates the motion of appetite as rest in the desired thing, is delightful (1). « This division, continues the Angelic Doctor, is not by opposed things, but by opposed notions. — However, those things which have no other notion of appetibility except delight are properly

called delightful, although they are sometimes harmful and dishonorable. Useful, indeed, are called those which do not have in themselves a reason for being desired, but are desired only as leading to another, such as taking bitter medicine. True honest things are said to be those which have in themselves a reason for being desired. »

XII. — SOME AXIOMS PERTAINING TO THIS SUBJECT.

1° Good arises from an integral cause, evil from any defect. Good implies perfect, but perfect implies that to which nothing is lacking. Therefore for good it is required that nothing be lacking to the being of principles, or causes, which constitute it; or an integral cause is required. Evil, however, is the privation of due good; but as soon as some defect is present, the privation of due good is incurred. Evil, therefore, arises from any defect. 2° Good is di ffusive of itself (2). Good has the notion of an end; for the end of every agent is to induce some perfection, but good and perfect mutually imply each other. Therefore every agent has good as its end. Moreover, it pertains to the notion of end to move. Good, therefore, relates as a certain mover. But truly every mover, by the very fact that it moves, communicates its motion to the mobile. Hence good, by the very fact that it moves to the notion of end, communicates its goodness to others and diffuses itself into others. Moreover, it pertains to good and perfect to assimilate others to itself. (1) « It would have been di fficult to justify in a more profound and luminous way this traditional division. » Pâvons, loc. cit. (2) Cf. S. Thomas, I. Cent. Gent., c. 37. It assimilates others to itself by communicating to them something of itself, and the better something is found, the more it diffuses its goodness to more remote things. « Di ffusion can be from good in two ways, says St. Bonaventure: either by way of multiplication, as heat or light is said to diffuse itself; or by way of useful operation, by which mode a good man is said to diffuse his goodness, while he operates and labors so that others may receive goodness not from him, but from God (1). » It should be noted that good which is diffusive of itself can be a necessary or a free cause: a necessary cause necessarily diffuses its good; a free cause, however, can communicate

itself, but is not necessarily bound to communicate itself in act: hence, although God is from eternity the supreme good, He is not therefore bound to communicate Himself from eternity (2). 3° God is the good of every good (3). The meaning is not that God is the intrinsic and constitutive reason of the goodness of creatures, but that He is the efficient, exemplary, and final cause of this goodness. 4° Every being is good in itself and good to another. Good in itself. Every being in itself has its species, its mode, and its order. But good consists in mode, species, and order, as was said n. IX. Therefore every being is good in itself. Moreover, this is clear from the saying: Good and being are convertible. Good to another. For good is diffusive of itself. But to diffuse itself to another is to be good to it. Therefore it is good to another. There prevails, therefore, a most general and transcendental attraction by virtue of which every being attracts and is attracted: it attracts, because it is suitable and good to another; it is attracted, because the other is suitable and good to it. 5° Insofar as we are, we are good (4). Because being and good are convertible, from that from which a thing has being it has being good, not however in such a way that being simply is good simply, nn.V. and VI. (1) S. Bonaventura, Sen. XI. dist. 10, a. 2, q. 1. (2) Cf. vol. II, pp. 66-67. (3) S. Avotensis, De Trinit., lib. VIII, c. 3, P . L., XLII, 949. (4) S. Avotensis, De Dectrin. ebrist. lib. I, c. 32, P . L. XXXII, 82. 1. — Evil is the privation of good. One of the opposites is known from the other, as darkness through light. Hence from good we must learn what evil is, which is the opposite of good. Evil

is opposed to good contrarily or privatively according to different respects. If evil is taken concretely as the subject which is called evil, it is opposed contrarily, as vice is opposed to virtue; if, however, it is taken formally, as the notion according to which something is called evil, it is opposed privatively, and thus is defined: The privation of due good. Evil, therefore, formally taken does not imply any being, any form, or perfection, but only the absence of due good. For whatever is appetible is good. But every being desires its being, its form. Therefore every being, every

form, or nature, is some good; consequently evil signifies neither being nor form nor any nature. It remains, therefore, that by the name of evil is implied a certain absence of good. For the notion of evil, however, not just any lack of good suffices, « otherwise it would follow that those things which do not exist at all would be evil, and again that any thing would be evil because it does not have the good of another thing, as that a man would be evil because he does not have the swiftness of a goat, or the strength of a lion (2).» Evil, therefore, is constituted by the absence of due good; or due good to itself, as when something is said to be evil in itself; or due good to another, as when something is said to be evil, or harmful, to another. Hence the saying is understood: Evil is distant both from being simply and from non-being simply, because it is neither as a habit nor as pure negation, but as a privation (1). II. — The division of evil. Evil is adequately divided into physical evil and moral evil. Proof. Every evil is an evil of a thing or an evil of an operation. But evil of a thing is called physical; evil of an operation, however, moral evil. Therefore. Proof of the major. Evil is the privation of good, which consists principally and per se in perfection and act. But there is a twofold act, first and second: first indeed is a thing, that is, form or integrity of the thing; second, however, is operation. Therefore evil will be twofold: evil of a thing, which is the privation of form, or of some part which is required for the integrity of a thing, such as blindness is an evil, and to lack a limb; and evil of an operation, which is the privation of due free operation; either because it does not exist, or because it does not have due mode and order. There is no metaphysical evil, such as Leibniz advocated. Evil of this kind would be imperfection, or limitation of any created thing, or lack of non-due perfection. But limitation or lack of further perfection is essential to a creature, nor is it evil for it: hence man is not considered evil because he does not have the swiftness of a goat nor the strength of a lion, as the Angelic Doctor wittily observes. Evil is properly that which deprives a thing of due perfection, n. I. And this privation is of a thing or of an

operation: physical evil or moral evil (2). III. — Evil of fault and of punishment. In voluntary agents, evil acquires a special notion and a special name. For good is simply the object of the will; wherefore evil, which is the privation of good, is found in rational creatures endowed with will according to a special notion. Physical evil has the notion of punishment, because it is contrary to the will and is inflicted by order of divine providence and justice as punishment for sin; moral evil, however, has the notion of fault: this (1) Cf. S. A u c u s t i n u s , De Mor. Manich., lib. II, c. 4, De Cio. Dei, lib. X1, c. 22, De Vera Relig. c. 24, De Doctrina Christ., lib. I, c. 32 ; D i o n s s , De d e c i n . n o m i n . c. 4, P . G., 715, 534, ss.; S. T h o m a s , I. P . qq. 48 and 49, Qq. D i s p . d e M a l o ; A l a m a n n u s , q. 20 ; and interpreters of St. Thomas already cited. (2) I. P ., q. 48, a. 3.

is imputed to someone as fault, when it fails from a perfect action, of which he is master according to his will. Thus every evil considered in voluntary things is punishment or fault, it is sin or punishment of sin. IV. — Fault has more of the notion of evil than punishment. Good simply consists in act. But ultimate act is operation, or the use of possessed things. Therefore the good of man is simply to be placed in the good use of things. But we use all things through the will. Therefore from a good will by which a man uses well the things he has, he is called a good man, and from an evil will, evil. For he who has an evil will can also use well what he has badly, as if a grammarian knowingly speaks incongruously. But fault consists in an evil will, or in a disordered act of the will; punishment, however, does

not consist in an evil will, but in the privation of something of those things which the will uses. Therefore from the evil of fault someone becomes evil, but not from the evil of punishment. Therefore fault has the notion of evil more perfectly than punishment. Moreover, that is a greater evil which deprives of a greater good. But punishment deprives of the good of a creature; fault, however, is properly opposed to uncreated good; since it is contrary to the fulfillment of the divine will and to the divine love by

which divine good is loved in itself and not only as participated by a creature. Therefore fault is a greater evil than punishment. Finally, the evil of punishment is assumed or inflicted because of the evil of fault. But a greater is not inflicted for a lesser, but conversely. Therefore (1). V. — The perfection of the universe requires that some evil be found in things. The perfection of the universe requires that there be in things all degrees of goodness, at least generic degrees. But the degrees of goodness are such that something is so good that (1) Hence it is understood what is to be thought of the doctrine of Tolstoi, who acknowledges no other evil except violence, or coaction. « Evil is violence. » — Violence and coaction can be physical evil, and sometimes moral; but on the other hand they can have the notion of good, indeed of a great good, insofar as they are inflicted to restrain the evil of fault and to protect order. — On that Tolstoian theory one may read G. Fonskovius, Revus Abdomadaire, 5 octob. 1907. it can never fail from good; and something so good that it can sometimes fail from good; just as in things are found beings which can never lose being, such as incorruptible beings; and some which can lose being, such as corruptible beings. Therefore the perfection of the universe, just as it requires that there be incorruptible and corruptible beings, so it requires that there be beings which can fail from good and beings which cannot fail from good. But to fail from good is a certain evil. Therefore the perfection of the universe requires that some evil be found in things. Evil, therefore, exists really in things, not as some positive being, but as real corruption and real privation: for there exist in the world beings which are really deprived of some good, or of some perfection due to them. VI. — What is the cause of evil. A fourfold cause is assigned: e fficient, material, formal, and final. « Evil does not have a formal cause, but is rather a privation of form, and similarly it does not have a final cause, but is rather a privation of order to the due end. For not only the end has the notion of good, but also the useful which is ordered to the end (1). » Concerning the material and efficient cause, therefore, the question is only raised. VII. — First

conclusion: Evil is in good as in a subject or material cause. Proof. Evil is the privation of good. But every privation demands a subject, since it is a negation in a subject. Therefore evil requires a subject. Moreover, every subject is some being, and therefore some good, since every being is convertible with good. Therefore evil requires good as a subject. Hence, if evil were found without admixture of good, without any good subject in which it is received, it would thereby vanish, as the Philosopher says: If evil is integral, it will destroy itself (2). VIII. — Second conclusion: Evil is from good as from an agent cause, not however per se, but per accidens (3). Proof of the I° part. Evil is a defect of good which is apt to (1) S. THOMAS, I. P ., q. 49, a. 1. (2) ARISTOT. IV Ethic. c. 5, (al. 11). (3) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P ., q. 49, a. 1, and II Sent., dist. 34, a. 4.

be had. But nothing fails from that which it is apt to have except from some cause drawing the thing outside its disposition: thus, a heavy body is not moved upwards unless impelled by something; nor does an agent fail in its action except because of some impediment. Therefore evil arises from some cause drawing the thing outside its disposition. But to be a cause cannot belong except to good, because nothing can be a cause except insofar as it is being, and

therefore insofar as good, since being and good are convertible. Therefore the cause effectively producing evil cannot be except good. The II° part is proved. Whatever is per se the cause of something tends per se to its proper effect. But it is incompatible that a good agent tends to evil as to its proper effect. Therefore. Proof of the minor. Every agent intends an effect like itself: for this is the end of the agent, to assimilate the effect to itself. Therefore a good agent per se intends a good effect. If, therefore, an evil effect follows, it is beyond intention and per accidens. This per accidens, however, in natural things can happen on the part of the cause and on the part of the effect. On the part of the cause, indeed, it is in two ways: 1° From the virtue or perfection of the agent; 2° from the defect of the agent. From the perfection of the agent, when to the form intended by the agent there follows by necessity the privation of

another form, as to the form of fire follows the privation of the form of wood. This happens indeed from the perfection of fire, which the stronger it is in power, the more perfectly it impresses its form and corrupts the contrary; but on the other hand per accidens, because fire does not intend to deprive the wood of its form, but to induce its own form; in doing which it also causes that per accidens. From the defect of the agent, this happens either because of the weakness of the principal cause, as the defect of motive power in children, or because of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the lame. The agent, however, whether principal or instrumental, does not cause evil insofar as it is an efficient cause, but insofar as it is a deficient cause: as efficient it is a being in act, and a perfect being, therefore it operates good. Therefore if evil follows, that is, a defect of being, and a defect of due perfection, this arises from the cause as deficient. Hence the saying: Evil does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one.

ART. VII — ON EVIL.

In the effect, however, evil sometimes arises from a defect of action, which flows into a defect of some principle, as has been said; sometimes from the indisposition of matter, which is not apt to receive the impression of the agent, from which necessarily a defect follows in the effect, as when monstrous births follow because of the indisposition of matter. In voluntary agents, however, moral evil is not considered from the matter or form of the effect, but follows only from the agent. Moreover, the principal agent of a moral act is the will, since an act is called moral because it is voluntary. In the act of the will, therefore, the root and origin of moral sin is to be sought. But more on these by the moralists. IX. — Whether God can be the cause of evil. Resp. : 1° God can by no means be the cause of the evil of fault. For the evil of fault is a recession from God. But God cannot be the cause of recession from Himself, as is clear. Therefore. 2° God cannot be the cause of evil which arises from a defect of the agent, since He is the highest virtue and the highest perfection. 3° God is the cause per

accidens of evil which consists in the corruption of some things. An agent, insofar as by its power it produces some form to which corruption and defect follow, per accidens causes by its power that corruption and defect. But the form which God causes in things is the good of the order of the universe, which requires that there be corruptions and defects in things. Therefore God, by causing the good of the order of the universe in things, causes per accidens the corruptions of things, or physical evil. 4° God causes the evil of punishment. For He causes the order of the universe. But to the order of the universe also pertains the order of justice, which requires that fitting punishment be inflicted on sinners. Therefore God causes the evil of punishment to preserve the order of justice. X. — It is incompatible that any evil nature exist, and a fortiori, one supreme evil which is the cause of all evil. Among the Persians there prevailed the doctrine of a twofold principle, good and evil, which was successively taken up by the Gnostics (1), the Manichaeans (1), (1) Cf. J. TIXESORT, Histoire des Dogmes, ch. IV, Les hérésies du IIe siècle.

the Albigenses: there are, therefore, good substances from a supreme good, and evil substances from a supreme evil. Such great madness scarcely needs refutation; both parts are therefore briefly explained.

ARTICLE EIGHT.

I° part. Every substance has first being, and therefore good, although not good simply, art. preced., nn. V and VI. Whatever is in nature, whether essence or accidents, implies only good: essence is first act and perfect, existence is second act and more perfect; accidents have the notion of perfective and completive. II° part. Since evil is the privation of being, or non-being, supreme evil would be supreme non- being. But supreme non-being is impossible in terms. Therefore. Moreover, supreme evil would be integral evil. But, if evil is integral, it will destroy itself, because then there will be no subject in which it is received, and with the subject removed, the evil itself is removed, n. VII. (1) Cf. S. ACOUSTIN. Conf., lib. IV, c. 15, n. 24 ; De Cic. Dei. lib. XI, c. 27 ; Qq. 83, q. 5 ; S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 49, a. 3, III. Cent. Gent. capt. 13, 15, De f. c. q. 3, a. 6.

On The Beautiful (1).

I. — Two things concur in the subjective notion of beauty: vision and complacency. The beautiful can be defined from St. Thomas: That which pleases when seen (2). Just as we described good from its effect, so also the beautiful from its proper effect, which is to delight the one seeing. Two things, therefore, are especially to be noted in the analysis of the beautiful: vision and delight, or complacency. Vision denotes a certain perfect cognition by which a thing is intuitively perceived. For beauty, not just any cognition suffices, but a certain vision, or intuition, is required by which the object is, as it were, comprehended. This vision designates not only the cognition of the senses, but also and especially the contemplation of the mind. Secondly, it is required that by virtue of this cognition complacency arise. In every perfect cognition, indeed, a certain complacency is found, which is certainty, or rest in known truth as truth; but this does not suffice for beauty, a special sense of pleasure and sweetness is required which arises from the contemplation (1) One may consult: 8. AUGUSTINUS, Confes., lib. IV, c. 13 ; De Vera Relig., cc. 30-32 ; Epist. XVIII ad Coelest. n. 2 ; De Civiti. Dei, lib. XXII, c. 19 ; De natura Boni, cont. Man., c. 8, De Genesi, cont. Man. lib. I, c. 21 ; B. THOMAS, Opusc. De Pulchro and Sum. Theol. . P . q. 5, a. 6, ad 1, q. 39, a. 8, 1a 11e, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3 ; CROUSAT, Traité du Beau, Amsterdam, 1724 ; P . AXONB, Essai sur le Beau, Paris, 1763 ; edit. COUSIN, 1843 ; HERMESON, Recherches sur l'origine de nos idées de Beauil and de Vertu, Lond. 1753 ; KANT, Traité du Beau et du Sublime ; Ch. LÉVÉQUÉ, La Science du Beau étudiée dans son principe, dans ses applications et dans son histoire ; COUSIN, du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien ; LÉRICHALAS, Études esthétiques ; TAISE, Philosophie de l'Art ; VALLET, L'Idée de Beau dans la Philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin ; DE SNEUT, La Théorie du Beau, selon les idées de saint Thomas d'Aquin ; DE WULF , La valeur esthétique de la moralité dans l'art ; GARD. MERCKER, Ontol. nn. 266-282 ; and more recent Scholastics, in Ontol. (2) I. P . q. 5, a. 6, ad. 1.

of things. These two must be entirely inseparable: if there is only vision without special complacency, truth is had, not beauty; if, however, there is only complacency of appetite without order to the cognitive power, good is had, not beauty. Hence it is clear what is to be thought of the difference between good and beautiful. The Greek Philosophers unanimously held that good and beautiful are entirely the same, and Socrates had expressed this confusion

of beauty and good by one word: Kalokagathia. The Neoplatonists and many moderns adhered to this opinion. The true opinion, however, can be expressed thus: II. — The beautiful and the good are indeed the same in subject, but their concepts are formally different. Proof of the I° part. Those things which are founded on the same thing are the same in subject. But the beautiful and the good are founded on the same thing, namely form: from form it arises that the subject is real, perfect, beautiful; indeed, the principal element of beauty is nothing other than the splendor of the form itself. Therefore the beautiful and the good are the same in subject. Hence many philosophers, even moderns (1), hold, with Cajetan, that beauty is a certain species of good. The II° part is shown. The beautiful and the good di ffer in two ways. 1° Good implies only the complacency of appetite; the beautiful, however, implies both vision and complacency proceeding from vision. Hence good is defined: That which simply pleases appetite; the beautiful, however: That whose apprehension pleases. The beautiful, therefore, adds to good a certain order to the cognitive power. « Hence those senses especially regard beauty which are most cognitive, namely sight and hearing, serving reason; for we say beautiful visible things and beautiful sounds. In sensibles of other senses, however, we do not use the name of beauty: for we do not say beautiful tastes or odors (2). » 2° Good implies the relation of a final cause; the beautiful, (1) Especially PALMERII, OnsL, c. 4, thes. 3; WILLEMS, OnsL, DOMIT DE VOANOS, t. I, p. 143. (2) S. THOMAS, I° II°, q. 27, n. 1, ad 3. however, properly pertains to the notion of formal cause. For beauty, as has been said,

regards the cognitive power. Moreover, all cognition takes place through assimilation, which indeed regards form; for likeness is a form of a thing existing beyond the thing. Therefore beauty regards form and pertains to the notion of formal cause. III. — The beautiful is also distinguished from truth. It indeed supposes truth and is founded in it; but it adds something to it. For truth, the adequation between intellect and thing suffices; for beauty, however, something more special is desired, namely a certain singular splendor and excellence of truth, so that the knower is more deeply and vividly affected by the object and perceives sweetness by contemplating the object. IV. — Certain de finitions of beauty are examined. Some moderns call beautiful that which is new, or which by its novelty strikes, moves, and attracts the intellect. But, on the contrary, it is clear that not every new thing is beautiful: crimes, monsters, fortuitous things, etc., lack beauty, although they appear new. On the other hand, many things lack novelty, yet are considered beautiful, such as the beautiful sky, beautiful mountains, beautiful nature, a beautiful soul, etc. Nor is the other definition which is handed down approved by us: Beauty is that which imitates nature. For beauty does not belong only to, nor to all nature; there are, on the contrary, many things imitating nature which are nevertheless considered ugly and are. The definition attributed to Plato, although the very words are not read in Plato's works, namely: Beauty is the splendor of truth, will be legitimate if it falls into the Thomistic definition itself: which when seen pleases. For truth implies an order to cognition; splendor, however, adds something to cognition by virtue of which sweetness and complacency arise in the knower. If, however, truth is taken strictly, it will be inadequate, for not only splendid truth, but many other things, are considered beautiful. The definition of St. Augustine also holds: Beauty is the splendor of order. Order is a certain truth which implies variety, integrity, proportion, unity; splendor, however, adds the principal and more formal element. The definition, however, does not explicitly state the elements of beauty. This is excellently achieved by

the following definition attributed to the Angelic Doctor: Beauty is the splendor of form upon proportioned parts of matter, or upon diverse powers, or actions (1). V. — The conditions of beauty. From this de finition it follows that beauty implies: 1° Variety, since it says parts of matter, or diverse powers or actions; 2° proportion, which for full and perfect attainment requires that all parts be found integral, and therefore that 3° integrity exists; and moreover that parts do not remain scattered and dispersed, but coalesce into some one

thing, hence 4° unity is required. And finally, what is formal in beauty is splendor, clarity. These five are included in these three which St. Thomas posits: « For beauty three things are required: first, integrity or perfection, for those things which are diminished are thereby ugly; and due proportion or consonance, and again clarity, hence those which have a bright color are said to be beautiful (2). » Integrity, moreover, also implies variety and unity. VI. — Beauty requires variety. We call beautiful that which when known pleases. For complacency to arise from cognition, variety is required in the object. Since man is not a simple being, but coalesces from many parts, he cannot be totally and fully satisfied in something uniform and simple; for what delights one part, another will perhaps displease. Where there is diversity, however, complacency and rest are more easily had. Beauty also requires all degrees of perfection which can be had in it; hence it is commonly exhibited as fullness, perfection, or excellence of perfection, as the foundation of beauty. Such, however, is the condition of creatures, that all perfections are not found in one simple thing, but in diverse things. Therefore, with variety excluded, beauty cannot be perfectly had. Finally, variety sharpens study, repels boredom, recreates a tired mind, and produces complacency. It is understood here, however, that there is either real variety or at least some (1) Opusc. de Pulchre et Bono. Some attribute the aforesaid little work to B. ALBERT, others, with UCCELLI, to S. THOMAS AQUINAS. (2) I. P ., q. 39, a. 8. one thing which is equivalent to several really varied things. Thus the divine

essence is most beautiful, because, although most simple, it is equivalent to variety, namely to many really distinct things. Variety, however, must not be excessive. Hence in art care must be taken lest division be excessive, and lest unsociable or too disparate things be joined. VIII. — Beauty requires integrity. Beauty demands perfection, indeed excellence of perfection. But perfect is said to be that to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its nature. The notion of beauty, therefore, requires that nothing be lacking to the being, or that it be entirely integral. Concerning beauty, as concerning good, the saying holds: From an integral cause. This integrity, moreover, implies a certain magnitude, whence the Philosopher says: Beauty is not except in great bodies, hence small men can be called well-proportioned and handsome, but not beautiful (1). Magnitude, moreover, which integrity implies, designates generally a certain pre-eminence, or a mode of having its elements in some excellent and eminent degree. It can be either dimensative magnitude exceeding the mediocrity of the species, as men who exceed the mediocrity of human stature are called beautiful; or intensive magnitude, in activity and virtue. In spiritual things, magnitude is a certain eminence either in the mode of possessing perfection in the essence itself, or in activity, virtue, and operation. VIII. — Beauty requires proportion and harmony. Proportion is the right disposition of all parts among themselves and of each part with the whole; harmony, however, is, as it were, the complement of proportion, and makes diverse parts not remain disparate, but rightly agree with each other; hence it is defined: The consonance of diverse things. That proportion is required for beauty is not to be doubted. For proportion represents order. But beauty does not consist without order; hence disordered things immediately become ugly. Beauty can indeed permit certain evils, provided they are reduced to order, according to the saying: (1) Ethic., lib. IV, c. 6.

Evils reduced to order contribute to the notion of beauty. Proportion and order, therefore, or the due disposition assigning each its place to like and unlike things, are always

required. One may rightly ask, with the illustrious Domet de Vorges, how the proportion of parts is preserved in simple yet beautiful things. « Priam says: Achilles, like the gods, remember your father! these words strike by their beauty. Where is the proportion of parts? (1) » — Our assertion is understood either of real parts or of some excellent thing which is equivalent to several proportioned things. Moreover, even in the aforesaid case, if all things are considered,

the words themselves, the person speaking, the one to whom the speech is directed, and all circumstances, proportion and harmony are found. IX. — Beauty requires unity. The perfection of a being cannot be preserved without unity; and, just as a being desires its being, its perfection and beauty, so it desires its unity. Hence we see beings resisting their division as much as possible. And the more perfect they are, the greater unity they enjoy. A plant is more one than a stone, man more one than an animal, and in man himself the intellect is more one than sense, for the intellect alone perceives all those things which are simultaneously attained by the external and internal senses. An angel is more one than man; for an angel understands many things by a single idea which in man require multiple ideas; and the highest angels use still fewer ideas than the lowest; and finally in God there is a single idea which is convertible with His essence. Hence the axiom: what is divided in lower things is united in higher (2). Unity, therefore, contributes to perfection and beauty. Wherefore St. Augustine says: The form of all beauty is unity (3). For beauty, as has been said, demands order. But diverse parts cannot consist in order unless there is some one form which collects, compels, and contains all things into one. X. — Finally, splendor, clarity is required. Light, splendor, color have always been included in the notion of beauty. (1) Opus cit , p. 145. (2) Cf. our work. La Lumière et la Foi, pp.21, ss. (3) Cf. S. Avocensis, De Vera Relig., c. 41. Hence the Greeks placed beauty in proportion and color; Cicero especially praises the pleasantness of color in beauty; according to the Neoplatonists, beauty and light are convertible; Augustine

also wishes the pleasantness of color to shine in beauty; the Angelic Doctor, in the cited text, places clarity or resplendence among the conditions of beauty. The reason for this is clear. Beauty is that which when seen pleases. But every vision, and especially delightful vision, demands some light, or clarity, on the part of the object: for each thing is visible and knowable insofar as it is clear, and recedes from knowability, visibility, and delightfulness insofar as it becomes obscure. Therefore, for the object to delight the cognitive faculty, it must enjoy some clarity, indeed shine with special elegance and sweetness, and hence complacency arises. XI. — What is that resplendence? Does material clarity and pleasantness of color su ffice? A higher and more sublime doctrine is opened by the definition attributed to the Angelic Doctor: that clarity of beauty is the resplendence of form. Form is that which constitutes a thing in a determinate species, or essence: wherefore the splendor of form is the splendor of essence itself. It is necessary, namely, that all clarity which is in a thing be derived from essence (1). For each thing is known and defined through its form, or species; form, therefore, in the ontological order expresses, defines, and therefore manifests the thing. Moreover, whatever manifests is light. Therefore form, or species, or essence, is the light of the thing. Hence, just as all perfection flows from form and essence, so all clarity of being results from form and essence; wherefore properties, which are only emanations of essence, have no other splendor except that which they participate from essence. Essence, therefore, provides the first splendor and the first beauty: hence beings have degrees of beauty according to the degree they hold in the hierarchy of forms; and in the same being there will be as many different beauties as there are different splendors of its form. (1) Hence Lamennais requires for beauty « that, by the vision of ideas, man links to contingent forms their necessary types, and that through the material envelope, visible to the eye of the flesh, the spirit discovers the invisible essence. » De l'Art et du Beau, c. II.

Thus, the resplendence of form upon proportioned parts of matter constitutes sensible beauty. The splendor of form upon powers and spiritual principles constitutes intellectual beauty. Finally, the splendor of form upon actions is moral beauty. In man, form is the soul: hence the resplendence of the soul upon proportioned parts of the body is physical beauty of man; the splendor of the soul upon spiritual powers is intellectual beauty; the splendor of the soul upon human acts is moral beauty (1).

Besides the natural form, there is in rational creatures raised to the supernatural order a certain higher form, namely sanctifying grace, a certain divine brilliance, namely the glory of the Lord which rises upon us, according to the word of the Prophet: The glory of the Lord is risen upon you (2). The light of grace, however, can shine either in the body sometimes in life and forever after the resurrection; or in the faculties of the soul, e.g., in the intellect through faith or the light of glory; or in human acts, e.g., when heroic operations are elicited, which constitutes supernatural beauty in the just. But of this beauty, to theologians. It must be recalled, moreover, that the splendor of the natural form itself is derived from the divine essence as a formal, although analogous, participation. For created essences are certain imitations of the uncreated essence: they depend, namely, immediately on the divine intellect, remotely on the divine essence. In some way, therefore, they are illuminated by the clarity of the intellect and essence of God. Hence, by the resplendence of form can be understood the clarity of created essence as the first and homogeneous exemplar, and the brilliance of the uncreated essence as the ultimate and superexcelling exemplar. It is not sufficient, however, that this splendor remain within, otherwise it cannot produce complacency, but it must shine forth externally, either upon proportioned parts of matter, or upon powers (1) « In a beautiful poem, it is the brilliance of the soul which is revealed through intelligence; in a beautiful action, it is the brilliance of the soul which is translated by the will. » La Lumière et la Foi, p. 10. (2) IsaA, IX, 1. and faculties, or upon operations and human acts (1). It will be the proper

function of art to express sensibly both the splendor of natural form and the splendor of grace, and as far as possible a certain splendor of the divine essence. XII. — On the Ideal. From these is understood what the ideal is. Form, essence, and species correspond to ideas: the species of a thing is its idea. Therefore the light of form is the resplendence of the idea. Because there is a twofold idea of each thing, namely its proper and proximate idea, and its ultimate idea, or archetype, which is in the divine mind, a twofold ideal must also be distinguished: one proximate, the other ultimate. The proximate ideal is the species, or universal nature: for this is the exemplar to which singular nature ought to be conformed; and since individuals always bear imperfections and defects and never fully exhaust whatever perfection is in the universal essence, hence it happens that the ideal is never perfectly attained by individuals. But it pertains to art to express that ideal sensibly with resplendence of order (2). The ultimate ideal, however, is the divine essence (3), in which are all exemplars of things; and, because that archetype is infinitely participable and imitable, art can progress indefinitely without ever exhausting or attaining the supreme ideal. XIII. — Whether the Ideal is something real and objective. The supreme ideal is most real, since it is the supreme and first reality, the fullness of being. The proximate ideal, however, is not a mere subjective figment, but exhibits a certain objectivity, (1) « Form designates the speci fic form, that is to say the perfection proper to a being of nature; resplendentia formae, it is the brilliant manifestation of this perfection. By reason of its intrinsic perfection, every thing is fundamentally beautiful; it becomes formally so when it shines, that is to say when it reveals itself brilliantly. » Card. McKerrac, n. 275. (2) « Beauty therefore consists in the manifestation of nature by the splendour of order ». Ibid. (3) This is confessed by all philosophers who acknowledge the true God: « God, who is the type of absolute liberty, is therefore also supreme beauty: all beauty derives from him. » Diction. philos. art. Beau. — Cf. B. FRANG. SALIS. Traité de l’Amour de Dieu,

liv I, c. 1.

according to what we have handed down concerning the nature and existence of Universals (1). XIV. — Whether every being is beautiful. Every being according to its species, or nature considered absolutely, is beautiful; not however as it really exists in a state of singularity. The I° part is easily proved. Nature considered according to itself is the ideal to which

individuals should be conformed; hence it includes in itself all perfections which belong to such a species; it is not diminished or disordered, but possesses in itself full integrity and proportion of its species. Moreover, it has in itself splendor, because it is the species or idea by which the thing is known, defined, and manifested. The II° part is con firmed by experience. A being existing in a state of singularity, either because of intrinsic impeding causes, or because of its own individuating principles, very often happens to lack integrity, magnitude, proportion; or that the clarity of form shines insufficiently. When one or several conditions of beauty are lacking, the being cannot be called beautiful simply (2). XV. — The division of beauty. They distinguish a threefold species of beauty: physical or sensible beauty, which is the resplendence of form upon proportioned parts of matter; intellectual beauty, which is the resplendence of form upon powers or spiritual principles; moral beauty, which is the resplendence of form upon human acts. Intellectual and moral beauty agree in something, because both are spiritual. The spiritual, however, is threefold: human, angelic, and divine. XVI. — On supreme beauty with respect to man. For something to be most beautiful with respect to man, it must be simultaneously spiritual and sensible. This is shown thus: (1) Log. Maj. Tract. I. (2) « The spectacle of nature and human life is far from o ffering us a realization of the idea of the beautiful capable of satisfying us; everywhere the ugly alongside the beautiful; the hideous and the deformed, the puny, the ignoble form a contrast to beauty, obscure it and disfigure it. » Diction. philos. art. Beau. Beauty is that which when seen pleases. Moreover, since man consists of the

spiritual and sensible simultaneously, for something to be most pleasing and agreeable to him, it must be simultaneously spiritual and sensible. Hence the supremely beautiful with respect to us is said to be that in which spiritual clarity shines externally and sensibly. There is, as we have said, a threefold clarity: of natural form, of supernatural form, or grace, and finally of the divine essence. Hence a man in whom the natural clarity of the soul shines is already called beautiful; but more beautiful is he in whom the light of grace shines together with the splendor of the soul; most beautiful, finally, in whom shine the clarity of the soul, the clarity of grace, and the clarity of divinity. He is most perfect in whom nature, grace, and deity shine and super-shine: the Man Christ Jesus, to whom be glory forever. Wherefore Christ is the supreme beauty and happiness with respect to us. After Him, the Blessed Virgin, in whom nature is perfect, grace excellent, who moreover in some way attains to the ends of deity (1). In the just, a certain divine clarity can also be distinguished, for the Most Holy Trinity inhabits their minds and irradiates them by its presence. All saints, therefore, are beautiful because of that triple resplendence: of nature, of grace, of the indwelling of the Holy Trinity. These things indeed go beyond the scope of philosophy; they are not, however, unfittingly mentioned for a fuller and deeper understanding of beauty (2). XVII. — On the degrees of beauty. Three degrees are commonly enumerated: Graceful, beautiful, sublime. The graceful is that which bears pleasantness, sweetness, charm, without however exhibiting a certain magnitude, but rather a certain incomplete state which is ordered to a more perfect and higher degree. As graceful are commonly cited flowers, brooks, dawn, an infant. Beautiful simply so called implies perfection and magnitude, and the other conditions already assigned. The sublime, however, rises above beauty; it is defined as: That which surpasses the intuition of the knower. (1) Cf. P . Moxsandre, Carême de 1890, Amen du sens esthétique. (2) Cf. Souvène, L’esthétique du dogme.

It is distinguished from beauty simply, which when known pleases, but does not so much surpass cognition. The sublime is perceived indeed in part only, because on the other hand it transcends our apprehension, and therefore causes admiration, stupor, fear, moves the mind, and with a certain insuperable force raises it upwards. We said intuition, because, as P . Liberatore notes (1), it is not necessary that it exceed

reasoning. Thus infinite being is sublime, because it surpasses any concept of ours, although we infer its attributes and conditions by reasoning. The same author distinguishes three species of the sublime: ontological sublime, dynamic sublime, and mathematical sublime. The first is founded on excellence of nature, the second on excellence of virtue, whether physical or moral, the third on excellence of magnitude, whether continuous or discrete. XVIII. The deformed. Deformity is the lack of due beauty, arising from the defect of one or more conditions which are required for the notion of beauty. The deformed is threefold: physical, or the privation of beauty in the body; intellectual, or the privation of beauty in the intellectual powers, in which way the intellect which delights in error is called deformed; moral, the privation of beauty in acts of the will, by which reason the devil is deformed. When deformity is excessive and enormous, it is horrible, which excites horror and abomination. The ridiculous is some diminished deformity, which does not cause aversion or horror, but only prompts laughter. XIX. — The faculty and science of beauty. The faculty which apprehends beauty is usually called taste. Some wish the faculty of art to be a power of its own kind, sublime and divine, or a certain divine instinct. But a new faculty is superfluous, for all things which concur in beauty can be attained by cognitive or appetitive faculties. On the other hand, it is impossible that one and the same faculty attains as its formal and specificative object all those so diverse things which sensible or spiritual beauty implies. Taste, therefore, essentially consists in the intellect; secondarily and as it were presuppositively, also in sensitive faculties. Essentially indeed in the intellect, for to

apprehend due proportion and due harmony of parts belongs to that faculty which compares and understands the order of parts to the whole, and this is reason alone; similarly to perceive the resplendence of form, or the ideal, cannot be of any faculty except the one which contemplates essential ideals. Sensitive faculties, however, concur: in the external senses, hearing and sight, as most cognitive of those things which make a thing beautiful in the physical order; among the internal senses, imagination especially serves, which presents vivid phantasms for the sensible expression of beauty (1). The science of beauty is called aesthetics, from the Greek word αισθάνομαι, to sense, because beauty does not signify just any cognition, but cognition with taste and flavor, and seems more to be felt than known (2). Hence beauty is also referred to appetite, because it produces complacency in it, and because it is a certain species of good which when seen delights the will. XX. — On the fine arts. Arts which express beauty sensibly, or intend to express it, are called fine arts. Five are enumerated: poetry, music, painting, architecture, sculpture. A fine art must achieve three things: 1° to conceive the ideal beauty; 2° to express it sensibly; for man, since he is not a pure spirit, does not delight in the abstract ideal and intelligible, but in the ideal and intelligible which shines in the sensible; 3° to express it not by any signs, but by signs more expressive and more apt for the sensible manifestation of beauty. (1) « It seems therefore indubitable that the notion of beauty reaches the spirit through the senses. But in itself it is supersensible: for it is the fruit of an abstractive work of which the senses are incapable. And that is why the work of art — the realization of an ideal by means of material processes — is addressed not to the senses alone, but to the intelligence. » Card. Men- cina, n. 268. (2) That word Aesthetica, signifying the science of beauty, was introduced by Baumgarten, a German philosopher (1714-1762). — In Kant, however, it designates the study of sensibility and the senses.

Wherefore art must participate in both idealism and realism. In idealism indeed, for pure realism does not fully

satisfy rational man; moreover, the resplendence of beauty is the resplendence of the ideal. In realism as well, so that beauty may be expressed by natural signs and that excessive license of fantasy may not be granted. Hence art is reduced to these two things: to elevate the real to the ideal order and to reduce the ideal itself to the real order, or as they say,

« idealize the real, realize the ideal. » The supreme end of art, however, is to elevate the mind to the highest. For art is the expression of beauty; beauty, however, is the splendor of truth and good. Therefore art should move to the love of truth and good. It suffices, however, that the work not be intrinsically evil, nor is the artist bound to intend proximately and immediately a moral or religious end, provided nothing is admitted which positively excludes such an end (1). XXI. — The order of dignity among the fine arts. The first place, no one objecting, is held by poetry. It surpasses the others: 1° by universality of object, for it can express the objects of the others and many more besides; 2° by immateriality, for it is the immediate expression of spiritual thought; 3° by the perfection of the signs it uses, for words which concur in poetry hold primacy among signs both in clarity and in immateriality. Music and painting, however, compared with each other, surpass and are surpassed. Painting indeed has a more universal object, and represents more clearly; many things which painting vividly exhibits, music either not at all or only confusedly expresses. Simply, however, music seems more noble; for through sounds it refers to something more immaterial and closer to the intellect than the objects of painting: sound is more abstract and serves the intellect better than colors and signs. Sculpture surpasses painting in some respects, for figure, which pertains to sculpture, represents the image of a thing more expressively than color, which pertains to painting. (1) The question concerning the morality of the arts is rather ethical and pertains to moralists, not to metaphysicians. On this matter one may consult Barcxartia, LArt et la Morale, Hetzel, Paris, 1898, Sestillanos, O.P ., LArt et la Morale, collect. « Science et Religion » ; Card.

Simply, however, painting excels sculpture, because sculpture represents an object according to material being, but painting in a more intentional mode, namely through likeness and image. It is disputed whether architecture surpasses sculpture in dignity. Architecture represents inorganic nature; sculpture, however, also organic and sensible: in this respect, sculpture is prior. On the other hand, architecture excels, for in its works, e.g., in temples, it exhibits a certain sublimity and magnitude by which the infinite is in some way represented, by which the mind is ravished and raised to the idea of the infinite. Simple sculpture, however, does not exhibit that sublimity. XXII. — Whether the rule of art and taste are merely subjective, or also objective and necessary. Beauty with respect to us implies two things, namely vision and complacency: from which aspect it says something relative, namely order to the mind, and something subjective, namely complacency. Now, complacency, as a subjective affection of the perceiver, can be diverse, even opposite, in different men. In this way, the saying is verified: There is no disputing about tastes, namely what is the subjective affection of this or that one is not to be considered; just as the sweetness of wine is most delightful to some, the sweetness of honey to others, etc. But on the other hand, taste has a real foundation and beauty itself exhibits something objective and absolute (1). Just as that is simply more delightful in which he who has the best taste delights most, so beauty simply is said to be that in which those who have the aesthetic faculty rightly disposed delight. But what is absolute and objective in beauty is first the ideal, whether proximate or ultimate; likewise, integrity, proportion, and the other elements of beauty are not subjective (1) « There is in art a point of perfection, as of goodness or maturity in nature; he who feels it and loves it has perfect taste; he who does not feel it and loves below or above has defective taste. There is therefore a good and a bad taste, and one disputes about tastes with foundation. » LA BRUYÈRE, Les Caractères, ch.

I, Des ouvrages de l'Esprit. ——— Page 201 ———

FIRST TREATISE

The notion of being must first be opened. This most common notion is made more explicit and in some way contracted through the notion of potency and act; but potency and act present the notion of essence and existence. Three things, therefore, are to be explained in this Treatise: hence it is asked: 1° On the notion of Being; 2° On Potency and Act; 3° On Essence and Existence. ——— Page 202 ———

QUESTION ONE

On the notion of being (1). To form a genuine and complete notion of being, we inquire what is the nature of being and what is the concept of being.

ARTICLE ONE — On The Nature Of Being

I — The threefold acceptation of being (2). Being, etymologically and grammatically, is a participle of the verb sum. A participle, however, is a concrete noun implying two things: both a form and a subject which has the form, just as living implies both life and the subject affected by life. Moreover, a participle, like every verb, exhibits not merely a quality or action in the abstract, but the very exercise of the action, just as loving implies the exercise of loving. Thus, being signifies the composite of being and that which has being, and moreover implies the exercise of being in the nature of things, or is the existing thing. Secondly, being can be taken anomalously. Moreover, a noun signifies without time and abstracts from all present act: thus ——— Page 203 ——— being taken nominatively does not necessarily imply the exercise of life, but only the thing which lives or can live. In this way, being does not necessarily imply the exercise of being, but only all that exists or can exist. Being can be taken in a third acceptation, « according as it is the verbal copula signifying the composition of any enunciation which the soul makes, hence this being is not something in the nature of things, but only in the act of the soul composing and dividing. And thus being is attributed to everything of which a proposition can be formed, whether it is a being or a privation of being; for we say that blindness exists (1). » Being thus taken posits nothing in reality, but requires being which is in reality as a cause, for from the fact that something is in the nature of things, the truth or falsity of the proposition which the intellect signifies by the word is, as it is taken for the verbal copula, is had. II. — Being simply said is being in the first acceptation, or participial being. Just as white is said from the form of whiteness, just as living is said from the act of living, so being is properly said from the form or act of being. Hence it is defined by St. Thomas as: That whose act is to be. For just as living properly so called is that whose act is to live and implies a composite of life and that which has life, so being properly so called is that whose act is to exist and implies a composite of that which has being and

being itself. « Being is implied as the principal and formal significate, because it is the abstract of this concrete being. That, however, which has being is implied secondarily as the susceptive of being (2). » In being, therefore, we distinguish two things: the subject which has being, and the form or act by which the subject has being. The subject which has being is called thing or essence; the act by which the thing has being is being or existence.

(1) Consuli possunt: ARISTOTELES, Metaphys. VIII and X ; S. THOMAS, Comm. in Metaphys. ; De Ente et Essentia ; CAJETANUS, Comm. in opusc. De Ente et Essentia; ALAMANUS, Metaphys., q. III ; STANIS, Disput. Metaphys.disp. 2 ; BALMES, Philosophie Fondam. liv. V ; MENCKER, On- nologie ; DOMET DE VORGES, Abrégé de Metaphys., c. I ; LERIDI et recen- tiores Scholastici; LABEYRRE, Dogme et Metaphysique, C. SENTROUT, L'Objet de la Metaphysique, selon Kant et selon Aristote. Gredit editio tertia. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, IV. Metaphys., lect. 11, III Sent., dist. 6, q. 2, a. 2, quodlib. a. 3. (1) Quodlib. 9. a. 3 (2) SXLVESTER FERRARESSIS, in I. Cont. Gent. c. 25. — «This subsistent being that we have called with Aristotle the first substance encloses in its concept: a quidditative element, what the thing is, the essence or, if you will, the essential being; and a complementary element, existence, or if you will, existential being. These are indeed two objects of thought, 'two objective rationales,' 'enveloped one and the other in what we call globally being, ens.' » Card. MERCKER, Ontot., n. 14. ——— Page 204 ———

schools the being of existence and the being of essence are distinguished. And finally it is transferred to signify the truth of composition in propositions, according as being is said to be the copula. Thus, being properly speaking designates the act of being, or existence; in a less strict sense, the essence itself, and finally, logically, the copula in propositions. VI. — In which acceptation is being the principle of categories or predicaments. Being is called transcendent because it transcends all categories and is contained by none; however, it is found in each and predicated of each: it is therefore the principle of

categories. In what acceptation, moreover, is transcendent being, which wanders through the ten predicaments, to be taken? Kant, Rosmini, contend that transcendent being is that first thing which has being in the soul and is placed as the copula in a proposition; others, holding with Scotus that essence and existence are not really distinguished, maintain that being, the principle of categories, is being which signifies mere and naked essence. The opinion of the Thomists and most scholastics, however, is proposed in the following conclusion: VII. — Conclusion: Being which is divided into the ten predicaments is not that which signi fies the truth of a proposition; it implies a composite of essence and being, in such a way, however, that it is placed in a genus not according to being, but by reason of quiddity. ——— Page 205 ———

are a certain aggregate of several beings pertaining to diverse categories. Being of reality, or real being, is that which has or can have being in the nature of things. It is twofold: actual and ideal. Actual is said to be that which actually has being on the part of reality; ideal, however, is that which does not yet have being, but can be given in the nature of things. Being of reason, however, is said to be that which has being objectively only in the mind and to which, accordingly, no being in the nature of things corresponds. It neither exists nor can exist outside the mind, and its whole being consists in its being apprehended by reason. It differs, therefore, entirely from ideal or possible being, which, although it does not exist, can be endowed with existence. IX. — Being of reason is twofold: negation and relation. Concerning the division into being of reason reasoning and being of reason reasoned, let what has been handed down in Logic be recalled. Here, however, it must be added that being of reason is divided into negation and relation (1). Under negation is comprehended privation, which is the negation of a due form. « That which is of reason, says the Angelic Doctor, can only be twofold, namely negation or some relation. » Proof. The nature of being of reason formally consists in its opposition to real being, namely that it is not capable of existence. But that which is not capable

of existence is either something positive or something non-positive. If it is not positive, it is negation or privation. But what is positive is either absolute or relative. ——— Page 206 ———

The third division, of being into ten predicaments, is dealt with below, Tract. III. The fourth division, into potency and act, is discussed shortly, namely, q. II. XI. — The distinction of being from the absolute. Absolute is said to be that which is independent of any other. Something can, however, depend on another as on an efficient cause, as on a subject of inherence, and as on a correlative. In three ways, therefore, something can be independent, or absolute. Independent of every efficient cause is the absolute properly so called, or transcendentally, and this is God alone; independent of a subject of inherence is substance, and it is called absolute predicamentally; independent of a correlative is that which does not have an equal, or unequal, etc., and it is called absolute disparate. According to Herbart, being in common is confused with the absolute, or is an absolute term excluding all negation and relation. This notion is pernicious and most false. For being comprehends whatever is knowable. Moreover, not only absolutes, but also relatives, are knowable. Therefore being is common to both absolute and relative. It is not, therefore, absolute: neither transcendentally taken, otherwise God alone would have the notion of being; nor predicamentally, otherwise only substance, not accident, could be called being. A fortiori it is clear that being is not absolute disparate. XII. — The distinction of being in common from divine being. God is the most actual being and of greatest comprehension, whose concept excludes all addition. Being in common, however, is potential and is contracted in its inferiors; it is of least comprehension, since it actually and explicitly implies only the least predicate that can be attributed to something. It does not exclude additions; indeed, it is determined and contracted by them. Those additions, however, are not something extraneous to being; but ——— Page 207 ———

mode of being in another, refer and exhibit expressly and explicitly something which being as such only implicitly contains. IV. — In what way being is predicated of its inferiors. The Scotists contend that being is univocal with respect to its inferiors, by the least univocation. There is, as they say, a threefold univocation: first, when the same notion is in all in the same mode of being, the same order, the same perfection. Second and lesser, when the same notion is in diverse things in the same mode and order, but not the same perfection; third and least, when the same notion is indeed in several things, but neither the same perfection, nor the same order, nor the same mode (1). V. — First conclusion: Real being is not univocal with respect to God and creature, nor is being common to the ten predicaments univocal with respect to substance and accident. Proof. Univocal is said to be that whose notion signified by the name is simply the same in its inferiors. But the notion of being signified by the name is not simply the same in God and creatures, in substance and accident. Therefore being is not univocal with respect to God and creatures, substance and accident. Proof of the minor. 1 That is not simply the same in several things which is found in one by essence and necessarily, but in another by participation and contingently: for those notions of being differ immensely and are almost opposed, as unreceived and received. Moreover, being in God is by essence and necessarily, and as unreceived, but in creatures as received and by participation and contingently. Therefore the notion of being cannot be the same in God and creatures. 2 That is not simply the same in several things which belongs to one as properly and in itself existing, but to another as existing in another and begging its being from another: for that notion of independence and that notion of dependence and inherence differ greatly. But being is ascribed to substance as ——— Page 209 ———

(3) Logic. pp. 45 and ss. are said, as healthy food and healthy medicine suppose an animal with respect to which they are called healthy. But nothing can be or be conceived

prior to God and creatures, substance and accident. Therefore. Moreover, in the analogy of being there are not three terms, but only two which are compared: creature indeed in order to God, accident in order to substance. Therefore only the analogy of one to another prevails. VIII. — Fourth conclusion: The analogy of being between God and creatures, substance and accident, is an analogy of proportionality; it is also of proportion, not formally, but virtually. Proof of the I° part. Analogy of proportionality is had when the notion signi fied by the name is found intrinsically and truly in both analogates. But the notion signified by the name being is found intrinsically in God and creatures, in substance and accident; for creatures are beings, not only denominatively, but by reality and intrinsically; not only substance, but also accident, is intrinsically being, because it is truly outside nothing, and truly has real effects, such as being quantified, being colored, being hot, etc. Therefore. From which the II° part is proved. In analogy of proportion properly so called, the analogous form is in the principal analogate intrinsically, but in the others extrinsically and by denomination. Moreover, the form of the chief analogate is placed in the definition of the others, so much so that the other analogates cannot be conceived without the form of the chief analogate: thus the health of food cannot be understood independently of the health of an animal. But 1° the notion of being is not found extrinsically and only by denomination in creatures and accident, but intrinsically, as we already know; 2° God is not placed in the de finition of creatures; substance, however, although it is included in the definition of accident as its subject, is not placed as the form denominating the accident, in the way that the health of an animal is the form denominating healthy medicine; but, on the contrary, accident has some proper form by which it is constituted and by which it is conceived, without thereby conceiving the form constituting substance. Therefore the analogy of proportion formally so called is lacking. Proof of the III° part, namely that the analogy of being includes nevertheless virtually the analogy of proportion. ——— Page

Something is said to be virtually such when it has the power to induce the same effect as that which a thing formally such produces; thus the human soul can be called a virtually corporeal form, because it can achieve what a formally corporeal form bestows. But the analogy of being has the power to produce the effect which the analogy of proportion formally so called produces. Therefore. Intrinsically secondary analogates, such as food is denominated extrinsically healthy from the health of an animal. But accident is so dependent on substance that, if per impossible it did not have entity intrinsically in itself, it could from the extrinsic denomination of the being of substance be called being; and creatures, although they are something of being and are called beings intrinsically, could nevertheless be called beings extrinsically. Therefore the analogy of being has the power to achieve what the analogy of proportion does. — With this distinction, the diverse places of the Angelic Doctor can be reconciled, who sometimes acknowledges between the created and uncreated only analogy of proportionality (1); at other times seems to admit also analogy of proportion (2). IX. — Fifth conclusion: Although the analogy between God and creatures agrees in many things with the analogy between substance and accident, it differs in some notable way. How it agrees is clear from the preceding conclusions. The difference, however, consists in this: Being is not prior to God and creatures, but is prior to substance and accident. The whole notion of being is absolutely and fully found in God. But when the whole notion of the analogate is found in one of those of which it is predicated, then there is no predicate prior to both. The reason is clear, because then the predicate does not exceed the subject nor is greater than it. But if it is not greater than the subject, it is not prior to it. Therefore being is not prior to God and

creatures. But when the whole notion of the analogate is not found in either of the subjects, then the predicate is greater and more common than the subject, and therefore prior. But the whole notion of being is not fully and

absolutely found in substance which is the first genus, since divine being is not included. Therefore being is prior to substance and accident (3). (1) Q. 2, De Verit. a. 11. (2) I. P . q. 16, a. 6. (3) Cf. S. THOMAS, Opusc. 39, (al. 42) De natura Generis, c I. X. — Di fficulties are solved. 1° Those things which communicate in a form are univocal. But God and creature, substance and accident, communicate in the form of being, namely in entity. Therefore they are univocal; therefore being is predicated of them univocally. Resp. : Distinguish the major: Those things which communicate in a form which is simply of the same notion are univocal, I grant; in a form which is not simply of the same notion, I deny; contradistinguish the minor and deny the conclusion. The distinction is clear from the notion of the univocal and analogical. 2° You will object: If the same notion of being is not in God and creatures, the cognition which we draw concerning God from creatures is fallacious. But this cannot be admitted. Therefore the notion of being is the same in God and creatures. Resp. : Distinguish the major: If the same notion of being is neither simply nor proportionally, the cognition is fallacious, I grant; if it is not the same simply, but the same proportionally, the cognition is fallacious, I deny. I grant the minor, and distinguish the conclusion: Therefore the notion of being is the same in God and creatures proportionally, I grant; simply, I deny. Cognition which is founded on likeness and analogy is not fallacious, because what belongs to the similar, insofar as it is similar, also belongs to the other of which it is the likeness. Hence what belongs to creatures proportionally and in a more eminent way is attributed to God. 3° Measure and measured are of the same notion. But God and creature relate as measure and measured. Therefore they are of the same notion. Resp. : Distinguish the major: Measure properly so called, such as is used in quantity, is of the same notion as the measured, I grant; measure improperly so called and superexcelling, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence. 4° The analogate is prior to the analogates. But being is not prior to God and creatures. Therefore it is not analogical. Resp. : Distinguish

the major: It is prior according to the imposition of the name, I grant; according to reality, I subdistinguish: if the whole notion of the analogate is found in neither of the analogates, I grant; otherwise, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the conclusion. The solution is clear from what was said in number IX (1). XI. — Whether the concept of being is the first of all both in logical order and in temporal order. The concept of being is simple and ——— Page 211 ———

Then to abstraction is added a comparative act by which being is referred to its inferiors as something most universal which is apt to be in many and innumerable things (3). Afterwards many other difficult and scientific acts are added by which one penetrates to the principles and properties of being; and from all these is formed that Ontological Metaphysics which we are attempting to acquire in the present context. Nevertheless, we must beware of the error of the Hegelians, who contend that nothing is positively and according to itself conceived. Since concepts are signs of things, just as names are signs of concepts, it is necessary that what is conceived according to itself be something according to itself. Moreover, nothing according to itself is not something, as is clear. Therefore it is not conceived according to itself. But it is conceived after the manner of another, namely after the manner of being. The mind does two things to compare conceived nothing: 1° it conceives entity; 2° it negates entity. Just as death is understood as life denied, so nothing is conceived as being negated. Nothing, therefore, in our mind is some being of reason, namely negation, which is conceived after the manner of a positive and includes two things in its concept: 1° entity, 2° lack of entity. Nothing, moreover, is divided in three ways: 1° by reason of object, it is the nothing of existence, which denies existence but not possibility, and the nothing of essence, which denies even possibility, such as a square circle. 2° By reason of extension, it is absolute and total nothing, which denies all being, and relative and partial nothing, which denies to another, but not being or some degree of being; thus death denies life but not all

being. 3° By reason of subject, it is the nothing of negation, which says only the absence of some form, and the nothing of privation, which is the lack of a due form. These things being understood, the opinion of Ad. Franck is refuted, who says: « Absolute nothing is impossible to conceive, and to speak of it is to contradict oneself (1). » XIII. — On the concept of nothing. Nothing is the negation of being. Many Idealists contend that no true concept of nothing is had. But on the contrary: whatever is in the mind exhibits some concept; but nothing is in the mind, since the mind discusses and reasons about nothing and discerns it from being. Therefore nothing has some concept. (1) Tract. I. q. II, a. V. Vol. I II. p. 81. (2) This question, how being is first known, is fully and excellently treated by Cajetanus in De Ente et Essentia, in the prooemium. (3) Let what we have discussed in Logic concerning the acts by which the direct universal and the reflexive, or logical, universal are formed be recalled, vol. I, pp. 219-221.

Resp. 1° Being taken properly for the existent is not a (1) FRASCEK, Diction. philos. v. Etre. — The same is asserted by ED. LE ROT: « The idea of nothing is only a pseudo-idea, nothing is unthinkable, since thinking nothing would always be thinking something or not thinking. » Revue de Métaphys. juillet 1907, pp. 479-480. — « The thought of nothing would only be a nothing of thought. » Ibid., p. 487. — Nothing cannot indeed be conceived according to itself, but after the manner of another, and by reason of being, of which it is the negation, it is most certainly conceived; a true and positive act of the mind is that by which we understand the opposition of being and non-being, which opposition the principle of contradiction expressed. ——— Page 212 ———

Resp. 2° Being taken for the existent can be called an essential predicate in a broad sense. That can be called a predicate essential in a broad sense which does not place a thing in another predicament, but is in the same genus as it. But being, although it can be denied while preserving the concept of the essence, since however it comes to a thing, does not place it in another predicament, but is in the same

predicament with it: thus being coming to substance is substantial being, and being coming to the essence of an accident is accidental being. Resp. 3° Being taken for essence is a strictly essential predicate of creatures; for no creature can be conceived unless it is some essence or has some essence. XV. — In what way the concept of being is the simplest of all. Being is the simplest, because it cannot be resolved by analysis into any notes; others, on the contrary, are resolved into being itself as into an ultimate term. This simplicity, however, is of imperfection and potentiality; for being is indivisible because it exhibits the least note, the least predicate that can be attributed to anything. It must therefore be carefully distinguished from the simplicity of pure act, which is the completion of all perfections, excluding all composition from genus and difference, from potency and act, substance and accident. XVI. — Errors concerning the concept of being. Pantheists wish the concept of being in common to be the concept of reality and the most general being to be the source of realities. Lamennais seems to adhere to these (1). On the other hand, Subjectivists, Nominalists, Conceptualists assert that the notion of being exhibits nothing objective, but is a figment of our mind. (1) For he calls being « the inexhaustible source of realities » and says that all particular beings are actually contained in it « not only in potency, but in reality. » Cf. Lamennais, Esquisse d'une Philosophie, I. P . liv. I. c. 5.

ART. III. — DE ENTIS CONCEPTU.

QUESTION TWO

ARTICLE ONE.

principle of acting or being acted upon, it appears that a twofold subjective potency is distinguished: active, namely a principle of acting, and passive, a principle of receiving something. In iron there is a passive potency to receive heat; in fire, an active potency to induce heat. ——— Page 214 ———

VI. — Conclusion: There exists in nature a state of potency, even passive. Arg. Ium. Wherever transmutation takes place, passive potency is present. But transmutations take place in nature. Therefore. The major is clear from what has been said, since passive potency is the principle of mutation from another. Proof of the minor. Mutation occurs when the same subject is otherwise disposed than before. But in the world we frequently see the same subject otherwise disposed than before, e.g., the same iron is now in a state of coldness, now becomes incandescent; the same subject which was seed becomes a plant, the plant becomes ashes; the same embryo which was an ovum becomes living, becomes sensitive, becomes man. Daily facts, therefore, invincibly demonstrate the state of potentiality. Oxygen and hydrogen before they were combined were not water, and yet water was not drawn from nothing: therefore oxygen and hydrogen were water in potency. Arg. IIum. It has been proved, in Natural Philosophy, that matter and form exist, which doctrine can be called certain with respect to living things. But the existence of matter and form implies the existence of potency and act (1). Therefore potency exists, even substantial, at least in living things. Arg. IIIum from the absurdities of the denying opinion. Unless a state of real potency distinct from act itself is given, it follows that a man who does not actually see is blind, for he is considered blind who lacks the power of seeing; and a man who does not actually feel is insensible, for he is utterly to be called insensible who does not have a true power of feeling. V. — The existence of potency. The existence of a state of mere potency, namely passive, was denied by the ancient Eleatics, especially Parmenides, Mellesius, Zeno; by the Moderns, F . Herbart, and others, who contend that potency, especially passive, is only a figment of reason, or not distinguished from mere possibility. The reality of potency, however, is asserted by Aristotle (2) and the Scholastics, both ancient and modern (3), and generally by all who defend the objectivity of motion. (1) Passive and active potency are in different subjects, says St. Thomas repeatedly after Aristotle. Cf. Metaphys. I. I ; IV Sent. dist.

4, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 ; dist. 14, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1. (2) Cf. ARISTOT., Phys., I, IV. (3) Cf. KLEPTOEN, La Philos. seol. t. I, c. 1. a. 3 ; FARON, Théorie fendantem. de l'acte et de la puissance. VII. — The first subdivision of passive potency: into quidditative and entitative. Receptive potency can be either for first being, which is substantial form, or for ultimate being, which is existence. The first does not have determinate entity, but is a determinable subject for quiddity through substantial form, and for this reason it is called quidditative potency. The other is already a certain essence, but needs to be actuated by being, or existence; and, because it is called being from being, therefore the subject susceptible of being is fittingly called entitative potency (2). (1) Cf. vol. II, pp. 113 and sqq. (2) Cf. Card. LOKKSZIKUL, Metaphysic. Gen. P . II, lect. IX. ——— Page 215 ——— 2 2 M E T A P H Y S I C A O N T O L O G I C A , T R A C T . I . Q . I I . The act corresponding to quidditative potency is specific essence, but the act corresponding to entitative potency is existence. But since the act of essence and the act of existence are of different physical genera, it follows that quidditative and entitative potency differ in physical genus. In whatever, therefore, composition of essence and existence is found, entitative potency is found, and in whatever composition of matter and form is present, quidditative potency is present. The first, therefore, belongs to all created things, the second only to corporeal things. VIII. — The second subdivision: into natural and obediential potency. Passive potency implies an order to active potency as to its complement and perfection. There is, however, a twofold active potency to which passive can be compared, namely: the potency of a natural agent, and the potency of the first agent, which can induce a higher effect. Hence a twofold passive potency is usually distinguished: natural and obediential. Natural is in order to a natural agent; the other is in order to the first agent and to an act exceeding the powers of nature. Three things must be established concerning obediential potency: whether it exists? what kind it is, passive only, or also active? and to what it extends? IX. — First conclusion: There is in every creature

an obediential potency for e ffects induced by

God and exceeding nature. Proof. The potency which is totally subject to some agent can be raised to all those effects which such an agent can induce. But the potency of every creature is totally subject to God, from whom it totally depends in being and preservation. Therefore it can be raised to all effects which God can induce. God, moreover, can induce effects exceeding the scope and powers of all nature. For the higher some active power is, the higher can it elevate that thing to an effect. But divine power is higher than every natural power of a creature, and consequently can induce an effect exceeding all the powers and exigencies of nature. Therefore every creature is in potency to effects surpassing the power of nature. Potency, however, to effects exceeding nature is called obediential. Therefore obediential potency exists in creatures.

it was distinguished from it (2). Hence if it is asked whether a stone can be converted into an angel and an angel into a stone, it must be answered: An angel and a stone retaining their proper difference cannot be converted into each other, which would imply contradiction; but if the difference between angel and stone is removed, both will agree in the common notion of being, and thus the author of being can convert that which is of entity in the angel into that which is of entity in the stone. XII. — How obediential potency is actuated. In two ways: through transient motion and through permanent habit. In the first way, a creature is elevated by God, as every instrument is elevated through virtuous motion communicatively given in a transient way by the principal agent; in this way the sacraments concur in the production of supernatural grace. In the second way, faculties are elevated to attain something which is contained within their adequate object, which nevertheless they cannot naturally perceive. Thus through the light of glory, which is a permanent habit, our intellect is made apt to see the divine essence, which is contained within the adequate object of the intellect, namely being and truth. It

is wisely said: within the adequate (1) S. THOMAS, De Perit. q. 29, a. 3, ad 3. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, III. P . q. 75, a. 4. ad 3. object, for obediential potency is not borne to those things which change essence and imply contradiction. Moreover, if faculties were borne outside their adequate object, e.g., the eye to understanding, the ear to seeing, the essence would be destroyed, and contradiction would be introduced. XIII. — On logical potency, or the possible. We have distinguished potency as such from the possible. Real potency is a true capacity, really existing in a real subject. The possible, however, is said to be that to which being is not repugnant, or which is apt to exist. It has, therefore, some real-ideal being, and a positive concept by reason of which it is distinguished from nothing, which cannot be conceived positively. The aptitude for existence, however, can arise both from the mutual convenience of terms, which present no repugnance, and from an extrinsic cause which can bring the thing to being. Hence a twofold possibility: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic is the aptitude for existence arising from the non-repugnance of terms to each other. Extrinsic is the aptitude for existence in relation to an active cause which can endow the thing with existence. Intrinsic is called absolute, because it is had independently of any hypothesis; metaphysical, because it lies in the very essence of the thing; primary, because it is presupposed to extrinsic potency. The latter, however, is called relative and secondary. With respect to God, relative possibility is as open as absolute possibility: for whatever is intrinsically possible can be brought into being by God. With respect to creatures, however, it is less open. Some things, indeed, cannot be effected by a created cause, such as spiritual substance; some, however, can be produced considering the laws of nature, but not considering the laws by which human morals are regulated; some, finally, can be produced considering both the laws of nature and morals. In the first case, there is physical possibility; in the other, physical and moral simultaneously. The opposite of possible is impossible: hence intrinsic impossibility is the repugnance to existence arising from the repugnance of terms to each

other; extrinsic impossibility is the repugnance arising only from the defect of active power in some created cause. It is subdivided into moral and physical, like possibility itself. ——— Page 217 ——— 276 METAPHYSICA ONTOLOGICA, TRACT. I. Q. II. ART. I. — DE POTENTIA. 277 XIV. — Some sayings concerning the possible and impossible. First: The possible adequately taken is intrinsically and extrinsically possible; for it must be possible in every respect, both in itself and in order to its cause. Second: The possible extrinsically is also intrinsically possible, but not conversely. For the secondary supposes the primary, but not conversely. Third: The intrinsically impossible is relatively impossible; but the relatively impossible can be intrinsically possible and with respect to God; of which kind is a golden mountain; for it is impossible with respect to us, but can be endowed with existence by God. Fourth: To know what is possible or impossible intrinsically, it suffices to consider the relation of terms to each other; but for extrinsic possibility to be known, it must be compared in order

to the cause from which the thing is producible. Fifth: Given the possible, it does not follow that there is absurdity; given the impossible, it follows that there is absurdity. Sixth: From act to potency, from not able to not being, the consequence holds; from potency to act, from not being to not able, the consequence does not hold. The saying is clear from the terms themselves. Seventh: Possibles derive their extrinsic possibility from divine omnipotence, which can actuate by existence whatever does not imply contradiction; but their intrinsic possibility they have in themselves, or in their constituent notes. This is dealt with below, concerning the foundation of essences. XV. — Whether the notion of the possible is posterior to the notion of the existent. The possible is a certain abstract notion. But the order of our cognition is that we are led from concretes to abstracts. Therefore the existent is conceived first; then the intellect, by abstracting from the state of reality and existence, forms the concept of the possible. Thus, our mind proceeds as follows: first, it forms the most common notion of being; then it conceives existence, by conceiving whether a thing

is; thirdly, essence, by conceiving what a thing is; fourthly, the attributes of a thing, by conceiving how a thing is. Among the attributes of essence, however, is possibility, hence fifthly it conceives possibility, by conceiving whether a thing can be. Extrinsic possibility is indeed manifestly posterior; intrinsic possibility is really the same as essential predicates, but is conceived as a mode of essence, and therefore is posterior to essence. Therefore possibility is inferred from the existence of a thing (1). However, XVI. — The intrinsic possibility of things does not arise from their existence. That which prescinds from actual existence does not originate from it. Moreover, the possible prescinds from actual existence, since it is indifferent to being and not being. Moreover, if possibility arose from actual existence, things, before they existed, would not be possible; and on the other hand, every possible would be endowed with existence, which is to introduce blind necessity and fatalism. (1) Cf. BALMES, Philosophie fondament. liv. V. c. IV. ——— Page 218 ———

ARTICLE TWO

ON ACT AND ITS RELATION TO POTENCY .

(1) S. THOMAS. Qq. Dipp. De Potent. Dei, q. 1, a. 1. Nevertheless, the two words are not infrequently used promiscuously (1). II. — There is, however, a certain order among those three acts. For operation supposes form and completes it, and existence supposes essence, which it actuates. Hence a division into first and second act. First act is said to be that which does not suppose another, but is ordered to another; second act, which implies another and tends to another. Thus, if form is compared to operation, essence and existence, form is first act, operation second act; essence first act, existence second act. III. — With respect to potency, received act and unreceived act and pure act are distinguished. Received act is that which informs potency and is received in potency; unreceived, however, is that which is received in no potency. If, moreover, some act is neither received in potency nor can receive a further act, then it will be unreceived and

non-receptive. Moreover, such an act is necessarily most perfect and infinite. For since act according to itself implies perfection, if some act is not pure perfection, it is clear that it is not pure act, but mixed with potency. Now act can be mixed with potency in two ways: either because it is itself the act of a potency, or because it is in potency to a further act. Moreover, unreceived act is not the act of a potency; but non-receptive act is not potency to an act. Wherefore unreceived and non- receptive act is purely act, pure perfection, hence it is called pure act. But what is pure perfection is without limit, since every limit denotes imperfection. Therefore unreceived and non-receptive act is properly and simply infinite act. But act which is not received in some subject, but receives a further act, can be called infinite in a certain respect, not however absolutely. Thus angelic form is not received in any matter; from which aspect it has nothing that restricts and limits it. (1) On the Aristotelian acceptation of act, consult P GARDERI, O. P . Revue Thomiste, 1893, n. 6 ; KAUFFMANN, Etude sur la cause finale,tra- doct. DUBER ; BACDIS, L'Acte et la puissance dans Aristote, Revue Tho- miste, 1899. ——— Page 219 ———

It gathers in itself the whole breadth of perfection which is in the order of essence and the whole fullness of that species. Nevertheless, it is not its ultimate actuality, since it is receptive of its ultimate act, namely existence; from which aspect it becomes potency, and therefore imperfect and finite. Beings of this kind, therefore, are composed of something which receives, namely essence, and of something which is received, namely being. Since, therefore, the act of being is received and a being is called being rather from the act of being, it follows that those things are not properly called unreceived beings, but rather received. By the very fact, however, that something is received in another, it is manifest that it is dependent. But what depends cannot exist by its own power, but borrows existence from another. Hence received act can be called received in two ways: 1° because it is in another; 2° because it is from another. Unreceived and non-receptive act,

however, exists by its own power, is a being from itself, or is God Himself. IV. — By reason of the mode of being, act is divided into subsistent and non-subsistent. Subsistent is called that which can exist in itself, independently of matter, and, if it subsists in itself as a complete nature, like an angel, it is perfectly subsistent act; if it needs to be united to matter to form a complete species, it is incompletely subsistent act, like the human soul. Non- subsistent is that which needs matter to exist. V. — Informing act and terminating act. Informing act is that which actuates its potency in the way that form actuates matter; terminating, which perfects and completes some potency, without however being its form, just as a point constitutes a line, yet is not its form, but only its term. Subsistence, existence are terminating acts; whiteness is an informing act. VI. — Substantial act and accidental act. The first gives being simply, as the soul to the body. The other, however, gives being in a certain respect and supposes being simply: thus is knowledge with respect to man, heat with respect to fire. Having explained the concept of potency and act, the relation between the two is seen. This

relation is expressed by the following Scholastic sayings:

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the possible is considered to be being insofar as it has an aptitude for acting or being in act, just as a builder is said to be one who can build, and a speculator one who can speculate, and the visible that which can be seen. Therefore act is properly and primarily intelligible and definable, but potency secondarily and by order to act.

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cannot be another act, but only potency. Therefore act is limited only by potency. Proof of the minor. Another act would be either of the same order or of a different order. Moreover, given two acts of the same order to be possible, there is only addition of perfection in the same order, by no means limitation. If, however, it is of a different order, it is either of a superior order, or of an inferior and subordinated order. But an act of a superior order is not limiting, because

it is of a superior order to perfect, not to limit or make imperfect. — If it is of an inferior order, it is something potential with respect to the superior. Hence it remains that act is limited only by potency. XVI. — The tenth saying: Act is multiplied only by potency. It follows from what has been said. Act, as perfection, cannot be multiplied unless perfection is multiplied in several distinct subsistents. But this distinction cannot be made except through potency. Therefore. Proof of the minor. Distinction cannot arise from some principle which is intrinsic to the perfection of one and not to the perfection of another, because an intrinsic difference changes the species. Therefore it must be made through extrinsic receptives or subjects, just as whiteness is multiplied because it is received in several subjects. But the subject and receptive is potency. Therefore multiplication takes place through potency. Hence a corollary: Act mixed with no potency, or unreceived and non-receptive act, is unique. XVII. — The eleventh saying: Act and potency are primarily opposed. Those things are primarily opposed whose notions exclude each other. But the notion of potency and the notion of act mutually exclude each other, for potency is determinable, perfectible, beginning; act is determining, perfecting, completion. Therefore. XVIII. — The twelfth saying: There is no middle state between potency and act. Against Leibniz and some dynamists who agree with him. By such a state a being either begins to act in some way or not at all. If it does not begin to act at all, it remains in the state of mere potency. If, however, it begins to act, there is already the beginning of act. But what is the beginning of act if not some act, at least imperfect? For the transition from potency to act, or motion, is a true act, for it is defined: the act of the existent in potency insofar as it is such, that is, the wayfaring act to a term (1). Therefore there is no middle state between potency and act, although between potency and perfect act there is an intermediate state, which is motion. XIX. — The thirteenth saying: From two beings in act one thing simply cannot be made. For since one and being are convertible, each thing is denominated one by that by which it is denominated being.

But it is called being ——— Page 222 ——— by the very act of being itself. Therefore it is called one by the act of being itself. But if each of the two beings in act is a being by its own act, then that which is one is not from the act itself of both, but from the act of one only, which would be the form of the other. For matter, as potency, is informed by form, which is act. Therefore from two beings in act, one thing simply cannot be made, unless one is reduced to the nature of matter with respect to the other, which is to say, it is not in act in the same way. ——— Page 223 ———

QUESTION THREE

On essence and existence (1). From the preceding, it is clear that the composition of potency and act is to be ascribed to every created being. The element, however, which has the nature of potency is called essence; the element which has the nature of act, however, is called existence. Now, having spoken in general of potency and act, we must speak more fully of essence and existence.

ARTICLE ONE — On The Notion And Properties Of Essences.

I. — Di fferent denominations of essence. Essence is called by Aristotle ousia, what it is,

species, nature, the reason of a thing, etc. Since it is something common to all genera, it cannot be properly defined; however, it is described in various ways according to the different respects considered in it. In itself considered, it is called: That by which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species; in order to the intellect, it is that by which a thing is first conceived by the intellect, that which is first conceived in a thing; with respect to attributes which (1) Consuli possunt : S. THOMAS, De Ente et Essentia ; QQ. Dipp. De Anima, a. 6; I. P . q. 3, a. 4 ; q. 8, a. 1 ; q. 44, a. 1 ; q. 54, a. 3 ; I. Cont. Gent., c. 22 ; II Cont. Gent., c. 52, 54 ; I. Sent., dist. 8; CAJETANUS, BANNEZ, in b. I.; SUAREZ, Disp. Metaphys. disp. 31 ; BALMES, Fundament. Philos., liv. V ; MERCER, Ontol. nn. 36, ss.; LORENZELLI, Metaphys. Gen.; GARRIGOU- LAGRANGE, Dieu, son

existence et sa nature, c. I. ——— Page 224 ——— itself, it is called: The first principle and first root of properties and actions; considered as potency with respect to its proper act, it is called: That whose act is being. Since it is that by which the question: what is the thing? is answered, it is also called quiddity; it is often called by Aristotle the what is, the what it was to be, that is, that by which each thing has to be what, to be proper and constitutive (1). It is also called form, because form generally designates that which determines and constitutes a thing in its proper species. II. — However, in composite substances, essence does not imply only form, but the composite of form and matter. The reason is that essence includes whatever is expressed in the definition. But in the definition of a composite substance, not only form but also matter is placed. Therefore the essence of a composite also implies matter itself. On the other hand, essence is not a relation between matter and form or something coming to them. For essence is first and fundamental being; but relation or something else coming to matter and form is being in a certain respect and extraneous. Wherefore essence cannot designate a relation between essence and form or something added to them. It remains, therefore, that it designates the composite of matter and form. And indeed, essence is that which has being, or that of which being is. But being is not of form alone or matter alone, but of the whole composite, as is clear from Natural Philosophy (2). Therefore in composite substances essence designates the composite of matter and form. In spiritual substances, however, which are devoid of any matter, essence is only form. III. — Essence is also called nature. It should be known, however, that this name nature is used in a fourfold sense by Boethius (3). First, it is called nature which relates commonly to all beings, as nature is defined: Everything that can be grasped by the intellect in any way. Secondly, as it belongs to substances only, and thus nature is said to be: What can act or be acted upon. Thirdly, nature is said to be the principle of motion or rest. Fourthly, each thing informing a specific difference is called nature. Taken in the first and fourth senses, nature is

convertible with essence, and signifies the essence of a thing, according as it has an order or ordination to the proper operation of the thing, since no thing is deprived of its proper operation (3). (1) On the meaning of that: what it was to be cf. Card. MENCKEN, n. 19, not.; MATTHIAS KAPPES, Aristot. lexik., p. 25. (2) I. P . Tract. II, q. 1, II, n. IV, vol. II, p. 149. (3) Cf. BONTIUS, De Persona et duabus Naturis, c. 1. P . L., LXIV, 1841-1342. ——— Page 225 ———

consideration is not primary in logical and analytic order; for it is not the divine essence that first leads us to the knowledge of created essences; but in synthetic order, and supposing that the concept of essences has already been acquired by the natural process of human cognition, that respect is profitably and beautifully considered. God knows His essence as participable and imitable, according to some mode of likeness, by creatures. The divine essence, moreover, known as thus imitable by such a creature, is the exemplar or idea of this creature. Hence divine ideas are the essence of God known as imitable in and by creatures in such or such a way; but the objective imitations and participations (1) S. THOMAS, De Ente et Essentia, c. I. — On nature, however, as the object of Cosmology cf. vol. II, p. 254, ss. corresponding to the divine ideas are the essences of things. These participations, however, are not by emanation, but by likeness and analogy, as has been said concerning the analogy of being (1). VI. — In what way essences are said to be eternal, necessary, immutable, indivisible. If they are considered as they are in God, they do not differ from the divine ideas; and thus they are absolutely and positively eternal, necessary, as the divine essence (2). If, however, they are considered as they exist in singular things, they participate in the conditions of those singulars, and hence it is clear that they are not eternal and necessary. If, however, it concerns spiritual creatures, even singular essences are eternal a parte post: supposing, namely, that they exist, they cannot be deprived of existence except by the absolute power of God. They are also called necessary, because, since they have in themselves no principle of corruption, they necessarily remain in being.

Considered in themselves, all essences are negatively eternal, insofar as their truth prescinds from all time, and is independent of all time: it has always been true, and always will be true, that man is a rational animal. However, positive eternity, which makes an essence really exist, does not belong to them, since no created essence is due to exist from eternity. Hence they differ fundamentally from the divine essence, which is positively eternal. They are necessary in this sense, that the constitutive notes of essences cannot be otherwise than they are: for any essence necessarily requires these essential predicates and no others, so that, given these principles, the essence is necessarily had; with them removed, it is necessarily destroyed. Thus the essence of a triangle is necessary, because a triangle cannot be conceived otherwise than as having three angles. In the same way, they are immutable, because their constitutive predicates cannot be varied unless the very notion of the essence is destroyed. (1) Supra, q. I, a. II, n. V and ss. pp. 257, ss. (2) On these St. Augustine beautifully discusses: « Therefore each thing is created by its proper reasons. But where are these reasons to be thought to exist except in the mind of the Creator?... They are not only ideas; but they themselves are true, because they are eternal, and remain such, and are unchangeable; by participation in which it happens that whatever is, is in whatever way it is. » Lib. 83 Quaest. q. 46, P . L. XL,30. ——— Page 226 ——— 2 0 2 M E T A P H Y S I C A O N T O L O G I C A , T R A C T . I . Q . I I I . Although all created essences are composite, they are nevertheless indivisible. They are composite. Every created essence consists of genus and difference; genus indeed is derived from what is more material and potential in the thing, difference from what is more formal and actual (1). Genus and difference, however, imply a plurality of elements, and therefore a certain logical composition. Therefore in every created essence there is a certain composition. Nevertheless, they are indivisible, because nothing can be added to them or subtracted from them. For essence is like a definition. But, with the smallest addition or subtraction,

there is a different definition and a different nature of the species, as the Angelic Doctor observes (2). Thus sentient animate substance is only the definition of an animal; if you add rational, you constitute the species of man; if you subtract sentient, you constitute the species of a plant. By the same right, nothing can be added to essences, nothing can be subtracted from essence. Hence the saying: Species, or essences, are like numbers. If something is added or subtracted from any number, even the least, it will not be the same number in species. The least in numbers is unity: if it is added to the ternary, a quaternary arises, which is another species of

number; if it is subtracted from the same, a binary remains, which is also another species of number. And similarly in definitions and in essence. The last property of essences is knowability. VII. — On the knowability of essences. We de fine the essences of things to some extent; but whether those definitions have some objective value; whether it is possible to know essences by a proper concept? This question is connected with the most celebrated dispute concerning the existence of universals (3). For universals are the natures or essences of things; if, therefore, universals lack objective value, it is clear that definitions of essences are devoid of all force and that our knowledge of essences is purely nominal. This consequence was embraced by the Nominalists, Locke, Hume, and in our days by Materialists and Positivists. (1) Cf. Logie., p. 61. (2) S. Thomas, VIII Metaphys., lect. 3 (3) Cf. Logie. Maj., Tract. I. VIII. — First conclusion: The essences of things are in themselves most knowable. A thing is knowable insofar as it has the notion of positive being, and ceases to be knowable insofar as it is negation and non-being. Moreover, the essences of things have the notion of positive being, since they are the intrinsic and positive principles by which being is constituted in a determinate degree. Therefore the essences of things are in themselves and ontologically most knowable. But they are not apprehended by us as they are in themselves. IX. — Second conclusion: The cognition of essences which we have in the present state is not intuitive,

but deduced and imperfect. For intuitive cognition it is required that the thing be present to the intellect either through itself or through a species immediately emitted by the thing itself. But the essences of things are not present to the intellect through themselves, nor through a species immediately emitted by themselves, but only through species received from others. Therefore the cognition we have of essences is not intuitive, but deduced. Proof of the minor. That essences of things are not present in the intellect through themselves is too clear; but that they are made present through species, not emitted by themselves, but received from others, is briefly declared. In the present state, universals and invisibles are known through sensibles and visibles. Moreover, properties and actions are more sensible and visible than the essences themselves. Therefore we know essences only through properties and actions, or through species deduced from those properties. What we first attain is operation and property; from those species we form others in which we understand the essence itself. Moreover, the species itself by which we understand operation and property is not intuitive, but abstractive; in the present life, indeed, we have no intuitive cognition, except the cognition of the senses (1). Hence, if species deduced from properties are representative of the essence, they are abstractive, a fortiori the intuitive concepts which we form in the present concerning essences cannot in any way exist. From which it follows that this cognition is imperfect. For when ——— Page 227 ———

something is not seen intuitively, necessarily many things in it will escape our knowledge. X. — Third conclusion: Nevertheless, by experience and reasoning we gather true and scienti fic cognition concerning many essences. Arg. Ium. Essence is that by which one thing is distinguished from all others. But in many cases we know scientifically by what reason one thing is specifically distinguished from others and what it claims as proper to itself. Therefore we obtain true cognition of their essences. The minor is proved by induction. Scientifically we know in what way living

things are constituted in themselves and differ from non-living things; among non-living things we know how to distinguish simple bodies from composite bodies; and among simple bodies we scientifically determine many species. Among living things we know by what right animals are distinguished from plants, men from brutes; and so on for many others. Arg. IIum. From the properties of a thing its essence can be known, proved, demonstrated. But we discover many properties of things, which are manifested by operations. Therefore we also have a clear view of many essences.

Proof of the major. A property is so connected with nature that, when the property is removed, the nature is indirectly changed and corrupted; and, on the contrary, given the property, the nature is necessarily presupposed, according to the axiom: The deletion of properties is a negation of nature. Therefore knowledge of the nature is necessarily inferred from knowledge of the property. Indeed, this cognition is scientific and proper. To know cause from effect, nature from properties, is to construct a true reasoning, namely a demonstration because, which has true demonstrative force and produces knowledge in the true sense (1). That cognition, however, is not quidditative and proper in the strictest sense, but in such a way that it truly refers to and expresses the quiddity and so belongs to the object that it can be applied to no other (2). Arg.IIIum. It is incompatible that the intellect cannot attain its formal and proper object, otherwise it would necessarily lack its own perfection. But the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of material things (1). Therefore it is incompatible that intellectual cognition does not at all attain essences of this kind. It is clear, therefore, that our cognition of essences is not nominal but scientific, just as we also know that universals are not pure names but that a true foundation on the part of reality corresponds to them. Essences therefore exhibit some objective reality, not a mere heap of properties and accidents (2). (1) Cf. vol.III, p. 114, ss. (2) More on these again below, concerning the objective value of substance, tract. III q. I, art. III, nn. VII

and ss. ——— Page 228 ———

ARTICLE TWO — On The Foundation Of Essences.

I. — State of the question. Two questions are commonly raised concerning the foundation of essences: first, what is the subject in which the possibility of things is ultimately founded; second, whether this foundation is something absolute and independent of the divine will and intellect, or whether it depends on them. This second question is often included in the first. The question, however, is not about the proximate and immediate foundation (for this is the essence itself, considered in itself), but about the ultimate and remote foundation, namely, that on which the very nature of essence ultimately depends. II. — First conclusion: There must be some ultimate foundation for the essences of things. This is proved a posteriori. Since we find in things both existence and essence, and since we also find that they are contingent, we are led to seek their cause. This cause cannot be another creature, for we would then proceed to infinity. Therefore we must arrive at a first cause, which is God. This is the foundation of all real being, and therefore also of ideal being, which is essence. Moreover, the intrinsic possibility of things is not an ultimate fact; it demands an explanation. For if something is possible, it is because its constituent notes do not imply contradiction. But this non-repugnance is not something absolute; it requires a cause. This cause cannot be the thing itself, for then we would have a vicious circle. Therefore it must be found in a supreme intellect, which is the first ideal cause. ——— Page 229 ———

foundation of essences (1). Wherefore the Scholastic theory is by no means to be abandoned, but to be explained by a better method and vindicated. III. — Second conclusion: Simply speaking, the truth of essences or the intrinsic possibility of things cannot be entirely independent of God. We do not dwell here on the opinion of the Kantians, which is refuted elsewhere (2). If essences depend solely on our intellect, our mind will be the measure of the truth of

things. Moreover, the truth of our cognition is measured by things, for cognition is then only true when it is conformed to the object. Therefore it is impossible that the essence and possibility of things depend solely on the human intellect. Moreover, things were already possible when the human intellect did not yet exist, and they would still remain possible and true even if the human intellect were removed. « Even if the human intellect did not exist, says the Angelic Doctor, things would still be called true (3). » The opinion of Plato is refuted from what has been discussed concerning universals (4). The opinion of the Wolffians is therefore attacked. Arg. Ium. Just as all real being depends on the first efficient (1) « Although the essences of things of experience, considered under their abstract form, are the explanatory, sufficient, and necessary reason of possibles and their properties, nevertheless, in a synthetic study, which the Scholastics called regressive, it is legitimate and indispensable to connect the results of analysis to the divine essence and its necessary imitability. » CAND. MERCER, n. 27. (2) Cf. vol. III. pp. 52, 88. (3) S. THOMAS, De Verit., q. 1, a. 2. (4) Logie, p. 232. cause, so in the synthetic order all ideal being depends on the first ideal cause. But God is not only the first efficient cause, but also the first ideal cause. Therefore not only the real being of creatures, but also their ideal being depends on God. Moreover, ideal being designates essence, which is what is first conceived and understood in a thing. Therefore the essence of creatures also depends on God. The major is clear in itself. If there is some real being independent of God, God is not the first efficient cause. Therefore, by parity, if there is some ideal being independent of God, God is not the first ideal cause. Arg. IIum. If essence does not depend on God, God depends on it in knowing. But God is entirely independent both in being and in knowing. Therefore. Proof of the major. God is dependent in knowing if He perceives some truth which is outside Himself. Now, in the aforesaid hypothesis, the essences of things would be some truths outside God. Therefore God would be dependent in knowing. — Moreover, the will is proportioned to the intellect: when the

intellect depends on something in knowing, the will is subjected to the same in effecting. Therefore the divine will also would depend on things in effecting. Arg. IIIum. Truth is said by order to the intellect. But in the hypothesis of God not existing there would be no intellect: not uncreated, as is supposed; not created, because the created presupposes the uncreated. Therefore there would be no truth, nor any essence. To the point, St. Thomas: « Even if the human intellect did not exist, things would still be called true in order to the divine intellect. But, if both intellects, which is impossible, were understood to be removed, in no way would the notion of truth remain (1).»

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modi essentiae pendere debent formaliter a prima causa ideali. Atqui prima causa idealis est intellectus divinus. Ergo essen- tiae formaliter pendent ab intellectu divino. Major constat ex dietis, minor ex terminis intelligitur. Ideale dicitur per ordi- nem ad intellectum. Ergo primum ideale, seu prima causa idea- lis, debet esse primus intellectus, id est intellectus divinus. Confirmatur. Artifex infinita sapientiae et perfectionis debet habere in suo intellectu ideas omnium quae a se fiunt vel fieri possunt. Atqui essentiae designant ideas rerum quae a Deo fiunt vel fieri possunt. Ergo Deus habet in suo intellectu essen- tias, ac proinde essentiae ab intellectu divino dependent. Prob. II pars. Essentiae non habent rationem cognoscibi- litatis nisi rationem entitatis prae se ferant. Atqui fons et ple- nitudo totius entitatis est essentia divina. Ergo essentiae rerum non habent rationem cognoscibilitatis nisi aliquid de essentia divina partieipent, et consequenter intellectus divinus non potest illas cognoscere nisi prius cognoscat essentiam divinam ut principium entitatis et cognoscibilitatis illarum. At si es- sentiae rerum cognoscuntur in essentia et per essentiam De pendent radicaliter ab illa. Ergo. Res ita concipienda est : Deus essentiam suam perfecte in- tuetur ; unde illam cognoscit

secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est. Sed essentia divina est cognoscibilis non so- lum secundum quod est in se, at etiam secundum omnes modos quibus participari potest a creaturis. Ergo Deus ex cognitione suae essentiae cognoscit omnes imitationes et participationes a creaturis. Hujusmodi porro imitationes et participationes sunt essentiae creaturarum. Ergo ex cognitione suae essentiae Deus omnes essentias cognoscit (1).

set aside, the divine essence contains creatures eminently indeed, but is not their idea. Moreover, for the divine essence to be the proximate foundation and idea of creatures, it must delineate and define them in their proper degree and in their proper measure. But the divine essence, according to itself, does not define creatures in their proper degree, since it exceeds (1) Boethius beautifully sang: « Thou, all things from the supreme example, thyself most beautiful, bearing the world in mind, and forming it from a like image, commanding the perfect to complete the perfect parts. » De Concil. philo., lib. III. metr. 9, P . L. LXIII, 258-259. (2) Cf. 2. Thomas, I. P . q. 15. ——— Page 232 ———

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ARTICLE THREE.

On The Distinction Between Essence And Existence.

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(3) Cf. I Sent., dist. 19, q. 2, a. 2 ; II Cont. Geni., c. 52 ; De Ente et Etencias, c. 5, q. 7. De Poten. a. 4. (4) Lect. 2. (5) Even in places where the word really is not written, P . TERNEREN, S. J., observes many things by which this distinction is more clearly signified than by the name itself. Cf. P . TERNEREN, De Unione hypostatica, p. 31. ——— Page 234 ———

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act is not the act of a potency; non-receptive act is not potency to an act. Therefore unreceived and non-receptive

act is pure act. Proof of the minor: 1° existence would be unreceived act. Since in a thing only two things are found, namely essence and existence, no other receptive of existence can be assigned besides essence. But existence cannot be received in essence unless it really differs from it — for nothing is properly received in itself; nor does a rational distinction suffice, otherwise God would be called received act, which no one concedes. Therefore existence would be received in nothing and would be unreceived act. 2° It would be non-receptive act. Non-receptive act is said to be that which is ordered to no further act. But existence is not ordered nor can it be ordered to a further act, since it is said and is the ultimate act, the ultimate actuality of every form. Therefore existence would be non- receptive act. It cannot be replied that created existence, although it is not an act received in another, is nevertheless an act received from another, and therefore is not pure act. For some act cannot be received from another unless in its concept it implies limitation and imperfection; but an act is limited either because it is received in another or because it receives another. Wherefore an act which is neither received between essence and existence begin by positing as an indisputable principle that the real essence of a being is real only through its existence. Evidently one must conclude to the identity of existence and essence. But, instead of starting from this assertion as from an indubitable axiom, they should prove it; and they do not think of it; all their arguments are therefore reduced to a vast petition of principle. » ——— Page 235 ———

being and accidental being are two actualities in different genera. Moreover, two actualities in different genera do not relate to each other as potency and act. In order, therefore, that conjunction of accidental being with substantial being take place, no other hypothesis remains except that both be received in some subject, which will be essence. But the aforesaid subject must be distinct from both, otherwise the preceding difficulty would return. Therefore in whatever accidental being is joined to substantial being, it is necessary that essence be really distinguished from

existence (1). Arg. V™. « No essence can be understood without those things which are parts of essence. But every essence or quiddity can be understood without understanding anything of its actual being; for I can understand what a man or phoenix is, and yet be ignorant whether it has being in the nature of things. Therefore it is clear that being is other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is some thing whose quiddity is its being, and this thing can only be one and first (2). » Many indirect arguments could be adduced. Thus in the natural composite, essentially diverse parts, namely matter and form, are actuated by a single existence; in the human composite, entirely distinct parts, soul and body, have a single existence; many faculties coexist in the same soul. If, therefore, essence is multiple, or many parts of essence, and yet existence is simple and unique, a real distinction between essence and existence must intervene. Many other conclusions, whether philosophical or theological, rest so much on this principle that it can be called the fundamental truth of Christian philosophy (4). VI. — Di fficulties are solved. 1° Actual essence is not a mere possible being but an actual being. But actual being exists. (1) Cf. S. THOMAS, II. Cont. Gent., c. 52 ; Card. LORENZELL, pp. 268- 169. (2) S. THOMAS, De Ente Eesentia, c. 5. (3) On these indirect arguments one may consult Card. MERCER, n. 49. (4) Cf. P . DEI. PRADO, O. P ., De Veritate fundamentalii philosophiae christianae, Placentia, 1899. ——— Page 236 ———

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potency informed by real act. The fundamental reason we have adduced proves that it is potency, not the very act of existing; otherwise existence would be unreceived and non-receptive act. 3° You will object: But actual essence is not only potency informed by act, but is itself act. Actual essence is a being actually produced by God. But a being actually produced by God is a certain act. Therefore actual essence is the act itself, namely existence.

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potency is some reality which act does not constitute, but supposes, so essence is a certain reality, which existence makes to be in act. « The existence of an essence is the sine qua non condition for the positing of the problem concerning the real or non-real distinction between this essence and its existence. But when this condition is realized, when an essence exists, the essence has its reality as essence, and this reality is distinct from the act by which it exists, it is a subjective, real potency, actualized by existence (2). » — To avoid going over the act again, we refer the reader to Card. Mercier (3) and P . A. De Poulpiquet, Q. P . (4).

ARTICLE FOUR

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IV. — Conclusion: Properly speaking, existence is neither in the predicament of substance nor in the predicament of accident. For a thing placed in a predicament is predicated univocally of its inferiors. Being, however, is some transcendent, which is predicated only analogically. Therefore. Because, however, the complement of a thing is reduced to the predicament of the thing itself, existence in some way reductively pertains to the predicament of the essence which it perfects: existence indeed perfecting substantial essence is referred to the genus of substance; existence perfecting accidental essence is in some way reduced to the genus of accident. Nevertheless, the existence of substance is not properly an accident, either predicamental or predicable. Proof. Existence is the ultimate complement, the ultimate 1) Dn M a n A . C n e l . T r a c t . I I . q . I I . a . I I . (2) Qq Disp - E Potent. q. 5. a. 4. ad. 3. ART. IV. — EXPLANATUR QUÆDAM CIRCA ESSENT. ET EXIST.317 actuality of substance, or of the being to which being in itself belongs. But the ultimate actuality of a being in itself cannot be a predicamental accident, or a being in another. Therefore the existence of substance cannot be a predicamental accident. Accident, whether predicamental or predicable, perfects substance with a perfection extraneous to its nature: thus clothing,

knowledge, perfect a man in something extraneous to the nature of man. But existence perfects a thing, not in some extraneous genus, but in its own nature, in the very genus of substance. Therefore the existence of substance is neither a predicamental nor a predicable accident properly speaking (1). In a broad sense, however, and by a certain likeness, it can be called a predicable accident. Whatever is not a part of essence can be called an accident. Existence is not a part of essence. Therefore it can be called an accident: not indeed a predicamental one, since it is itself a substantial act, but a predicable one in a broad sense. More correctly speaking, however, existence could be called a quasi-property. For a property is that which, although distinct from essence, is constituted by the principles of essence. But existence, although distinct from essence, is quasi-constituted by the principles of essence; for from the principles of essence it arises that existence is a substantial or accidental act. Therefore existence is a quasi-property. In short: since potency and act are in the same genus, the existence of substance is a substantial act, just as substance itself is substantial potency; the existence of accident, however, is an accidental act, just as the essence of accident itself is accidental potency; nevertheless, existence itself is not directly in the predicament of substance or accident. Being is not properly said to be reduced to a predicament, as Bannez acutely observes, but rather to be participated in and limited by every predicament and every genus and predicamental difference, just as being is not reduced to a predicament, but is divided into ten predicaments through the diverse modes in which it is participated and limited (2).
(1) « Some authors of our opinion have wanted to conclude that being must be considered as a simple accident. All the great scholastics reject this consequence. » DOMET DE VORONS, Abrégé de Métaphysique, t. II, p. 20. (2) Cf. BANNER, Comm. in I. P . q. 3, a. 4. ——— Page 239 ———

not belong formally to God. In this it essentially and principally consists, that it is a term completing substance and making it to be outside nothing. Thus in Christ the Lord, substance does not have created existence, but exists

outside nothing through the existence of the divine Word terminating and completing the dependence of the humanity, so that it is outside nothing. Moreover, if it were of the formal notion of existence that it be received in a subject, it could not be supplied by divine existence. Therefore that being is received does not pertain to the formal notion, but only to the material and imperfect notion of existence. Thus the author is praised. VII. — Whether existence is more perfect than the essence it actuates. Existence is simply more perfect than essence. That is simply more perfect by which a thing is said to be simply a being. But a thing is said to be simply a being by existence: for essence without being is only a being in potency, but when it has being it is a being simply. Therefore existence is simply more perfect than essence. Moreover, being is the ultimate actuality of all perfections and of all forms; being is not perfected by its conjunction with essence, but rather perfects essence. Hence it relates to essence as perfective to perfectible. In being itself all perfections are understood. Thus what is most powerful in God is not understood as life, wisdom, etc., but that He is subsisting being itself, in which other perfections are comprehended. Therefore being is simply more perfect. — Hence it is that all things most desire being as the best of all. In a certain respect, however, essence is more perfect than being, because it limits and contracts being; hence existence relates to essence as limitable and determinable to limiting and determining. Moreover, the determining is more perfect than the determinable. Moreover, although being is not perfected simply by essence, but perfects it, supposing however that it is received in essence, it is perfected in a certain respect, insofar as it is received in a nobler essence: thus it is more perfect in a living thing than in a mineral, in an angel than in a man (1).

produce being simply is to cause it from non-being simply. Wherefore, for creatures to be said to cause existence absolutely and simply, they must produce existence from non-existence. But it is incompatible for

creatures to produce existence from non-existence. Therefore it is incompatible for creatures to be causes of existence absolutely and simply. It can be proposed in another way: The causative power of existence supposes that the agent cause has being from its nature. No creature, however, has being from itself and its nature; but the being of every creature is communicated and preserved by God. Therefore no creature is per se causative of existence. — The minor is clear; the major is shown. Something is first such in itself before it is productive of its like, just as fire is first hot in itself before it is heating. Therefore something must first be in itself before it is productive of being in another. Moreover, each thing is said to be of such a nature from its proper form which belongs to it per se. Hence, for something to be per se causative of its like, it must have that from its proper form, or nature; and, consequently, for something to be per se causative of existence, it must have existence from itself and from its proper nature. Since, therefore, God alone is His being by essence, He alone is the one who produces being. Thus, being is the proper effect of God, which can indeed be taken in a threefold sense: 1° that being is the per se first effect depending on God alone; 2° that being is the formal and adequate object of God alone, for God alone is the cause of every being participating in being or pertaining to the being of a thing; 3° that God alone produces being insofar as it is being and being without any limitation (1). (1) Cf. BANKEK, loc cit.

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SECOND TREATISE. DIFFERENT GIFTS AND WITH DIVERSE FUNCTIONS: ONE, ESSENCE, REFERRING TO

QUESTION ONE.

(1) On the distinction between transcendentals and universals cf. Logic., pp 52-53. (2) Q. 1 De Verit., a. 1. (3) « This way of seeing has passed into the French language. When we say a being, we always speak of a distinct individual; we do not say that a color is a being, although it is nevertheless something different from the colored object. » Domme de Vorons, op. cit., t. I, p. 3%. If, however, the mode of being is taken in the other way, namely according to the order of one to another, this can be in two ways: one according to the division of one from another, and this is expressed by the name something, as if another what. One and something differ in this, that one says undivided being in itself, something says being divided from others. The other way according to the agreement of one being with another, and this indeed cannot be, unless something is taken which is apt to agree with every being. This, however, is the soul, which in a certain way becomes all things, as the Philosopher says. In the soul, however, are cognitive and appetitive powers. The agreement of being to appetite is expressed by the name good; for good is what all things desire. The agreement of being to intellect, however, is expressed by the name truth. Under this respect there are also three transcendentals: something, truth, good. Concerning thing and being, enough has been said in the preceding Treatise (1). Since, however, something is reduced to one, it remains to speak of one, truth, and good. Although there are six words, in practice only four transcendentals are enumerated; for thing and being, one and something are used promiscuously. Being is exhibited as some subject of which the others are predicated; hence it is asked whether the other three, namely one, truth, good

are properties of being. 11. — First conclusion: One, truth, good are properties of being transcendentally. Proof. That is called a property of something which emanates from it and is predicated of it in what kind necessarily (2). But one, truth, good emanate from being and are predicated of it in what kind necessarily. Therefore they are properties of being. The major is the notion of property; proof of the minor. 1« One, truth, good emanate from being. Something is said to emanate from some essence insofar as it supposes this essence previously constituted; thus visibility emanates from man because the essence of man is presupposed to the concept of visibility and is pre-understood as already constituted. But the notion of being virtually and, in our mode of understanding, is presupposed to the objective concept of one, truth, ——— Page 243 ——— 326 ONTOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS, TRACT. II. Q. I. boni, praesupponitur; non enim unum, verum, bonum intel- ligeremus nisi rationem entis jam constitutum exhiberent, quia praeter ens est nihilum, et nihilum mente concipi nullatenus potest. Ergo unitas, veritas, bonitas ab ente tanquam ab essen- tia dimanare censentur. 2° Praedicantur in quale. Quod non dicit ipsam essentiam, sed ab essentia jam constituta dimanat, non praedicatur directe in quid, sed potius in quale. Atqui unum, verum, bo- num, juxta nostrum intelligendi modum, dimanant ab essen- tia jam constituta, ut modo diximus. Ergo, juxta nostrum in- telligendi modum, non praedicantur directe et immediate in quid, sed potius in quale. 3° in quale necessario, nam unitas, veritas, bonitas ab ente inseparabiles sunt, siquidem cum ente materialer ec -ertun- - , ut in sequentibus ostendemus. rather than some reality superadded to the essence itself, such as intellect, will, etc. But the properties of being flow from it not by physical emanation, but according to our mode of understanding; nor are they some reality superadded to being itself, since it is impossible to add anything to being which is not being itself. Therefore those properties are not properties of a thing, or physical. They are, however, demonstrable properties. The subject of every science has demonstrable passions, or properties, for what every

science especially intends is to demonstrate properties of the subject, through the definition of the subject or property or passion (1). But the subject of metaphysical science is being, whose properties are one, truth, good. Therefore one, truth, good are demonstrable properties of being. III. — Objections: It is of the nature of a property that it be really distinguished from its subject. But one, truth, good are not really distinguished from being. Therefore they are not properties of being. Resp. : Distinguish the major: It is of the nature of a predicamental property to be really distinguished from the subject, I grant; of the nature of a property most commonly taken,

as it abstracts from predicamental and transcendental, I deny. Distinguish the consequence: They are not predicamental properties, I grant; transcendent, I deny. A predicamental property is indeed an accident really distinct from substance; but in the concept of a property most commonly taken is included only that it emanates from essence and is predicated of it in what kind necessarily, according to our mode of understanding. That this belongs to one, truth, good, we have shown. They are therefore properties of being, not predicamental, but transcendental. This will be more clear from the following conclusion. IV. — Second conclusion: The properties of being are not properties of a thing, or physical, but demonstrable properties. Proof. Properties of a thing, or physical, are those which flow from essence by real and physical emanation as V. — Transcendent properties add something to being, which is not really distinguished from it, but as explicit from implicit. So the Thomists commonly, against many Scotists, who thought that one, truth, good add a positive entity. Proof of the conclusion. What is not a mere synonym of something adds something to it. But those three properties of being are not a mere synonym of it; for when it is said: Being is one, is true, is good, it is not intended: Being is being, which would be a nugatory statement, but some true predicate belonging to it and somewhat distinct from it is signified. Therefore the properties add something to being. Not, however, a real entity really discrete from it;

for who can conceive a positive entity which is something (1) Cf. Logic., De praecognitionibus et praecognitis, pp. 388, ss. — The ancient scholastics use the word passion rather than property; a passion implies a subject prior to itself from which it arises and which it always accompanies. In this way, the passions of being presuppose being constituted, emanate from it and necessarily accompany it. Attributes are not infrequently used in this signification. However, attribute and property are not entirely convertible; attribute has rather a logical respect and is taken for a predicate attributed to a subject; moreover, an attribute is said to be, even if it adds nothing, but a physical property adds something to a subject; hence divine attributes are called, not divine properties. ——— Page 244 ———

what is most real and positive.

ART. VIII. — ON THE BEAUTIFUL.

possible. The divine (1) Cf. AARSTOR. V. Metaphys. text. 7-12.; S. THOMAS, 1. 7 et 8 in V. Me- apphys. et 1. 4, in X Metaphys. / 1. P ., q. 11 i. Sent., dist. 24 ; Cont. Gent., c. 53 ; De Verit. q. 8 ; SCOTUS, 11. Sent.; CAJETANUS, BANNES, PBOUNS, in I. P . q. 11 ; SUAREN, disp. 4 ; and authors already a. 1. cited. (2) Cf. Tract. I. q. I, a. I, n. IX. Above, p. 251. essence was certainly discrete from the essence of man and the essence of an angel, although neither angel nor man yet existed. Three things, therefore, are included in the notion of perfect one: being, the negation of division from itself, division from any other. However, being reduplicatively as divided from others is strictly called something, as we have already noted. II. — On the formal notion of one. Suarez seems to think that one adds nothing positive to being, either in reality or different in reason; the Scotists contend that it adds a positively distinct formality; or a relation of identity. The Thomists, however, more commonly teach that the transcendental one by its proper addition adds to being only the negation of division; but by improper addition and as to the explicit it adds something positive, namely being itself, not materially taken, but

insofar as it grounds the negation of division in itself. Against the Scotistic opinion, it suffices to note this: If one added a positive perfection to being, this would also be being, and therefore would imply a new positive perfection, and hence an infinite process (1). Moreover, if one were a formality distinct from being as excluding from excluded, it would not be formally being, since it would formally exclude it. One also does not consist formally in the relation of identity, because identity is posterior to unity and supposes it: for the same things are those whose substance is one. But one by its proper addition adds real negation. For unity is indivision. But indivision is real negation, or privation of division. Therefore it adds real negation of division. By improper addition, however, it adds something positive, namely being itself as undivided. « One, says the Angelic Doctor, does not signify pure negation but being itself undivided, and therefore one and being are convertible (2). » — « One according to itself relates more to position (1) « The unity of this superadded being would in turn imply a new positive perfection, therefore a new being, grafting itself onto the previous one, and we would thus proceed to infinity, accumulating perfection upon perfection to explain the unity of a first subject. » Card. MENCKRS, n. 63. (2) L. 4. in X Metaphys. ——— Page 246 ———

III. — On the negation which one implies. One properly negates actual division, but not necessarily divisibility: for a being remains one, even if it is divisible. Hence unity of simplicity and unity of composition are distinguished, as will be explained shortly, n. IX. The negation which pertains to the essence of one is the negation of division in itself, namely that which does not admit another suppositum. Although this is not principally signified, it nonetheless necessarily enters into the concept of one, which is defined: Undivided being in itself. But the negation of component parts does not pertain to one, otherwise composite beings would lack transcendental unity. The negation of division into several selves does not pertain to one, for a man would be one transcendentally, even if he were divided into several selves. Nor does the negation of division into

essential parts pertain to one, for if a composite is divided into essential parts, each retains transcendental unity. Therefore one can admit in itself many distinct things, whether they are physical parts, such as matter and form, and thus we have proved in Natural Philosophy that a composite is one, although it coalesces from really distinct matter and form; or metaphysical parts, such as essence and existence, and thus above we have shown that being is one, although essence and existence are distinguished; or accidental parts, and thus in Psychology we have proved that the soul is one, although faculties are distinguished from it (1). But what one cannot admit in itself is another suppositum, because another and another suppositum make another and another individual. The negation of identity with another, or division from another, necessarily accompanies one; for, if being is itself, it is necessarily not another. However, this negation does not properly say one, but implies something pertaining to multitude; for, the division of one from another being understood, multitude is immediately implied. IV. — The negation of division which one implies is not a negation simply, nor a privation simply, but has the mode of privation. The Angelic Doctor explains the matter thus: « This privation is intermediate between true privation and simple negation, having something common with both: with true privation indeed in this, that it is a privation in some subject, hence it does not belong (1) On this matter one may consult Card. Mencken, who establishes and proves three theses: « First thesis: the metaphysical composition of a being is reconciled with its essential unity... Second thesis: the physical composition of beings is not incompatible with their substantial unity... Third thesis: the accidental composition of several substances does not follow their respective unity. » Ontol., nn. 79, ss. — Cf. what we will discuss below a. III, On the things opposed to one, and q. II, a. V. On simple and composite being. ——— Page 247 ———

2° Numerical unity relates to number as measure to measured, for number is de fined: multitude measured by one. Therefore it adds to being the relation of measure and

part. 3° Numerical unity pertains reductively to the predicament of quantity. What is properly placed in the predicament is quantity. Because numerical unity is not quantity, but the principle of some quantity, namely number, it is not properly in the predicament. However, principles and parts of a thing are placed reductively in the predicament of the whole thing. Therefore, since unity is the principle of quantity, it is placed reductively in the predicament of quantity. Transcendental unity, however, cannot be placed even reductively in a predicament, since it exceeds all categories. 4° Transcendental unity belongs to all things; numerical unity belongs only to quantitative things, in which number can be; in others, however, there is multitude, not number, as will be explained a. III, n. I (1). VII. — Transcendental one is convertible with being, or, in other words, any thing is one by its entity. Proof. Any thing by its entity is either simple or composite. — If it is simple, it is without division both in act and potency. But lack of division is unity. Therefore it is one by its entity. If it is composite, it includes a multitude of parts. But the multitude of parts is nothing other than several unities joined together and constituting some whole; for a composite does not have being unless its parts are divided, but after they constitute and compose the composite itself. Therefore any being, whether simple or composite, is one by its entity. Moreover, if a thing were not one by its entity, but by something else, this again would have to be one by something else, and hence there would be an infinite process, which is impossible. Therefore it is incompatible for a being not to be one by its entity. Moreover, its entity is through being itself, as is clear. Therefore it is one through itself, and hence one and being are convertible. There is therefore an adequation and conversion between being and one, and « hence it is that each thing, as it preserves its being, so it preserves its unity (2). » VIII. — Division of unity. Because one is convertible with being, according as being is said in different ways, one is said in different ways. Moreover, being is sometimes per se, sometimes per accidens, (1) This distinction was not understood by Balmbs,

who incautiously writes: « One cannot conclude, however, that unity identified with being is distinguished from unity which engenders number. All beings, one in themselves, but distinct from each other, whatever they are, can be conceived under the idea of number. » Philos. fondam. liv.VI, c. 2. — Which opinion had already been excellently refuted by S. Thomas, IV Metaphys., lect. 2. (2) S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 11. a. 1. ——— Page 248 ———

which is to be expressed by a single definition. According to logical intentions, one can be said in four ways: one in number, one in species, one in genus, one in analogy. One in number are those whose matter is one, for the principle of individuation is signate matter, as has been proved elsewhere (3) and this unity is properly called individual. One in species are those whose definition is one; for nothing is (1) That unity of composition is fivefold: essential, entitative, integral, accidental, and numerical. Cf. vol. II, p. 13. Entitative composition, however, belongs to every created being, even the simple, such as an angel. (2) S. Thomas, II Cont. Gent., c. 56. (3) Cf. vol. II, pp. 236, 58. properly defined except the species, since every definition consists of genus and difference (1). One in genus are those which have one mode of predication, that is, agree in some one thing apt to be predicated of many in what incompletely. One in analogy, however, are those whose notion is neither simply the same nor simply diverse, but to such an extent that a certain proportion and relation exists between them, as has been said concerning analogy of proportion and proportionality (2). Hence Socrates is in himself one in number; Socrates and Plato are one in species; man and animal are one in genus; the health of food and the health of an animal are one in analogy. Unity of species is formal unity insofar as it implies indivision of essence, to which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be subtracted; individual unity is material unity. Formal unity and multiplication arise from form; the first principle of material unity and multiplication, however, is signate matter. One per accidens can be considered in operating and in being. Unity of several in operating is

called dynamic; and if indeed it exists among several natural agents, it is called physical dynamic; if it exists among several free agents, as among several citizens, it is called moral dynamic. One per accidens in being is distinguished in four ways: natural, artificial, moral, of aggregation. Natural, when things of different genera, e.g., man and whiteness, are joined by nature under one undivided being. Hence a white man is a natural per accidens unity. Artificial, when diverse things are joined by the operation of art into one being; thus is a house. Moral, when several are joined by reason of a common end, such as a family, a state. Of aggregation, when several things are joined by chance into some accidental being, such as a pile of stones. Another way of distinguishing one per se and one per accidens is proposed by the illustrious Domet de Vorges. With formal unity, one per se is a being in itself comprising all the necessary elements of its essence, and one per accidens will be a nature conceived with ——— Page 249 ———

X. — Certain notions which have a relation to the notion of one, namely same, similar, equal. By the very fact that something is undivided in itself, it is clear that it agrees with itself. This agreement of a being with itself is called identity. Identity, therefore, is a certain unity of being; and accordingly as many species of identity can be assigned as there are species of unity. Identity properly so called is threefold: metaphysical, physical, and moral. Metaphysical is that which belongs to an entirely immutable being, such as God; physical is had when the physical reality of a being, such as essence, remains without any change, of which kind are angels, the human soul; moral, when physical reality, although it changes in itself, nevertheless persists the same in common estimation, because the change takes place gradually and imperceptibly. Of this kind is the identity of our body throughout the course of life. In the strict sense, identity implies individual unity, or says something one in number; in a broader sense, however, it is the union of several agreeing in the nature of genus or species. In this way, the nature of Peter and Paul is said to be the same. The same are said to be those which agree in substance; similar

those which agree in quality; equal those which agree in quantity; or, as the Angelic Doctor says, the same is one in substance, equal one in quantity, similar one in quality (1). These words, however, are not used so strictly in practice. In a less strict sense, similar are said to be those which agree either in nature or in quality; hence an agent is said to act similarly to itself whether it produces an accident or a substance. Wherefore similarity commonly taken is considered according to agreement, or communication in form (2). There is, however, a threefold communication in form and therefore a threefold similarity. 1° Some communicate in form according to the same notion and according to the same mode; thus two equally white things agree in the form of whiteness by the same notion and the same mode; this is the most perfect similarity, hence these are not only called similar, but equal in their similarity. 2° Some communicate in the same form according to the same notion, but not according to the same mode, as two unequally white things; but this is not had except in accidental forms, for substantial forms do not admit of more and less. 3° Some communicate in the same form but not according to the same notion, as happens in non-univocal agents with respect to their proper effects. Thus the form of a house agrees with the form which is in the mind of the artificer, but in such a way that the form of the house is not of the same notion as the form which is in the mind of the artificer. In this way all creatures are said to be similar to God. 1) Cf. Abrdgid de Metaphysique, I. pp. 51-52. (2) « This is the true practical unity. » Ibidem. (3) Logic., pp. 239 and ss. (1) IV Metaphys., lect. 2. (2) Cf. S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 4, a. 2. ——— Page 250 ———

Hence it happens that an individual is entirely incommunicated and incommunicable. (1) Cf. Letres entre LEMINITES et CLARK, among the Opera LEMINITUM.

number is known by one, because unity taken a number of times gives the number. » S. Thomas, X Metaphys., lect. 2. (2) « The ultimate unity gives species to number. » S. Thomas, VIII, Met. 1. 3. (3) Those who seek a longer exposition may consult Card. Mercier, nn. 83 (4) Cf. S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 11, a. 2. contrarily. Contrary opposition, indeed, is between two things which imply something positive. But one and many imply something positive; for one does not signify pure privation, but something positive, namely being itself undivided. Therefore one and many, although they are opposed by way of privation, are not however opposed according to pure privation and habit, but as contraries (X Metaph. lect. 4°). The II° part is declared. Predicamental one, which is the principle of number, is opposed to number as measure to measured, since number is defined: Multitude measured by one. But measure and measured are opposed relatively. Therefore predicamental one and number are opposed relatively. V. — One is not directly opposed to multitude itself, but rather to the division which is found in it. « One, says the Angelic Doctor, is not the remover of multitude, but of division, which is prior in reason than one or multitude (1). « That which is directly opposed to unity is that by reason of which unity is dissolved. But that by reason of which unity is dissolved is division, not multitude. Therefore what is directly opposed to one is not properly multitude, but division, which is found in multitude. Proof of the minor. Given division, unity, which is indivision itself, is immediately dissolved; given multitude, however, unity is not dissolved unless division is also introduced: for given many palms in the same continuous thing, one continuum remains, unless they are divided. V. — One taken materially is not opposed to multitude. One taken materially designates positive entity itself. This entity, however, constitutes multitude. Moreover, nothing is constituted from its contrary. Therefore one taken materially, by reason of its positive entity, is not opposed to multitude. Therefore opposition between unity and multitude is considered only with respect to essence, or

the formal notion of unity, and division, which is in multitude. VI. — Multitude is founded in unity and is itself posterior, both in knowing and in being. Proof of the I° part. (1) I. P ., q. 30, a. 3, a d 3. ——— Page 252 ———

to identity, which is defined as: Lack of identity among several. Since, however, identity is a certain unity of being, distinction implies in creatures a certain plurality and multiplicity of being. This plurality, however, is designated by different names: diversity, dissimilitude, inequality, difference. Those which are not one in substance are called diverse, just as those which are one in substance are called the same; those which are not one in quality are called dissimilar; those which are not one in quantity are called unequal. Diverse extends more broadly than different. For difference, besides the fact that they differ, must have something the same in which they agree. Hence difference implies two things: 1° that those which differ agree in some univocal predicate; 2° that they are separated from each other by formal differences. Thus man and brute agree in some univocal predicate and are separated by rationality and irrationality; and therefore they are truly different. Plant and animal agree in some univocal thing and on the other hand are separated by sensibility and insensibility, hence they are called different. Those, however, which agree in no univocal predicate are simply diverse: thus God and creature do not properly differ, but are diverse; likewise substance and accident. Distinction is sometimes taken in a stricter sense, for lack of identity between two individuals, and thus there is a threefold degree: Those which are not one in genus are called diverse; those which are not one in species are called different; those which are not one in number are distinct. In the present context, however, distinction is taken in a general sense, and whatever are not the same are called distinct, whether they are diverse or different. VIII. — Real and logical distinction. Distinction, as has been said, implies a certain plurality. If this plurality is in things independently of the mind's concept, a real distinction is introduced; if, however, it is had only in our concepts, it is a distinction of reason, or logical. Real

distinction supposes real composition in a being; logical distinction, however, can be conceived in the simplest being. Indeed, the simpler and more perfect something is, the more foundations for logical distinctions it provides. For a being of this kind, remaining in itself most simple, is equivalent to innumerable really distinct beings; and hence it provides a foundation for innumerable distinctions. Real distinction is twofold: greater, or entitative, which exists between thing and thing, as between man and garment; lesser, or modal, which is between a thing and a mode, as between a curved line and the curvature of the line. For it is divided into adequate and inadequate, according as the extremes do not include each other at all, as ——— Page 253 ———

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Divine attributes are distinguished in this way; for one includes the other in its concept, although it is distinguished from it under another respect. Those things are distinguished virtually which, although really the same, are equivalent to several really distinct things, as the human soul is equivalent to vegetative and sensitive (1)). It is divided, however, into (1) « There is, for example, a complete virtual distinction between the concepts of vegetative soul and intellective soul, by means of which we can represent the human soul. Not only, indeed, is the formal term of these two concepts composed of expressly different notes, which is the minimum required for a virtual distinction, but, in addition, each of them can exist separately in nature. Vegetative life is realizable in beings which do not have intelligence, and existence can exist in outside organized subjects. » Card. Mira- cien, n. 77. virtual intrinsic and virtual extrinsic. It is called intrinsic virtual, when the diverse formalities of a thing, even if not really prescinded, achieve the same as formalities really prescinded; because they are equivalent to them. It is called extrinsic virtual, when the distinction does not affect the thing itself intrinsically, but only dominatively and in concept. IX. — A distinction of reason su ffices to remove contradiction. Contradiction is introduced through

simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same thing. Affirmation and negation, however, exist only in the intellect, for they are divisive differences of propositions, which are not in things, but are produced by the intellect. Therefore, to verify affirmation and negation simultaneously of something, plurality in the intellect suffices. Moreover, where there is a distinction of reason, there is plurality in the intellect. Therefore a distinction of reason suffices to remove contradiction, so that affirmation and negation of the same thing can be verified without contradiction. X. — Whether a distinction of reason supposes a real distinction. Distinction can be considered on the part of the object and on the part of the subject, or intellect. Hence it must be answered: 1° Sometimes a distinction of reason supposes a real distinction on the part of the object. The distinction of white Peter from himself as black is a distinction of reason; but this implies a real distinction, namely the distinction of accident from substance, or whiteness from Peter. This example shows that a logical distinction sometimes supposes a real distinction also on the part of the object. 2° A distinction of reason always supposes a real distinction on the part of the subject. Concepts of reason, indeed, can be considered in three ways: 1° as signifying the same object, as when it is said: man is man; 2° as one adds something to another, as man and animal; 3° as they are of simply diverse notions, as animal and rational. Moreover, in this threefold case, concepts are subjectively diverse: for the concept of rational in my intellect is numerically distinct from the concept of animal; indeed, even in the first case: man is man, there are two concepts, one of which is the subject, the other the predicate. Therefore they are numerically distinct, and consequently are really distinguished on the part of the subject, ——— Page 254 ——— 348 ONTOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS TRACT. II. Q. I. 349 quatenus sunt duae ideae, seu duo accidentia numero distincta. 3e Distinction rationis major, quamvis non semper supponat distinctionem realem, ex parte objecti, subaudit tamen in ob- jecto fundamentum reale distinctionis. Probatur. Adest in objecto reale distinctionis fundamentum,

quando objectum aequivalet pluribus realiter distinctis. Sed objectum in distinctione majori aequivalet pluribus realiter distinctis : sic homo aequivalet animali et rationali ; et, quam- vis haec sint unum physice, viget verum fundamentum conci- piendi illa ut distincta, adeo ut intelligatur unum altero non intellecto. Ergo distinctione major supponit in objecto reale dis- tinctionis fundamentum. XII. — Whether falsehood can underlie a logical distinction. The act of distinction, or precision or abstraction, is reduced to simple apprehension. But falsehood cannot underlie simple apprehension. Therefore. — The major is declared. By precision, or distinction of reasoned reason, one and the same thing is considered separately from another, but the mind abstains from all judgment; it neither affirms nor denies the note which it considers separately to be in fact separate. Therefore falsity or truth does not underlie logical distinction, unless perhaps per accidens, as has been said in Logic, concerning simple apprehension (1). From these is understood the saying: There is no falsehood in prescinding or abstracting, that is, error cannot underlie precision or abstraction, because they are acts of simple apprehension

(2). XI. — What are the foundations of logical distinctions. These foundations are considered on the part of the intellect and on the part of the object. On the part of the intellect is its imperfection. For since our mind does not apprehend things intuitively, but through diverse motions, namely composing, dividing, reasoning, it needs several and distinct concepts to know what is truly one and undivided. However, the more perfect the intellect, the fewer concepts it needs, because it comprehends more in one (1). On the part of the object, sometimes its imperfection, because the thing exhibits two things which relate to each other as imperfect to perfect, potency to act, as in man animality to rationality. Hence the necessity of distinguishing genus and difference. But more commonly, the foundation of distinction is the perfection of the object, insofar as either one essence is equivalent to many really distinct things, as the human soul is equivalent to vegetative and sensitive forms; or one cause produces effects which proceed from distinct causes, etc.

(1) This also holds for angels: « The higher the angel, the fewer species it will need to apprehend the universality of intelligibles; and therefore its forms must be more universal, as if each extends to more things. » S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 55, a. 3. XIII. — The Scotistic distinction (3). The Scotists thought there is a distinction intermediate between real and rational distinction, namely a formal actual distinction from the nature of the thing. This is said to exist, not between two things, but between two formalities, e.g., between animality and rationality. It is from the nature of the thing, because actually and independently of our concept animality is not rationality, and before the operation of the mind the predication is true: The animality of Socrates is not his rationality. On the one hand it approaches real distinction, because it exists actually from the nature of the thing; on the other hand it approaches rational distinction, because animality and rationality, although they are two formalities distinct by their own nature, are not however two things in Socrates, but one thing. It is rightly said, therefore, to be intermediate between real distinction and rational distinction. The Scotists place this distinction between divine attributes (4) and between metaphysical degrees. Metaphysical degrees, however, are the series of essential predicates in one individual which are ordered by way of a ladder (1) Cf. Logic, pp. 264, ss. (2) « In this operation there can be no error, because neither one denies nor affirms: so that there is nothing clearer than this axiom of the School: He who makes a precision does not make a lie: abstinentium non est mendacium. » Bossuert, Logique, I. I. c. XXIII. (3) Many think that this distinction is not from Scotus himself, but was introduced by his disciples; for Scotus places between divine attributes the same distinction which St. Bonaventure calls of reason. Cf. Sco- ren, III Sent., dist. 2., q. 7, nn. 43 and 44. (4) Cf. Cajet. Comm. de ente et essentia, c. VI, q. XII. ——— Page 255 ———

reasoned or virtual reason. Therefore no medium exists. Hence many recent Scotists do not dare to call it intermediate, but reduce it to virtual distinction and call it

real analogically, insofar as it has a real foundation in nature. — If the Scotists intended nothing else, why did they pronounce insufficient the division admitted by other Scholastics? XV. — Second conclusion: The distinction which exists between metaphysical degrees is not real and independent of the operation of the mind, but only virtual. Metaphysical degrees are proportioned to the form from which they arise and of which they are formalities, and therefore are in the being itself as they are in the form from which they proceed. But in the form from which they proceed they are not really distinguished. The minor is clear from what has been said in II. P . Natural Philosophy, where it was shown that there is in man a single soul, and a single form, namely the rational soul, by reason of which man is not only a man, but also animal, living, body, substance, and being (1). Therefore, if metaphysical degrees: man, animal, living, body, substance, being are really one in form, they must be really one in man himself. They are distinguished, however, virtually. For, just as a hexagon contains a pentagon and a tetragon and exceeds them, so one intellective soul contains and exceeds the sensitive and vegetative; and thus it provides a foundation for distinguishing in man the intellective, sensitive, and vegetative, in such a way that one can be conceived without the other being understood. By the very fact that one thing is equivalent to several, it can be understood according as it is equivalent to one, without considering the other, and then according as it agrees with the other, without considering the first. XVI. — Objection: Contradictories are veri fied of metaphysical degrees. But, for contradictories to be verified, a real distinction is required. Therefore there is a real distinction between metaphysical degrees. Resp. 1°: With the major granted, I deny the minor; for, as was said above, a distinction of reason suffices to remove contradiction, n. IX. Resp. 2°: Distinguish the major: Contradictories are veri fied of metaphysical degrees dependently on the operation of the mind, I grant; independently of the operation of the mind, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: For contradictories to be

verified independently of the operation of the mind, a real distinction is required, I grant; otherwise, I deny. And I deny the consequence (2). (1) Cf. vol. II, pp. 486, ss.; pp. 422, ss. — On that Scotistic doctrine, one may read A. VACANT, Etudes comparées sur la philosophie de S. Thomas d' Aquin et sur celle de Duns Scot, pp. 20, ss. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 13, a.4, ad 2, q. 76, a. 3 ; GOUIN, Meto pAgo., q. 2, a. 2. § 1 ; Card. MERCER, n. 79; DOMET DE VORGES, c. VIII ——— Page 256 ——— 1. — On the threefold truth. In Logic we distinguished a threefold truth: formal, which is the conformity of the intellect with the object; transcendental, which is the truth of being itself; moral, which is the conformity of signs or words with the mind's sentiment. Concerning logical truth we have treated sufficiently elsewhere; the discussion, therefore, is about metaphysical truth. What does it imply and in what does it consist? II. — The truth of being implies formally an order or conformity to the intellect. When something is per se first such, others are not such except by order to it. But the intellect is per se first true. Therefore all other things are called true by order to the intellect. The major is an axiom, which is clear enough. For when something is per se first such, it is as it were the chief analogate in that genus; therefore other things cannot be called such except by order to that chief. Thus, because health is per se first in an animal, other things are denominated healthy by order to the animal. Proof of the minor, namely that the intellect is per se first true, or (1) One may consult Aristotle II Metaphys. c. 1, and VI Metaphys. c. 3. In these, however, he treats rather of the truth of cognition. Hence Domet De Vorges (op. cit.) holds that the notion of transcendental truth is of Christian origin « The notion of transcendent truth seems to us to have a Christian and Platonic origin. » — Consult S. Au- gustius, Solilog., I. II, c. 5, De vera Religione, c. 36; S. Axelimus, cc. 7- 11, Monolog., c. 31-36, Brevisio. i. f., c. 6; S. Thomas, I. Senz. dist. 17, and dist. 39, I. p. q. 16 Qo. De Peru. S. Bonaventur and Scotus in Senz.; Carneolus, dist. 19, q. 3, nov. Edit., t. II, pp. 157, ss.; Cajetanus, Banne, in I. P . q. 16; Suarez,

disp. 8; Alamannus, IV P . Meta- phys., q. 17; and more recent Scholastics: Sanservirino, Ziolara, Lepid, Mercier, Domet De Voros, and Pioeus, Comment. Semine Theologique, e°c.

relation to the divine intellect, but also a relation to the created intellect and to the thing itself. However, the primary relation is to the divine intellect, because this is the first and most fundamental conformity. The relation to the created intellect is secondary, and the relation to the thing itself is fundamental. ——— Page 258 ———

made. Natural things, however, are indeed known by the created intellect, but are not made. Therefore they have a per accidens order to the created intellect. On the contrary, the cognition of the intellect depends on things and is measured by things: for cognition is said to be true only insofar as it is conformed to the thing. Hence the axiom: The truth of natural things is posterior to the divine intellect, posterior to the created intellect. — Arti ficial things, however, have a per se order to the intellect of the artificer; for they ——— Page 259 ———

intellect are said to be true insofar as they are apt (1) Hence Bossuet writes: The true is what is; the false is what is not. » Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même, c. I, n. XVI. (2) To this belong the definitions of truth given by S. Augustine: Truth is that by which what is is shown (De vera Relig., c. 36), and by S. Hilary: Truth as declarative or manifestative of being (De Trinit., lib. 5, ante med.). (3) 8. Thomas, I. Cont. Gent., c. 60. ——— Page 260 ———

ARTICLE FIVE.

I. — The notion of falsity. Since falsity is opposed to truth, it is de fined from the opposite. Hence logical falsity, or in knowing, is the non-adequation of intellect and thing, insofar as the

intellect knows a thing otherwise than it is; metaphysical falsity, or in being, would be the difformity of a thing with its norm or with the intellect to which it is said to be ordered; falsity in signifying is the difformity of the

signification of words or writing with the thing signified; moral falsity, or falsity of sin, is the difformity of a human act with the rule of morals, or the difformity of the will with divine reason. II. — False is opposed to true not contradictorily, nor privatively, but contrarily. Contradiction is pure negation without a subject, namely it posits nothing nor determines a subject for itself, and for this reason it can be said both of being and of non-being, such as non-seeing and non- sitting. Privation is negation in a subject: it posits nothing real, but determines a subject for itself, namely the subject to which such a perfection is due. A contrary, however, since it is between two positive extremes, both posits something and determines a subject. But the false determines a subject and posits something in the subject: for, just as truth posits an adequate acceptation of the thing, so falsity posits a non-adequate or difform acceptation of the thing. Therefore falsity is opposed to truth not contradictorily, not privatively, but contrarily. III. — Falsity simply is not found in things depending on God, except in voluntary things, in which moral falsity can exist: but falsity in a certain respect can be in things by order to our intellect. (1) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 17, and his interpreters already cited.

for being and truth are convertible. But every thing is per se and essentially being. Therefore it is per se and essentially true.

2° In a certain respect, however, it can be called false with respect to our intellect, and this in two ways. In one way, according to the notion of the signified, so that that is said to be false in things which is signified or represented by false speech or intellect, according to which mode any thing can be called false with respect to what it is not, true with respect to what it is. Thus a true tragedian is a false Hector, as Augustine says (1). The tragedian truly has the being of a tragedian; according to this he is, therefore he can be called true; but he does not have the very being of Hector; according to this he is not, therefore he is called false. — In another way, a thing is said to be false by way of cause, insofar as it is apt to produce a false opinion of itself;

which can happen thus: Since our cognition arises from sense, which concerns accidents, we judge things from external accidents. Therefore, when some things in external accidents have a likeness to other things, they are said to be false according to those things. Thus tin has external accidents similar to the external accidents of silver: hence it can sometimes produce in us a false opinion that it is silver, and so tin is said to be false silver. In this example the axiom is also verified: A thing according to what it is is said to be true, according to what it is not is said to be false. Tin truly has the being of tin: according to this it is, and is called true; it does not have the being of silver: according to this it is not, and is called false. Therefore true tin is false silver, just as a true tragedian is a false Hector. IV. — On logical falsity. This is the non-adequation of the intellect with the thing. It is properly had in judgment. Per se it never underlies apprehension; per accidens, however, it can underlie complex apprehension (2). Falsity, or error, however, is never present in cognition except under the influence of the will. For the intellect is determined to assent either by an evident object or by the will. But false cannot be an evident object which draws the intellect to assent. Other things which concern the truth and falsity of cognition are required in Log. Maj. Tract. II. (1) On the causes of error cf. Logic, pp. 253-254. ——— Page 264 ——— 1. — The de finition of good. The definition of good given by the Philosopher is celebrated: Good is what all things desire. Good is described from its effect, which is to move appetite, just as motive power is usually manifested by motion. All things. The meaning is not: nothing is good unless it is desired by all, as if all beings desired all good; on the contrary, it is certain that each thing desires a good proportioned to itself; but it is intended: all things desire some good and nothing is desired except because it is good and under the aspect in which it is good. Nor is the objection valid concerning some who desire evil; because they do not desire evil except under the aspect of good, insofar as they consider it good, and their intention is per se directed to good, but per accidens falls upon evil (2). Desire.

A threefold appetite is distinguished: innate, which is the inclination of each thing to its own perfection; sensitive, following sensitive cognition; intellective, following the cognition of the intellect. When it is said: what all things desire, it is to be understood of every appetite, whether natural, sensitive, or intellectual. Natural things tend by natural appetite to good, not that they know good, but because they are moved to good by some knower, namely by the ordination of the divine intellect, in the way an arrow tends to the target from the direction of the archer. 1. — The de finition of good. The definition of good given by the Philosopher is celebrated: Good is what all things desire. Good is described from its effect, which is to move appetite, just as motive power is usually manifested by motion. All things. The meaning is not: nothing is good unless it is desired by all, as if all beings desired all good; on the contrary, it is certain that each thing desires a good proportioned to itself; but it is intended: all things desire some good and nothing is desired except because it is good and under the aspect in which it is good. Nor is the objection valid concerning some who desire evil; because they do not desire evil except under the aspect of good, insofar as they consider it good, and their intention is per se directed to good, but per accidens falls upon evil (2). Desire. A threefold appetite is distinguished: innate, which is the inclination of each thing to its own perfection; sensitive, following sensitive cognition; intellective, following the cognition of the intellect. When it is said: what all things desire, it is to be understood of every appetite, whether natural, sensitive, or intellectual. Natural things tend by natural appetite to good, not that they know good, but because they are moved to good by some knower, namely by the

ordination of the divine intellect, in the way an arrow tends to the target from the direction of the archer. (1) Cf. ARNSTOT. I. Ethic. and V. Metaphys. : S. AQUINISTUS. De Doctri- na christiania, lib. I, c. 32, P . L. XXXIV, 32, and De Trinit. lib. VIII, c. 3, P . L. XLII, 949 ; BONTIUS. De Hebdomad., circa med., P . L., LXIV, 1312, ss.; DIONYSIUS.

De divin. nomin. c. 3, P . G., III, 679, c. 5, 815 ; 8. THOMAS, q. 21. De Veritat., and I. P . q. 5 ; CAJETANUS, BANKER, PÉQUES, in h. L. SUAREZ, disp. 10 ; ALAMANUS, q. 19 ; and more recent Scholastics cited above; COUSIN. Du Vrai, du Beau, du Bien. (2) S. THOMAS, I. Ethic., lect. 6. A di fficulty could be raised against the aforesaid definition. For just as good implies an order to appetite, so truth implies an order to intellect and cognition. But truth is not defined as: What all things know. Therefore good should not be defined as: What all things desire. Resp. : There is a great disparity. Truth cannot imply an order to all things, but only to those which can receive beings in an intentional mode and attract them to themselves: for cognition is perfected through an intentional species by virtue of which the known is drawn to the knower. Good, on the contrary, can imply an order to all things, because appetite is drawn to the thing itself, and the appetition is terminated in the thing according to its real being. Moreover, all beings can receive some being, namely some natural perfection. Wherefore good, which perfects appetite, can be said of all things in some way. Hence good is rightly defined as what all things desire, although truth cannot be defined as what all things know. II. — The notion of transcendental good consists in the perfection of a thing itself insofar as this perfection implies an order to appetite. Since good is what all things desire, the goodness of a thing consists in its appetibility. But the appetibility of a thing is nothing other than the perfection of the thing itself implying an order to appetite. Therefore transcendental goodness consists in the perfection of a thing itself, insofar as it implies an order to appetite. The minor is declared. Nothing is appetible unless it suits appetite. Moreover, nothing truly suits appetite unless it in some way perfects it, just as, conversely, something is said to be unsuitable to a thing because it places some imperfection in it. Therefore appetibility is the perfection of a thing itself implying an order to appetite. Moreover, nothing is perfective of another unless it is perfect in itself; for nothing gives what it in no way has in itself. Hence good signifies being as perfect in itself and perfective of another. Being perfect in itself

relates to good presuppositively; but what is properly constitutive of good, or formal, is being perfective of another, namely appetite. Cajetan (and, after him, Suarez, Card. Zigliara) distinguishes a twofold appetibility: fundamental and formal. Fundamental appetibility is the very notion by which being becomes appetible. ——— Page 265 ———

argumentation it follows that two things are found in the notion of good: something absolute, namely the perfection of a thing, and something relative, namely suitability, or order to appetite. Hence diverse opinions have arisen concerning the formal constitutive of good. The first places it in the absolute: so Herveus, Molina. The second, attributed to Durandus, Capreolus, places it in some relation, or connotation. The third, which is that of Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Bannez, and many Thomists, teaches that goodness consists primarily and per se in some absolute nature, or perfection; secondarily, however, and consequently but necessarily, in a relation to appetite. We choose the last. Against the first, it is argued: Good cannot be placed in a purely absolute nature, for it relates to appetite as the visible to sight, the intelligible to the intellect. Moreover, the visible and the intelligible do not signify something purely absolute, but imply a relation to sight and intellect. Therefore neither can good be something merely absolute, but necessarily implies some relation. Against the second: Good necessarily, primarily, and principally implies the perfection by virtue of which it becomes appetible, or suitable to appetite. But a relation according to itself does not express perfection, but only a mere respect. Therefore the formal constitutive of good is not a relation. The last opinion remains. Good, as the object of appetite,

same in suppositum; they are distinguished in reason, insofar as good adds to being the transcendental relation of suitability to appetite. Hence, because good adds to being, being is presupposed to good. First, therefore, in the conception of the intellect, being falls, then good; and so, according to reason, being is prior to good (3). VI. — On

being simply and good simply. This distinction of reason su ffices so that being simply and good simply are taken in entirely different significations. Since being implies that something is properly in act, and act properly implies an order to potency, by this something is said to be being simply by which it is first discerned from what is only in potency. But something is first discerned from a being in potency through substantial being: (1) On this matter, consult Card. MEBCHEN, n. 122. — Let what has been said elsewhere concerning the twofold order, dynamic and teleological, which prevails in the world, be recalled. Vol. II, pp. 37-38. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 5, a. 3. (3) Ibid. a. 2. for each thing is properly placed in act through its substantial being. Therefore through its substantial being each thing is said to be being simply; but through superadded acts it is said to be being in a certain respect. Thus, being quantified, being white, comes to an already existing thing, but does not remove the thing from a state of potency simply so called. Therefore it cannot be called being simply, but only being in a certain respect. Being simply, therefore, has the notion of first being. But good implies the notion of perfect, which is appetible. Perfect, however, which according to etymology is the same as totally in act, designates that to which nothing is lacking according to the proper act of its nature; consequently it implies the notion of the ultimate. Hence that which is ultimately perfect is said to be good simply; but what does not have the ultimate perfection which it ought to have, although it has some perfection insofar as it is in act, is not called perfect simply nor good simply, but in a certain respect. Thus, therefore, according to first being, which is substantial, something is said to be being simply, and good in a certain respect, that is insofar as it is being; but according to ultimate act, something is said to be being in a certain respect, and good simply (1). Now, the ultimate perfection is the ultimate end; then only will a creature be simply good when it attains its ultimate end and enjoys it. This end, however, cannot be obtained in the present life. Therefore no mortal can be called good and perfect simply.

The Blessed, on the contrary, are simply perfect, since they are immovably established in the end. In another sense, being simply can designate what is absolutely, a being from itself; and good simply what is absolutely good and without limit. In which sense, good simply is good by essence, and in this acceptation no one is good except God alone; but good in a certain respect designates good by participation and emanating from another. (1) Ibid., a. 1, ad. 1. — « It is therefore true, as Boethius wished, that things are not said to be and to be good in the same way or according to the same reality, if it concerns being and being good, in the pure and simple sense: being, indeed, concerns substantial being, while being good concerns the completion of being by the presence of all that, even accidentally, contributes to its perfection. » P . Pécuves, O.P . Comm. Som- me Théol., t. I, 1 175. ——— Page 267 ———

to order, for inclination and love is a certain weight: My love, my weight (3). In these three is represented some vestige of the Holy Trinity. Measure and mode imply substance limited by its principles, which is the principle of all things which are in the thing; and so it signifies the Father, who is the Principle not from a principle. Species, or form, implies the species, or idea which is in the mind of the artificer, and so it signifies the Son, who is the Word and idea of the Father; weight and order designate love, and so they signify the Holy Spirit, who is the Love of the Father and the Son (4). X. — The division of good into true and apparent. Good is the perfection of the appetent. Either, therefore, it truly perfects the appetent or only apparently. In the first case, it is true good; in the other, apparent good, or false good. Moreover, just as it is incompatible that something totally false be known, so it is incompatible that something totally evil be desired. Therefore false good must be, in some respect, true good. This happens thus: In the created appetent, several appetitions are distinguished: one superior and principal, others inferior; each tends to some good proportioned and different. (1) Cf. S. A u g u s t i n . De N a t u r a B o n i , c. 3, P . L. X L V I I . 5 3 5 ; S. T h o - m a s , I. P . q. 5, a. 5 ; P . P r o v e s , i n h. 1. (2) Sap. XI. 21. (3)

Cf. S. A u g u s t i n . De G e n e s . a d l i t e r . , l i b . I V , c. 3, P . L. X X X I V , 2 9 9 . (4) Cf. S. T h o m a s , I. P . q. 4 5 , a. 7 . — C f . also our work: La

which one tends, hence there is the term, or the end which; or rest in that thing, the term, or end by which. Therefore there will be a threefold good according to this threefold term: Good

terminating the motion of appetite in a certain respect, as a means through which one tends to another, is called useful. That which ultimately and totally terminates appetite, as the thing towards which appetite per se tends, is called honest, because honest is said to be that which is desired for itself. That, finally, which terminates the motion of appetite as rest in the desired thing, is delightful (1). « This division, continues the Angelic Doctor, is not by opposed things, but by opposed notions. — However, those things which have no other notion of appetibility except delight are properly called delightful, although they are sometimes harmful and dishonorable. Useful, indeed, are called those which do not have in themselves a reason for being desired, but are desired only as leading to another, such as taking bitter medicine. True honest things are said to be those which have in themselves a reason for being desired. »

——— Page 270 ——— 1. — Evil is the privation of good. One of the opposites is known from the other, as darkness through light. Hence from good we must learn what evil is, which is the opposite of good. Evil is opposed to good contrarily or privatively according to different respects. If evil is taken concretely as the subject which is called evil, it is opposed contrarily, as vice is opposed to virtue; if, however, it is taken formally, as the notion according to which something is called evil, it is opposed privatively, and thus is defined: The privation of due good. Evil, therefore, formally taken does not imply any being, any form, or perfection, but only the absence of due good. For whatever is appetible is good. But every being desires its being, its form. Therefore every being, every form, or nature, is some

good; consequently evil signifies neither being nor form nor any nature. It remains, therefore, that by the name of evil is implied a certain absence of good. For the notion of evil, however, not just any lack of good suffices, « otherwise it would follow that those things which do not exist at all would be evil, and again that any thing would be evil because it does not have the good of another thing, as that a man would be evil because he does not have the swiftness of a goat, or the strength of a lion (2).» Evil, therefore, is constituted by the absence of due good; or due good to itself, as when something is said to be evil in itself; or due good to another, as when something is said to be evil, or harmful, to another. Hence the saying is understood: Evil is distant both from being simply and from non-being simply, because it is neither as a habit nor as pure negation, but as a privation (1). II. — The division of evil. Evil is adequately divided into physical evil and moral evil. Proof. Every evil is an evil of a thing or an evil of an operation. But evil of a thing is called physical; evil of an operation, however, moral evil. Therefore. Proof of the major. Evil is the privation of good, which consists principally and per se in perfection and act. But there is a twofold act, first and second: first indeed is a thing, that is, form or integrity of the thing; second, however, is operation. Therefore evil will be twofold: evil of a thing, which is the privation of form, or of some part which is required for the integrity of a thing, such as blindness is an evil, and to lack a limb; and evil of an operation, which is the privation of due free operation; either because it does not exist, or because it does not have due mode and order. There is no metaphysical evil, such as Leibniz advocated. Evil of this kind would be imperfection, or limitation of any created thing, or lack of non-due perfection. But limitation or lack of further perfection is essential to a creature, nor is it evil for it: hence man is not considered evil because he does not have the swiftness of a goat nor the strength of a lion, as the Angelic Doctor wittily observes. Evil is properly that which deprives a thing of due perfection, n. I. And this privation is of a thing or of an operation: physical evil or moral evil (2). III. — Evil of fault

and of punishment. In voluntary agents, evil acquires a special notion and a special name. For good is simply the object of the will; wherefore evil, which is the privation of good, is found in rational creatures endowed with will according to a special notion. Physical evil has the notion of punishment, because it is contrary to the will and is inflicted by order of divine providence and justice as punishment for sin; moral evil, however, has the notion of fault: this (1) Cf. S. A u c u s t i n u s , De Mor. Manich., lib. II, c. 4, De Cio. Dei, lib. X1, c. 22, De Vera Relig. c. 24, De Doctrina Christ., lib. I, c. 32 ; D i o n s s , De d e c i n . n o m i n . c. 4, P . G., 715, 534, ss.; S. T h o m a s , I. P . qq. 48 and 49, Qq. D i s p . d e M a l o ; A l a m a n n u s . q. 20 ; and interpreters of St. Thomas already cited. (2) I. P ., q. 48, a. 3. ——— Page 271 ———

good will by which a man uses well the things he has, he is called a good man, and from an evil will, evil. For he who has an evil will can also use well what he has badly, as if a grammarian knowingly speaks incongruously. But fault consists in an evil will, or in a disordered act of the will; punishment, however, does not consist in an evil will, but in the privation of something of those things which the will uses. Therefore from the evil of fault someone becomes evil, but not from the evil of punishment. Therefore fault has the notion of evil more perfectly than punishment. Moreover, that is a greater evil which deprives of a greater good. But punishment deprives of the good of a creature; fault, however, is properly opposed to uncreated good; since it is contrary to the fulfillment of the divine will and to the divine love by which divine good is loved in itself and not only as participated by a creature. Therefore fault is a greater evil than punishment. Finally, the evil of punishment is assumed or inflicted because of the evil of fault. But a greater is not inflicted for a lesser, but conversely. Therefore (1). V. — The perfection of the universe requires that some evil be found in things. The perfection of the universe requires that there be in things all degrees of goodness, at least generic degrees. But the degrees of goodness are such that something is so good that (1) Hence it is understood what is

to be thought of the doctrine of Tolstoi, who acknowledges no other evil except violence, or coaction. « Evil is violence. » — Violence and coaction can be physical evil, and sometimes moral; but on the other hand they can have the notion of good, indeed of a great good, insofar as they are inflicted to restrain the evil of fault and to protect order. — On that Tolstoian theory one may read G. Fonskovius, Revus Abdomadaire, 5 octob. 1907. it can never fail from good; and something so good that it can sometimes fail from good; just as in things are found beings which can never lose being, such as incorruptible beings; and some which can lose being, such as corruptible beings. Therefore the perfection of the universe, just as it requires that there be incorruptible and corruptible beings, so it requires that there be beings which can fail from good and beings which cannot fail from good. But to fail from good is a certain evil. Therefore the perfection of the universe requires that some evil be found in things. Evil, therefore, exists really in things, not as some positive being, but as real corruption and real privation: for there exist in the world beings which are really deprived of some good, or of some perfection due to them. VI. — What is the cause of evil. A fourfold cause is assigned: e fficient, material, formal, and final. « Evil does not have a formal cause, but is rather a privation of form, and similarly it does not have a final cause, but is rather a privation of order to the due end. For not only the end has the notion of good, but also the useful which is ordered to the end (1). » Concerning the material and efficient cause, therefore, the question is only raised. VII. — First conclusion: Evil is in good as in a subject or material cause. Proof. Evil is the privation of good. But every privation demands a subject, since it is a negation in a subject. Therefore evil requires a subject. Moreover, every subject is some being, and therefore some good, since every being is convertible with good. Therefore evil requires good as a subject. Hence, if evil were found without admixture of good, without any good subject in which it is received, it would thereby vanish, as the Philosopher says: If evil is integral, it will destroy itself (2). VIII. — Second conclusion:

Evil is from good as from an agent cause, not however per se, but per accidens (3). Proof of the I° part. Evil is a defect of good which is apt to (1) S. THOMAS, I. P ., q. 49, a. 1. (2) ARISTOT. IV Ethic. c. 5, (al. 11). (3) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P ., q. 49, a. 1, and II Sent., dist. 34, a. 4. ——— Page 272 ———

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ART. VII — ON EVIL.

justice. X. — It is incompatible that any evil nature exist, and a fortiori, one supreme evil which is the cause of all evil. Among the Persians there prevailed the doctrine of a twofold principle, good and evil, which was successively taken up by the Gnostics (1), the Manichaeans (1), (1) Cf. J. TIXESORT, Histoire des Dogmes, ch. IV, Les hérésies du IIe siècle. ——— Page 273 ———

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ARTICLE EIGHT.

On The Beautiful (1).

flesh, the spirit discovers the invisible essence. » De l'Art et du Beau, c. II. ——— Page 277 ———

(3) This is confessed by all philosophers who acknowledge the true God: « God, who is the type of absolute liberty, is therefore also supreme beauty: all beauty derives from him. » Diction. philos. art. Beau. — Cf. B. FRANG. SALIS. Traité de l’Amour de Dieu, liv I, c. 1. ——— Page 278 ———

assigned. The sublime, however, rises above beauty; it is defined as: That which surpasses the intuition of the knower. (1) Cf. P . Moxsandre, Carême de 1890, Amen du sens esthétique. (2) Cf. Souvène, L’esthétique du dogme. ——— Page 279 ———

material processes — is addressed not to the senses alone, but to the intelligence. » Card. Men- cina, n. 268. (2) That word Aesthetica, signifying the science of beauty, was introduced by Baumgarten, a German philosopher (1714-1762). — In Kant, however, it designates the study of sensibility and the senses. ——— Page 280 ———

ART. VIII. — ON THE BEAUTIFUL.

But on the other hand, taste has a real foundation, and beauty itself exhibits something objective and absolute (1). Just as that is simply more delightful in which he who has the best taste delights most, so beauty simply is said to be that in which those who have the aesthetic faculty rightly disposed delight. But what is absolute and objective in beauty is first the ideal, whether proximate or ultimate; likewise, integrity, proportion, and the other elements of beauty are not subjective (1) « There is in art a point of perfection, as of goodness or maturity in nature; he who feels it and loves it has perfect taste; he who does not feel it and loves below or above has defective taste. There is therefore a good and a bad taste, and one disputes about tastes with foundation. » La Barcvén, Les Caractères, ch. I, Des ouvrages de l'Esprit. ——— Page 281 ——— figments, but have an objective character. Thus, although the pleasure felt may be subjective, the reasons for that pleasure are found in the object itself and are independent of us. Therefore, concerning tastes, that is, concerning the subjective feeling, there is no disputing; but concerning the foundation of taste, that is, concerning the beauty of the object, there is good ground for dispute. This distinction, often overlooked, is the key to resolving this ancient question. Furthermore, the judgment of taste, like every judgment, has its norm. The immediate norm is the ideal type which the intellect forms for itself; the ultimate norm is the divine intellect. Therefore, even in matters of taste, it can be said that there is a rule based on the nature of things, and that the beautiful is not merely a matter of arbitrary human convention. ——— Page 282 ———

QUESTION ONE

ARTICLE ONE — On The Nature Of Being

——— Page 284 ——— being taken nominatively does not necessarily imply the exercise of life, but only the thing which lives or can live. In this way, being does not necessarily imply the exercise of being, but only all that exists or can exist. Being can be taken in a third acceptation, « according as it is the verbal copula signifying the composition of any enunciation which the soul makes, hence this being is not something in the nature of things, but only in the act of the soul composing and dividing. And thus being is attributed to everything of which a proposition can be formed, whether it is a being or a privation of being; for we say that blindness exists (1). » Being thus taken posits nothing in reality, but requires being which is in reality as a cause, for from the fact that something is in the nature of things, the truth or falsity of the proposition which the intellect signifies by the word is, as it is taken for the verbal copula, is had. II. — Being simply said is being in the first acceptation, or participial being. Just as white is said from the form of whiteness, just as living is said from the act of living, so being is properly said from the form or act of being. Hence it is defined by St. Thomas as: That whose act is to be. For just as living properly so called is that whose act is to live and implies a composite of life and that which has life, so being properly so called is that whose act is to exist and implies a composite of that which has being and being itself. « Being is implied as the principal and formal significate, because it is the abstract of this concrete being. That, however, which has being is implied secondarily as the susceptive of being (2). » In being, therefore, we distinguish two things: the subject which has being, and the form or act by which the subject has being. The subject which has being is called thing or essence; the act by which the thing has being is being or existence. (1) Consuli possunt: ARISTOTELES, Metaphys. VIII and X ; S. THOMAS, Comm. in Metaphys. ; De Ente et Essentia ; CAJETANUS, Comm. in opusc. De Ente et Essentia;

ALAMANUS, Metaphys., q. III ; STANIS, Disput. Metaphys.disp. 2 ; BALMES, Philosophie Fondam. liv. V ; MENCKER, On- nologie ; DOMET DE VORGES, Abrégé de Metaphys., c. I ; LERIDI et recen- tiores Scholastici; LABEYRRE, Dogme et Metaphysique, C. SENTROUT, L'Objet de la Metaphysique, selon Kant et selon Aristote. Gredit editio tertia. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, IV. Metaphys., lect. 11, III Sent., dist. 6, q. 2, a. 2, quodlib. a. 3. (1) Quodlib. 9. a. 3 (2) SXLVESTER FERRARESSIS, in I. Cont. Gent. c. 25. — «This subsistent being that we have called with Aristotle the first substance encloses in its concept: a quidditative element, what the thing is, the essence or, if you will, the essential being; and a complementary element, existence, or if you will, existential being. These are indeed two objects of thought, 'two objective rationales,' 'enveloped one and the other in what we call globally being, ens.' » Card. MERCKER, Ontot., n. 14. ——— Page 285 ———

But, because being absolutely and primarily is said of substances, and later, in a certain respect, of accidents, hence it is that essence is properly and truly in substances, but in accidents in a certain way and in a certain respect. Other matters concerning essence, namely its division and properties, etc., will be dealt with in q. III. IV. — Existence. The subject which receives being, namely the thing or essence, does not imply in its concept the actual exercise of being, but only the capacity, or potency, for being; but that by which essence is placed in the actual exercise of being is called being. Being, therefore, is the ultimate actuality of a thing, or the act by which something is formally denominated being or existing, just as life is the act by which something is called living; it is that by which a thing issues from a state of possibility and is placed in a state of reality; that by which the question: does the thing exist? is answered. Being is more often called existence by the Moderns; St. Thomas and the Ancients rather abstain from the word existence. To exist according to the force of the name is to stand out from, or implies a procession from some cause. Created being indeed stands out from some cause, and can rightly be called existence, but being

according to itself implies no procession from anything; wherefore the verbal noun is more fitting for designating being according to itself: being taken and being as it belongs to God. The matter, however, is not of the greatest importance; wherefore in practice we use being or existence promiscuously. V. — Being. Being in the strict and proper signi fication designates the act of being. But it happens that words which primarily designate an act, by a certain analogy, are transferred to the potency itself which is informed by such an act. Hence the name being is secondarily and analogically attributed to the essence which is informed by the act of being; and thus in the schools the being of existence and the being of essence are distinguished. And finally it is transferred to signify the truth of composition in propositions, according as being is said to be the copula. Thus, being properly speaking designates the act of being, or existence; in a less strict sense, the essence itself, and finally, logically, the copula in propositions. VI. — In which acceptation is being the principle of categories or predicaments. Being is called transcendent because it transcends all categories and is contained by none; however, it is found in each and predicated of each: it is therefore the principle of categories. In what acceptation, moreover, is transcendent being, which wanders through the ten predicaments, to be taken? Kant, Rosmini, contend that transcendent being is that first thing which has being in the soul and is placed as the copula in a proposition; others, holding with Scotus that essence and existence are not really distinguished, maintain that being, the principle of categories, is being which signifies mere and naked essence. The opinion of the Thomists and most scholastics, however, is proposed in the following conclusion: VII. — Conclusion: Being which is divided into the ten predicaments is not that which signi fies the truth of a proposition; it implies a composite of essence and being, in such a way, however, that it is placed in a genus not according to being, but by reason of quiddity.
——— Page 286 ———

It is con firmed. Transcendent being is that which is contracted to some mode of being in the diverse predicaments. But that determination takes place insofar as being is received in a subject, for unreceived being is infinite and indeterminate. Therefore transcendent being implies being with a subject in which it is received, and therefore a composite of essence and being. The III° part is proved. « Because nothing is placed in a genus according to its being, but by reason of its quiddity, says the Angelic Doctor; which is clear from the fact that the being of each thing is proper to it and distinct from the being of any other thing (1). » Moreover, that is first divisible into predicaments which is first diverse and by reason of which another thing becomes diverse. But essences, or quiddities, are first diverse; being, however, becomes diverse because of the diverse essences which receive it. Therefore, although the whole existing thing, or the whole composite of essence and being, is in a predicament, that which is first divisible into predicaments is essential being, or quidditative being, not existential being. That indeed, by analogy, can be divided in some way into genera, insofar as every existence is substantial or accidental, but this is because existence is received in substantial or accidental essence. It remains, therefore, that predicaments properly and first divide essential being, although they imply a composite of essence and being. VIII. — A fourfold division of being: 1° per se and per accidens, 2° of reality and of reason, 3° into ten predicaments, 4° into potency and act. Being per se is being properly so called which has true unity. Being per accidens is that which does not properly have a cause, nor properly unity, such as fortuitous things, and those which are a certain aggregate of several beings pertaining to diverse categories. Being of reality, or real being, is that which has or can have being in the nature of things. It is twofold: actual and ideal. Actual is said to be that which actually has being on the part of reality; ideal, however, is that which does not yet have being, but can be given in the nature of things. Being of reason, however, is said to be that which has being objectively only in the mind

and to which, accordingly, no being in the nature of things corresponds. It neither exists nor can exist outside the mind, and its whole being consists in its being apprehended by reason. It differs, therefore, entirely from ideal or possible being, which, although it does not exist, can be endowed with existence. IX. — Being of reason is twofold: negation and relation. Concerning the division into being of reason reasoning and being of reason reasoned, let what has been handed down in Logic be recalled. Here, however, it must be added that being of reason is divided into negation and relation (1). Under negation is comprehended privation, which is the negation of a due form. « That which is of reason, says the Angelic Doctor, can only be twofold, namely negation or some relation. » Proof. The nature of being of reason formally consists in its opposition to real being, namely that it is not capable of existence. But that which is not capable of existence is either something positive or something non-positive. If it is not positive, it is negation or privation. But what is positive is either absolute or relative. ——— Page 287 ———

concerning God would be sophistical (2).» Likewise, we denominate, define, and know substances from accidents, namely actions, properties. Therefore, if accident and substance agree in no way in reality, but only in name, our cognition of substances will be empty and fallacious. It is necessary, therefore, that being be predicated analogically of God and creatures, of substance and accident. But what this analogy is, is disputed. Some think it is analogy of proportion, others analogy of proportionality, others both proportion and proportionality. Let what was said in Minor Logic, Tract. I, q. I, art. III be recalled (3). VII. — Third conclusion: The analogy between God and creatures, substance and accident, is not an analogy of several to a third, but of one to another. — Analogy of several to a third supposes something prior with respect to which those several (1) « In vain will one reply with Saguen that all beings are equal in their opposition to nothingness and that, consequently, a univocal concept suffices to embrace them all. It is not true that they are all equally the non-nothing. Does not the Necessary, the Infinite, the Perfect, the Immutable, the Eternal, really differ from the contingent, the finite, the imperfect, the changeable, and the temporal? Do substance and accident, spirit and matter, exist in the same way? » C. LABEYRIN, Dogme « Méthaphysique, p. 174. (2) S. THOMAS, De Poenit., q. 7, a. 2. (3) Logic. pp. 45 and ss. are said, as healthy food and healthy medicine suppose an animal with respect to which they are called healthy. But nothing can be or be conceived prior to God and creatures, substance and accident. Therefore. Moreover, in the analogy of being there are not three terms, but only two which are compared: creature indeed in order to God, accident in order to substance. Therefore only the analogy of one to another prevails. VIII. — Fourth conclusion: The analogy of being between God and creatures, substance and accident, is an analogy of proportionality; it is also of proportion, not formally, but virtually. Proof of the I° part. Analogy of proportionality is had when the notion signi fied by the name is found

intrinsically and truly in both analogates. But the notion signified by the name being is found intrinsically in God and creatures, in substance and accident; for creatures are beings, not only denominatively, but by reality and intrinsically; not only substance, but also accident, is intrinsically being, because it is truly outside nothing, and truly has real effects, such as being quantified, being colored, being hot, etc. Therefore. From which the II° part is proved. In analogy of proportion properly so called, the analogous form is in the principal analogate intrinsically, but in the others extrinsically and by denomination. Moreover, the form of the chief analogate is placed in the definition of the others, so much so that the other analogates cannot be conceived without the form of the chief analogate: thus the health of food cannot be understood independently of the health of an animal. But 1° the notion of being is not found extrinsically and only by denomination in creatures and accident, but intrinsically, as we already know; 2° God is not placed in the de finition of creatures; substance, however, although it is included in the definition of accident as its subject, is not placed as the form denominating the accident, in the way that the health of an animal is the form denominating healthy medicine; but, on the contrary, accident has some proper form by which it is constituted and by which it is conceived, without thereby conceiving the form constituting substance. Therefore the analogy of proportion formally so called is lacking. Proof of the III° part, namely that the analogy of being includes nevertheless virtually the analogy of proportion. ——— Page 291 ———

formally so called produces. Therefore. Intrinsically secondary analogates, such as food is denominated extrinsically healthy from the health of an animal. But accident is so dependent on substance that, if per impossible it did not have entity intrinsically in itself, it could from the extrinsic denomination of the being of substance be called being; and creatures, although they are something of being and are called beings intrinsically, could nevertheless be called beings extrinsically. Therefore the

analogy of being has the power to achieve what the analogy of proportion does. — With this distinction, the diverse places of the Angelic Doctor can be reconciled, who sometimes acknowledges between the created and uncreated only analogy of proportionality (1); at other times seems to admit also analogy of proportion (2). IX. — Fifth conclusion: Although the analogy between God and creatures agrees in many things with the analogy between substance and accident, it differs in some notable way. How it agrees is clear from the preceding conclusions. The difference, however, consists in this: Being is not prior to God and creatures, but is prior to substance and accident. The whole notion of being is absolutely and fully found in God. But when the whole notion of the analogate is found in one of those of which it is predicated, then there is no predicate prior to both. The reason is clear, because then the predicate does not exceed the subject nor is greater than it. But if it is not greater than the subject, it is not prior to it. Therefore being is not prior to God and creatures. But when the whole notion of the analogate is not found in either of the subjects, then the predicate is greater and more common than the subject, and therefore prior. But the whole notion of being is not fully and absolutely found in substance which is the first genus, since divine being is not included. Therefore being is prior to substance and accident (3). (1) Q. 2, De Verit. a. 11. (2) I. P . q. 16, a. 6. (3) Cf. S. THOMAS, Opusc. 39, (al. 42) De natura Generis, c I. X. — Di fficulties are solved. 1° Those things which communicate in a form are univocal. But God and creature, substance and accident, communicate in the form of being, namely in entity. Therefore they are univocal; therefore being is predicated of them univocally. Resp. : Distinguish the major: Those things which communicate in a form which is simply of the same notion are univocal, I grant; in a form which is not simply of the same notion, I deny; contradistinguish the minor and deny the conclusion. The distinction is clear from the notion of the univocal and analogical. 2° You will object: If the same notion of being is not in God and creatures, the cognition which we draw concerning God from creatures is

fallacious. But this cannot be admitted. Therefore the notion of being is the same in God and creatures. Resp. : Distinguish the major: If the same notion of being is neither simply nor proportionally, the cognition is fallacious, I grant; if it is not the same simply, but the same proportionally, the cognition is fallacious, I deny. I grant the minor, and distinguish the conclusion: Therefore the notion of being is the same in God and creatures proportionally, I grant; simply, I deny. Cognition which is founded on likeness and analogy is not fallacious, because what belongs to the similar, insofar as it is similar, also belongs to the other of which it is the likeness. Hence what belongs to creatures proportionally and in a more eminent way is attributed to God. 3° Measure and measured are of the same notion. But God and creature relate as measure and measured. Therefore they are of the same notion. Resp. : Distinguish the major: Measure properly so called, such as is used in quantity, is of the same notion as the measured, I grant; measure improperly so called and superexcelling, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence. 4° The analogate is prior to the analogates. But being is not prior to God and creatures. Therefore it is not analogical. Resp. : Distinguish the major: It is prior according to the imposition of the name, I grant; according to reality, I subdistinguish: if the whole notion of the analogate is found in neither of the analogates, I grant; otherwise, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the conclusion. The solution is clear from what was said in number IX (1). XI. — Whether the concept of being is the first of all both in logical order and in temporal order. The concept of being is simple and ——— Page 292 ———

Resp. 1° Being taken properly for the existent is not a (1) FRASCEK, Diction. philos. v. Etre. — The same is asserted by ED. LE ROT: « The idea of

nothing is only a pseudo-idea, nothing is unthinkable, since thinking nothing would always be thinking something or not thinking. » Revue de Métaphys. juillet 1907, pp. 479-480. — « The thought of nothing would only be a nothing of thought. » Ibid., p. 487. — Nothing cannot indeed

be conceived according to itself, but after the manner of another, and by reason of being, of which it is the negation, it is most certainly conceived; a true and positive act of the mind is that by which we understand the opposition of being and non-being, which opposition the principle of contradiction expressed. ——— Page 293 ———

ART. III. — DE ENTIS CONCEPTU.

conflict between being and non-being; 3° since being designates something that implies an order to real existence, one can in some way argue from the notion of being to prove the existence of some being which is not abstracted from all existence, nor receives existence from another, but exists by its own power and imparts existence to others (2); and finally being is the first predicate which is ascribed to anything existing in nature. Therefore, although being in common as such does not exist on the part of reality, nevertheless to the concept of being there corresponds objective value, or some entity independent of the intellect. This entity, moreover, is not properly God and creature, nor substance and accident, reduplicatively considered as such, but the nature or essence which is common to them by the community of analogy, and which implies an order to real existence. This common essence does not exist according to the mode in which it is conceived, (1) Cf. Logie. Maj. Tract. I. (2) Cf. P . LEPID, Ontologia, sect. I, cap. III. ——— Page 294 ———

QUESTION TWO

ARTICLE ONE.

principle, however, can be taken either properly as it designates some real capacity existing in a real subject, and then it is called real, or subjective, potency; or improperly, insofar as it implies a real capacity not in the thing itself, but only in an extrinsic cause, insofar as there is no repugnance to its being produced by some cause; and thus it is called logical-objective potency, or simple possibility. It is called objective, because it belongs to a thing not according to itself, but as the thing is an object of mental consideration, and also as the thing is an object of real potency in the cause from which it can be produced. Many other worlds are in objective potency, because they are an object of divine power by which they can be endowed with existence. Logical potency in itself is mere non-repugnance to existence, but it supposes real potency in the extrinsic cause on which the thing depends. Possible worlds in themselves are nothing other than mere non-repugnance to existence, but in God, who is able to produce them, they are real potency. Hence is refuted the error of those who confuse potency as such and possibility; a being in potency is also possible, but not every possible being is a being in potency: in the latter can be included some real and subjective capacity. From the Aristotelian notion of potency, that it is a principle of acting or being acted upon, it appears that a twofold subjective potency is distinguished: active, namely a principle of acting, and passive, a principle of receiving something. In iron there is a passive potency to receive heat; in fire, an active potency to induce heat. ——— Page 295 ———

actually have the perfection which is to be acquired by transmutation, requires another which may bestow that perfection, or which may transmute. Hence active potency implies a principle which can transmute and move. From these can be understood the definition which Aristotle gives of active and passive potency. — Active potency is the principle of transmutation in another, insofar as it is

another, that is, the principle of transmuting another insofar as it is another. These last words are skillfully added. For the active principle, or transmuting, can be found in that which suffers and is transmuted, but it is not moved and moves according to the same aspect, but according to different aspects: a man, e.g., moves himself according to the heart, is moved according to other parts. True passive potency is defined: The principle of mutation from another, insofar as it is another, that is, the principle of receiving transmutation from another insofar as it is another. Why these last words are added, we already know: something can suffer from itself, but not according to the same aspect: a man can be moved by himself, but one part is the mover, another part the moved. Hence it follows that active and passive potency are really distinguished, or are in different subjects, because nothing is according to the same aspect agent and patient (1). VI. — Conclusion: There exists in nature a state of potency, even passive. Arg. Ium. Wherever transmutation takes place, passive potency is present. But transmutations take place in nature. Therefore. The major is clear from what has been said, since passive potency is the principle of mutation from another. Proof of the minor. Mutation occurs when the same subject is otherwise disposed than before. But in the world we frequently see the same subject otherwise disposed than before, e.g., the same iron is now in a state of coldness, now becomes incandescent; the same subject which was seed becomes a plant, the plant becomes ashes; the same embryo which was an ovum becomes living, becomes sensitive, becomes man. Daily facts, therefore, invincibly demonstrate the state of potentiality. Oxygen and hydrogen before they were combined were not water, and yet water was not drawn from nothing: therefore oxygen and hydrogen were water in potency. Arg. IIum. It has been proved, in Natural Philosophy, that matter and form exist, which doctrine can be called certain with respect to living things. But the existence of matter and form implies the existence of potency and act (1). Therefore potency exists, even substantial, at least in living things. Arg. IIIum from the

absurdities of the denying opinion. Unless a state of real potency distinct from act itself is given, it follows that a man who does not actually see is blind, for he is considered blind who lacks the power of seeing; and a man who does not actually feel is insensible, for he is utterly to be called insensible who does not have a true power of feeling. V. — The existence of potency. The existence of a state of mere potency, namely passive, was denied by the ancient Eleatics, especially Parmenides, Mellesius, Zeno; by the Moderns, F . Herbart, and others, who contend that potency, especially passive, is only a figment of reason, or not distinguished from mere possibility. The reality of potency, however, is asserted by Aristotle (2) and the Scholastics, both ancient and modern (3), and generally by all who defend the objectivity of motion. (1) Passive and active potency are in different subjects, says St. Thomas repeatedly after Aristotle. Cf. Metaphys. I. I ; IV Sent. dist. 4, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 ; dist. 14, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1. (2) Cf. ARISTOT., Phys., I, IV. (3) Cf. KLEPTOEN, La Philos. seol. t. I, c. 1. a. 3 ; FARON, Théorie fendantem. de l'acte et de la puissance. VII. — The first subdivision of passive potency: into quidditative and entitative. Receptive potency can be either for first being, which is substantial form, or for ultimate being, which is existence. The first does not have determinate entity, but is a determinable subject for quiddity through substantial form, and for this reason it is called quidditative potency. The other is already a certain essence, but needs to be actuated by being, or existence; and, because it is called being from being, therefore the subject susceptible of being is fittingly called entitative potency (2). (1) Cf. vol. II, pp. 113 and sqq. (2) Cf. Card. LOKKSZIKUL, Metaphysic. Gen. P . II, lect. IX. ——— Page 296 ——— 2 2 M E T A P H Y S I C A O N T O L O G I C A , T R A C T . I . Q . I I . The act corresponding to quidditative potency is specific essence, but the act corresponding

to entitative potency is existence. But since the act of essence and the act of existence are of different physical genera, it follows that quidditative and entitative potency differ in physical genus. In whatever, therefore, composition

of essence and existence is found, entitative potency is found, and in whatever composition of matter and form is present, quidditative potency is present. The first, therefore, belongs to all created things, the second only to corporeal things. VIII. — The second subdivision: into natural and obediential potency. Passive potency implies an order to active potency as to its complement and perfection. There is, however, a twofold active potency to which passive can be compared, namely: the potency of a natural agent, and the potency of the first agent, which can induce a higher effect. Hence a twofold passive potency is usually distinguished: natural and obediential. Natural is in order to a natural agent; the other is in order to the first agent and to an act exceeding the powers of nature. Three things must be established concerning obediential potency: whether it exists? what kind it is, passive only, or also active? and to what it extends? IX. — First conclusion: There is in every creature an obediential potency for e ffects induced by God and exceeding nature. Proof. The potency which is totally subject to some agent can be raised to all those effects which such an agent can induce. But the potency of every creature is totally subject to God, from whom it totally depends in being and preservation. Therefore it can be raised to all effects which God can induce. God, moreover, can induce effects exceeding the scope and powers of all nature. For the higher some active power is, the higher can it elevate that thing to an effect. But divine power is higher than every natural power of a creature, and consequently can induce an effect exceeding all the powers and exigencies of nature. Therefore every creature is in potency to effects surpassing the power of nature. Potency, however, to effects exceeding nature is called obediential. Therefore obediential potency exists in creatures.

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existence arising from the repugnance of terms to each other; extrinsic impossibility is the repugnance arising only from the defect of active power in some created cause. It is subdivided into moral and physical, like possibility itself. ——— Page 298 ———

ARTICLE TWO

ON ACT AND ITS RELATION TO POTENCY .

Since, therefore, potency and act are opposed, Aristotle thought that act could be sufficiently defined in this way: Act is the existence of a thing not as we say it is in potency. Act comes from the verb to act, just as potency comes from the verb to be able. Hence from the common understanding of men, the name act was first attributed to operation; for thus almost all understand act. Secondly, however, it was thence transferred to form, insofar as form is the principle and end of operation. But, because every operation supposes being, or existence, in the third acceptation act designates the being of a thing. Hence a threefold acceptation of act: act of essence, act of existence, act of operation (1). The act of essence is that by which essence is determined to a certain species. That by which a thing is placed in a certain species, however, is form. Hence that act is properly called formal act. The act of existence, however, is also called the act of being by which a thing is placed outside the state of mere possibility. Hence it is clear how far from the truth those are who confuse act with action. Action is indeed act, but not every act is action: action properly designates the exercise of an active power, but act the actual perfection, substantial or accidental, of a being. Aristotle calls act energeia or entelecheia: energeia more properly expresses action, entelecheia however perfection. (1) S. THOMAS. Qq. Dipp. De Potent. Dei, q. 1, a. 1. Nevertheless, the two words are not infrequently used promiscuously (1). II. — There is, however, a certain order among those three acts. For operation supposes form and completes it, and existence supposes essence, which it actuates. Hence a division into first and second act. First act is said to be that which does not suppose another, but is ordered to another; second act, which implies another and tends to another. Thus, if form is compared to operation, essence and existence, form is first act, operation second act; essence first act, existence second act. III. — With

respect to potency, received act and unreceived act and pure act are distinguished. Received act is that which informs potency and is received in potency; unreceived, however, is that which is received in no potency. If, moreover, some act is neither received in potency nor can receive a further act, then it will be unreceived and non-receptive. Moreover, such an act is necessarily most perfect and infinite. For since act according to itself implies perfection, if some act is not pure perfection, it is clear that it is not pure act, but mixed with potency. Now act can be mixed with potency in two ways: either because it is itself the act of a potency, or because it is in potency to a further act. Moreover, unreceived act is not the act of a potency; but non-receptive act is not potency to an act. Wherefore unreceived and non- receptive act is purely act, pure perfection, hence it is called pure act. But what is pure perfection is without limit, since every limit denotes imperfection. Therefore unreceived and non-receptive act is properly and simply infinite act. But act which is not received in some subject, but receives a further act, can be called infinite in a certain respect, not however absolutely. Thus angelic form is not received in any matter; from which aspect it has nothing that restricts and limits it. (1) On the Aristotelian acceptation of act, consult P GARDERI, O. P . Revue Thomiste, 1893, n. 6 ; KAUFFMANN, Etude sur la cause finale,tra- doct. DUBER ; BACDIS, L'Acte et la puissance dans Aristote, Revue Tho- miste, 1899. ——— Page 300 ———

dependent. But what depends cannot exist by its own power, but borrows existence from another. Hence received act can be called received in two ways: 1° because it is in another; 2° because it is from another. Unreceived and non-receptive act, however, exists by its own power, is a being from itself, or is God Himself. IV. — By reason of the mode of being, act is divided into subsistent and non-subsistent. Subsistent is called that which can exist in itself, independently of matter, and, if it subsists in itself as a complete nature, like an angel, it is perfectly subsistent act; if it needs to be united to matter to form a complete

species, it is incompletely subsistent act, like the human soul. Non- subsistent is that which needs matter to exist. V. — Informing act and terminating act. Informing act is that which actuates its potency in the way that form actuates matter; terminating, which perfects and completes some potency, without however being its form, just as a point constitutes a line, yet is not its form, but only its term. Subsistence, existence are terminating acts; whiteness is an informing act. VI. — Substantial act and accidental act. The first gives being simply, as the soul to the body. The other, however, gives being in a certain respect and supposes being simply: thus is knowledge with respect to man, heat with respect to fire. Having explained the concept of potency and act, the relation between the two is seen. This relation is expressed by the following Scholastic sayings:

the genus of substance; and if potency is in the genus of accident, act also will be in the line of accident. Proof. Act and potency relate in such a way that act is the essential complement and essential perfection of potency. But an accident cannot essentially complete and perfect a substance. Therefore, if potency is substance, act cannot be an accident, but must be substance. Proof of the minor. To perfect a substance essentially is to give it some substantial being, as is clear. Moreover, it is incompatible that an accident give substantial being. Therefore it is incompatible that an accident essentially complete a potency. Again, what constitutes and essentially perfects an accident must be of the same essence with it. But for substance to be of the same essence with accident is impossible. Therefore substance is not the essential perfective of an accident, otherwise potency by receiving act would cease to be accident, and would become substance, contrary to the hypothesis. X. — The fourth saying: Potency derives its species from act. Everything is speci fied by that by which it is defined, for species and definition are convertible. But potency is defined by act. Therefore it is specified by it. — Proof of the minor. A thing is intelligible and de finable insofar as it is being, for intelligibility is founded in being. Moreover, being is said properly and primarily of a thing

which is in act; but of a thing which is in potency secondarily and by order to act; for the possible is considered to be being insofar as it has an aptitude for acting or being in act, just as a builder is said to be one who can build, and a speculator one who can speculate, and the visible that which can be seen. Therefore act is properly and primarily intelligible and definable, but potency secondarily and by order to act.

cannot be made, unless one is reduced to the nature of matter with respect to the other, which is to say, it is not in act in the same way. ——— Page 304 ———

QUESTION THREE

ARTICLE ONE — On The Notion And Properties Of Essences.

ordination to the proper operation of the thing, since no thing is deprived of its proper operation (3). (1) On the meaning of that: what it was to be cf. Card. MENCKEN, n. 19, not.; MATTHIAS KAPPES, Aristot. lexik., p. 25. (2) I. P . Tract. II, q. 1, II, n. IV, vol. II, p. 149. (3) Cf. BONTIUS, De Persona et duabus Naturis, c. 1. P . L., LXIV, 1841-1342. ——— Page 306 ———

remain such, and are unchangeable; by participation in which it happens that whatever is, is in whatever way it is. » Lib. 83 Quaest. q. 46, P . L. XL,30. ——— Page 307 ——— 2 0 2 M E T A P H Y S I C A O N T O L O G I C A , T R A C T . I . Q . I I I . Although all created essences are composite, they are nevertheless indivisible. They are composite. Every created essence consists of genus and difference; genus indeed is derived from what is more material and potential in the thing, difference from what is more formal and actual (1). Genus and difference, however, imply a plurality of elements, and therefore a certain logical composition. Therefore in every created essence there is a certain composition. Nevertheless, they are indivisible, because nothing can be added to them or subtracted from them. For essence is like a definition. But, with the smallest addition or subtraction, there is a different definition and a different

nature of the species, as the Angelic Doctor observes (2). Thus sentient animate substance is only the definition of an animal; if you add rational, you constitute the species of man; if you subtract sentient, you constitute the species of a plant. By the same right, nothing can be added to essences, nothing can be subtracted from essence. Hence the saying: Species, or essences, are like numbers. If something is added or subtracted from any number, even the least, it will not be the same number in species. The least in numbers is unity: if it is added to the ternary, a quaternary arises, which is another species of number; if it is subtracted from the same, a binary remains, which is also another species of number. And similarly in definitions and in essence. The last property of essences is knowability. VII. — On the knowability of essences. We de fine the essences of things to some extent; but whether those definitions have some objective value; whether it is possible to know essences by a proper concept? This question is connected with the most celebrated dispute concerning the existence of universals (3). For universals are the natures or essences of things; if, therefore, universals lack objective value, it is clear that definitions of essences are devoid of all force and that our knowledge of essences is purely nominal. This consequence was embraced by the Nominalists, Locke, Hume, and in our days by Materialists and Positivists. (1) Cf. Logie., p. 61. (2) S. Thomas, VIII Metaphys., lect. 3 (3) Cf. Logie. Maj., Tract. I. VIII. — First conclusion: The essences of things are in themselves most knowable. A thing is knowable insofar as it has the notion of positive being, and ceases to be knowable insofar as it is negation and non-being. Moreover, the essences of things have the notion of positive being, since they are the intrinsic and positive principles by which being is constituted in a determinate degree. Therefore the essences of things are in themselves and ontologically most knowable. But they are not apprehended by us as they are in themselves. IX. — Second conclusion: The cognition of essences which we have in the present state is not intuitive, but deduced and imperfect. For intuitive cognition it is required that the thing be present to the intellect either

through itself or through a species immediately emitted by the thing itself. But the essences of things are not present to the intellect through themselves, nor through a species immediately emitted by themselves, but only through species received from others. Therefore the cognition we have of essences is not intuitive, but deduced. Proof of the minor. That essences of things are not present in the intellect through themselves is too clear; but that they are made present through species, not emitted by themselves, but received from others, is briefly declared. In the present state, universals and invisibles are known through sensibles and visibles. Moreover, properties and actions are more sensible and visible than the essences themselves. Therefore we know essences only through properties and actions, or through species deduced from those properties. What we first attain is operation and property; from those species we form others in which we understand the essence itself. Moreover, the species itself by which we understand operation and property is not intuitive, but abstractive; in the present life, indeed, we have no intuitive cognition, except the cognition of the senses (1). Hence, if species deduced from properties are representative of the essence, they are abstractive, a fortiori the intuitive concepts which we form in the present concerning essences cannot in any way exist.

From which it follows that this cognition is imperfect. For when ——— Page 308 ———

find that they are contingent, we are led to seek their cause. This cause cannot be another creature, for we would then proceed to infinity. Therefore we must arrive at a first cause, which is God. This is the foundation of all real being, and therefore also of ideal being, which is essence. Moreover, the intrinsic possibility of things is not an ultimate fact; it demands an explanation. For if something is possible, it is because its constituent notes do not imply contradiction. But this non-repugnance is not something absolute; it requires a cause. This cause cannot be the thing itself, for then we would have a vicious circle. Therefore it must be found in a supreme intellect, which is the first ideal cause. ——— Page 310 ———

effecting. Arg. IIIum. Truth is said by order to the intellect. But in the hypothesis of God not existing there would be no intellect: not uncreated, as is supposed; not created, because the created presupposes the uncreated. Therefore there would be no truth, nor any essence. To the point, St. Thomas: « Even if the human intellect did not exist, things would still be called true in order to the divine intellect. But, if both intellects, which is impossible, were understood to be removed, in no way would the notion of truth remain (1).»

et ratio voliti non est ratio cogniti, sicut, in creatis, quamvis bonum et ve- rum convertantur, voluntas tamen quae habet pro objeto bo- num et intellectus qui habet pro objecto verum realit- diffe- runt. Nullatenus ergo sequitur ut quae a divino intellectu pen- tent etiam a divina voluntate pendeant. Reponit Secretan : Deus est quod ipse vult et res sunt quod ipse vult. Nam Absolutum est causa suae existentiae, causa suae propriae legis, atque pro sua voluntate determinat mo- dum quo seipsum producit. — Quae omnia in terminis contra- dictionem involvunt. Causa est prius causato, producens prius producto : unde, si Absolutum seipsum produceret, esset pos- terius seipso (2). VI. — Quinta conclusio : Proprie loquendo, essentiae rerum ... pendent formaliter et immediate ab intellectu divino ;

remote et ultimo ab essentia divina. Prob. I« pars, quae est praecedentium conclusionum sequela. Esse quod habent essentiae et possibilia est esse ideale ; et, quia omne esse ideale originatur a prima causa ideali, hujus- (1) Cf. Legie. pp. 335, ss. (2) « To be the cause of one's own existence! To produce oneself! But to be cause, one must exist. The being who would be the cause of his existence would have to exist to produce his existence! The being supposed to produce himself does not exist, since he is capable of exerting a productive action. The contradiction is flagrant. » CaTd. Mxctca, n 92. ——— Page 312 ———

Sub duplici ergo respectu est idea creaturarum. Dicitur- proprie idea, non praecise ut est species intelligibilis neque ut cognitio creaturarum, neque etiam ut scientia vel ars ; sed ut est forma objecta divino intellectui et cognita ab ipso ut imi- tabilis a creaturis. Hic est enim sensus quo usurpatur idea : forma objecta intellectu praeter rem intra intellectum existens, vel : forma ad cujus imitationem artifex operatur (1). Divina essentia est idea creaturarum primo quidem quantum ad perfectiones quae in suo conceptu nullam imper- fectionem involvunt et reperiuntur in Deo et creaturis, ut esse, vivere. Id iquet, nam essentia divina est expressissima similitudo et vivum exemplar omnium illarum perfectionum. Imo etiam est idea perfectionum quae solis creaturis competunt, ut sunt essentiae finita ; nam illa imitantur divinam essentiam et in ea secundum eminentiorem modum continentur. Essentia rerum, prout sunt in idea divina, infinita sunt nu- mero, quia essentia divina est infinite participabilis et imita- bilis : unde quicumque assignetur gradus perfectionis et imi tationis, potest alius et alius major haberi, et ita in infinitum(2). VIII. — Why the divine essence, the intellect being set aside, is not the proximate foundation of essences. The divine essence is the foundation of essences and the idea of creatures only because it is a form set before the divine intellect and known by it as imitable by creatures. For this is the proper acceptation of idea, as has just been declared. Therefore, the intellect being set aside, the divine essence contains creatures eminently indeed, but is not their idea.

Moreover, for the divine essence to be the proximate foundation and idea of creatures, it must delineate and define them in their proper degree and in their proper measure. But the divine essence, according to itself, does not define creatures in their proper degree, since it exceeds (1) Boethius beautifully sang: « Thou, all things from the supreme example, thyself most beautiful, bearing the world in mind, and forming it from a like image, commanding the perfect to complete the perfect parts. » De Concil. philo., lib. III. metr. 9, P . L. LXIII, 258-259. (2) Cf. 2. Thomas, I. P . q. 15. ——— Page 313 ———

ARTICLE THREE.

On The Distinction Between Essence And Existence.

ultimate actuality of every form. II. — The question to be solved. Since existence is the act of essence, essence and existence relate to each other as potency and act. Moreover, every potency is really distinguished from its correlative act. Hence a real distinction between essence and existence seems to be implied. Not a few authors, however, think that the question cannot be solved so easily. Hence a notable controversy. All concede: 1° that there is no real distinction in God between essence and existence; — 2° that in creatures ideal and abstractly considered essence is really distinguished from existence; 3° that actual essence at least in reason di ffers from existence. The whole difficulty, therefore, is: whether real and actual essence is really distinguished from existence; or, in other words, whether real essence is placed completely outside causes by its own power; whether it is itself the act of existing, or whether it is placed ultimately outside causes through some act really distinct from itself, which will be existence.

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intermediate between strict real distinction and mere rational distinction, which he calls formal actual from the nature of the thing. IV. — The mind of the Angelic Doctor is most certain. Some have wished to doubt the mind of the Angelic Doctor. But this distinction is so fundamental in the

teaching of Aquinas that he places in it the very distinction between God and creatures. Of God he says: « Since in God there is nothing potential, it follows that in Him essence is not other than His being. His essence, therefore, is His being (1). » Of creatures, however: « But because created form thus subsisting has being and is not its own being, it is necessary that its being be received and contracted to a determinate nature (2). » But if the Angelic Doctor intended a mere rational distinction, the argument would be of no force, since even in God a rational distinction between essence and existence is placed. But, omitting other citations (3), it suffices to adduce two testimonies which make the matter entirely clear. — Comm. on the book of Boethius (4) on the Hebdomads: « It must be considered, therefore, that, as being and that which is differ in simple things according to intention, so in composite things they differ really (5). » — And what is to be understood by the name of simple being, he explains, adding: « This (1) I. P . q. 3, a. 4. (2) I. P . q. 7, a. 2. (3) Cf. I Sent., dist. 19, q. 2, a. 2 ; II Cont. Geni., c. 52 ; De Ente et Etencias, c. 5, q. 7. De Poten. a. 4. (4) Lect. 2. (5) Even in places where the word really is not written, P . TERNEREN, S. J., observes many things by which this distinction is more clearly signified than by the name itself. Cf. P . TERNEREN, De Unione hypostatica, p. 31. ——— Page 315 ———

Métaphysique, pp. 178- 179, rightly observes: « All the deniers of the real distinction between essence and existence begin by positing as an indisputable principle that the real essence of a being is real only through its existence. Evidently one must conclude to the identity of existence and essence. But, instead of starting from this assertion as from an indubitable axiom, they should prove it; and they do not think of it; all their arguments are therefore reduced to a vast petition of principle. »

Arg. III™. Act is limited and multiplied only by potency, as is already clear (on potency and act, q. II, art. II). But existence not distinct from essence does not have potency, since it is unreceived and non-receptive act, as has just been shown. Therefore existence not distinct from essence is

unlimited and unmultiplied, or infinite and unique (2). Arg. IV™. In whatever accidental being is joined to substantial being, it is necessary that being be really distinguished from essence. But in every created being accidental being is joined to substantial being: thus in man the being of white, the being of wise, etc., is joined to the substantial being of man. Therefore in every created being it is necessary that being be distinguished from essence. Proof of the major. Accidental being cannot be joined to substantial being by identity. Because they differ in genus from each other, as being simply and being in a certain respect; nor can it be joined to substantial being as received in it, just as (1) « The principle of causality: 'being whose essence is not identical to existence necessarily depends on a cause', finds in the real distinction of essence and existence its rigorous meaning and justification. » Card. MERCER, n. 48. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, Quodlib. 3, q. 8, a. 20. ART. III. — ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE. 311 act in potency; for substantial existence is the ultimate actuality, by no means potency. Moreover, substantial being and accidental being are two actualities in different genera. Moreover, two actualities in different genera do not relate to each other as potency and act. In order, therefore, that conjunction of accidental being with substantial being take place, no other hypothesis remains except that both be received in some subject, which will be essence. But the aforesaid subject must be distinct from both, otherwise the preceding difficulty would return. Therefore in whatever accidental being is joined to substantial being, it is necessary that essence be really distinguished from existence (1). Arg. V™. « No essence can be understood without those things which are parts of essence. But every essence or quiddity can be understood without understanding anything of its actual being; for I can understand what a man or phoenix is, and yet be ignorant whether it has being in the nature of things. Therefore it is clear that being is other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is some thing whose quiddity is its being, and this thing can only be one and first (2). » Many indirect

arguments could be adduced. Thus in the natural composite, essentially diverse parts, namely matter and form, are actuated by a single existence; in the human composite, entirely distinct parts, soul and body, have a single existence; many faculties coexist in the same soul. If, therefore, essence is multiple, or many parts of essence, and yet existence is simple and unique, a real distinction between essence and existence must intervene. Many other conclusions, whether philosophical or theological, rest so much on this principle that it can be called the fundamental truth of Christian philosophy (4). VI. — Di fficulties are solved. 1° Actual essence is not a mere possible being but an actual being. But actual being exists. (1) Cf. S. THOMAS, II. Cont. Gent., c. 52 ; Card. LORENZELL, pp. 268- 169. (2) S. THOMAS, De Ente Eesentia, c. 5. (3) On these indirect arguments one may consult Card. MERCER, n. 49. (4) Cf. P . DEI. PRADO, O. P ., De Veritate fundamentalii philosophiae christianae, Placentia, 1899. ——— Page 317 ———

Let it be noted again that the error of those who deny a middle state between the possible and act lies hidden here: Essence is not mere possible, therefore it is the act of existence. The consequence is denied; for it is a real potency which real act supposes and actuates. 2° Inst.: Actual essence exists by its own power. What according to itself is a certain actuality in the nature of things exists according to itself. But actual essence according to itself is a certain actuality in the nature of things. Therefore it exists according to itself, or by its own power. Resp. : Distinguish the major: what is a certain actuality designating the real act itself exists according to itself, I grant; what is a certain actuality designating only the potency informed by real act exists according to itself, I deny. — Contradistinguish the minor: actual essence is a certain actuality designating the potency informed by real act, I grant; it is a certain actuality designating the real act itself, I deny; and I deny the consequence. Something can be called actual in two ways: either because it is the real act itself, or because it is informed by real act. Thus prime matter is said to be real and actual, not as if it were the act itself, but because it is

informed by real act. Moreover, if the thing which is called actual is the act itself, it manifestly exists through itself; but, if it is only potency informed by act, it is clear that a thing of this kind does not exist through itself, but only through the act by which it is called actual. — Now, the whole controversy is whether actual essence is the real act, or only potency informed by real act. The fundamental reason we have adduced proves that it is potency, not the very act of existing; otherwise existence would be unreceived and non- receptive act. 3° You will object: But actual essence is not only potency informed by act, but is itself act. Actual essence is a being actually produced by God. But a being actually produced by God is a certain act. Therefore actual essence is the act itself, namely existence.

ARTICLE FOUR

(1) « Some authors of our opinion have wanted to conclude that being must be considered as a simple accident. All the great scholastics reject this consequence. » DOMET DE VORONS, Abrégé de Métaphysique, t. II, p. 20. (2) Cf. BANNER, Comm. in I. P . q. 3, a. 4. ——— Page 320 ———

suppositum simultaneously effectively causes the determination of existence. 2° Matter, form, suppositum, can be called the material cause of existence, because they are compared to it as a receptive subject. No form, however, can be called the efficient cause of existence; for the efficient cause must have in itself the being it causes. Moreover, no form according to itself has existence. Therefore no form can be the effective cause of existence. (1) Cf. BAXNER, loc. cit. ——— Page 321 ———

4° Composition of matter and form is ascribed only to material beings, because matter and form divide only material substance; composition of potency and act, however, belongs to all created beings, because potency and act divide all being and every genus of being. X. — Whether existence is a mode or a thing. Existence is more appropriately called a mode than a thing. For it relates as a term. Moreover, the term of a thing is properly its mode,

just as a point is the ultimate mode of a line. Therefore existence is a mode of a thing, or essence. Moreover, « the notion of mode consists in this, that it is the actual exercise of a thing, just as sitting and union are the actual exercise of sitting or uniting. But existence is the actual exercise of constituting a thing outside causes. Therefore it is more appropriately called a mode of a thing than (1) S. THOMAS, II Cont. Gent. c. 54; CAJET. De Ente et Essentia, c. 5. q. 9. HUDSON

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SECOND TREATISE. DIFFERENT GIFTS AND WITH DIVERSE FUNCTIONS: ONE, ESSENCE, REFERRING TO

QUESTION ONE.

potius in quale. Atqui unum, verum, bo- num, juxta nostrum intelligendi modum, dimanant ab essen- tia jam constituta, ut modo diximus. Ergo, juxta nostrum intelligendi modum, non praedicantur directe et immediate in quid, sed potius in quale. 3° in quale necessario, nam unitas, veritas, bonitas ab ente inseparabiles sunt, siquidem cum ente materialer ec -ertun- - , ut in sequentibus ostendemus. rather than some reality superadded to the essence itself, such as intellect, will, etc. But the properties of being flow from it not by physical emanation, but according to our mode of understanding; nor are they some reality superadded to being itself, since it is impossible to add anything to being which is not being itself. Therefore those properties are not properties of a thing, or physical. They are, however, demonstrable properties. The subject of every science has demonstrable passions, or properties, for what every science especially intends is to demonstrate properties of the subject, through the definition of the subject or property or passion (1). But the subject of metaphysical science is being, whose properties are one, truth, good. Therefore one, truth, good are demonstrable properties of being. III. — Objections: It is of the nature of a property that it be really distinguished from its subject. But one, truth, good are not really distinguished from being. Therefore they are not properties of being. Resp. : Distinguish the major: It is of the nature of a predicamental property to be really distinguished from the subject, I grant; of the nature of a property most commonly taken, as it abstracts from predicamental and transcendental, I deny. Distinguish the consequence: They are not predicamental properties, I grant; transcendent, I deny. A predicamental

property is indeed an accident really distinct from substance; but in the concept of a property most commonly taken is included only that it emanates from essence and is predicated of it in what kind necessarily, according to our mode of understanding. That this belongs to one, truth, good, we have shown. They are therefore properties of being, not predicamental, but transcendental. This will be more clear from the following conclusion. IV. — Second conclusion: The properties of being are not properties of a thing, or physical, but demonstrable properties. Proof. Properties of a thing, or physical, are those which flow from essence by real and physical emanation as V. — Transcendent properties add something to being, which is not really distinguished from it, but as explicit from implicit. So the Thomists commonly, against many Scotists, who thought that one, truth, good add a positive entity. Proof of the conclusion. What is not a mere synonym of something adds something to it. But those three properties of being are not a mere synonym of it; for when it is said: Being is one, is true, is good, it is not intended: Being is being, which would be a nugatory statement, but some true predicate belonging to it and somewhat distinct from it is signified. Therefore the properties add something to being. Not, however, a real entity really discrete from it; for who can conceive a positive entity which is something (1) Cf. Logic., De praecognitionibus et praecognitis, pp. 388, ss. — The ancient scholastics use the word passion rather than property; a passion implies a subject prior to itself from which it arises and which it always accompanies. In this way, the passions of being presuppose being constituted, emanate from it and necessarily accompany it. Attributes are not infrequently used in this signification. However, attribute and property are not entirely convertible; attribute has rather a logical respect and is taken for a predicate attributed to a subject; moreover, an attribute is said to be, even if it adds nothing, but a physical property adds something to a subject; hence divine attributes are called, not divine properties. ——— Page 325 ———

VI. — What is the order among the six transcendentals. The transcendentals are ordered among themselves according to their proper formal notions. Being, therefore, holds the first place, for it precedes the others as subject its properties, or passions. The second place is held by one, for it follows being absolutely; the third place, however, claims something, for one, or being undivided in itself, being apprehended, being divided from any other is immediately apprehended; the fourth place is held by thing; for thing is said from its proper quiddity, or essence; moreover, every essence becomes proper from the fact that it is undivided in itself and divided from any other. Thing, therefore, immediately follows one and something. Finally, truth is prior to good. For since being simply is prior to being perfect, that which follows being simply is prior to that which follows being perfect. But truth follows being simply, good, however, follows being perfect. Therefore truth is prior to good. The reason for the minor is that something, by the very fact that it has being simply, is apt to be understood, or is intelligible and true; but in order to be appetible and good, it must be conceived as endowed with a certain perfection by which it can allure, draw, move appetite. VII. — Whether the word « fact » should be numbered among the transcendentals. With respect to the imposition of origin, fact implies act and effect; but from usage it signifies not only actions of man but also actions of nature; hence historical facts, physical facts, chemical facts, etc., are called facts. Because, therefore, fact implies activity, and activity is ordered to producing something, the name « fact » has been transferred to express what is, especially what is most real and positive.

ART. VIII. — ON THE BEAUTIFUL.

possible. The divine I. — The notion of unity. Unity in the abstract is the notion by which a thing is constituted undivided in itself and divided from any other, or is the indivision of a thing in itself and division from any other. One in the concrete is said to be that which is undivided in itself and divided from any other. Two things are primarily in the concept of one: being and the negation of division.

One does not signify only negation. For one is a transcendental property of being. But a property of being must imply in the direct notion something positive like being itself. On the other hand, it does not exhibit being only, otherwise it would not differ at all from it, and hence mere synonymy and tautology would be introduced. It adds, therefore, something; not something real, which is impossible, but something of reason. Being of reason, however, is relation or negation (2). Now one does not imply relation, but follows being absolutely in itself. It remains, therefore, that one adds above being a certain negation, that is, the negation of division. Wherefore one signifies principally, and directly, being; less principally and indirectly, the negation of division; for a quality of being must exhibit principally something positive like that of which it is a property. Moreover, one implies division from another. By the very fact that being is itself, it necessarily follows that it is not another, but is discrete from another. Hence, even before the creation of the world, God was divided from other beings, not indeed as actually existing, but as future or possible. The divine (1) Cf. AARSTOR. V. Metaphys. text. 7-12.; S. THOMAS, 1. 7 et 8 in V. Me-apphys. et 1. 4, in X Metaphys. / 1. P ., q. 11 i. Sent., dist. 24 ; Cont. Gent., c. 53 ; De Verit. q. 8 ; SCOTUS, 11. Sent.; CAJETANUS, BANNES, PBOUNS, in I. P . q. 11 ; SUAREN, disp. 4 ; and authors already a. 1. cited. (2) Cf. Tract. I. q. I, a. I, n. IX. Above, p. 251. essence was certainly discrete from the essence of man and the essence of an angel, although neither angel nor man yet existed. Three things, therefore, are included in the notion of perfect one: being, the negation of division from itself, division from any other. However, being reduplicatively as divided from others is strictly called something, as we have already noted. II. — On the formal notion of one. Suarez seems to think that one adds nothing positive to being, either in reality or different in reason; the Scotists contend that it adds a positively distinct formality; or a relation of identity. The Thomists, however, more commonly teach that the transcendental one by its proper addition adds to being only the negation of

division; but by improper addition and as to the explicit it adds something positive, namely being itself, not materially taken, but insofar as it grounds the negation of division in itself. Against the Scotistic opinion, it suffices to note this: If one added a positive perfection to being, this would also be being, and therefore would imply a new positive perfection, and hence an infinite process (1). Moreover, if one were a formality distinct from being as excluding from excluded, it would not be formally being, since it would formally exclude it. One also does not consist formally in the relation of identity, because identity is posterior to unity and supposes it: for the same things are those whose substance is one. But one by its proper addition adds real negation. For unity is indivision. But indivision is real negation, or privation of division. Therefore it adds real negation of division. By improper addition, however, it adds something positive, namely being itself as undivided. « One, says the Angelic Doctor, does not signify pure negation but being itself undivided, and therefore one and being are convertible (2). » — « One according to itself relates more to position (1) « The unity of this superadded being would in turn imply a new positive perfection, therefore a new being, grafting itself onto the previous one, and we would thus proceed to infinity, accumulating perfection upon perfection to explain the unity of a first subject. » Card. MENCKRS, n. 63. (2) L. 4. in X Metaphys. ——— Page 327 ———

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species from the ultimate unity (2). Number, therefore, arises from predicamental unity and is measured by it. Predicamental unity, moreover, corresponds to quantity, which is threefold: length in extension, mass in weight, time in discrete quantity. Hence a threefold unit of measure: centimeter, in length; gram, in mass and weight; second, in time. The notion of number, therefore, is more fully formed from the consideration of quantity, the continuum, time, concerning which we have spoken in I. P . Natural Philosophy, and which do not have a proper metaphysical respect. III. — Multitude is opposed to transcendental one contrarily; but number is opposed to numerical, or predicamental, one relatively. The I° part is proved. Those things whose notions are opposed are themselves opposed. But the notion of transcendental one and the notion of multitude are opposed (4). Therefore. The minor is declared. The notion of transcendental one is indivision; the notion of multitude is division. But division and indivision are opposed, as is clear. Therefore the notion of transcendental one and the notion of multitude are opposed. What kind of opposition, however, is this? At first glance, it seems to be privative, for indivision is privation of division. More truly, however, one and many are said to be opposed (1) « Measure is nothing other than that by which the quantity of a thing is known: the quantity of a thing, however, is known by one and number. By one indeed, as when we say one stadium or one foot; by number, however, as when we say three stadia or three feet. Further, every number is known by one, because unity taken a number of times gives the number. » S. Thomas, X Metaphys., lect. 2. (2) « The ultimate unity gives species to number. » S. Thomas, VIII, Met. 1. 3. (3) Those who seek a longer exposition may consult Card. Mercier, nn. 83 (4) Cf. S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 11, a. 2. contrarily. Contrary opposition, indeed, is between two things which imply something positive. But one and many imply something positive; for one does not signify pure privation, but something positive, namely being itself undivided. Therefore one and many, although they are

opposed by way of privation, are not however opposed according to pure privation and habit, but as contraries (X Metaph. lect. 4°). The II° part is declared. Predicamental one, which is the principle of number, is opposed to number as measure to measured, since number is defined: Multitude measured by one. But measure and measured are opposed relatively. Therefore predicamental one and number are opposed relatively. V. — One is not directly opposed to multitude itself, but rather to the division which is found in it. « One, says the Angelic Doctor, is not the remover of multitude, but of division, which is prior in reason than one or multitude (1). « That which is directly opposed to unity is that by reason of which unity is dissolved. But that by reason of which unity is dissolved is division, not multitude. Therefore what is directly opposed to one is not properly multitude, but division, which is found in multitude. Proof of the minor. Given division, unity, which is indivision itself, is immediately dissolved; given multitude, however, unity is not dissolved unless division is also introduced: for given many palms in the same continuous thing, one continuum remains, unless they are divided. V. — One taken materially is not opposed to multitude. One taken materially designates positive entity itself. This entity, however, constitutes multitude. Moreover, nothing is constituted from its contrary. Therefore one taken materially, by reason of its positive entity, is not opposed to multitude. Therefore opposition between unity and multitude is considered only with respect to essence, or the formal notion of unity, and division, which is in multitude. VI. — Multitude is founded in unity and is itself posterior, both in knowing and in being. Proof of the I° part. (1) I. P ., q. 30, a. 3, a d 3. ——— Page 333 ———

or privation, of unity, be founded in some one. Therefore multitude, which is the removal of unity, is founded in some one and is some one. Proof of the II° part. That is said to be prior to another in the order of cognition which is placed in the definition of the other. But one is placed in the definition of multitude; for multitude is said to be: That which is made of ones, of which one is not the other; but multitude is not

placed in the definition of one. Therefore one is prior in the order of cognition. Moreover, one says negation of division. « But division falls into the intellect from the negation of being itself: so that what first falls into the intellect is being; second, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division; third, one; fourth, multitude (1). » Therefore one is prior to multitude in the order of cognition. Proof of the III° part. Multitude in the order of reality is a certain composite of ones. But the composite is posterior to its components in the order of reality. Therefore in the order of reality, multitude is posterior to one. It depends, therefore, on one in its being, nor would it be contained under being unless it were in some way contained under one. For Dionysius says that there is no multitude not participating in one. But those which are many in parts are one in the whole, and those which are many in accidents are one in subject, and those which are many in number are one in species, and those which are many in species are one in genus, and those which are many in processes are one in principle (2).» VII. — The notion of distinction. Just as multitude is opposed to unity, so distinction is opposed to identity, which is defined as: Lack of identity among several. Since, however, identity is a certain unity of being, distinction implies in creatures a certain plurality and multiplicity of being. This plurality, however, is designated by different names: diversity, dissimilitude, inequality, difference. Those which are not one in substance are called diverse, just as those which are one in substance are called the same; those which are not one in quality are called dissimilar; those which are not one in quantity are called unequal. Diverse extends more broadly than different. For difference, besides the fact that they differ, must have something the same in which they agree. Hence difference implies two things: 1° that those which differ agree in some univocal predicate; 2° that they are separated from each other by formal differences. Thus man and brute agree in some univocal predicate and are separated by rationality and irrationality; and therefore they are truly different. Plant and animal agree in some univocal thing and on the

other hand are separated by sensibility and insensibility, hence they are called different. Those, however, which agree in no univocal predicate are simply diverse: thus God and creature do not properly differ, but are diverse; likewise substance and accident. Distinction is sometimes taken in a stricter sense, for lack of identity between two individuals, and thus there is a threefold degree: Those which are not one in genus are called diverse; those which are not one in species are called different; those which are not one in number are distinct. In the present context, however, distinction is taken in a general sense, and whatever are not the same are called distinct, whether they are diverse or different. VIII. — Real and logical distinction. Distinction, as has been said, implies a certain plurality. If this plurality is in things independently of the mind's concept, a real distinction is introduced; if, however, it is had only in our concepts, it is a distinction of reason, or logical. Real distinction supposes real composition in a being; logical distinction, however, can be conceived in the simplest being. Indeed, the simpler and more perfect something is, the more foundations for logical distinctions it provides. For a being of this kind, remaining in itself most simple, is equivalent to innumerable really distinct beings; and hence it provides a foundation for innumerable distinctions. Real distinction is twofold: greater, or entitative, which exists between thing and thing, as between man and garment; lesser, or modal, which is between a thing and a mode, as between a curved line and the curvature of the line. For it is divided into adequate and inadequate, according as the extremes do not include each other at all, as ——— Page 334 ———

distinct, and consequently are really distinguished on the part of the subject, ——— Page 335 ——— 348 ONTOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS TRACT. II. Q. I. 349 quatenus sunt duae ideae, seu duo accidentia numero distincta. 3e Distinction rationis major, quamvis non semper supponat distinctionem realem, ex parte objecti, subaudit tamen in ob- jecto fundamentum reale distinctionis. Probatur. Adest in objecto reale distinctionis fundamentum,

quando objectum aequivalet pluribus realiter distinctis. Sed objectum in distinctione majori aequivalet pluribus realiter distinctis : sic homo aequivalet animali et rationali ; et, quam- vis haec sint unum physice, viget verum fundamentum conci- piendi illa ut distincta, adeo ut intelligatur unum altero non intellecto. Ergo distinctione major supponit in objecto reale dis- tinctionis fundamentum. XII. — Whether falsehood can underlie a logical distinction. The act of distinction, or precision or abstraction, is reduced to simple apprehension. But falsehood cannot underlie simple apprehension. Therefore. — The major is declared. By precision, or distinction of reasoned reason, one and the same thing is considered separately from another, but the mind abstains from all judgment; it neither affirms nor denies the note which it considers separately to be in fact separate. Therefore falsity or truth does not underlie logical distinction, unless perhaps per accidens, as has been said in Logic, concerning simple apprehension (1). From these is understood the saying: There is no falsehood in prescinding or abstracting, that is, error cannot underlie precision or abstraction, because they are acts of simple apprehension (2). XI. — What are the foundations of logical distinctions. These foundations are considered on the part of the intellect and on the part of the object. On the part of the intellect is its imperfection. For since our mind does not apprehend things intuitively, but through diverse motions, namely composing, dividing, reasoning, it needs several and distinct concepts to know what is truly one and undivided. However, the more perfect the intellect, the fewer concepts it needs, because it comprehends more in one (1). On the part of the object, sometimes its imperfection, because the thing exhibits two things which relate to each other as imperfect to perfect, potency to act, as in man animality to rationality. Hence the necessity of distinguishing genus and difference. But more commonly, the foundation of distinction is the perfection of the object, insofar as either one essence is equivalent to many really distinct things, as the human soul is equivalent to vegetative and sensitive forms; or one cause produces effects which proceed from distinct causes, etc.

(1) This also holds for angels: « The higher the angel, the fewer species it will need to apprehend the universality of intelligibles; and therefore its forms must be more universal, as if each extends to more things. » S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 55, a. 3. XIII. — The Scotistic distinction (3). The Scotists thought there is a distinction intermediate between real and rational distinction, namely a formal actual distinction from the nature of the thing. This is said to exist, not between two things, but between two formalities, e.g., between animality and rationality. It is from the nature of the thing, because actually and independently of our concept animality is not rationality, and before the operation of the mind the predication is true: The animality of Socrates is not his rationality. On the one hand it approaches real distinction, because it exists actually from the nature of the thing; on the other hand it approaches rational distinction, because animality and rationality, although they are two formalities distinct by their own nature, are not however two things in Socrates, but one thing. It is rightly said, therefore, to be intermediate between real distinction and rational distinction. The Scotists place this distinction between divine attributes (4) and between metaphysical degrees. Metaphysical degrees, however, are the series of essential predicates in one individual which are ordered by way of a ladder (1) Cf. Logic, pp. 264, ss. (2) « In this operation there can be no error, because neither one denies nor affirms: so that there is nothing clearer than this axiom of the School: He who makes a precision does not make a lie: abstinentium non est mendacium. » Bossuert, Logique, I. I. c. XXIII. (3) Many think that this distinction is not from Scotus himself, but was introduced by his disciples; for Scotus places between divine attributes the same distinction which St.

Bonaventure calls of reason. Cf. Sco- ren, III Sent., dist. 2., q. 7, nn. 43 and 44. (4) Cf. Cajet. Comm. de ente et essentia, c. VI, q. XII. ——— Page 336 ———

1. — On the threefold truth. In Logic we distinguished a threefold truth: formal, which is the conformity of the intellect with the object; transcendental, which is the truth

of being itself; moral, which is the conformity of signs or words with the mind's sentiment. Concerning logical truth we have treated sufficiently elsewhere; the discussion, therefore, is about metaphysical truth. What does it imply and in what does it consist? II. — The truth of being implies formally an order or conformity to the intellect. When something is per se first such, others are not such except by order to it. But the intellect is per se first true. Therefore all other things are called true by order to the intellect. The major is an axiom, which is clear enough. For when something is per se first such, it is as it were the chief analogate in that genus; therefore other things cannot be called such except by order to that chief. Thus, because health is per se first in an animal, other things are denominated healthy by order to the animal. Proof of the minor, namely that the intellect is per se first true, or (1) One may consult Aristotle II Metaphys. c. 1, and VI Metaphys. c. 3. In these, however, he treats rather of the truth of cognition. Hence Domet De Vorges (op. cit.) holds that the notion of transcendental truth is of Christian origin « The notion of transcendent truth seems to us to have a Christian and Platonic origin. » — Consult S. Au- gustius, Solilog., I. II, c. 5, De vera Religione, c. 36; S. Axelimus, cc. 7- 11, Monolog., c. 31-36, Brevisio. i. f., c. 6; S. Thomas, I. Senz. dist. 17, and dist. 39, I. p. q. 16 Qo. De Peru. S. Bonaventur and Scotus in Senz.; Carneolus, dist. 19, q. 3, nov. Edit., t. II, pp. 157, ss.; Cajetanus, Banne, in I. P . q. 16; Suarez, disp. 8; Alamannus, IV P . Meta- phys., q. 17; and more recent Scholastics: Sanservirino, Ziolara, Lepid, Mercier, Domet De Voros, and Pioeus, Comment. Semine Theolo- gique, e°c.

real thing, but something according to reason, as explicit from implicit. For being as such implies only entity, but truth implies entity as knowable and conformable to intellect. Hence entity is the primary and fundamental element in the concept of truth; the relation to intellect is secondary and consequent. This is confirmed. In the order of being, a thing is true because it is; it does not become being because it is true. Therefore entity is prior to the

relation to intellect. Hence entity is the primary constitutive of truth. IV. — The question of the foundation of truth. The truth of things is founded ultimately in the divine intellect; proximately in the created intellect, and in the things themselves as the cause of truth in the intellect. This is clear from what has been said concerning the foundation of essences. For truth is the conformity of the intellect with the thing. If, therefore, the thing is the measure of the intellect, truth is in the intellect; if the intellect is the measure of the thing, truth is in the thing. Now, with respect to the human intellect, things are the measure; with respect to the divine intellect, things are measured. Therefore, proximately, truth is in the human intellect, but ultimately it is in the divine intellect and in things as in their cause. V. — The truth of being is not merely a relation to the divine intellect, but also to the human intellect, and to the things themselves. For the truth of a thing consists in its conformity to its exemplar, which is the divine idea. But this conformity is in the thing itself, and it is also in the created intellect, which is conformed to the thing. Therefore the truth of being is not merely a relation to the divine intellect, but also a relation to the created intellect and to the thing itself. However, the primary relation is to the divine intellect, because this is the first and most fundamental conformity. The relation to the created intellect is secondary, and the relation to the thing itself is fundamental. ——— Page 339 ———

These things being explained and the danger of Ontologism and exaggerated Exemplarism being removed, it can safely and rightly be stated VI. — Conclusion: Simply and properly speaking, all things are called true by order to the divine intellect; not however by order to the human intellect except secondarily. — The truth of being is the conformity of a thing to the true intellect and to its norm; therefore it primarily consists in conformity to the supremely true and infallible intellect and to the first norm. The supremely true and infallible intellect and the first norm, however, is the divine intellect. Therefore the truth of being is said primarily by order to the divine intellect.

Moreover, since truth is an order to intellect, a thing ought to be called primarily true with respect to the intellect to which it has a per se order, but secondarily with respect to that intellect to which it has a per accidens order. For the judgment of a thing is not taken according to what belongs to it per accidens, but according to what belongs to it per se. But, in the ontological order, natural things have a per se order to the divine intellect, but per accidens to the human intellect. Therefore they are called primarily true with respect to the divine intellect, secondarily with respect to the created intellect. The minor is declared. A thing has a per se order to the intellect on which it depends according to its being. But all things depend on the divine intellect according to their being, for the divine intellect is the first cause in which all created things are, just as all artifacts are in the mind of the artificer. Therefore natural things have a per se order to the divine intellect. A thing, on the contrary, has a per accidens order to the intellect by which it is known, but not made. Natural things, however, are indeed known by the created intellect, but are not made. Therefore they have a per accidens order to the created intellect. On the contrary, the cognition of the intellect depends on things and is measured by things: for cognition is said to be true only insofar as it is conformed to the thing. Hence the axiom: The truth of natural things is posterior to the divine intellect, posterior to the created intellect. — Arti ficial things, however, have a per se order to the intellect of the artificer; for they ——— Page 340 ———

Thus, truth adds nothing above the entity of a thing except an order to intellect. Transcendental truth is indeed convertible with being in substance; formal truth, however, is convertible with being as manifestative with manifested (2). The whole notion of truth, therefore, implies two things: real entity and the aptitude for conformity to intellect or some norm. Hence truth is distinguished from being by a lesser distinction of reasoned reason, insofar as the concept of being does not explicitly and expressly say this conformity, but the concept of truth expressly imports it. And this distinction of reason suffices so that being is said to

be properly in things, but truth properly in the intellect. VIII. — The aforesaid conformity to intellect or norm can be in act or in aptitude. Transcendental truth abstracts from actual or potential cognition, and only implies being as intelligible and assimilable and conformable to intellect. A thing, namely, is said to be true « insofar as it is apt to produce a true estimation of itself, and insofar as it imitates its proper notion, which is in the divine mind (3). » With respect to the divine intellect, things are actually adequate and actually conformed; with respect to the human intellect, however, things are apt to be adequate and conformed, that is, they are adequate and conformable. The relation which truth implies, therefore, is actual or aptitudinal assimilation, conformity or conformability to intellect. IX. — In what way truth is in things. In order to the created intellect, truth is in things not formally and according to essence, but only causally. For things with respect to the created intellect are said to be true insofar as they are apt (1) Hence Bossuet writes: The true is what is; the false is what is not. » Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même, c. I, n. XVI. (2) To this belong the definitions of truth given by S. Augustine: Truth is that by which what is is shown (De vera Relig., c. 36), and by S. Hilary: Truth as declarative or manifestative of being (De Trinit., lib. 5, ante med.). (3) 8. Thomas, I. Cont. Gent., c. 60. ——— Page 341 ———

consolation: I am ravished that you are so great, that I cannot see you entirely; it is by this infinite that I recognize you as the Being who drew me from nothing. My spirit succumbs under so much majesty, happy to lower its eyes, unable to bear the brilliance of your glory. » Traité de l’existence de Dieu, II partie, c. II is received in many created intellects, and thus according to the multitude of intellects it is multiplied. Indeed, in the same intellect there are many truths. « In one way because of the diversity of known things of which it has diverse conceptions, which diverse truths follow in the soul. In another way from the diverse mode of understanding. For the course of Socrates is one thing, but the soul, which understands time by composing and dividing, understands the course of Socrates

in diverse ways as present, past, and future, and according to this it forms diverse conceptions, in which diverse truths are found (1). » In the third acceptation, there are many truths for many things, but for one thing there is only one truth. For truth thus taken is entity itself. But one thing has one entity; many things have many entities. Therefore one thing has one truth, many things have a multiple truth. This multiple truth of things, however, is said by order to one truth, which is the truth of the divine intellect. For in all analogates there is one principal and supreme with respect to which others are said. Therefore, although created things are true by their own proper and intrinsic truth, they are all called true by relation to one supreme and unique truth (2).

itself. » The first notion of truth, however, is inherent in a thing before the second, (1) To this pertains proposition 58 condemned by the S. R. and U. Inquisition by the decree « Lamentabili sane exitu » 3 July 1907: « Truth is no more immutable than man, since it evolves with him, in him, and through him. » (2) Q. 1. De Veri. a. 2. because the comparison to the divine intellect is prior to the human. Hence, even if the human intellect did not exist, things would still be called true in order to the divine intellect; but, if both intellects, which is impossible, were understood to be removed, in no way would the notion of truth remain.»
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ARTICLE FIVE.

intellect. Therefore nothing in things can be difform to the divine intellect, otherwise God would be an impotent artificer, who is unable to produce things in being as He conceives them in His mind. The II° part is shown. Voluntary things can be compared to God as known to knower, and in this way they are always conformed to the divine mind, because they are always known as they are. In another way, as regulated to its rule, and in this way difformity, or moral falsity, can occur. For divine reason is the norm to which a human act ought to be conformed. But the free will, from the power of sinning which it has, can not conform its act to the eternal reason. Therefore in free agents a certain moral falsity can occur with respect to the eternal reason. The III° part is shown. 1° There is no falsity simply in things with respect to our intellect. What is per se and essentially being is per se and essentially true; ——— Page 344 ———

that they know good, but because they are moved to good by some knower, namely by the ordination of the divine intellect, in the way an arrow tends to the target from the direction of the archer. 1. — The de finition of good. The definition of good given by the Philosopher is celebrated: Good is what all things desire. Good is described from its effect, which is to move appetite, just as motive power is usually manifested by motion. All things. The meaning is not: nothing is good unless it is desired by all, as if all beings desired all good; on the contrary, it is certain that each thing desires a good proportioned to itself; but it is intended: all things desire some good and nothing is desired except because it is good and under the aspect in which it is good. Nor is the objection valid concerning some who desire evil; because they do not desire evil except under the aspect of good, insofar as they consider it good, and their intention is per se directed to good, but per accidens falls upon evil (2). Desire. A threefold appetite is distinguished: innate, which is the inclination of each thing to its own perfection; sensitive, following sensitive cognition; intellective, following the cognition of the intellect. When it is said: what

all things desire, it is to be understood of every appetite, whether natural, sensitive, or intellectual. Natural things tend by natural appetite to good, not that they know good, but because they are moved to good by some knower, namely by the ordination of the divine intellect, in the way an arrow tends to the target from the direction of the archer. (1) Cf. ARNSTOT. I. Ethic. and V. Metaphys. : S. AQUINISTUS. De Doctri- na christiania, lib. I, c. 32, P . L. XXXIV, 32, and De Trinit. lib. VIII, c. 3, P . L. XLII, 949 ; BONTIUS. De Hebdomad., circa med., P . L., LXIV, 1312, ss.; DIONYSIUS. De divin. nomin. c. 3, P . G., III, 679, c. 5, 815 ; 8. THOMAS, q. 21. De Veritat., and I. P . q. 5 ; CAJETANUS, BANKER, PÉQUES, in h. L. SUAREZ, disp. 10 ; ALAMANUS, q. 19 ; and more recent Scholastics cited above; COUSIN. Du Vrai, du Beau, du Bien. (2) S. THOMAS, I. Ethic., lect. 6. A di fficulty could be raised against the aforesaid definition. For just as good implies an order to appetite, so truth implies an order to intellect and cognition. But truth is not defined as: What all things know. Therefore good should not be defined as: What all things desire. Resp. : There is a great disparity. Truth cannot imply an order to all things, but only to those which can receive beings in an intentional mode and attract them to themselves: for cognition is perfected through an intentional species by virtue of which the known is drawn to the knower. Good, on the contrary, can imply an order to all things, because appetite is drawn to the thing itself, and the appetition is terminated in the thing according to its real being. Moreover, all beings can receive some being, namely some natural perfection. Wherefore good, which perfects appetite, can be said of all things in some way. Hence good is rightly defined as what all things desire, although truth cannot be defined as what all things know. II. — The notion of transcendental good consists in the perfection of a thing itself insofar as this perfection implies an order to appetite. Since good is what all things desire, the goodness of a thing consists in its appetibility. But the appetibility of a thing is nothing other than the perfection of the thing itself implying an order to appetite. Therefore transcendental goodness

consists in the perfection of a thing itself, insofar as it implies an order to appetite. The minor is declared. Nothing is appetible unless it suits appetite. Moreover, nothing truly suits appetite unless it in some way perfects it, just as, conversely, something is said to be unsuitable to a thing because it places some imperfection in it. Therefore appetibility is the perfection of a thing itself implying an order to appetite. Moreover, nothing is perfective of another unless it is perfect in itself; for nothing gives what it in no way has in itself. Hence good signifies being as perfect in itself and perfective of another. Being perfect in itself relates to good presuppositively; but what is properly constitutive of good, or formal, is being perfective of another, namely appetite. Cajetan (and, after him, Suarez, Card. Zigliara) distinguishes a twofold appetibility: fundamental and formal. Fundamental appetibility is the very notion by which being becomes appetible. ——— Page 346 ———

(3) S. THOMAS, in I. EBIIC. Nic. lect. 1. ——— Page 347 ———

simply what is absolutely good and without limit. In which sense, good simply is good by essence, and in this acceptation no one is good except God alone; but good in a certain respect designates good by participation and emanating from another. (1) Ibid., a. 1, ad. 1. — « It is therefore true, as Boethius wished, that things are not said to be and to be good in the same way or according to the same reality, if it concerns being and being good, in the pure and simple sense: being, indeed, concerns substantial being, while being good concerns the completion of being by the presence of all that, even accidentally, contributes to its perfection. » P . Pécuves, O.P . Comm. Som- me Théol., t. I, 1 175. ——— Page 348 ———

to the end, or to action, or something of this kind, because each thing insofar as it is in act acts and tends to what suits it according to its form. Three things, therefore, are required: the commensuration of the subject to the form, the form itself, and the inclination of the form. (1) III

Metaphys., c. 2. (2) I. P . q. 5, a. 3, ad 4. (3) Comm. in I. P . q. 5, a. 3. ——— Page 349 ———

considering the superior tendency, it is false. XI. — Another division into honest, useful, and delightful good (1). This division is properly of human good. Honest is said to be that which is fitting by its own nature, and which is desired for its own sake; useful, that which is ordered as a means to another; delightful, that which is desired for the sake of the rest, or delight attached to it. If, however, we consider the notion of good more deeply and commonly, this division is found to belong properly to good insofar as it is good. For good is something insofar as it is appetible and the term of the motion of appetite. But the term of motion is threefold. Therefore good is divided in three ways. Proof of the minor. There is a term simply, or ultimate, which does not tend to another; and a term in a certain respect, that is an intermediate term, which terminates some part of the motion, but again is ordered to another. Moreover, the ultimate term of motion can be taken in two ways: either the thing itself to (1) Cf. S. T h o m a s , I. P . q. 5, a. 6 ; C a j e t a x u s , P b o v e s , i n h. I. ——— Page 350 ———

but is not necessarily bound to communicate itself in act: hence, although God is from eternity the supreme good, He is not therefore bound to communicate Himself from eternity (2). 3° God is the good of every good (3). The meaning is not that God is the intrinsic and constitutive reason of the goodness of creatures, but that He is the efficient, exemplary, and final cause of this goodness. 4° Every being is good in itself and good to another. Good in itself. Every being in itself has its species, its mode, and its order. But good consists in mode, species, and order, as was said n. IX. Therefore every being is good in itself. Moreover, this is clear from the saying: Good and being are convertible. Good to another. For good is diffusive of itself. But to diffuse itself to another is to be good to it. Therefore it is good to another. There prevails, therefore, a most general and transcendental attraction by virtue of which every being attracts and is attracted: it attracts, because it is suitable and good to another; it is attracted, because the

other is suitable and good to it. 5° Insofar as we are, we are good (4). Because being and good are convertible, from that from which a thing has being it has being good, not however in such a way that being simply is good simply, nn.V. and VI. (1) S. Bonaventura, Sen. XI. dist. 10, a. 2, q. 1. (2) Cf. vol. II, pp. 66-67. (3) S. Avotensis, De Trinit., lib. VIII, c. 3, P . L., XLII, 949. (4) S. Avotensis, De Dectrin. ebrist. lib. I, c. 32, P . L. XXXII, 82. ——— Page 351 ——— 1. — Evil is the privation of good. One of the opposites is known from the other, as darkness through light. Hence from good we must learn what evil is, which is the opposite of good. Evil is opposed to good contrarily or privatively according to different respects. If evil is taken concretely as the subject which is called evil, it is opposed contrarily, as vice is opposed to virtue; if, however, it is taken formally, as the notion according to which something is called evil, it is opposed privatively, and thus is defined: The privation of due good. Evil, therefore, formally taken does not imply any being, any form, or perfection, but only the absence of due good. For whatever is appetible is good. But every being desires its being, its form. Therefore every being, every form, or nature, is some good; consequently evil signifies neither being nor form nor any nature. It remains, therefore, that by the name of evil is implied a certain absence of good. For the notion of evil, however, not just any lack of good suffices, « otherwise it would follow that those things which do not exist at all would be evil, and again that any thing would be evil because it does not have the good of another thing, as that a man would be evil because he does not have the swiftness of a goat, or the strength of a lion (2).» Evil, therefore, is constituted by the absence of due good; or due good to itself, as when something is said to be evil in itself; or due good to another, as when something is said to be evil, or harmful, to another. Hence the saying is understood: Evil is distant both from being simply and from non-being simply, because it is neither as a habit nor as pure negation, but as a privation (1). II. — The division of evil. Evil is adequately divided into physical evil and moral evil. Proof. Every evil is an evil of a

thing or an evil of an operation. But evil of a thing is called physical; evil of an operation, however, moral evil. Therefore. Proof of the major. Evil is the privation of good, which consists principally and per se in perfection and act. But there is a twofold act, first and second: first indeed is a thing, that is, form or integrity of the thing; second, however, is operation. Therefore evil will be twofold: evil of a thing, which is the privation of form, or of some part which is required for the integrity of a thing, such as blindness is an evil, and to lack a limb; and evil of an operation, which is the privation of due free operation; either because it does not exist, or because it does not have due mode and order. There is no metaphysical evil, such as Leibniz advocated. Evil of this kind would be imperfection, or limitation of any created thing, or lack of non-due perfection. But limitation or lack of further perfection is essential to a creature, nor is it evil for it: hence man is not considered evil because he does not have the swiftness of a goat nor the strength of a lion, as the Angelic Doctor wittily observes. Evil is properly that which deprives a thing of due perfection, n. I. And this privation is of a thing or of an operation: physical evil or moral evil (2).

III. — Evil of fault and of punishment. In voluntary agents, evil acquires a special notion and a special name. For good is simply the object of the will; wherefore evil, which is the privation of good, is found in rational creatures endowed with will according to a special notion. Physical evil has the notion of punishment, because it is contrary to the will and is inflicted by order of divine providence and justice as punishment for sin; moral evil, however, has the notion of fault: this (1) Cf. S. A u c u s t i n u s , De Mor. Manich., lib. II, c. 4, De Cio. Dei, lib. X1, c. 22, De Vera Relig. c. 24, De Doctrina Christ., lib. I, c. 32 ; D i o n s s , De d e c i n . n o m i n . c. 4, P . G., 715, 534, ss.; S. T h o m a s , I. P . qq. 48 and 49, Qq. D i s p . d e M a l o ; A l a m a n n u s . q. 20 ; and interpreters of St. Thomas already cited. (2) I. P ., q. 48, a. 3. ——— Page 352 ———

have a final cause, but is rather a privation of order to the due end. For not only the end has the notion of good, but

also the useful which is ordered to the end (1). » Concerning the material and efficient cause, therefore, the question is only raised. VII. — First conclusion: Evil is in good as in a subject or material cause. Proof. Evil is the privation of good. But every privation demands a subject, since it is a negation in a subject. Therefore evil requires a subject. Moreover, every subject is some being, and therefore some good, since every being is convertible with good. Therefore evil requires good as a subject. Hence, if evil were found without admixture of good, without any good subject in which it is received, it would thereby vanish, as the Philosopher says: If evil is integral, it will destroy itself (2). VIII. — Second conclusion: Evil is from good as from an agent cause, not however per se, but per accidens (3). Proof of the I° part. Evil is a defect of good which is apt to (1) S. THOMAS, I. P ., q. 49, a. 1. (2) ARISTOT. IV Ethic. c. 5, (al. 11). (3) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P ., q. 49, a. 1, and II Sent., dist. 34, a. 4. ——— Page 353 ———

as when monstrous births follow because of the indisposition of matter. In voluntary agents, however, moral evil is not considered from the matter or form of the effect, but follows only from the agent. Moreover, the principal agent of a moral act is the will, since an act is called moral because it is voluntary. In the act of the will, therefore, the root and origin of moral sin is to be sought. But more on these by the moralists. IX. — Whether God can be the cause of evil. Resp. : 1° God can by no means be the cause of the evil of fault. For the evil of fault is a recession from God. But God cannot be the cause of recession from Himself, as is clear. Therefore. 2° God cannot be the cause of evil which arises from a defect of the agent, since He is the highest virtue and the highest perfection. 3° God is the cause per accidens of evil which consists in the corruption of some things. An agent, insofar as by its power it produces some form to which corruption and defect follow, per accidens causes by its power that corruption and defect. But the form which God causes in things is the good of the order of the

universe, which requires that there be corruptions and defects in things. Therefore God, by causing the good of the order of the universe in things, causes per accidens the corruptions of things, or physical evil. 4° God causes the evil of punishment. For He causes the order of the universe. But to the order of the universe also pertains the order of justice, which requires that fitting punishment be inflicted on sinners. Therefore God causes the evil of punishment to preserve the order of justice. X. — It is incompatible that any evil nature exist, and a fortiori, one supreme evil which is the cause of all evil. Among the Persians there prevailed the doctrine of a twofold principle, good and evil, which was successively taken up by the Gnostics (1), the Manichaeans (1), (1) Cf. J. TIXESORT, Histoire des Dogmes, ch. IV, Les hérésies du IIe siècle. ——— Page 354 ———

ARTICLE EIGHT.

On The Beautiful (1).

intuition, is required by which the object is, as it were, comprehended. This vision designates not only the cognition of the senses, but also and especially the contemplation of the mind. Secondly, it is required that by virtue of this cognition complacency arise. In every perfect cognition, indeed, a certain complacency is found, which is certainty, or rest in known truth as truth; but this does not suffice for beauty, a special sense of pleasure and sweetness is required which arises from the contemplation (1) One may consult: 8. AUGUSTINUS, Confes., lib. IV, c. 13 ; De Vera Relig., cc. 30-32 ; Epist. XVIII ad Coelest. n. 2 ; De Civiti. Dei, lib. XXII, c. 19 ; De natura Boni, cont. Man., c. 8, De Genesi, cont. Man. lib. I, c. 21 ; B. THOMAS, Opusc. De Pulchro and Sum. Theol. . P . q. 5, a. 6, ad 1, q. 39, a. 8, 1a 11e, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3 ; CROUSAT, Traité du Beau, Amsterdam, 1724 ; P . AXONB, Essai sur le Beau, Paris, 1763 ; edit. COUSIN, 1843 ; HERMESON, Recherches sur l'origine de nos idées de Beauil and de Vertu, Lond. 1753 ; KANT, Traité du Beau et du Sublime ; Ch. LÉVÉQUÉ, La Science du Beau étudiée dans son principe, dans ses applications et dans son histoire ; COUSIN, du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien ; LÉRICHALAS, Études esthétiques ; TAISE, Philosophie de l'Art ; VALLET, L'Idée de Beau dans la Philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin ; DE SNEUT, La Théorie du Beau, selon les idées de saint Thomas d'Aquin ; DE WULF , La valeur esthétique de la moralité dans l'art ; GARD. MERCKER, Ontol. nn. 266-282 ; and more recent Scholastics, in Ontol. (2) I. P . q. 5, a. 6, ad. 1. ——— Page 355 ———

perceives sweetness by contemplating the object. IV. — Certain de finitions of beauty are examined. Some moderns call beautiful that which is new, or which by its novelty strikes, moves, and attracts the intellect. But, on the contrary, it is clear that not every new thing is beautiful: crimes, monsters, fortuitous things, etc., lack beauty, although they appear new. On the other hand, many things

lack novelty, yet are considered beautiful, such as the beautiful sky, beautiful mountains, beautiful nature, a beautiful soul, etc. Nor is the other definition which is handed down approved by us: Beauty is that which imitates nature. For beauty does not belong only to, nor to all nature; there are, on the contrary, many things imitating nature which are nevertheless considered ugly and are. The definition attributed to Plato, although the very words are not read in Plato's works, namely: Beauty is the splendor of truth, will be legitimate if it falls into the Thomistic definition itself: which when seen pleases. For truth implies an order to cognition; splendor, however, adds something to cognition by virtue of which sweetness and complacency arise in the knower. If, however, truth is taken strictly, it will be inadequate, for not only splendid truth, but many other things, are considered beautiful. The definition of St. Augustine also holds: Beauty is the splendor of order. Order is a certain truth which implies variety, integrity, proportion, unity; splendor, however, adds the principal and more formal element. The definition, however, does not explicitly state the elements of beauty. This is excellently achieved by ——— Page 356 ———

cause. This integrity, moreover, implies a certain magnitude, whence the Philosopher says: Beauty is not except in great bodies, hence small men can be called well-proportioned and handsome, but not beautiful (1). Magnitude, moreover, which integrity implies, designates generally a certain pre-eminence, or a mode of having its elements in some excellent and eminent degree. It can be either dimensative magnitude exceeding the mediocrity of the species, as men who exceed the mediocrity of human stature are called beautiful; or intensive magnitude, in activity and virtue. In spiritual things, magnitude is a certain eminence either in the mode of possessing perfection in the essence itself, or in activity, virtue, and operation. VIII. — Beauty requires proportion and harmony. Proportion is the right disposition of all parts among themselves and of each part with the whole; harmony, however, is, as it were, the complement of proportion, and

makes diverse parts not remain disparate, but rightly agree with each other; hence it is defined: The consonance of diverse things. That proportion is required for beauty is not to be doubted. For proportion represents order. But beauty does not consist without order; hence disordered things immediately become ugly. Beauty can indeed permit certain evils, provided they are reduced to order, according to the saying: (1) Ethic., lib. IV, c. 6. ——— Page 357 ———

thing is visible and knowable insofar as it is clear, and recedes from knowability, visibility, and delightfulness insofar as it becomes obscure. Therefore, for the object to delight the cognitive faculty, it must enjoy some clarity, indeed shine with special elegance and sweetness, and hence complacency arises. XI. — What is that resplendence? Does material clarity and pleasantness of color su ffice? A higher and more sublime doctrine is opened by the definition attributed to the Angelic Doctor: that clarity of beauty is the resplendence of form. Form is that which constitutes a thing in a determinate species, or essence: wherefore the splendor of form is the splendor of essence itself. It is necessary, namely, that all clarity which is in a thing be derived from essence (1). For each thing is known and defined through its form, or species; form, therefore, in the ontological order expresses, defines, and therefore manifests the thing. Moreover, whatever manifests is light. Therefore form, or species, or essence, is the light of the thing. Hence, just as all perfection flows from form and essence, so all clarity of being results from form and essence; wherefore properties, which are only emanations of essence, have no other splendor except that which they participate from essence. Essence, therefore, provides the first splendor and the first beauty: hence beings have degrees of beauty according to the degree they hold in the hierarchy of forms; and in the same being there will be as many different beauties as there are different splendors of its form. (1) Hence Lamennais requires for beauty « that, by the vision of ideas, man links to contingent forms their necessary types, and that through the material envelope, visible to the eye of the flesh, the spirit discovers the

invisible essence. » De l'Art et du Beau, c. II. ——— Page 358 ———

correspond to ideas: the species of a thing is its idea. Therefore the light of form is the resplendence of the idea. Because there is a twofold idea of each thing, namely its proper and proximate idea, and its ultimate idea, or archetype, which is in the divine mind, a twofold ideal must also be distinguished: one proximate, the other ultimate. The proximate ideal is the species, or universal nature: for this is the exemplar to which singular nature ought to be conformed; and since individuals always bear imperfections and defects and never fully exhaust whatever perfection is in the universal essence, hence it happens that the ideal is never perfectly attained by individuals. But it pertains to art to express that ideal sensibly with resplendence of order (2). The ultimate ideal, however, is the divine essence (3), in which are all exemplars of things; and, because that archetype is infinitely participable and imitable, art can progress indefinitely without ever exhausting or attaining the supreme ideal. XIII. — Whether the Ideal is something real and objective. The supreme ideal is most real, since it is the supreme and first reality, the fullness of being. The proximate ideal, however, is not a mere subjective figment, but exhibits a certain objectivity, (1) « Form designates the speci fic form, that is to say the perfection proper to a being of nature; resplendentia formae, it is the brilliant manifestation of this perfection. By reason of its intrinsic perfection, every thing is fundamentally beautiful; it becomes formally so when it shines, that is to say when it reveals itself brilliantly. » Card. McKerrac, n. 275. (2) « Beauty therefore consists in the manifestation of nature by the splendour of order ». Ibid. (3) This is confessed by all philosophers who acknowledge the true God: « God, who is the type of absolute liberty, is therefore also supreme beauty: all beauty derives from him. » Diction. philos. art. Beau. — Cf. B. FRANG. SALIS. Traité de l’Amour de Dieu, liv I, c. 1. ——— Page 359 ———

to be that in which spiritual clarity shines externally and sensibly. There is, as we have said, a threefold clarity: of

natural form, of supernatural form, or grace, and finally of the divine essence. Hence a man in whom the natural clarity of the soul shines is already called beautiful; but more beautiful is he in whom the light of grace shines together with the splendor of the soul; most beautiful, finally, in whom shine the clarity of the soul, the clarity of grace, and the clarity of divinity. He is most perfect in whom nature, grace, and deity shine and super-shine: the Man Christ Jesus, to whom be glory forever. Wherefore Christ is the supreme beauty and happiness with respect to us. After Him, the Blessed Virgin, in whom nature is perfect, grace excellent, who moreover in some way attains to the ends of deity (1). In the just, a certain divine clarity can also be distinguished, for the Most Holy Trinity inhabits their minds and irradiates them by its presence. All saints, therefore, are beautiful because of that triple resplendence: of nature, of grace, of the indwelling of the Holy Trinity. These things indeed go beyond the scope of philosophy; they are not, however, unfittingly mentioned for a fuller and deeper understanding of beauty (2). XVII. — On the degrees of beauty. Three degrees are commonly enumerated: Graceful, beautiful, sublime. The graceful is that which bears pleasantness, sweetness, charm, without however exhibiting a certain magnitude, but rather a certain incomplete state which is ordered to a more perfect and higher degree. As graceful are commonly cited flowers, brooks, dawn, an infant. Beautiful simply so called implies perfection and magnitude, and the other conditions already assigned. The sublime, however, rises above beauty; it is defined as: That which surpasses the intuition of the knower. (1) Cf. P . Moxsandre, Carême de 1890, Amen du sens esthétique. (2) Cf. Souvène, L’esthétique du dogme. ——— Page 360 ———

of parts to the whole, and this is reason alone; similarly to perceive the resplendence of form, or the ideal, cannot be of any faculty except the one which contemplates essential ideals. Sensitive faculties, however, concur: in the external senses, hearing and sight, as most cognitive of those things which make a thing beautiful in the physical order; among the internal senses, imagination especially serves, which

presents vivid phantasms for the sensible expression of beauty (1). The science of beauty is called aesthetics, from the Greek word αισθάνομαι, to sense, because beauty does not signify just any cognition, but cognition with taste and flavor, and seems more to be felt than known (2). Hence beauty is also referred to appetite, because it produces complacency in it, and because it is a certain species of good which when seen delights the will. XX. — On the fine arts. Arts which express beauty sensibly, or intend to express it, are called fine arts. Five are enumerated: poetry, music, painting, architecture, sculpture. A fine art must achieve three things: 1° to conceive the ideal beauty; 2° to express it sensibly; for man, since he is not a pure spirit, does not delight in the abstract ideal and intelligible, but in the ideal and intelligible which shines in the sensible; 3° to express it not by any signs, but by signs more expressive and more apt for the sensible manifestation of beauty. (1) « It seems therefore indubitable that the notion of beauty reaches the spirit through the senses. But in itself it is supersensible: for it is the fruit of an abstractive work of which the senses are incapable. And that is why the work of art — the realization of an ideal by means of material processes — is addressed not to the senses alone, but to the intelligence. » Card. Men- cina, n. 268. (2) That word Aesthetica, signifying the science of beauty, was introduced by Baumgarten, a German philosopher (1714-1762). — In Kant, however, it designates the study of sensibility and the senses. ——— Page 361 ———

Menchen, Ontol., n. 282.

ART. VIII. — ON THE BEAUTIFUL.

QUESTION ONE

ARTICLE ONE — On The Nature Of Being

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VII. — Conclusion: Being which is divided into the ten predicaments is not that which signi fies the truth of a proposition; it implies a composite of essence and being, in

such a way, however, that it is placed in a genus not according to being, but by reason of quiddity. ——— Page 367 ———

« That which is of reason, says the Angelic Doctor, can only be twofold, namely negation or some relation. » Proof. The nature of being of reason formally consists in its opposition to real being, namely that it is not capable of existence. But that which is not capable of existence is either something positive or something non-positive. If it is not positive, it is negation or privation. But what is positive is either absolute or relative. ——— Page 368 ———

absolute: neither transcendentally taken, otherwise God alone would have the notion of being; nor predicamentally, otherwise only substance, not accident, could be called being. A fortiori it is clear that being is not absolute disparate. XII. — The distinction of being in common from divine being. God is the most actual being and of greatest comprehension, whose concept excludes all addition. Being in common, however, is potential and is contracted in its inferiors; it is of least comprehension, since it actually and explicitly implies only the least predicate that can be attributed to something. It does not exclude additions; indeed, it is determined and contracted by them. Those additions, however, are not something extraneous to being; but ——— Page 369 ———

ARTICLE TWO — On The Concept Of Being.

Proof of the I° part. A concept is then only perfectly abstracted from its inferior when the inferior concept can be resolved into at least two concepts: one superior, the other differential. But the inferiors of being cannot be resolved into two concepts, one of which is being, the other a differential concept extraneous to being. Therefore the concept of being is not a concept perfectly abstracted from its inferiors. The major explains what a perfectly abstract concept is, and is understood by induction. For this reason animal is a concept perfectly abstracted from man and horse, because man can be resolved into two ——— Page 370 ———

being differ immensely and are almost opposed, as unreceived and received. Moreover, being in God is by essence and necessarily, and as unreceived, but in creatures as received and by participation and contingently. Therefore the notion of being cannot be the same in God and creatures. 2 That is not simply the same in several things which belongs to one as properly and in itself existing, but to another as existing in another and begging its being from another: for that notion of independence and that notion of dependence and inherence differ greatly. But being is ascribed to substance as ——— Page 371 ———

form is in the principal analogate intrinsically, but in the others extrinsically and by denomination. Moreover, the form of the chief analogate is placed in the definition of the others, so much so that the other analogates cannot be conceived without the form of the chief analogate: thus the health of food cannot be understood independently of the health of an animal. But 1° the notion of being is not found extrinsically and only by denomination in creatures and accident, but intrinsically, as we already know; 2° God is not placed in the de finition of creatures; substance, however, although it is included in the definition of accident as its subject, is not placed as the form denominating the accident, in the way that the health of an animal is the form denominating healthy medicine; but, on the contrary, accident has some proper form by which it is constituted and by which it is conceived, without thereby conceiving the form constituting substance. Therefore the analogy of proportion formally so called is lacking. Proof of the III° part, namely that the analogy of being includes nevertheless virtually the analogy of proportion. ——— Page 372 ———

we draw concerning God from creatures is fallacious. But this cannot be admitted. Therefore the notion of being is the same in God and creatures. Resp. : Distinguish the major: If the same notion of being is neither simply nor proportionally, the cognition is fallacious, I grant; if it is not the same simply, but the same proportionally, the cognition is fallacious, I deny. I grant the minor, and distinguish the conclusion: Therefore the notion of being is the same in God

and creatures proportionally, I grant; simply, I deny. Cognition which is founded on likeness and analogy is not fallacious, because what belongs to the similar, insofar as it is similar, also belongs to the other of which it is the likeness. Hence what belongs to creatures proportionally and in a more eminent way is attributed to God. 3° Measure and measured are of the same notion. But God and creature relate as measure and measured. Therefore they are of the same notion. Resp. : Distinguish the major: Measure properly so called, such as is used in quantity, is of the same notion as the measured, I grant; measure improperly so called and superexcelling, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence. 4° The analogate is prior to the analogates. But being is not prior to God and creatures. Therefore it is not analogical. Resp. : Distinguish the major: It is prior according to the imposition of the name, I grant; according to reality, I subdistinguish: if the whole notion of the analogate is found in neither of the analogates, I grant; otherwise, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor, and deny the conclusion. The solution is clear from what was said in number IX (1). XI. — Whether the concept of being is the first of all both in logical order and in temporal order. The concept of being is simple and ——— Page 373 ———

existence, which denies existence but not possibility, and the nothing of essence, which denies even possibility, such as a square circle. 2° By reason of extension, it is absolute and total nothing, which denies all being, and relative and partial nothing, which denies to another, but not being or some degree of being; thus death denies life but not all being. 3° By reason of subject, it is the nothing of negation, which says only the absence of some form, and the nothing of privation, which is the lack of a due form. These things being understood, the opinion of Ad. Franck is refuted, who says: « Absolute nothing is impossible to conceive, and to speak of it is to contradict oneself (1). » XIII. — On the concept of nothing. Nothing is the negation of being. Many Idealists contend that no true concept of nothing is had. But on the contrary: whatever is in the mind exhibits some

concept; but nothing is in the mind, since the mind discusses and reasons about nothing and discerns it from being. Therefore nothing has some concept. (1) Tract. I. q. II, a. V. Vol. I II. p. 81. (2) This question, how being is first known, is fully and excellently treated by Cajetanus in De Ente et Essentia, in the prooemium. (3) Let what we have discussed in Logic concerning the acts by which the direct universal and the reflexive, or logical, universal are formed be recalled, vol. I, pp. 219-221.

common to be the concept of reality and the most general being to be the source of realities. Lamennais seems to adhere to these (1). On the other hand, Subjectivists, Nominalists, Conceptualists assert that the notion of being exhibits nothing objective, but is a figment of our mind. (1) For he calls being « the inexhaustible source of realities » and says that all particular beings are actually contained in it « not only in potency, but in reality. » Cf. Lamennais, Esquisse d'une Philosophie, I. P . liv. I. c. 5.

ART. III. — DE ENTIS CONCEPTU.

QUESTION TWO

ARTICLE ONE.

from their correlative act. For a principle implies a real distinction from that of which it is a principle. Therefore, since both are a principle of act, both are distinguished from their corresponding act. In God, active potency is not precisely a principle of action, since God is His own action, but a principle of the produced effect. They differ, however, in this: 1° Passive potency is imperfect, for everything su ffers according as it is deficient and imperfect; but active potency is act and perfection. For from active potency action emanates, which is a certain perfection. But nothing gives except what it in some way contains in itself. Therefore active potency in some way contains the perfection of operation. Hence the saying of St. Thomas: Everything according as it is in act and perfect, according to this is an active principle of something (1). 2° Active potency, although it is called potency with respect to operation, which is its term and ultimate perfection, is nevertheless in itself some act, which is called first act; but passive potency, as passive, cannot in any way be called act. For as the Angelic Doctor explains (2), active potency is not divided against act, but is founded in it, for everything acts according as it is in act; but passive potency is divided against act, for everything suffers according as it is in potency. Hence this potency is excluded from God, but not the active. In short, passive potency is potency only, to which corresponds the first act informing it; but active potency is a first act to which second act, or operation emanating from it, corresponds. Passive potency is properly for being, but active for acting. IV. — Another consideration of active and passive potency. Passive potency, as has been said, is the capacity to receive something (1) I. P . q. 25, a. 1. (2) Ibid. which it did not previously have, in which notion is included a subject which is otherwise disposed than before, since it acquires what it previously did not possess. Moreover, to be otherwise disposed than before is to be transmuted. Wherefore passive potency designates some

principle which can be transmuted and moved. But a passive principle, since it does not actually have the perfection which is to be acquired by transmutation, requires another which may bestow that perfection, or which may transmute. Hence active potency implies a principle which can transmute and move. From these can be understood the definition which Aristotle gives of active and passive potency. — Active potency is the principle of transmutation in another, insofar as it is another, that is, the principle of transmuting another insofar as it is another. These last words are skillfully added. For the active principle, or transmuting, can be found in that which suffers and is transmuted, but it is not moved and moves according to the same aspect, but according to different aspects: a man, e.g., moves himself according to the heart, is moved according to other parts. True passive potency is defined: The principle of mutation from another, insofar as it is another, that is, the principle of receiving transmutation from another insofar as it is another. Why these last words are added, we already know: something can suffer from itself, but not according to the same aspect: a man can be moved by himself, but one part is the mover, another part the moved. Hence it follows that active and passive potency are really distinguished, or are in different subjects, because nothing is according to the same aspect agent and patient (1). VI. — Conclusion: There exists in nature a state of potency, even passive. Arg. Ium. Wherever transmutation takes place, passive potency is present. But transmutations take place in nature. Therefore. The major is clear from what has been said, since passive potency is the principle of mutation from another. Proof of the minor. Mutation occurs when the same subject is otherwise disposed than before. But in the world we frequently see the same subject otherwise disposed than before, e.g., the same iron is now in a state of coldness, now becomes incandescent; the same subject which was seed becomes a plant, the plant becomes ashes; the same embryo which was an ovum becomes living, becomes sensitive, becomes man. Daily facts, therefore, invincibly demonstrate the state of potentiality. Oxygen and

hydrogen before they were combined were not water, and yet water was not drawn from nothing: therefore oxygen and hydrogen were water in potency. Arg. IIum. It has been proved, in Natural Philosophy, that matter and form exist, which doctrine can be called certain with respect to living things. But the existence of matter and form implies the existence of potency and act (1). Therefore potency exists, even substantial, at least in

living things. Arg. IIIum from the absurdities of the denying opinion. Unless a state of real potency distinct from act itself is given, it follows that a man who does not actually see is blind, for he is considered blind who lacks the power of seeing; and a man who does not actually feel is insensible, for he is utterly to be called insensible who does not have a true power of feeling. V. — The existence of potency. The existence of a state of mere potency, namely passive, was denied by the ancient Eleatics, especially Parmenides, Mellesius, Zeno; by the Moderns, F . Herbart, and others, who contend that potency, especially passive, is only a figment of reason, or not distinguished from mere possibility. The reality of potency, however, is asserted by Aristotle (2) and the Scholastics, both ancient and modern (3), and generally by all who defend the objectivity of motion. (1) Passive and active potency are in different subjects, says St. Thomas repeatedly after Aristotle. Cf. Metaphys. I. I ; IV Sent. dist. 4, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 ; dist. 14, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1. (2) Cf. ARISTOT., Phys., I, IV. (3) Cf. KLEPTOEN, La Philos. seol. t. I, c. 1. a. 3 ; FARON, Théorie fendantem. de l'acte et de la puissance. VII. — The first subdivision of passive potency: into quidditative and entitative. Receptive potency can be either for first being, which is substantial form, or for ultimate being, which is existence. The first does not have determinate entity, but is a determinable subject for quiddity through substantial form, and for this reason it is called quidditative potency. The other is already a certain essence, but needs to be actuated by being, or existence; and, because it is called being from being, therefore the subject susceptible of being is fittingly called entitative potency (2). (1) Cf. vol. II, pp.

113 and sqq. (2) Cf. Card. LOKKSZIKUL, Metaphysic. Gen. P . II, lect. IX. ——— Page 377 ——— 2 2 M E T A P H Y S I C A O N T O L O G I C A , T R A C T . I . Q . I I . The act corresponding to quidditative potency is specific essence, but the act corresponding to entitative potency is existence. But since the act of essence and the act of existence are of different physical genera, it follows that quidditative and entitative potency differ in physical genus. In whatever, therefore, composition of essence and existence is found, entitative potency is found, and in whatever composition of matter and form is present, quidditative potency is present. The first, therefore, belongs to all created things, the second only to corporeal things. VIII. — The second subdivision: into natural and obediential potency. Passive potency implies an order to active potency as to its complement and perfection. There is, however, a twofold active potency to which passive can be compared, namely: the potency of a natural agent, and the potency of the first agent, which can induce a higher effect. Hence a twofold passive potency is usually distinguished: natural and obediential. Natural is in order to a natural agent; the other is in order to the first agent and to an act exceeding the powers of nature. Three things must be established concerning obediential potency: whether it exists? what kind it is, passive only, or also active? and to what it extends? IX. — First conclusion: There is in every creature an obediential potency for e ffects induced by God and exceeding nature. Proof. The potency which is totally subject to some agent can be raised to all those effects which such an agent can induce. But the potency of every creature is totally subject to God, from whom it totally depends in being and preservation. Therefore it can be raised to all effects which God can induce. God, moreover, can induce effects exceeding the scope and powers of all nature. For the higher some active power is, the higher can it elevate that thing to an effect. But divine power is higher than every natural power of a creature, and consequently can induce an effect exceeding all the powers and exigencies of nature. Therefore every creature is in potency

to effects surpassing the power of nature. Potency, however, to effects exceeding nature is called obediential. Therefore obediential potency exists in creatures.

which nevertheless they cannot naturally perceive. Thus through the light of glory, which is a permanent habit, our intellect is made apt to see the divine essence, which is contained within the adequate object of the intellect, namely being and truth. It is wisely said: within the adequate (1) S. THOMAS, De Perit. q. 29, a. 3, ad 3. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, III. P . q. 75, a. 4. ad 3. object, for obediential potency is not borne to those things which change essence and imply contradiction. Moreover, if faculties were borne outside their adequate object, e.g., the eye to understanding, the ear to seeing, the essence would be destroyed, and contradiction would be introduced. XIII. — On logical potency, or the possible. We have distinguished potency as such from the possible. Real potency is a true capacity, really existing in a real subject. The possible, however, is said to be that to which being is not repugnant, or which is apt to exist. It has, therefore, some real-ideal being, and a positive concept by reason of which it is distinguished from nothing, which cannot be conceived positively. The aptitude for existence, however, can arise both from the mutual convenience of terms, which present no repugnance, and from an extrinsic cause which can bring the thing to being. Hence a twofold possibility: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic is the aptitude for existence arising from the non-repugnance of terms to each other. Extrinsic is the aptitude for existence in relation to an active cause which can endow the thing with existence. Intrinsic is called absolute, because it is had independently of any hypothesis; metaphysical, because it lies in the very essence of the thing; primary, because it is presupposed to extrinsic potency. The latter, however, is called relative and secondary. With respect to God, relative possibility is as open as absolute possibility: for whatever is intrinsically possible can be brought into being by God. With respect to creatures, however, it is less open. Some things, indeed, cannot be effected by a created cause, such as spiritual

substance; some, however, can be produced considering the laws of nature, but not considering the laws by which human morals are regulated; some, finally, can be produced considering both the laws of nature and morals. In the first case, there is physical possibility; in the other, physical and moral simultaneously. The opposite of possible is impossible: hence intrinsic impossibility is the repugnance to existence arising from the repugnance of terms to each other; extrinsic impossibility is the repugnance arising only from the defect of active power in some created cause. It is subdivided into moral and physical, like possibility itself. ——— Page 379 ———

foundation of essences. XV. — Whether the notion of the possible is posterior to the notion of the existent. The possible is a certain abstract notion. But the order of our cognition is that we are led from concretes to abstracts. Therefore the existent is conceived first; then the intellect, by abstracting from the state of reality and existence, forms the concept of the possible. Thus, our mind proceeds as follows: first, it forms the most common notion of being; then it conceives existence, by conceiving whether a thing is; thirdly, essence, by conceiving what a thing is; fourthly, the attributes of a thing, by conceiving how a thing is. Among the attributes of essence, however, is possibility, hence fifthly it conceives possibility, by conceiving whether a thing can be. Extrinsic possibility is indeed manifestly posterior; intrinsic possibility is really the same as essential predicates, but is conceived as a mode of essence, and therefore is posterior to essence. Therefore possibility is inferred from the existence of a thing (1). However, XVI. — The intrinsic possibility of things does not arise from their existence. That which prescinds from actual existence does not originate from it. Moreover, the possible prescinds from actual existence, since it is indifferent to being and not being. Moreover, if possibility arose from actual existence, things, before they existed, would not be possible; and on the other hand, every possible would be endowed with existence, which is to introduce blind necessity and fatalism. (1) Cf. BALMES, Philosophie fondament. liv. V. c.

IV. ——— Page 380 ———

ARTICLE TWO

ON ACT AND ITS RELATION TO POTENCY .

Received act is that which informs potency and is received in potency; unreceived, however, is that which is received in no potency. If, moreover, some act is neither received in potency nor can receive a further act, then it will be unreceived and non-receptive. Moreover, such an act is necessarily most perfect and infinite. For since act according to itself implies perfection, if some act is not pure perfection, it is clear that it is not pure act, but mixed with potency. Now act can be mixed with potency in two ways: either because it is itself the act of a potency, or because it is in potency to a further act. Moreover, unreceived act is not the act of a potency; but non-receptive act is not potency to an act. Wherefore unreceived and non- receptive act is purely act, pure perfection, hence it is called pure act. But what is pure perfection is without limit, since every limit denotes imperfection. Therefore unreceived and non-receptive act is properly and simply infinite act. But act which is not received in some subject, but receives a further act, can be called infinite in a certain respect, not however absolutely. Thus angelic form is not received in any matter; from which aspect it has nothing that restricts and limits it. (1) On the Aristotelian acceptation of act, consult P GARDERI, O. P . Revue Thomiste, 1893, n. 6 ; KAUFFMANN, Etude sur la cause finale,tra- doct. DUBER ; BACDIS, L'Acte et la puissance dans Aristote, Revue Thomiste, 1899. ——— Page 381 ———

and act. Proof of the minor. Pure act, since it is non-receptive, can acquire nothing, and consequently can lose nothing, because something is lost so that another may be received. But something is said to be lost when it is separated from the subject in which it was received. But pure act has nothing received. Therefore it can lose nothing. Therefore every mutable being supposes some act which is acquired or lost, and some potency in which the lost act was received and in which the act to be acquired will be

received; which is composition of potency and act. Every immutable being, therefore, is pure act. But since pure act is God alone, it is clear that every created being is mutable, composed of potency and act. VIII. — The second saying: Act and potency divide being and every genus of being. It coincides with the preceding saying. The meaning is: Created being in common is divided into potency and act in such a way that potency is as it were the genus, act as it were the difference. Indeed, potency is, like a genus, a determinable principle; act is, like a difference, a determining principle. For when we wish to know the nature of something, we inquire what is its genus and what its difference; so we perceive the nature of being from potency as from a genus, from act as from a difference. It is added: And every genus of being, so that the composition of act and potency may be known to be common to all categories. There is, moreover, a twofold genus of being: substantial being and accidental being; substantial being indeed consists of substantial potency and substantial act; accidental being, however, of accidental potency and accidental act. This is more fully demonstrated from what follows. ——— Page 382 ———

XI. — The fifth saying: Nothing is reduced from potency to act except by some being in act. A being in potency lacks perfection, but act is perfection. But lacking perfection cannot give

itself perfection. Therefore it cannot give itself act, or reduce itself from potency to act. It demands, therefore, another which can bestow perfection. But again that cannot bestow perfection unless it itself possesses perfection, or act in itself. Therefore a being in potency must be reduced to act by some being in act. XII. — The sixth saying: Although that which is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act is prior in potency than in act in the order of generation; nevertheless, simply speaking, act is prior to potency in reason, nature, and perfection. Proof of the I° part. Since generation proceeds from imperfect to perfect, it is necessary in the order of generation that the imperfect be prior to the perfect, as a boy is prior to a man. Moreover,

the imperfect corresponds to potency, the perfect to act. Therefore in the same subject which passes from potency to act, potency is prior to act. Proof of the II° part. 1° Act is prior in reason. That by which another is de fined is prior to it in reason, just as animal is prior to man, subject prior to accident. But potency cannot be defined except through act. Therefore act is prior to potency in reason. 2° It is prior in nature. That is said to be prior in nature, prior to another, when another depends on it in being. But potency depends on act in being, because potency does not stir itself to act, but requires another which is already in act (1). Therefore act is prior in nature. Hence unless some prior act existed, all things would have remained in potency and would remain forever (2). 3° It is prior in perfection. The end is more perfect than those things which are for the end. But act is the end of potency; for active potency is for the sake of the act of operation, and passive potency for the sake of the act of form, from which it receives its complement. Therefore act is prior to potency in the order of perfection. (1) Cf vol II, p 28, 30 (2) The primacy of act is denied by Ed. Le Rov, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, mars 1907; whose doctrines are refuted by P . GARRIOOU-LAOBAIROK, O. P ., Revue Thomiste, juillet-août 1907, pp 317, ss. ——— Page 383 ———

Act, as perfection, cannot be multiplied unless perfection is multiplied in several distinct subsistents. But this distinction cannot be made except through potency. Therefore. Proof of the minor. Distinction cannot arise from some principle which is intrinsic to the perfection of one and not to the perfection of another, because an intrinsic difference changes the species. Therefore it must be made through extrinsic receptives or subjects, just as whiteness is multiplied because it is received in several subjects. But the subject and receptive is potency. Therefore multiplication takes place through potency. Hence a corollary: Act mixed with no potency, or unreceived and non-receptive act, is unique. XVII. — The eleventh saying: Act and potency are primarily opposed. Those things are primarily opposed whose notions exclude each other. But the notion of potency

and the notion of act mutually exclude each other, for potency is determinable, perfectible, beginning; act is determining, perfecting, completion. Therefore. XVIII. — The twelfth saying: There is no middle state between potency and act. Against Leibniz and some dynamists who agree with him. By such a state a being either begins to act in some way or not at all. If it does not begin to act at all, it remains in the state of mere potency. If, however, it begins to act, there is already the beginning of act. But what is the beginning of act if not some act, at least imperfect? For the transition from potency to act, or motion, is a true act, for it is defined: the act of the existent in potency insofar as it is such, that is, the wayfaring act to a term (1). Therefore there is no middle state between potency and act, although between potency and perfect act there is an intermediate state, which is motion. XIX. — The thirteenth saying: From two beings in act one thing simply cannot be made. For since one and being are convertible, each thing is denominated one by that by which it is denominated being. But it is called being ——— Page 384 ——— by the very act of being itself. Therefore it is called one by the act of being itself. But if each of the two beings in act is a being by its own act, then that which is one is not from the act itself of both, but from the act of one only, which would be the form of the other. For matter, as potency, is informed by form, which is act. Therefore from two beings in act, one thing simply cannot be made, unless one is reduced to the nature of matter with respect to the other, which is to say, it is not in act in the same way. ——— Page 385 ———

QUESTION THREE

ARTICLE ONE — On The Notion And Properties Of Essences.

LAGRANGE, Dieu, son existence et sa nature, c. I. ——— Page 386 ——— itself, it is called: The first principle and first root of properties and actions; considered as potency with respect to its proper act, it is called: That whose act is being. Since it is that by which the question: what is the thing? is answered, it is also called quiddity; it is often called by Aristotle the what is, the what it was to be, that is, that by which each thing has to be what, to be proper and constitutive (1). It is also called form, because form generally designates that which determines and constitutes a thing in its proper species. II. — However, in composite substances, essence does not imply only form, but the composite of form and matter. The reason is that essence includes whatever is expressed in the definition. But in the definition of a composite substance, not only form but also matter is placed. Therefore the essence of a composite also implies matter itself. On the other hand, essence is not a relation between matter and form or something coming to them. For essence is first and fundamental being; but relation or something else coming to matter and form is being in a certain respect and extraneous. Wherefore essence cannot designate a relation between essence and form or something added to them. It remains, therefore, that it designates the composite of matter and form. And indeed, essence is that which has being, or that of which being is. But being is not of form alone or matter alone, but of the whole composite, as is clear from Natural Philosophy (2). Therefore in composite substances essence designates the composite of matter and form. In spiritual substances, however, which are devoid of any matter, essence is only form. III. — Essence is also called nature. It should be known, however, that this name nature is used in a fourfold sense by Boethius (3). First, it is called nature which relates commonly to all beings, as nature is defined: Everything that can be grasped by the intellect in any way. Secondly, as

it belongs to substances only, and thus nature is said to be: What can act or be acted upon. Thirdly, nature is said to be the principle of motion or rest. Fourthly, each thing informing a specific difference is called nature. Taken in the first and fourth senses, nature is convertible with essence, and signifies the essence of a thing, according as it has an order or ordination to the proper operation of the thing, since no thing is deprived of its proper operation (3). (1) On the meaning of that: what it was to be cf. Card. MENCKEN, n. 19, not.; MATTHIAS KAPPES, Aristot. lexik., p. 25. (2) I. P . Tract. II, q. 1, II, n. IV, vol. II, p. 149. (3) Cf. BONTIUS, De Persona et duabus Naturis, c. 1. P . L., LXIV, 1841-1342.
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cf. vol. II, p. 254, ss. corresponding to the divine ideas are the essences of things. These participations, however, are not by emanation, but by likeness and analogy, as has been said concerning the analogy of being (1). VI. — In what way essences are said to be eternal, necessary, immutable, indivisible. If they are considered as they are in God, they do not differ from the divine ideas; and thus they are absolutely and positively eternal, necessary, as the divine essence (2). If, however, they are considered as they exist in singular things, they participate in the conditions of those singulars, and hence it is clear that they are not eternal and necessary. If, however, it concerns spiritual creatures, even singular essences are eternal a parte post: supposing, namely, that they exist, they cannot be deprived of existence except by the absolute power of God. They are also called necessary, because, since they have in themselves no principle of corruption, they necessarily remain in being. Considered in themselves, all essences are negatively eternal, insofar as their truth prescinds from all time, and is independent of all time: it has always been true, and always will be true, that man is a rational animal. However, positive eternity, which makes an essence really exist, does not belong to them, since no created essence is due to exist from eternity. Hence they differ fundamentally from the divine essence, which is positively eternal. They are necessary in this sense, that the constitutive notes of

essences cannot be otherwise than they are: for any essence necessarily requires these essential predicates and no others, so that, given these principles, the essence is necessarily had; with them removed, it is necessarily destroyed. Thus the essence of a triangle is necessary, because a triangle cannot be conceived otherwise than as having three angles. In the same way, they are immutable, because their constitutive predicates cannot be varied unless the very notion of the essence is destroyed. (1) Supra, q. I, a. II, n. V and ss. pp. 257, ss. (2) On these St. Augustine beautifully discusses: « Therefore each thing is created by its proper reasons. But where are these reasons to be thought to exist except in the mind of the Creator?... They are not only ideas; but they themselves are true, because they are eternal, and remain such, and are unchangeable; by participation in which it happens that whatever is, is in whatever way it is. » Lib. 83 Quaest. q. 46, P . L. XL,30. ——— Page 388 ——— 2 0 2 M E T A P H Y S I C A O N T O L O G I C A , T R A C T . I . Q . I I I . Although all created essences are composite, they are nevertheless indivisible. They are composite. Every created essence consists of genus and difference; genus indeed is derived from what is more material and potential in the thing, difference from what is more formal and actual (1). Genus and difference, however, imply a plurality of elements, and therefore a certain logical composition. Therefore in every created essence there is a certain composition. Nevertheless, they are indivisible, because nothing can be added to them or subtracted from them. For essence is like a definition. But, with the smallest addition or subtraction, there is a different definition and a different nature of the species, as the Angelic Doctor observes (2). Thus sentient animate substance is only the definition of an animal; if you add rational, you constitute the species of man; if you subtract sentient, you constitute the species of a plant. By the same right, nothing can be added to essences, nothing can be subtracted from essence. Hence the saying: Species, or essences, are like numbers. If something is added or subtracted from any number, even the least, it will not be

the same number in species. The least in numbers is unity: if it is added to the ternary, a quaternary arises, which is another species of number; if it is subtracted from the same, a binary remains, which is also another species of number. And similarly in definitions and in essence. The last property of essences is knowability. VII. — On the knowability of essences. We de fine the essences of things to some extent; but whether those definitions have some objective value; whether it is possible to know essences by a proper concept? This question is connected with the most celebrated dispute concerning the existence of universals (3). For universals are the natures or essences of things; if, therefore, universals lack objective value, it is clear that definitions of essences are devoid of all force and that our knowledge of essences is purely nominal. This consequence was embraced

by the Nominalists, Locke, Hume, and in our days by Materialists and Positivists. (1) Cf. Logie., p. 61. (2) S. Thomas, VIII Metaphys., lect. 3 (3) Cf. Logie. Maj., Tract. I. VIII. — First conclusion: The essences of things are in themselves most knowable. A thing is knowable insofar as it has the notion of positive being, and ceases to be knowable insofar as it is negation and non-being. Moreover, the essences of things have the notion of positive being, since they are the intrinsic and positive principles by which being is constituted in a determinate degree. Therefore the essences of things are in themselves and ontologically most knowable. But they are not apprehended by us as they are in themselves. IX. — Second conclusion: The cognition of essences which we have in the present state is not intuitive, but deduced and imperfect. For intuitive cognition it is required that the thing be present to the intellect either through itself or through a species immediately emitted by the thing itself. But the essences of things are not present to the intellect through themselves, nor through a species immediately emitted by themselves, but only through species received from others. Therefore the cognition we have of essences is not intuitive, but deduced. Proof of the minor. That essences of things are not present in the

intellect through themselves is too clear; but that they are made present through species, not emitted by themselves, but received from others, is briefly declared. In the present state, universals and invisibles are known through sensibles and visibles. Moreover, properties and actions are more sensible and visible than the essences themselves. Therefore we know essences only through properties and actions, or through species deduced from those properties. What we first attain is operation and property; from those species we form others in which we understand the essence itself. Moreover, the species itself by which we understand operation and property is not intuitive, but abstractive; in the present life, indeed, we have no intuitive cognition, except the cognition of the senses (1). Hence, if species deduced from properties are representative of the essence, they are abstractive, a fortiori the intuitive concepts which we form in the present concerning essences cannot in any way exist. From which it follows that this cognition is imperfect. For when ——— Page 389 ———

expresses the quiddity and so belongs to the object that it can be applied to no other (2). Arg.IIIum. It is incompatible that the intellect cannot attain its formal and proper object, otherwise it would necessarily lack its own perfection. But the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of material things (1). Therefore it is incompatible that intellectual cognition does not at all attain essences of this kind. It is clear, therefore, that our cognition of essences is not nominal but scientific, just as we also know that universals are not pure names but that a true foundation on the part of reality corresponds to them. Essences therefore exhibit some objective reality, not a mere heap of properties and accidents (2). (1) Cf. vol.III, p. 114, ss. (2) More on these again below, concerning the objective value of substance, tract. III q. I, art. III, nn. VII and ss. ——— Page 390 ———

intellect did not yet exist, and they would still remain possible and true even if the human intellect were removed. « Even if the human intellect did not exist, says the Angelic Doctor, things would still be called true (3). » The opinion of Plato is refuted from what has been discussed concerning universals (4). The opinion of the Wolffians is therefore attacked. Arg. Ium. Just as all real being depends on the first efficient (1) « Although the essences of things of experience, considered under their abstract form, are the explanatory, sufficient, and necessary reason of possibles and their properties, nevertheless, in a synthetic study, which the Scholastics called regressive, it is legitimate and indispensable to connect the results of analysis to the divine essence and its necessary imitability. » CAND. MERCER, n. 27. (2) Cf. vol. III. pp. 52, 88. (3) S. THOMAS, De Verit., q. 1, a. 2. (4) Logie, p. 232. cause, so in the synthetic order all ideal being depends on the first ideal cause. But God is not only the first efficient cause, but also the first ideal cause. Therefore not only the real being of creatures, but also their ideal being depends on God. Moreover, ideal being designates essence, which is what is first conceived and understood in a thing. Therefore the essence of creatures also depends on God. The major is clear in itself. If there is some real being independent of God, God is not the first efficient cause. Therefore, by parity, if there is some ideal being independent of God, God is not the first ideal cause. Arg. IIum. If essence does not depend on God, God depends on it in knowing. But God is entirely independent both in being and in knowing. Therefore. Proof of the major. God is dependent in knowing if He perceives some truth which is outside Himself. Now, in the aforesaid hypothesis, the essences of things would be some truths outside God. Therefore God would be dependent in knowing. — Moreover, the will is proportioned to the intellect: when the intellect depends on something in knowing, the will is subjected to the same in effecting. Therefore the divine will also would depend on things in effecting. Arg. IIIum. Truth is said by order to the intellect. But in the hypothesis of God

not existing there would be no intellect: not uncreated, as is supposed; not created, because the created presupposes the uncreated. Therefore there would be no truth, nor any essence. To the point, St. Thomas: « Even if the human intellect did not exist, things would still be called true in order to the divine intellect. But, if both intellects, which is impossible, were understood to be removed, in no way would the notion of truth remain (1).»

V. — Fourth conclusion: The essence of things does not depend on the free will of God (1). If the free will of God were the foundation of essences, God could will that a triangle not have three angles; that man not be a rational animal, that two and two not be four, and innumerable similar things. But to posit this is to derogate from divine perfection; to introduce scepticism; to overturn all metaphysics. Therefore. Proof of the minor in parts. 1° It derogates from divine perfection to assert that God can will absurd and contradictory things. But in that opinion God could will absurd and contradictory things. For to will the same thing to be and not to be is absurd and contradictory. But God could will the same thing to be and not to be: man to be a rational animal, because such is supposed to be the essence of man, and on the other hand man not to be a rational animal, because, if God willed, the nature of man would be otherwise. Therefore God could will contradictory and absurd things. 2° If God can change all essences, the essence of the principle of contradiction can also be changed. But once the principle (1) Cartesianus thus summarizes his opinion: « Thus, therefore, one must not think that eternal truths depend on the human understanding or on the existence of things, but only on the will of God, who, as a sovereign legislator, has ordered and established them from all eternity. » (Eaures de DtssaTtT, édit. Coess, t. II, p. 353. — To this opinion adhered in Switzerland, CaRoLus SeoCTaT. « God is absolute liberty. Everything is possible, even contraries, to absolute liberty. » Cf. SeoCTaT, La philosophie de la liberté : L'idée, leçon XVII. ART. II. — DE ESSENTIARUM FUNDAMENTO. 301 eipio contradictionis, inducitur universalis scepticismus, et

ruit tota Metaphysica, nam principium contradictionis est primum fundamentum, quo sublato, necesse est ut caetera euneta corruant (1). 3o Metaphysicae, et generatim omnis scientiae, certitudo ex firmitate objecti originatur. Atqui objectum intellectus nostri sunt essentiae rerum. Ergo Metaphysicae et omnis scientiae cer- titudo ex firmitate et immutabilitate essentiarum pendet ; quare,si essentiae sunt ad nutum voluntatis divinae mutabiles, nutat Metaphysicae et scientiarum certitudo. Objicit Cartesius : In Deo idem est velle et cognoscere. Ergo ex hoc ipso quod Deus aliquid velit, ideo cognoscit, et ideo tantum talis res est vera. Resp. : Licet in Deo omnia attributa sint unum, ratio tamen volendi non est ratio intelligendi, et ratio voliti non est ratio cogniti, sicut, in creatis, quamvis bonum et ve- rum convertantur, voluntas tamen quae habet pro objeto bonum et intellectus qui habet pro objecto verum realit- differunt. Nullatenus ergo sequitur ut quae a divino intellectu pen- tent etiam a divina voluntate pendeant. Reponit Secretan : Deus est quod ipse vult et res sunt quod ipse vult. Nam Absolutum est causa suae existentiae, causa suae propriae legis, atque pro sua voluntate determinat mo- dum quo seipsum producit. — Quae omnia in terminis contradictionem involvunt. Causa est prius causato, producens prius producto : unde, si Absolutum seipsum produceret, esset pos- terius seipso (2). VI. — Quinta conclusio : Proprie loquendo, essentiae rerum ... pendent formaliter et immediate ab intellectu divino ; remote et ultimo ab essentia divina. Prob. I« pars, quae est praecedentium conclusionum sequela. Esse quod habent essentiae et possibilia est esse ideale ; et, quia omne esse ideale originatur a prima causa ideali, hujus- (1) Cf. Legie. pp. 335, ss. (2) « To be the cause of one's own existence! To produce oneself! But to be cause, one must exist. The being who would be the cause of his existence would have to exist to produce his existence! The being supposed to produce himself does not exist, since he is capable of exerting a productive action. The contradiction is flagrant. » CaTd. Mxctca, n 92. ——— Page 393 ———

fiunt vel fieri possunt. Ergo Deus habet in suo intellectu essen- tias, ac proinde essentiae ab intellectu divino dependent. Prob. II pars. Essentiae non habent rationem cognoscibi- litatis nisi rationem entitatis prae se ferant. Atqui fons et ple- nitudo totius entitatis est essentia divina. Ergo essentiae rerum non habent rationem cognoscibilitatis nisi aliquid de essentia divina partieipent, et consequenter intellectus divinus non potest illas cognoscere nisi prius cognoscat essentiam divinam ut principium entitatis et cognoscibilitatis illarum. At si es- sentiae rerum cognoscuntur in essentia et per essentiam De pendent radicaliter ab illa. Ergo. Res ita concipienda est : Deus essentiam suam perfecte in- tuetur ; unde illam cognoscit secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est. Sed essentia divina est cognoscibilis non so- lum secundum quod est in se, at etiam secundum omnes modos quibus participari potest a creaturis. Ergo Deus ex cognitione suae essentiae cognoscit omnes imitationes et participationes a creaturis. Hujusmodi porro imitationes et participationes sunt essentiae creaturarum. Ergo ex cognitione suae essentiae Deus omnes essentias cognoscit (1).

ARTICLE THREE.

On The Distinction Between Essence And Existence.

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potency and real act. III. — The opinion for a real distinction is cited by some from Aristotle (2 Post. Analyt. text. 7): Being, however, is the substance of nothing, as is clear. The meaning is: existence is convertible with the substance, or essence, of no creature. These words, however, can be understood of some logical distinction. The doctrine of real distinction, however, is not clearly manifested except among Christians, almost as a consequence of the dogma of creation (2). Boethius is cited, whose opinion St. Thomas explains (3). B. Albert, the Angelic Doctor, Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Cajetan, Bannez, and commonly the Thomists advocate a real distinction. Among the Jesuit philosophers, the following adhere to this

opinion: Fonseca, Conimbricenses, Pallavicini, Sylvester Maurus, and in our time, among others, Liberatore, Cornoldi, Schiffini, De Maria, Ludovicus de San, Remer, Billot. (1) « This question of the real distinction of existence and essence is of the highest importance; in a certain sense, all metaphysics depends on it... It is like the central point of all metaphysics, I would almost say the stamp of its orthodoxy and the only means of exactly solving all the problems raised, when, without being satisfied, as is too often done nowadays, with examining facts at the surface, one wants to penetrate into their depth. » DOMIN DE VONNES, Abrégé de Métaphysique, t. II, p. 2, 4. (2) « The thesis which occupies us is certainly of Christian origin; it is a philosophical application of the dogma of creation. » IDEM, p.5. (3) Cf. De l'hebdomad., lect. 2 : Boethius's words are these: « It is different that which is from being. » Hebdom. I. The school of St. Thomas is well served in this point as in others by Sanseverino, Card. Pecci, Farges, Card. Mercier, Card.Lorenzelli, Domet de Vorges, Gredt, etc. The negative opinion is embraced by Alexander Halensis, Aureolus, Henry of Ghent, Durandus, Gabriel Biel, Suarez, Vasquez, Hurtadus, Arriaga, Oviedo, Tongiorgi, Franzelin, Pesch, Delmas, Kuntz, Palmieri. To these many moderns, generally all Cartesians, adhere. The third opinion is that of Scotus, who invented a distinction between essence and existence intermediate between strict real distinction and mere rational distinction, which he calls formal actual from the nature of the thing. IV. — The mind of the Angelic Doctor is most certain. Some have wished to doubt the mind of the Angelic Doctor. But this distinction is so fundamental in the teaching of Aquinas that he places in it the very distinction between God and creatures. Of God he says: « Since in God there is nothing potential, it follows that in Him essence is not other than His being. His essence, therefore, is His being (1). » Of creatures, however: « But because created form thus subsisting has being and is not its own being, it is necessary that its being be received and contracted to a determinate nature (2). » But if the Angelic Doctor intended a mere rational

distinction, the argument would be of no force, since even in God a rational distinction between essence and existence is placed. But, omitting other citations (3), it suffices to adduce two testimonies which make the matter entirely clear. — Comm. on the book of Boethius (4) on the Hebdomads: « It must be considered, therefore, that, as being and that which is differ in simple things according to intention, so in composite things they differ really (5). » — And what is to be understood by the name of simple being, he explains, adding: « This (1) I. P . q. 3, a. 4. (2) I. P . q. 7, a. 2. (3) Cf. I Sent., dist. 19, q. 2, a. 2 ; II Cont. Geni., c. 52 ; De Ente et Etencias, c. 5, q. 7. De Poten. a. 4. (4) Lect. 2. (5) Even in places where the word really is not written, P . TERNEREN, S. J., observes many things by which this distinction is more clearly signified than by the name itself. Cf. P . TERNEREN, De Unione hypostatica, p. 31. ——— Page 396 ———

further act. But existence is not ordered nor can it be ordered to a further act, since it is said and is the ultimate act, the ultimate actuality of every form. Therefore existence would be non- receptive act. It cannot be replied that created existence, although it is not an act received in another, is nevertheless an act received from another, and therefore is not pure act. For some act cannot be received from another unless in its concept it implies limitation and imperfection; but an act is limited either because it is received in another or because it receives another. Wherefore an act which is neither received between essence and existence begin by positing as an indisputable principle that the real essence of a being is real only through its existence. Evidently one must conclude to the identity of existence and essence. But, instead of starting from this assertion as from an indubitable axiom, they should prove it; and they do not think of it; all their arguments are therefore reduced to a vast petition of principle. » ——— Page 397 ———

being; for I can understand what a man or phoenix is, and yet be ignorant whether it has being in the nature of things. Therefore it is clear that being is other than essence or

quiddity, unless perhaps there is some thing whose quiddity is its being, and this thing can only be one and first (2). » Many indirect arguments could be adduced. Thus in the natural composite, essentially diverse parts, namely matter and form, are actuated by a single existence; in the human composite, entirely distinct parts, soul and body, have a single existence; many faculties coexist in the same soul. If, therefore, essence is multiple, or many parts of essence, and yet existence is simple and unique, a real distinction between essence and existence must intervene. Many other conclusions, whether philosophical or theological, rest so much on this principle that it can be called the fundamental truth of Christian philosophy (4). VI. — Di fficulties are solved. 1° Actual essence is not a mere possible being but an actual being. But actual being exists. (1) Cf. S. THOMAS, II. Cont. Gent., c. 52 ; Card. LORENZELL, pp. 268- 169. (2) S. THOMAS, De Ente Eesentia, c. 5. (3) On these indirect arguments one may consult Card. MERCER, n. 49. (4) Cf. P . DEI. PRADO, O. P ., De Veritate fundamentalii philosophiae christianae, Placentia, 1899. ——— Page 398 ———

ARTICLE FOUR

accident. Nevertheless, the existence of substance is not properly an accident, either predicamental or predicable. Proof. Existence is the ultimate complement, the ultimate 1) Dn M a n A . C n e l . T r a c t . I I . q . I I . a . I I . (2) Qq Disp - E Potent. q. 5. a. 4. ad. 3. ART. IV. — EXPLANATUR QUÆDAM CIRCA ESSENT. ET EXIST.317 actuality of substance, or of the being to which being in itself belongs. But the ultimate actuality of a being in itself cannot be a predicamental accident, or a being in another. Therefore the existence of substance cannot be a predicamental accident. Accident, whether predicamental or predicable, perfects substance with a perfection extraneous to its nature: thus clothing, knowledge, perfect a man in something extraneous to the nature of man. But existence perfects a thing, not in some extraneous genus, but in its own nature, in the very genus of substance. Therefore the existence of substance is neither a predicamental nor a predicable accident properly speaking (1). In a broad sense, however, and by a certain likeness, it can be called a predicable accident. Whatever is not a part of essence can be called an accident. Existence is not a part of essence. Therefore it can be called an accident: not indeed a predicamental one, since it is itself a substantial act, but a predicable one in a broad sense. More correctly speaking, however, existence could be called a quasi-property. For a property is that which, although distinct from essence, is constituted by the principles of essence. But existence, although distinct from essence, is quasi-constituted by the principles of essence; for from the principles of essence it arises that existence is a substantial or accidental act. Therefore existence is a quasi-property. In short: since potency and act are in the same genus, the existence of substance is a substantial act, just as substance itself is substantial potency; the existence of accident, however, is an accidental act, just as the essence of accident itself is accidental potency; nevertheless, existence itself is not directly in the predicament of substance or accident. Being is not properly said to be reduced to a predicament, as

Bannez acutely observes, but rather to be participated in and limited by every predicament and every genus and predicamental difference, just as being is not reduced to a predicament, but is divided into ten predicaments through the diverse modes in which it is participated and limited (2). (1) « Some authors of our opinion have wanted to conclude that being must be considered as a simple accident. All the great scholastics reject this consequence. » DOMET DE VORONS, Abrégé de Métaphysique, t. II, p. 20. (2) Cf. BANNER, Comm. in I. P . q. 3, a. 4. ——— Page 401 ———

more perfect than essence. That is simply more perfect by which a thing is said to be simply a being. But a thing is said to be simply a being by existence: for essence without being is only a being in potency, but when it has being it is a being simply. Therefore existence is simply more perfect than essence. Moreover, being is the ultimate actuality of all perfections and of all forms; being is not perfected by its conjunction with essence, but rather perfects essence. Hence it relates to essence as perfective to perfectible. In being itself all perfections are understood. Thus what is most powerful in God is not understood as life, wisdom, etc., but that He is subsisting being itself, in which other perfections are comprehended. Therefore being is simply more perfect. — Hence it is that all things most desire being as the best of all. In a certain respect, however, essence is more perfect than being, because it limits and contracts being; hence existence relates to essence as limitable and determinable to limiting and determining. Moreover, the determining is more perfect than the determinable. Moreover, although being is not perfected simply by essence, but perfects it, supposing however that it is received in essence, it is perfected in a certain respect, insofar as it is received in a nobler essence: thus it is more perfect in a living thing than in a mineral, in an angel than in a man (1).

in itself before it is productive of its like, just as fire is first hot in itself before it is heating. Therefore something must first be in itself before it is productive of being in another. Moreover, each thing is said to be of such a nature

from its proper form which belongs to it per se. Hence, for something to be per se causative of its like, it must have that from its proper form, or nature; and, consequently, for something to be per se causative of existence, it must have existence from itself and from its proper nature. Since, therefore, God alone is His being by essence, He alone is the one who produces being. Thus, being is the proper effect of God, which can indeed be taken in a threefold sense: 1° that being is the per se first effect depending on God alone; 2° that being is the formal and adequate object of God alone, for God alone is the cause of every being participating in being or pertaining to the being of a thing; 3° that God alone produces being insofar as it is being and being without any limitation (1). (1) Cf. BANKEK, loc cit.

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SECOND TREATISE. DIFFERENT GIFTS AND WITH DIVERSE FUNCTIONS: ONE, ESSENCE, REFERRING TO

QUESTION ONE.

If, however, the mode of being is taken in the other way, namely according to the order of one to another, this can be in two ways: one according to the division of one from another, and this is expressed by the name something, as if another what. One and something differ in this, that one says undivided being in itself, something says being divided from others. The other way according to the agreement of one being with another, and this indeed cannot be, unless something is taken which is apt to agree with every being. This, however, is the soul, which in a certain way becomes all things, as the Philosopher says. In the soul, however, are cognitive and appetitive powers. The agreement of being to appetite is expressed by the name good; for good is what all things desire. The agreement of being to intellect, however, is expressed by the name truth. Under this respect there are also three transcendentals: something, truth, good. Concerning thing and being, enough has been said in the preceding Treatise (1). Since, however, something is reduced to one, it remains to speak of one, truth, and good. Although there are six words, in practice only four transcendentals are enumerated; for thing and being, one and something are used promiscuously. Being is exhibited as some subject of which the others are predicated; hence it is asked whether the other three, namely one, truth, good are properties of being. 11. — First conclusion: One, truth, good are properties of being transcendentally. Proof. That is called a property of something which emanates from it and is predicated of it in what kind necessarily (2). But one, truth, good emanate from being and are predicated of it in what kind necessarily. Therefore they are properties of being. The major is the notion of property; proof of the

minor. 1« One, truth, good emanate from being. Something is said to emanate from some essence insofar as it supposes this essence previously constituted; thus visibility emanates from man because the essence of man is presupposed to the concept of visibility and is pre-understood as already constituted. But the notion of being virtually and, in our mode of understanding, is presupposed to the objective concept of one, truth, ——— Page 405 ——— 326 ONTOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS, TRACT. II. Q. I. boni, praesupponitur; non enim unum, verum, bonum intel- ligeremus nisi rationem entis jam constitutum exhiberent, quia praeter ens est nihilum, et nihilum mente concipi nullatenus potest. Ergo unitas, veritas, bonitas ab ente tanquam ab essen- tia dimanare censentur. 2° Praedicantur in quale. Quod non dicit ipsam essentiam, sed ab essentia jam constituta dimanat, non praedicatur directe in quid, sed potius in quale. Atqui unum, verum, bo- num, juxta nostrum intelligendi modum, dimanant ab essen- tia jam constituta, ut modo diximus. Ergo, juxta nostrum in- telligendi modum, non praedicantur directe et immediate in quid, sed potius in quale. 3° in quale necessario, nam unitas, veritas, bonitas ab ente inseparabiles sunt, siquidem cum ente materialer ec -ertun- - , ut in sequentibus ostendemus. rather than some reality superadded to the essence itself, such as intellect, will, etc. But the properties of being flow from it not by physical emanation, but according to our mode of understanding; nor are they some reality superadded to being itself, since it is impossible to add anything to being which is not being itself. Therefore those properties are not properties of a thing, or physical. They are, however, demonstrable properties. The subject of every science has demonstrable passions, or properties, for what every science especially intends is to demonstrate properties of the subject, through the definition of the subject or property or passion (1). But the subject of metaphysical science is being, whose properties are one, truth, good. Therefore one, truth, good are demonstrable properties of being. III. — Objections: It is of the nature of a property that it be really distinguished from its subject. But one, truth, good are not

really distinguished from being. Therefore they are not properties of being. Resp. : Distinguish the major: It is of the nature of a predicamental property to be really distinguished from the subject, I grant; of the nature of a property most commonly taken, as it abstracts from predicamental and transcendental, I deny. Distinguish the consequence: They are not predicamental properties, I grant; transcendent, I deny. A predicamental property is indeed an accident really distinct from substance; but in the concept of a property most commonly taken is included only that it emanates from essence and is predicated of it in what kind necessarily, according to our mode of understanding. That

this belongs to one, truth, good, we have shown. They are therefore properties of being, not predicamental, but transcendental. This will be more clear from the following conclusion. IV. — Second conclusion: The properties of being are not properties of a thing, or physical, but demonstrable properties. Proof. Properties of a thing, or physical, are those which flow from essence by real and physical emanation as V. — Transcendent properties add something to being, which is not really distinguished from it, but as explicit from implicit. So the Thomists commonly, against many Scotists, who thought that one, truth, good add a positive entity. Proof of the conclusion. What is not a mere synonym of something adds something to it. But those three properties of being are not a mere synonym of it; for when it is said: Being is one, is true, is good, it is not intended: Being is being, which would be a nugatory statement, but some true predicate belonging to it and somewhat distinct from it is signified. Therefore the properties add something to being. Not, however, a real entity really discrete from it; for who can conceive a positive entity which is something (1) Cf. Logic., De praecognitionibus et praecognitis, pp. 388, ss. — The ancient scholastics use the word passion rather than property; a passion implies a subject prior to itself from which it arises and which it always accompanies. In this way, the passions of being presuppose being constituted,

emanate from it and necessarily accompany it. Attributes are not infrequently used in this signification. However, attribute and property are not entirely convertible; attribute has rather a logical respect and is taken for a predicate attributed to a subject; moreover, an attribute is said to be, even if it adds nothing, but a physical property adds something to a subject; hence divine attributes are called, not divine properties. ——— Page 406 ———

ART. VIII. — ON THE BEAUTIFUL.

« If one wants to a ffirm that a thing exists, one says: it is a fact. The existence of the Church is

a fact, we ourselves have said above: the fact of existence. It is the fashionable term for indicating something real and positive (1). » In some way, therefore, it approaches the transcendentals; however, it is not properly one of the transcendentals. For fact implies that which has a cause; transcendentals, however, prescind from cause and effect. Moreover, fact is not properly said except of things which are manifested sufficiently directly by sensible experience; hence the existence of God is not called a fact; transcendentals, on the contrary, are predicated of every thing, even entirely immaterial or abstract (2). (1) DOMER DE VOSQUS, op. cit., p. 36. (2) « One will not regularly say that the existence of God is a fact. This word therefore has a psychological rather than metaphysical value. It is relative to the manner in which the thing is known to us. The same applies to the word phenomenon brought into fashion by the Scottish school, which indicates actions and qualities by which substances manifest themselves to us. » Ibid. ——— Page 407 ——— 1. — The notion of unity. Unity in the abstract is the notion by which a thing is constituted undivided in itself and divided from any other, or is the indivision of a thing in itself and division from any other. One in the concrete is said to be that which is undivided in itself and divided from any other. Two things are primarily in the concept of one: being and the negation of division. One does not signify only negation. For one is a transcendental property of being. But a property of being

must imply in the direct notion something positive like being itself. On the other hand, it does not exhibit being only, otherwise it would not differ at all from it, and hence mere synonymy and tautology would be introduced. It adds, therefore, something; not something real, which is impossible, but something of reason. Moreover, a being of reason is relation or negation (2). Now one does not imply relation, but follows being absolutely in itself. It remains, therefore, that one adds above being a certain negation, that is, the negation of division. Wherefore one signifies principally, and directly, being; less principally and indirectly, the negation of division; for a quality of being must exhibit principally something positive like that of which it is a property. Moreover, one implies division from another. By the very fact that being is itself, it necessarily follows that it is not another, but is discrete from another. Hence, even before the creation of the world, God was divided from other beings, not indeed as actually existing, but as future or possible. The divine I. — The notion of unity. Unity in the abstract is the notion by which a thing is constituted undivided in itself and divided from any other, or is the indivision of a thing in itself and division from any other. One in the concrete is said to be that which is undivided in itself and divided from any other. Two things are primarily in the concept of one: being and the negation of division. One does not signify only negation. For one is a transcendental property of being. But a property of being must imply in the direct notion something positive like being itself. On the other hand, it does not exhibit being only, otherwise it would not differ at all from it, and hence mere synonymy and tautology would be introduced. It adds, therefore, something; not something real, which is impossible, but something of reason. Being of reason, however, is relation or negation (2). Now one does not imply relation, but follows being absolutely in itself. It remains, therefore, that one adds above being a certain negation, that is, the negation of division. Wherefore one signifies principally, and directly, being; less principally and indirectly, the negation of division; for a quality of being

must exhibit principally something positive like that of which it is a property. Moreover, one implies division from another. By the very fact that being is itself, it necessarily follows that it is not another, but is discrete from another. Hence, even before the creation of the world, God was divided from other beings, not indeed as actually existing, but as future or possible. The divine (1) Cf. AARSTOR. V. Metaphys. text. 7-12.; S. THOMAS, 1. 7 et 8 in V. Meapphys. et 1. 4, in X Metaphys. / 1. P ., q. 11 i. Sent., dist. 24 ; Cont. Gent., c. 53 ; De Verit. q. 8 ; SCOTUS, 11. Sent.; CAJETANUS, BANNES, PBOUNS, in I. P . q. 11 ; SUAREN, disp. 4 ; and authors already a. 1. cited.

(2) Cf. Tract. I. q. I, a. I, n. IX. Above, p. 251. essence was certainly discrete from the essence of man and the essence of an angel, although neither angel nor man yet existed. Three things, therefore, are included in the notion of perfect one: being, the negation of division from itself, division from any other. However, being reduplicatively as divided from others is strictly called something, as we have already noted. II. — On the formal notion of one. Suarez seems to think that one adds nothing positive to being, either in reality or different in reason; the Scotists contend that it adds a positively distinct formality; or a relation of identity. The Thomists, however, more commonly teach that the transcendental one by its proper addition adds to being only the negation of division; but by improper addition and as to the explicit it adds something positive, namely being itself, not materially taken, but insofar as it grounds the negation of division in itself. Against the Scotistic opinion, it suffices to note this: If one added a positive perfection to being, this would also be being, and therefore would imply a new positive perfection, and hence an infinite process (1). Moreover, if one were a formality distinct from being as excluding from excluded, it would not be formally being, since it would formally exclude it. One also does not consist formally in the relation of identity, because identity is posterior to unity and supposes it: for the same things are those whose substance is one. But one by its proper addition adds real negation. For unity is indivision. But indivision is

real negation, or privation of division. Therefore it adds real negation of division. By improper addition, however, it adds something positive, namely being itself as undivided. « One, says the Angelic Doctor, does not signify pure negation but being itself undivided, and therefore one and being are convertible (2). » — « One according to itself relates more to position (1) « The unity of this superadded being would in turn imply a new positive perfection, therefore a new being, grafting itself onto the previous one, and we would thus proceed to infinity, accumulating perfection upon perfection to explain the unity of a first subject. » Card. MENCKRS, n. 63. (2) L. 4. in X Metaphys. ——— Page 408 ———

Although this is not principally signified, it nonetheless necessarily enters into the concept of one, which is defined: Undivided being in itself. But the negation of component parts does not pertain to one, otherwise composite beings would lack transcendental unity. The negation of division into several selves does not pertain to one, for a man would be one transcendentally, even if he were divided into several selves. Nor does the negation of division into essential parts pertain to one, for if a composite is divided into essential parts, each retains transcendental unity. Therefore one can admit in itself many distinct things, whether they are physical parts, such as matter and form, and thus we have proved in Natural Philosophy that a composite is one, although it coalesces from really distinct matter and form; or metaphysical parts, such as essence and existence, and thus above we have shown that being is one, although essence and existence are distinguished; or accidental parts, and thus in Psychology we have proved that the soul is one, although faculties are distinguished from it (1). But what one cannot admit in itself is another suppositum, because another and another suppositum make another and another individual. The negation of identity with another, or division from another, necessarily accompanies one; for, if being is itself, it is necessarily not another. However, this negation does not properly say one, but implies something pertaining to multitude; for, the division of one from another being understood, multitude is

immediately implied. IV. — The negation of division which one implies is not a negation simply, nor a privation simply, but has the mode of privation. The Angelic Doctor explains the matter thus: « This privation is intermediate between true privation and simple negation, having something common with both: with true privation indeed in this, that it is a privation in some subject, hence it does not belong (1) On this matter one may consult Card. Mencken, who establishes and proves three theses: « First thesis: the metaphysical composition of a being is reconciled with its essential unity... Second thesis: the physical composition of beings is not incompatible with their substantial unity... Third thesis: the accidental composition of several substances does not follow their respective unity. » Ontol., nn. 79, ss. — Cf. what we will discuss below a. III, On the things opposed to one, and q. II, a. V. On simple and composite being. ——— Page 409 ———

parts of a thing are placed reductively in the predicament of the whole thing. Therefore, since unity is the principle of quantity, it is placed reductively in the predicament of quantity. Transcendental unity, however, cannot be placed even reductively in a predicament, since it exceeds all categories. 4° Transcendental unity belongs to all things; numerical unity belongs only to quantitative things, in which number can be; in others, however, there is multitude, not number, as will be explained a. III, n. I (1). VII. — Transcendental one is convertible with being, or, in other words, any thing is one by its entity. Proof. Any thing by its entity is either simple or composite. — If it is simple, it is without division both in act and potency. But lack of division is unity. Therefore it is one by its entity. If it is composite, it includes a multitude of parts. But the multitude of parts is nothing other than several unities joined together and constituting some whole; for a composite does not have being unless its parts are divided, but after they constitute and compose the composite itself. Therefore any being, whether simple or composite, is one by its entity. Moreover, if a thing were not one by its entity, but by something else, this again would have to be one by

something else, and hence there would be an infinite process, which is impossible. Therefore it is incompatible for a being not to be one by its entity. Moreover, its entity is through being itself, as is clear. Therefore it is one through itself, and hence one and being are convertible. There is therefore an adequation and conversion between being and one, and « hence it is that each thing, as it preserves its being, so it preserves its unity (2). » VIII. — Division of unity. Because one is convertible with being, according as being is said in different ways, one is said in different ways. Moreover, being is sometimes per se, sometimes per accidens, (1) This distinction was not understood by Balmbs, who incautiously writes: « One cannot conclude, however, that unity identified with being is distinguished from unity which engenders number. All beings, one in themselves, but distinct from each other, whatever they are, can be conceived under the idea of number. » Philos. fondam. liv.VI, c. 2. — Which opinion had already been excellently refuted by S. Thomas, IV Metaphys., lect. 2. (2) S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 11. a. 1. ——— Page 410 ———

(1) That unity of composition is fivefold: essential, entitative, integral, accidental, and numerical. Cf. vol. II, p. 13. Entitative composition, however, belongs to every created being, even the simple, such as an angel. (2) S. Thomas, II Cont. Gent., c. 56. (3) Cf. vol. II, pp. 236, 58. properly defined except the species, since every definition consists of genus and difference (1). One in genus are those which have one mode of predication, that is, agree in some one thing apt to be predicated of many in what incompletely. One in analogy, however, are those whose notion is neither simply the same nor simply diverse, but to such an extent that a certain proportion and relation exists between them, as has been said concerning analogy of proportion and proportionality (2). Hence Socrates is in himself one in number; Socrates and Plato are one in species; man and animal are one in genus; the health of food and the health of an animal are one in analogy. Unity of species is formal unity insofar as it implies indivision of essence, to which nothing can be added and from which

nothing can be subtracted; individual unity is material unity. Formal unity and multiplication arise from form; the first principle of material unity and multiplication, however, is signate matter. One per accidens can be considered in operating and in being. Unity of several in operating is called dynamic; and if indeed it exists among several natural agents, it is called physical dynamic; if it exists among several free agents, as among several citizens, it is called moral dynamic. One per accidens in being is distinguished in four ways: natural, artificial, moral, of aggregation. Natural, when things of different genera, e.g., man and whiteness, are joined by nature under one undivided being. Hence a white man is a natural per accidens unity. Artificial, when diverse things are joined by the operation of art into one being; thus is a house. Moral, when several are joined by reason of a common end, such as a family, a state. Of aggregation, when several things are joined by chance into some accidental being, such as a pile of stones. Another way of distinguishing one per se and one per accidens is proposed by the illustrious Domet de Vorges. With formal unity, one per se is a being in itself comprising all the necessary elements of its essence, and one per accidens will be a nature conceived with ——— Page 411 ———

which belongs to an entirely immutable being, such as God; physical is had when the physical reality of a being, such as essence, remains without any change, of which kind are angels, the human soul; moral, when physical reality, although it changes in itself, nevertheless persists the same in common estimation, because the change takes place gradually and imperceptibly. Of this kind is the identity of our body throughout the course of life. In the strict sense, identity implies individual unity, or says something one in number; in a broader sense, however, it is the union of several agreeing in the nature of genus or species. In this way, the nature of Peter and Paul is said to be the same. The same are said to be those which agree in substance; similar those which agree in quality; equal those which agree in quantity; or, as the Angelic Doctor says, the same is one in substance, equal one in quantity, similar one in quality (1).

These words, however, are not used so strictly in practice. In a less strict sense, similar are said to be those which agree either in nature or in quality; hence an agent is said to act similarly to itself whether it produces an accident or a substance. Wherefore similarity commonly taken is considered according to agreement, or communication in form (2). There is, however, a threefold communication in form and therefore a threefold similarity. 1° Some communicate in form according to the same notion and according to the same mode; thus two equally white things agree in the form of whiteness by the same notion and the same mode; this is the most perfect similarity, hence these are not only called similar, but equal in their similarity. 2° Some communicate in the same form according to the same notion, but not according to the same mode, as two unequally white things; but this is not had except in accidental forms, for substantial forms do not admit of more and less. 3° Some communicate in the same form but not according to the same notion, as happens in non-univocal agents with respect to their proper effects. Thus the form of a house agrees with the form which is in the mind of the artificer, but in such a way that the form of the house is not of the same notion as the form which is in the mind of the artificer. In this way all creatures are said to be similar to God. 1) Cf. Abrdgid de Metaphysique, I. pp. 51-52. (2) « This is the true practical unity. » Ibidem. (3) Logic., pp. 239 and ss. (1) IV Metaphys., lect. 2. (2) Cf. S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 4, a. 2. ——— Page 412 ———

ARTICLE THREE — On The Things Opposed To One.

(3) Those who seek a longer exposition may consult Card. Mercier, nn. 83 (4) Cf. S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 11, a. 2. contrarily. Contrary opposition, indeed, is between two things which imply something positive. But one and many imply something positive; for one does not signify pure privation, but something positive, namely being itself undivided. Therefore one and many, although they are opposed by way of privation, are not however opposed according to pure privation and habit, but as contraries (X Metaph. lect. 4°). The II° part is declared. Predicamental one, which is the principle of number, is opposed to number as measure to measured, since number is defined: Multitude measured by one. But measure and measured are opposed relatively. Therefore predicamental one and number are opposed relatively. V. — One is not directly opposed to multitude itself, but rather to the division which is found in it. « One, says the Angelic Doctor, is not the remover of multitude, but of division, which is prior in reason than one or multitude (1). « That which is directly opposed to unity is that by reason of which unity is dissolved. But that by reason of which unity is dissolved is division, not multitude. Therefore what is directly opposed to one is not properly multitude, but division, which is found in multitude. Proof of the minor. Given division, unity, which is indivision itself, is immediately dissolved; given multitude, however, unity is not dissolved unless division is also introduced: for given many palms in the same continuous thing, one continuum remains, unless they are divided. V. — One taken materially is not opposed to multitude. One taken materially designates positive entity itself. This entity, however, constitutes multitude. Moreover, nothing is constituted from its contrary. Therefore one taken materially, by reason of its positive entity, is not opposed to multitude. Therefore opposition between unity and multitude is considered only with respect to essence, or the formal notion of unity, and division, which is in multitude. VI. — Multitude is founded in unity and is itself posterior, both in knowing and in being. Proof of the I° part. (1) I. P ., q. 30, a. 3, a d 3. ——— Page

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inequality, difference. Those which are not one in substance are called diverse, just as those which are one in substance are called the same; those which are not one in quality are called dissimilar; those which are not one in quantity are called unequal. Diverse extends more broadly than different. For difference, besides the fact that they differ, must have something the same in which they agree. Hence difference implies two things: 1° that those which differ agree in some univocal predicate; 2° that they are separated from each other by formal differences. Thus man and brute agree in some univocal predicate and are separated by rationality and irrationality; and therefore they are truly different. Plant and animal agree in some univocal thing and on the other hand are separated by sensibility and insensibility, hence they are called different. Those, however, which agree in no univocal predicate are simply diverse: thus God and creature do not properly differ, but are diverse; likewise substance and accident. Distinction is sometimes taken in a stricter sense, for lack of identity between two individuals, and thus there is a threefold degree: Those which are not one in genus are called diverse; those which are not one in species are called different; those which are not one in number are distinct. In the present context, however, distinction is taken in a general sense, and whatever are not the same are called distinct, whether they are diverse or different. VIII. — Real and logical distinction. Distinction, as has been said, implies a certain plurality. If this plurality is in things independently of the mind's concept, a real distinction is introduced; if, however, it is had only in our concepts, it is a distinction of reason, or logical. Real distinction supposes real composition in a being; logical distinction, however, can be conceived in the simplest being. Indeed, the simpler and more perfect something is, the more foundations for logical distinctions it provides. For a being of this kind, remaining in itself most simple, is equivalent to innumerable really distinct beings; and hence it provides a foundation for innumerable distinctions. Real distinction is twofold:

greater, or entitative, which exists between thing and thing, as between man and garment; lesser, or modal, which is between a thing and a mode, as between a curved line and the curvature of the line. For it is divided into adequate and inadequate, according as the extremes do not include each other at all, as ——— Page 415 ———

is divided, however, into (1) « There is, for example, a complete virtual distinction between the concepts of vegetative soul and intellective soul, by means of which we can represent the human soul. Not only, indeed, is the formal term of these two concepts composed of expressly different notes, which is the minimum required for a virtual distinction, but, in addition, each of them can exist separately in nature. Vegetative life is realizable in beings which do not have intelligence, and existence can exist in outside organized subjects. » Card. Mira- cien, n. 77. virtual intrinsic and virtual extrinsic. It is called intrinsic virtual, when the diverse formalities of a thing, even if not really prescinded, achieve the same as formalities really prescinded; because they are equivalent to them. It is called extrinsic virtual, when the distinction does not affect the thing itself intrinsically, but only dominatively and in concept. IX. — A distinction of reason su ffices to remove contradiction. Contradiction is introduced through simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same thing. Affirmation and negation, however, exist only in the intellect, for they are divisive differences of propositions, which are not in things, but are produced by the intellect. Therefore, to verify affirmation and negation simultaneously of something, plurality in the intellect suffices. Moreover, where there is a distinction of reason, there is plurality in the intellect. Therefore a distinction of reason suffices to remove contradiction, so that affirmation and negation of the same thing can be verified without contradiction. X. — Whether a distinction of reason supposes a real distinction. Distinction can be considered on the part of the object and on the part of the subject, or intellect. Hence it must be answered: 1° Sometimes a distinction of reason supposes a real distinction on the part of the object. The distinction of

white Peter from himself as black is a distinction of reason; but this implies a real distinction, namely the distinction of accident from substance, or whiteness from Peter. This example shows that a logical distinction sometimes supposes a real distinction also on the part of the object. 2° A distinction of reason always supposes a real distinction on the part of the subject. Concepts of reason, indeed, can be considered in three ways: 1° as signifying the same object, as when it is said: man is man; 2° as one adds something to another, as man and animal; 3° as they are of simply diverse notions, as animal and rational. Moreover, in this threefold case, concepts are subjectively diverse: for the concept of rational in my intellect is numerically distinct from the concept of animal; indeed, even in the first case: man is man, there are two concepts, one of which is the subject, the other the predicate. Therefore they are numerically distinct, and consequently are really distinguished on the part of the subject, ——— Page 416 ——— 348 ONTOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS TRACT. II. Q. I. 349 quatenus sunt duae ideae, seu duo accidentia numero distincta. 3e Distinction rationis major, quamvis non semper supponat distinctionem realem, ex parte objecti, subaudit tamen in ob- jecto fundamentum reale distinctionis. Probatur. Adest in objecto reale distinctionis fundamentum, quando objectum aequivalet pluribus realiter distinctis. Sed objectum in distinctione majori aequivalet pluribus realiter distinctis : sic homo aequivalet animali et rationali ; et, quam- vis haec sint unum physice, viget verum fundamentum conci- piendi illa ut distincta, adeo ut intelligatur unum altero non intellecto. Ergo distinctione major supponit in objecto reale dis- tinctionis fundamentum. XII. — Whether falsehood can underlie a logical distinction. The act of distinction, or precision or abstraction, is reduced to simple apprehension. But falsehood cannot underlie simple apprehension. Therefore. — The major is declared. By precision, or distinction of reasoned reason, one and the same thing is considered separately from another, but the mind abstains from all judgment; it neither affirms nor denies the note which it considers separately to be in fact

separate. Therefore falsity or truth does not underlie logical distinction, unless perhaps per accidens, as has been said in Logic, concerning simple apprehension (1). From these is understood the saying: There is no falsehood in prescinding or abstracting, that is, error cannot underlie precision or abstraction, because they are acts of simple apprehension (2). XI. — What are the foundations of logical distinctions. These foundations are considered on the part of the intellect and on the part of the object. On the part of the intellect is its imperfection. For since our mind does not apprehend things

intuitively, but through diverse motions, namely composing, dividing, reasoning, it needs several and distinct concepts to know what is truly one and undivided. However, the more perfect the intellect, the fewer concepts it needs, because it comprehends more in one (1). On the part of the object, sometimes its imperfection, because the thing exhibits two things which relate to each other as imperfect to perfect, potency to act, as in man animality to rationality. Hence the necessity of distinguishing genus and difference. But more commonly, the foundation of distinction is the perfection of the object, insofar as either one essence is equivalent to many really distinct things, as the human soul is equivalent to vegetative and sensitive forms; or one cause produces effects which proceed from distinct causes, etc. (1) This also holds for angels: « The higher the angel, the fewer species it will need to apprehend the universality of intelligibles; and therefore its forms must be more universal, as if each extends to more things. » S. Thomas, I. P ., q. 55, a. 3. XIII. — The Scotistic distinction (3). The Scotists thought there is a distinction intermediate between real and rational distinction, namely a formal actual distinction from the nature of the thing. This is said to exist, not between two things, but between two formalities, e.g., between animality and rationality. It is from the nature of the thing, because actually and independently of our concept animality is not rationality, and before the operation of the mind the predication is true: The animality of Socrates is not his rationality. On the one hand it

approaches real distinction, because it exists actually from the nature of the thing; on the other hand it approaches rational distinction, because animality and rationality, although they are two formalities distinct by their own nature, are not however two things in Socrates, but one thing. It is rightly said, therefore, to be intermediate between real distinction and rational distinction. The Scotists place this distinction between divine attributes (4) and between metaphysical degrees. Metaphysical degrees, however, are the series of essential predicates in one individual which are ordered by way of a ladder (1) Cf. Logic, pp. 264, ss. (2) « In this operation there can be no error, because neither one denies nor affirms: so that there is nothing clearer than this axiom of the School: He who makes a precision does not make a lie: abstinentium non est mendacium. » Bossuert, Logique, I. I. c. XXIII. (3) Many think that this distinction is not from Scotus himself, but was introduced by his disciples; for Scotus places between divine attributes the same distinction which St. Bonaventure calls of reason. Cf. Sco- ren, III Sent., dist. 2., q. 7, nn. 43 and 44. (4) Cf. Cajet. Comm. de ente et essentia, c. VI, q. XII. ——— Page 417 ———

XV. — Second conclusion: The distinction which exists between metaphysical degrees is not real and independent of the operation of the mind, but only virtual. Metaphysical degrees are proportioned to the form from which they arise and of which they are formalities, and therefore are in the being itself as they are in the form from which they proceed. But in the form from which they proceed they are not really distinguished. The minor is clear from what has been said in II. P . Natural Philosophy, where it was shown that there is in man a single soul, and a single form, namely the rational soul, by reason of which man is not only a man, but also animal, living, body, substance, and being (1). Therefore, if metaphysical degrees: man, animal, living, body, substance, being are really one in form, they must be really one in man himself. They are distinguished, however, virtually. For, just as a hexagon contains a pentagon and a tetragon and exceeds them, so one intellective soul contains and exceeds

the sensitive and vegetative; and thus it provides a foundation for distinguishing in man the intellective, sensitive, and vegetative, in such a way that one can be conceived without the other being understood. By the very fact that one thing is equivalent to several, it can be understood according as it is equivalent to one, without considering the other, and then according as it agrees with the other, without considering the first. XVI. — Objection: Contradictories are veri fied of metaphysical degrees. But, for contradictories to be verified, a real distinction is required. Therefore there is a real distinction between metaphysical degrees. Resp. 1°: With the major granted, I deny the minor; for, as was said above, a distinction of reason suffices to remove contradiction, n. IX. Resp. 2°: Distinguish the major: Contradictories are veri fied of metaphysical degrees dependently on the operation of the mind, I grant; independently of the operation of the mind, I deny. Contradistinguish the minor: For contradictories to be verified independently of the operation of the mind, a real distinction is required, I grant; otherwise, I deny. And I deny the consequence (2). (1) Cf. vol. II, pp. 486, ss.; pp. 422, ss. — On that Scotistic doctrine, one may read A. VACANT, Etudes comparées sur la philosophie de S. Thomas d' Aquin et sur celle de Duns Scot, pp. 20, ss. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 13, a.4, ad 2, q. 76, a. 3 ; GOUIN, Meto pAgo., q. 2, a. 2. § 1 ; Card. MERCER, n. 79; DOMET DE VORGES, c. VIII ——— Page 418 ——— 1. — On the threefold truth. In Logic we distinguished a threefold truth: formal, which is the conformity of the intellect with the object; transcendental, which is the truth of being itself; moral, which is the conformity of signs or words with the mind's sentiment. Concerning logical truth we have treated sufficiently elsewhere; the discussion, therefore, is about metaphysical truth. What does it imply and in what does it consist? II. — The truth of being implies formally an order or conformity to the intellect. When something is per se first such, others are not such except by order to it. But the intellect is per se first true. Therefore all other things are called true by order to the intellect. The major is an axiom, which is clear enough.

For when something is per se first such, it is as it were the chief analogate in that genus; therefore other things cannot be called such except by order to that chief. Thus, because health is per se first in an animal, other things are denominated healthy by order to the animal. Proof of the minor, namely that the intellect is per se first true, or (1) One may consult Aristotle II Metaphys. c. 1, and VI Metaphys. c. 3. In these, however, he treats rather of the truth of cognition. Hence Domet De Vorges (op. cit.) holds that the notion of transcendental truth is of Christian origin « The notion of transcendent truth seems to us to have a Christian and Platonic origin. » — Consult S. Au- gustius, Solilog., I. II, c. 5, De vera Religione, c. 36; S. Axelimus, cc. 7- 11, Monolog., c. 31-36, Brevisio. i. f., c. 6; S. Thomas, I. Senz. dist. 17, and dist. 39, I. p. q. 16 Qo. De Peru. S. Bonaventur and Scotus in Senz.; Carneolus, dist. 19, q. 3, nov. Edit., t. II, pp. 157, ss.; Cajetanus, Banne, in I. P . q. 16; Suarez, disp. 8; Alamannus, IV P . Meta- phys., q. 17; and more recent Scholastics: Sanservirino, Ziolara, Lepid, Mercier, Domet De Voros, and Pioeus, Comment. Semine Theolo- gique, e°c.

the thing itself is fundamental. ——— Page 420 ———

cognition is said to be true only insofar as it is conformed to the thing. Hence the axiom: The truth of natural things is posterior to the divine intellect, posterior to the created intellect. — Arti ficial things, however, have a per se order to the intellect of the artificer; for they ——— Page 421 ———

(2) To this belong the definitions of truth given by S. Augustine: Truth is that by which what is is shown (De vera Relig., c. 36), and by S. Hilary: Truth as declarative or manifestative of being (De Trinit., lib. 5, ante med.). (3) 8. Thomas, I. Cont. Gent., c. 60. ——— Page 422 ———

1° All things are true from eternity according to the truth of the divine mind. For truth is the adequation of intellect and thing. But from eternity the divine intellect and things are adequate.

For although things do not yet exist, there is nevertheless an adequation; for in the commensuration of intellect and thing it is not required that both extremes actually exist. Thus our intellect is adequate to future things, which however are not yet in act, as when we say: Antichrist will be born. Hence this is denominated true by the truth which is in the intellect only, even when the thing itself does not exist. Similarly, the divine intellect could have been adequate from eternity to those things which were not from eternity, but were made in time, and thus those things which are in time can be denominated true from eternity by eternal truth. (1) S. Thomas, q. 1, De Veri., a. 5. (2) Cf. I. P . q. 16, a. 6. (3) Ibid., aa. 7 and 8. ——— Page 423 ——— 2eTruth is immutable with respect to the divine intellect. For since truth is the adequation of intellect and thing, it can be varied either on the part of the intellect, from the fact that someone takes a different opinion about a thing remaining in the same state, or on the part of the thing, if the opinion remaining the same, the thing is changed. If, therefore, there is some intellect in which there cannot be an alternation of opinions or whose acceptation no thing, no change of a thing, escapes, in it there is immutable truth. But the divine intellect is of this kind. Therefore its truth is immutable. Created truth, however, which we find in things and in the created intellect, is not properly eternal, since the thing or intellect in which it inheres is not from eternity. It can, however, be said to be eternal in another respect, because the truth of essences prescinds from all time; likewise it is said to be immutable, insofar as there is an invariable and necessary connection between essential predicates (1). XII. — In what way the truth of things is measure and measured. The Angelic Doctor excellently and elegantly explains the matter (2): « Natural things, from which our intellect receives knowledge, measure our intellect, as is said in X. Metaphys., but they are measured by the divine intellect, in which all created things are, just as all artifacts are in the intellect of the artificer. Thus, therefore, the divine intellect is measuring, not measured; but a natural thing is measuring and measured; but our

intellect is measured, not measuring natural things indeed, but only artificial ones. » A natural thing, therefore, placed between two intellects, is called true according to adequation to both. For according to adequation to the divine intellect, it is called true, insofar as it fulfills that to which it is ordered by the divine intellect. According to adequation to the human intellect, however, a thing is called true because it is apt to form a true estimation of itself. » The first notion of truth, however, is inherent in a thing before the second, (1) To this pertains proposition 58 condemned by the S. R. and U. Inquisition by the decree « Lamentabili sane exitu » 3 July 1907: « Truth is no more immutable than man, since it evolves with him, in him, and through him. » (2) Q. 1. De Veri. a. 2. because the comparison to the divine intellect is prior to the human. Hence, even if the human intellect did not exist, things would still be called true in order to the divine intellect; but, if both intellects, which is impossible, were understood to be removed, in no way would the notion of truth remain.»
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ARTICLE FIVE.

of the will with divine reason. II. — False is opposed to true not contradictorily, nor privatively, but contrarily. Contradiction is pure negation without a subject, namely it posits nothing nor determines a subject for itself, and for this reason it can be said both of being and of non-being, such as non-seeing and non- sitting. Privation is negation in a subject: it posits nothing real, but determines a subject for itself, namely the subject to which such a perfection is due. A contrary, however, since it is between two positive extremes, both posits something and determines a subject. But the false determines a subject and posits something in the subject: for, just as truth posits an adequate acceptation of the thing, so falsity posits a non-adequate or difform acceptation of the thing. Therefore falsity is opposed to truth not contradictorily, not privatively, but contrarily. III. — Falsity simply is not found in things depending on God, except in voluntary things, in which moral falsity can exist: but falsity in a certain respect can be in things by order to our intellect. (1) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 17, and his interpreters already cited.

a true tragedian is a false Hector, as Augustine says (1). The tragedian truly has the being of a tragedian; according to this he is, therefore he can be called true; but he does not have the very being of Hector; according to this he is not, therefore he is called false. — In another way, a thing is said to be false by way of cause, insofar as it is apt to produce a false opinion of itself; which can happen thus: Since our cognition arises from sense, which concerns accidents, we judge things from external accidents. Therefore, when some things in external accidents have a likeness to other things, they are said to be false according to those things. Thus tin has external accidents similar to the external accidents of silver: hence it can sometimes produce in us a false opinion that it is silver, and so tin is said to be false silver. In this example the axiom is also verified: A thing according to what it is is said to be true, according to what it is not is said to be false. Tin truly has the being of tin: according to this it is, and is called true; it does not have the being of

silver: according to this it is not, and is called false. Therefore true tin is false silver, just as a true tragedian is a false Hector. IV. — On logical falsity. This is the non-adequation of the intellect with the thing. It is properly had in judgment. Per se it never underlies apprehension; per accidens, however, it can underlie complex apprehension (2). Falsity, or error, however, is never present in cognition except under the influence of the will. For the intellect is determined to assent either by an evident object or by the will. But false cannot be an evident object which draws the intellect to assent. Other things which concern the truth and falsity of cognition are required in Log. Maj. Tract. II. (1) On the causes of error cf. Logic, pp. 253-254. ——— Page 426 ——— 1. — The de finition of good. The definition of good given by the Philosopher is celebrated: Good is what all things desire. Good is described from its effect, which is to move appetite, just as motive power is usually manifested by motion. All things. The meaning is not: nothing is good unless it is desired by all, as if all beings desired all good; on the contrary, it is certain that each thing desires a good proportioned to itself; but it is intended: all things desire some good and nothing is desired except because it is good and under the aspect in which it is good. Nor is the objection valid concerning some who desire evil; because they do not desire evil except under the aspect of good, insofar as they consider it good, and their intention is per se directed to good, but per accidens falls upon evil (2). Desire. A threefold appetite is distinguished: innate, which is the inclination of each thing to its own perfection; sensitive, following sensitive cognition; intellective, following the cognition of the intellect. When it is said: what all things desire, it is to be understood of every appetite, whether natural, sensitive, or intellectual. Natural things tend by natural appetite to good, not that they know good, but because they are moved to good by some knower, namely by the ordination of the divine intellect, in the way an arrow tends to the target from the direction of the archer. 1. — The de finition of good. The definition of good given by the Philosopher is celebrated:

Good is what all things desire. Good is described from its effect, which is to move appetite, just as motive power is usually manifested by motion. All things. The meaning is not: nothing is good unless it is desired by all, as if all beings desired all good; on the contrary, it is certain that each thing desires a good proportioned to itself; but it is intended: all things desire some good and nothing is desired except because it is good and under the aspect in which it is good. Nor is the objection valid concerning some who desire evil; because they do not desire evil except under the aspect of good, insofar as they consider it good, and their intention is per se directed to good, but per accidens falls upon evil (2). Desire. A threefold appetite is distinguished: innate, which is the inclination of each thing to its own perfection; sensitive, following sensitive cognition; intellective, following the cognition of the intellect. When it is said: what all things desire, it is to be understood of every appetite, whether natural, sensitive, or intellectual. Natural things tend by natural appetite to good, not that they know good, but because they are moved to good by some knower, namely by the ordination of the divine intellect, in the way an arrow tends to the target from the direction of the archer. (1) Cf. ARNSTOT. I. Ethic. and V. Metaphys. : S. AQUINISTUS. De Doctri- na christiania, lib. I, c. 32, P . L. XXXIV, 32, and De Trinit. lib. VIII, c. 3, P . L. XLII, 949 ; BONTIUS. De Hebdomad., circa

med., P . L., LXIV, 1312, ss.; DIONYSIUS. De divin. nomin. c. 3, P . G., III, 679, c. 5, 815 ; 8. THOMAS, q. 21. De Veritat., and I. P . q. 5 ; CAJETANUS, BANKER, PÉQUES, in h. L. SUAREZ, disp. 10 ; ALAMANUS, q. 19 ; and more recent Scholastics cited above; COUSIN. Du Vrai, du Beau, du Bien. (2) S. THOMAS, I. Ethic., lect. 6. A di fficulty could be raised against the aforesaid definition. For just as good implies an order to appetite, so truth implies an order to intellect and cognition. But truth is not defined as: What all things know. Therefore good should not be defined as: What all things desire. Resp. : There is a great disparity. Truth cannot imply an order to all things, but only to those which can receive beings in an intentional mode and attract them

to themselves: for cognition is perfected through an intentional species by virtue of which the known is drawn to the knower. Good, on the contrary, can imply an order to all things, because appetite is drawn to the thing itself, and the appetition is terminated in the thing according to its real being. Moreover, all beings can receive some being, namely some natural perfection. Wherefore good, which perfects appetite, can be said of all things in some way. Hence good is rightly defined as what all things desire, although truth cannot be defined as what all things know. II. — The notion of transcendental good consists in the perfection of a thing itself insofar as this perfection implies an order to appetite. Since good is what all things desire, the goodness of a thing consists in its appetibility. But the appetibility of a thing is nothing other than the perfection of the thing itself implying an order to appetite. Therefore transcendental goodness consists in the perfection of a thing itself, insofar as it implies an order to appetite. The minor is declared. Nothing is appetible unless it suits appetite. Moreover, nothing truly suits appetite unless it in some way perfects it, just as, conversely, something is said to be unsuitable to a thing because it places some imperfection in it. Therefore appetibility is the perfection of a thing itself implying an order to appetite. Moreover, nothing is perfective of another unless it is perfect in itself; for nothing gives what it in no way has in itself. Hence good signifies being as perfect in itself and perfective of another. Being perfect in itself relates to good presuppositively; but what is properly constitutive of good, or formal, is being perfective of another, namely appetite. Cajetan (and, after him, Suarez, Card. Zigliara) distinguishes a twofold appetibility: fundamental and formal. Fundamental appetibility is the very notion by which being becomes appetible. ——— Page 427 ———

in some relation, or connotation. The third, which is that of Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Bannez, and many Thomists, teaches that goodness consists primarily and per se in some absolute nature, or perfection; secondarily, however, and consequently but necessarily, in a relation to appetite. We

choose the last. Against the first, it is argued: Good cannot be placed in a purely absolute nature, for it relates to appetite as the visible to sight, the intelligible to the intellect. Moreover, the visible and the intelligible do not signify something purely absolute, but imply a relation to sight and intellect. Therefore neither can good be something merely absolute, but necessarily implies some relation. Against the second: Good necessarily, primarily, and principally implies the perfection by virtue of which it becomes appetible, or suitable to appetite. But a relation according to itself does not express perfection, but only a mere respect. Therefore the formal constitutive of good is not a relation. The last opinion remains. Good, as the object of appetite,

good (3). VI. — On being simply and good simply. This distinction of reason su ffices so that being simply and good simply are taken in entirely different significations. Since being implies that something is properly in act, and act properly implies an order to potency, by this something is said to be being simply by which it is first discerned from what is only in potency. But something is first discerned from a being in potency through substantial being: (1) On this matter, consult Card. MEBCHEN, n. 122. — Let what has been said elsewhere concerning the twofold order, dynamic and teleological, which prevails in the world, be recalled. Vol. II, pp. 37-38. (2) Cf. S. THOMAS, I. P . q. 5, a. 3. (3) Ibid. a. 2. for each thing is properly placed in act through its substantial being. Therefore through its substantial being each thing is said to be being simply; but through superadded acts it is said to be being in a certain respect. Thus, being quantified, being white, comes to an already existing thing, but does not remove the thing from a state of potency simply so called. Therefore it cannot be called being simply, but only being in a certain respect. Being simply, therefore, has the notion of first being. But good implies the notion of perfect, which is appetible. Perfect, however, which according to etymology is the same as totally in act, designates that to which nothing is lacking according to the proper act of its nature; consequently it

implies the notion of the ultimate. Hence that which is ultimately perfect is said to be good simply; but what does not have the ultimate perfection which it ought to have, although it has some perfection insofar as it is in act, is not called perfect simply nor good simply, but in a certain respect. Thus, therefore, according to first being, which is substantial, something is said to be being simply, and good in a certain respect, that is insofar as it is being; but according to ultimate act, something is said to be being in a certain respect, and good simply (1). Now, the ultimate perfection is the ultimate end; then only will a creature be simply good when it attains its ultimate end and enjoys it. This end, however, cannot be obtained in the present life. Therefore no mortal can be called good and perfect simply. The Blessed, on the contrary, are simply perfect, since they are immovably established in the end. In another sense, being simply can designate what is absolutely, a being from itself; and good simply what is absolutely good and without limit. In which sense, good simply is good by essence, and in this acceptation no one is good except God alone; but good in a certain respect designates good by participation and emanating from another. (1) Ibid., a. 1, ad. 1. — « It is therefore true, as Boethius wished, that things are not said to be and to be good in the same way or according to the same reality, if it concerns being and being good, in the pure and simple sense: being, indeed, concerns substantial being, while being good concerns the completion of being by the presence of all that, even accidentally, contributes to its perfection. » P . Pécuves, O.P . Comm. Som- me Théol., t. I, 1 175.